Middle East Policy最新文献

The dynamics of the relationship between the United States and China have been shifting. This has prompted changes in strategic calculus and policy adoption by the friends and foes of each side. Iran, given its decades-long links with China, has made several. First, it has deepened its ties with the Asian power beyond collaboration in business and trade. Second, it has revised its policies in the Gulf region to be a part of what it sees as China's network of influence, hoping to better position itself in a multilateral global order. Third, it has been seeking opportunities to project power through showing off its military capabilities in Ukraine. This article examines these strategic responses and concludes that Iran has been pursuing an agenda in line with the world vision of its senior leaders. The end goal for Tehran is to gain more power and relevance in the global strategic calculus. This analysis is part of a special issue examining the responses of Gulf countries to rising Sino-American competition, edited by Andrea Ghiselli, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Enrico Fardella.

With its thriving economy, well-crafted policies, diverse and lively multicultural society, and advanced infrastructure, the United Arab Emirates plays a significant role in the Middle East. It has become strategically and economically important to both the United States and China, and both countries have established strong strategic partnerships with the Gulf state. As the UAE is a small yet ambitious state, both powers are crucial to its strategy for maintaining security and diversifying its economy. Thus, to secure its interests, the UAE has adopted a strategy of balancing its relationships with Washington and Beijing. This article examines the strategy and aims to predict its direction in light of the increasing competition and rivalry between the two global powers. The analysis is part of a special issue examining the responses of Gulf countries to rising Sino-American competition, edited by Andrea Ghiselli, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Enrico Fardella.

This essay argues that the recent protests in Iran, ostensibly driven by the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, are a symbol of a far greater dissatisfaction with arbitrary rule, corruption, and incompetence. While compulsory veiling was the immediate cause, the main drivers are the ailing economy and the decline in public services. Given the depth and breadth of street protests and the ongoing civil disobedience, the Islamic Republic simply cannot return to business as usual. At the same time, the regime is incapable of reinventing itself. It faces political and socioeconomic constraints and a mix of demographic and environmental challenges, among others. As for whether outside pressure can help protesters, the West must balance its championing of the movement with its pursuit of diplomatic engagement on Iran's nuclear program. And Iran is now getting more international assistance by looking eastward to China and Russia. With the government and security forces willing to use violence against protesters, civil disobedience may be the only method to systematically challenge the ruling order.

This essay contextualizes the 2023 Israel-Hamas war within a century-old legal history of Palestinian dispossession that has been facilitated through the violation and misuse of international law. It argues that Hamas's attacks of October 7 were not simply driven by sanguinary hatred of Jews, as some commentators have suggested. Instead, the war crimes were motivated by the Palestinians’ disillusionment with an international system that has consistently denied them their right to self-determination. This has been exacerbated by Israel's criminalization of nonviolent resistance. Such historical perspective illuminates the underlying causes not just of the present war but of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the development of an international nuclear security regime. States are expected to adopt legislation and institutionalize measures to ensure cooperation among stakeholders and create their own national nuclear security regimes. This article evaluates the steps taken by Turkey, a newcomer in nuclear energy. It argues that while Ankara has acted in line with its traditional conception of security, this is not enough. The inadequate cooperation and coordination among stakeholders, and the insufficient development of a security culture specifically oriented to nuclear energy, leave the country vulnerable. The analysis explains the vulnerabilities and incomplete tasks, and proposes actions necessary for Turkey to create a sound national nuclear security regime.

Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a growing interest in the terrorism problem, in general, and the strategy of suicide bombing, in particular. Between 1996 and 2016, Turkey experienced several deadly suicide attacks by groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. These attacks can be explained by individual-oriented, institutional, socio-psychological/economical/identity, and structural theories. However, a central question now is why there have been no suicide attacks since 2016—that is, until the attempted bombing of the Ministry of the Interior on October 1, 2023. This article advances five main reasons for this success: a shift in Turkey's antiterrorism strategy, the introduction of new technologies, terror groups’ concerns about losing legitimacy among supporters, the failure of these organizations to achieve their objectives through suicide terrorism, and changes in Turkey's external environment. The article concludes that, as the October 1 attack demonstrates, the renewal of suicide terrorism is likely, given Ankara's sole focus on the institutional and international/structural aspects of the problem, which does not allow enough attention on individual and sociological factors.

A small state with big ambitions, the United Arab Emirates has become a major player in the Middle East region, especially since the Arab Spring. It played a major role in weakening the Muslim Brotherhood by supporting rulers like Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt and would-be leaders such as General Khalifa Haftar of Libya. Abu Dhabi was the critical player behind the blockade of Qatar in 2017, and it has taken a leading role in the normalization of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This article employs a range of theoretical perspectives, including structural realism and liberalism, to explain the UAE's foreign policy and behavior. It argues that there are at least four major drivers: combating political Islam, containing Iran, dominating regional ports and waterways, and increasing economic prosperity.