Middle East Policy最新文献

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has developed an unlikely but pragmatic ally in expanding his hold on state power: the armed forces. This article shows how Erdoğan fundamentally restructured and curbed the military's power after the failed coup attempt of 2016. These reforms divided the army, empowered the police-like gendarmerie, and placed civilian authorities squarely in control of both. The study analyzes the use of the gendarmerie inside Turkey, and the army outside, as the government battled the Covid-19 outbreak and tried to assist foreign countries in their fights against the pandemic. This use of hard power bolstered the government's soft power, strengthening the Erdoğan regime. The case demonstrates the effectiveness of Turkey's new civil-military relations and indicates that we should expect to see the state continue to leverage its military capacity to solve problems at home and abroad.

Right-wing politics has increased its potency around the world, especially in Turkey, which has experienced a two-decade reign of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). One of the most important instruments the AKP has used to gain and maintain power is the discourse of resentment. This emotional language features an appeal to a populist sense of the nation's rising above dangers posed by the elite and the bureaucracy. This article examines Turkey's right-wing politics, showing how and why leaders have created and deployed the resentment discourse. Analyzing the historical-social context of this instrument of power will help us understand the rise of the right. Even though Erdoğan's party suffered a setback in the spring 2024 municipal elections, the politics of resentment is still effective and allows the party to extend its success in national contests.

China's interests have expanded rapidly in the Middle East since the turn of the century, and it is now the leading trade partner for many states in the region. The unrest sparked by the war between Israel and Hamas, including the Red Sea shipping crisis that imperils global trade, threatens those interests. The perceived absence of deep Chinese participation in trying to resolve these emergencies contrasts with previous peacekeeping efforts and raises questions about Beijing's willingness to take part in global-security initiatives. This article analyzes variations in Chinese decision making on the use of force and diplomacy in the Middle East. Based on publicly available data, an examination of sources in English and Chinese, and interviews previously conducted in China, we develop a three-pronged typology that explains Chinese strategic behavior in the region: military engagement, perceived free riding, and diplomacy. The article contributes to the literatures of security studies, Chinese foreign and military policy, and the security of the Middle East.

There have been protracted negotiations in Vienna to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or nuclear deal, that Iran signed in 2015 but was suspended by the withdrawal of the United States four years later. This article argues that two factors account for the failure to renew the JCPOA. One is the 2021 change of presidency in Iran from the reformist Hassan Rouhani to the conservative Ebrahim Raisi. The other is the transformed international environment that provided Iran with opportunities to align with China and Russia. While it suited Iran to continue the nuclear talks to minimize the risk of more punitive actions, Tehran has recalculated its interests and taken a hard line on a potential new deal. The process has grown more complicated with Israel's war in Gaza, the conflict's possible expansion across the region, and the election of a new Iranian president. The analysis concludes that Iran is unlikely to return to the JCPOA.

For nearly 20 years, nongovernmental organizations backing the Palestinian cause have promoted both “differentiation” and the better-known strategy of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS). Differentiation is the practice of distinguishing between Israel and the occupied territories, terminating contracts with actors—irrespective of nationality—that contribute to and benefit from occupation-related activities, and seeking to promote Palestinian investments and exports. This strategy is fundamentally different from BDS, which targets not just the occupation but the Israeli state and its national entities. However, this article finds that laws and proposed legislation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel do not delineate between Israel and Israeli-controlled territory, blurring the line between differentiation and BDS as tools to support Palestine. The evidence shows that courts have mostly ruled against differentiation practices, thus allowing harsh campaigns that impose heavy burdens on NGOs. These costs are both direct, through legal proceedings, and indirect in that they restrict the space for humanitarian action and delegitimize groups that employ differentiation. The study considers whether this constitutes lawfare, defined by experts as the exploitation “of the law of armed conflict to achieve tactical and strategic goals.”

This study examines Israel's failure to prevent Black October, the Hamas invasion that killed more than 1,100 people and sparked the Gaza war. The article synthesizes literatures of security and intelligence to advance three levels at which we must analyze Israel's missteps. The first is the intelligence level, where the state assessed threats. The second is operational, where officials devised military and security solutions, such as relying on technology to police the border with the Gaza Strip. The third level is political-diplomatic, where the government pursued regional normalization agreements without focusing on solutions to the Palestinian file. Failures at all three levels were intertwined. The examination of these cascading mistakes opens a window into the interactions within and across these levels among military and civilian decision makers, and it suggests how they should be addressed going forward.