Research in Economics最新文献

This paper studies the effect of deep recessions on intergenerational inequality by quantifying the welfare effects on households at different phases of the life cycle. Deep recessionary episodes are characterized by large declines in the prices of real and financial assets and in employment. The former levies high welfare costs on older households who own financial wealth, the latter determines labour income losses and destroys the human capital of younger cohorts, lowering their productivity. The paper extends previous analyses in the literature by including permanent labour income losses in an OLG model calibrated to match the Great Recession. The analysis shows that younger households lose more than double of all other living cohorts, as younger household become unemployed and experience a decline in their future income. The dynamics of households’ consumption and portfolio composition between 2007 and 2013 in the US are consistent with the predictions of the model.

We study in a Stackelberg industry the licensing of a product that embodies an innovation (quality-improving product) whose owner may be the firm that plays as a leader or a follower in setting output in the the product market. We find that the innovation is transferred (and social welfare is reduced) if its owner is the market-leader firm. However, if the innovation is in the hands of the market-follower firm, it is not licensed, even though licensing would be welfare enhancing. Thus, subsidizing R&D with the mandatory licensing of the resulting innovation may be a socially desirable policy.

Does the maturity of debt matter for productivity? Using data on Italian firms from 1997 to 2015, we study the relationship among debt maturity, productivity, and firm characteristics. We find that productivity is positively associated with short-term debt and negatively associated with long-term debt. This result supports the hypothesis that the less intense monitoring of firm performance and fewer liquidation fears stemming from the long maturity of debt causes a moral hazard, while short-term debt serves as a disciplinary device to improve firm performance in the short run. This effect is evident in small- and medium-sized enterprises and old firms. In contrast, large firms can utilize long-term financing to improve productivity through long-term investments. Firms improve productivity by purchasing intangible assets financed by short-term debt.

In this paper we apply a clustering procedure to detect trend changes in macroeconomic data, focusing on the GDP time series for the G-7 countries. A finite mixture of regression models is considered to show different patterns and changes in GDP slopes over time in the long-trend component. Two popular trend-cycle decompositions (i.e., Beveridge and Nelson Decomposition and Hodrick and Prescott filter) are considered in a preliminary step of the analysis to stress the differences between the two methods in terms of the inferred clustering, if any. This approach can be used also to detect structural breaks or change points and it is an alternative to existing approaches in a probabilistic framework. We also discuss international changes in the GDP distribution for the G-7 countries, highlighting similarities, e.g., in break dates, aiming at adding more insights on the economic integration among countries. Our findings suggest that by looking at changes in slope over time a mixture of regression models is able to detect change points, also compared with alternative procedures.

Every firm in differentiated oligopoly offers a product that is different from that of rival firms. Similarly, in general, a firm interfaces with consumers and interacts with rival firms on the market. As a result, both the firm and consumers experience information asymmetry. In practice, a firm is a risk taker in its dealings with rival firms and is a risk averter in its interface with consumers. However, firms utilize intangible investments (non-price strategies) to convey the value of their product to consumers and stabilize their market share. Note that consumers are risk averse and ignore such attempts by a firm once they recognize the intrinsic value of the product. These two features explain the frequency and depth of the supply fluctuations that have not been acknowledged so far. This study offers a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon along with the steady state behavior in a synthetic manner.

“With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of production activity.”- Knight (1957, p.267)

This paper constructs a stylized model of election between two opportunistic candidates who can influence equilibrium policy platforms in exchange for monetary contributions provided by two distinct lobby groups. Two key features are embedded which give rise to a dual uncertainty in the model: the existence of partisan spread across voter groups as well as the embezzlement of campaign funds received by the electoral candidates from the interest groups. We derive and compare the equilibrium platforms of the two office-seeking candidates in three scenarios: none of the above uncertainties exist (benchmark case), only uncertainty about voters’ preferences exist (swing-voter case), and both the uncertainties exist (swing voters and lobby groups case). We find that an opportunistic candidate’s swing-voter tax platform is always lower than the benchmark tax platform. Additionally, the equilibrium tax choice of electoral contenders in the swing voters and opposing lobby groups case is found to be greater than the tax level chosen under the swing-voter case if the lobby group advocating a greater level of tax is sufficiently well-organized such that it outweighs the relative swing-voter effect in that group. Furthermore, we find that when an electoral candidate transitions from being highly corrupt to becoming relatively more honest, the equilibrium level of public good provision adjusts in conformity with the well-organized group’s economic preferences. Finally, if the strength of relative lobbying effect is weaker, a lower partisan bias within that group induces an electoral candidate to choose a tax platform closer to that group’s policy bliss point.

This paper examines which types of firms, from a developed country (DC) or a less developed country (LDC), tend to practice dumping, using a two-market equilibrium analysis of trade in similar products. Specifically, we present a vertical product differentiation model of duopolistic competition between a DC firm and an LDC firm under free trade to show that the DC firm sells a higher-quality product without dumping. In contrast, the LDC firm sells a lower-quality product and practices dumping in the DC market by charging a price lower than the product's price in the LDC's local market. In response to the LDC dumping, the DC government's use of an optimal antidumping duty increases its domestic welfare. The LDC's social welfare may increase if its exporting firm accepts price undertaking rather than dumping. From the perspective of world welfare, defined by aggregating the welfare of the trading countries (DC and LDC), the trade damage measure through imposing antidumping fines on LDC dumping is Pareto-improving compared to free trade (under which dumping takes place) and price undertakings.

Remittances have a wide range of benefits to households and the economy at large. Evidence show that women are the major recipients of remittances in developing countries, consequently this may have the potential of reducing the gender gap in economic outcomes. This study examines the impact of remittances on gender gap in financial inclusion in developing countries. The dataset for the study was built from multiple sources. Based on data availability, the study covers 102 developing countries for three years, namely 2011, 2014 and 2017. The study employs fixed effects instrumental variable technique using the economic conditions of the top five remittance sending countries (proxied by their GDP per capita and employment rate) as instruments. For robustness purpose different measurements of remittances are used in the analysis. Though the study does not provide evidence that remittances impact the overall inequality in access to financial services, the results show that remittances significantly reduce the gender gap in financial inclusion in developing countries. Based on these findings, the study makes appropriate policy recommendations.

This paper studies how an optimal menu chosen by a social planner depends on whether agents receive imperfect signals about their true tastes (imperfect self-knowledge) or the properties of available alternatives (imperfect information). Under imperfect self-knowledge, it is not optimal to offer fewer alternatives than the number of different tastes present in the population, unless noise is infinite (agents have no clue about their true preferences). As noise increases, the social planner offers menu items that are closer together (more similar). However, under imperfect information, as noise increases, it could be optimal to construct a menu with more distinct alternatives, restrict the number of options, or, for some finite noise, offer a single item.