Middle East Policy最新文献

This article argues protest and violence between 2013 and 2019 both strengthened Turkey's competitive authoritarian regime in the short term and significantly weakened it over time. Crises in liberal democracy create opportunities for illiberal populists to build tightly bounded, vertical networks of supporters, but public disruptions can reconfigure such informal structures and allow new opposition networks to emerge. Using process tracing, the study shows how President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's attempts at building a dominant, religious-nationalist community failed in the face of the 2013 protests in Istanbul and the violence around the 2015 national elections. These, in turn, altered the ruling party's vertical network. In Istanbul, the opposition took advantage of these changes to create a more pluralistic network and win the 2019 mayoral vote. After a narrow loss in the 2023 presidential contest, the opposition parties ran separately in the 2024 local elections and triumphed, pointing toward a post-Erdoğan party system. Attention to both government and opposition networks and how they change helps illustrate the dynamics of illiberal populist regimes.

Hamas's al-Aqsa Flood operation, Israel's brutal response, and the regional escalation of the conflict, including Iran's and Israel's unprecedented strikes on each other's territory, mark a critical juncture for the Middle East. These events have brought a renewed focus on the Levant as a key area of Iranian geopolitical interest and rivalry with Israel. Syria and the broader subregion are viewed by Tehran as vital for its national security and that of its alliance network, the Axis of Resistance, and for the survival of the regime. This article explores Iran's policy toward the Levant, focusing on Syria as the crucible of Iran's engagement with the region over the last decade. The study highlights how Iran's approach is defined by its continued desire to maintain its projection of strategic depth, thus ensuring its own security and that of the Axis of Resistance. Israel looms large over this calculus as the Islamic Republic looks to strengthen its allies’ positions against its enduring rival.

Some observers expected that the 2023 general elections in Turkey would end the long rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while others anticipated his narrow victory. But it takes more than results at the ballot box for Turkish democracy to flourish in the medium term. Instead, we must focus on the underlying political structure, especially the constitution and its making. This study examines the social and political forces that have shaped Turkey's constitutions, from the Ottoman Empire through today. The analysis shows that top-down constitutional processes only create advantages for the incumbent power, and they are symptomatic of weak democratic traditions. The most common use of constitutional revisions has been to serve the needs of the political elite at the time, without any long-term objectives or broadly based political discourse among governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders. Therefore, Turkey has not been able to break the cycle of authoritarianism, even through seemingly democratic constitutional revisions. The study concludes that the future of the constitution is not bright. Given Erdoğan's narrow victory in the 2023 elections and setbacks in the recent municipal voting, revisions in the near term will seek to shore up the power of the ruling Justice and Development Party.

The unexpected victory of the opposition Republican People's Party in Turkey's March 31 municipal elections raises intriguing questions about the future of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after more than two decades of his rule. Just 10 months after Erdoğan won a new term, a significant portion of the electorate voted against him and his Justice and Development Party, marking his largest defeat ever. The president acknowledged the significance of the defeat, describing the results as “not only a loss of votes but also a loss of soul and blood.” This article analyzes the factors that drove the outcome and contends that this was more a protest of the Turkish strongman than an approval of opposition policies. The people voted against Erdoğan's arrogance and authoritarian style, as well as the poor quality of his party's candidates; the worsening economy, especially for retirees; and perceptions of a deteriorating justice system. The main opposition party also benefited from skillful leadership less than a year after its defeat in the presidential election. While the outcome of the 2024 vote signals a desire for democratic governance and accountability, it remains uncertain at this early stage whether this is a temporary deviation.

Since the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, Israel's reactions have been met with criticism from a key friend: Russia. However, Moscow's public condemnation of the humanitarian crisis has not changed its material or normative policies toward Israel in other respects. This article analyzes Russia-Israel relations, especially concerning the Syrian conflict between 2015 and 2021. It demonstrates how the two states developed norms and structural practices—including regular meetings of elites, public statements, and other mechanisms—to mitigate disputes. These strategies created and sustained a friendship balance that prevented rivalry and escalation between the two. This process has helped them maintain their relationship during the recent spike of violence despite increasing strains.

The ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 marked a turning point in Egypt's modern history. The long-persecuted Muslim Brotherhood immediately became a key political player, and its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, won election to lead the country. But despite those two years of popular engagement and victories at the ballot box, Morsi was ousted and the movement banished once again after a confrontation with the military in July 2013. Why did the Brotherhood choose to risk a conflict with the armed forces and not seek a compromise? This article contends that the decision was driven by the Muslim Brotherhood's long history of persecution, its broad base of support, its impressive successes after Mubarak fell, and its fear of losing the presidency. These set the Brotherhood on a course of action that suited its experiences and preferences. This path led the movement to ignore several facts suggesting it must seek to coordinate with the armed forces: The Brotherhood and the military did not enjoy cordial relations after Morsi's election in 2012; the movement's grassroots power was substantial, but there was no evidence it could prevail over the military's demand for Morsi to step down; and the military maintained its internal cohesion. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's historical path guided its decision to avoid cooperation.