Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1177/00207020231213612
Carter Brundage
Increasingly, both China and the US frame the secure domestic supply of semiconductors as a national security issue. Yet it is difficult to differentiate between the securitization of semiconductors as a national security vulnerability or as an arena for geopolitical competition. This article leverages Barry Buzan's theory of the power-security dilemma to provide a framework for deciphering and decoupling the two countries’ efforts to reduce their semiconductor supply-chain vulnerabilities and related power struggle. First, the US's and China's supply-chain vulnerabilities are explored as a security struggle, with special attention paid to their dependencies on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. Second, recent American efforts to restrict the flow of semiconductor technologies to China are explored as a power struggle. This article concludes by using Buzan's theory to draw conclusions about the origins and potential evolution of the US-China semiconductor power-security dilemma.
{"title":"The US-China Semiconductor Power-Security Dilemma: Decoupling the Security and Power Struggles Through the Theory of Dr. Barry Buzan","authors":"Carter Brundage","doi":"10.1177/00207020231213612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231213612","url":null,"abstract":"Increasingly, both China and the US frame the secure domestic supply of semiconductors as a national security issue. Yet it is difficult to differentiate between the securitization of semiconductors as a national security vulnerability or as an arena for geopolitical competition. This article leverages Barry Buzan's theory of the power-security dilemma to provide a framework for deciphering and decoupling the two countries’ efforts to reduce their semiconductor supply-chain vulnerabilities and related power struggle. First, the US's and China's supply-chain vulnerabilities are explored as a security struggle, with special attention paid to their dependencies on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. Second, recent American efforts to restrict the flow of semiconductor technologies to China are explored as a power struggle. This article concludes by using Buzan's theory to draw conclusions about the origins and potential evolution of the US-China semiconductor power-security dilemma.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"25 5‐6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135392612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1177/00207020231213607
Zachary Paikin
Since Russian president Vladimir Putin's 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, followed by his country's invasion of neighbouring Georgia the ensuing year, Russia has been one of the most powerful and visible challengers of a West-centric conception of international order. This has led to assertions that Russia is a revisionist state. However, such assertions largely gloss over the “intermediate” stages that Russia has occupied between the two extremes of status quo and revisionist power throughout the post–Cold War era. They also reveal an understanding of international order that is mostly uniform. Employing an English School framework, this paper shows how Russia only became a fully revisionist state in the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. And using a theoretical model which outlines the impact of contestation on international society, it outlines the consequences of Russia's recent descent into revisionism for the so-called rules-based international order.
{"title":"The war in Ukraine and the Dawn of Russian Revisionism: An English School Approach","authors":"Zachary Paikin","doi":"10.1177/00207020231213607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231213607","url":null,"abstract":"Since Russian president Vladimir Putin's 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, followed by his country's invasion of neighbouring Georgia the ensuing year, Russia has been one of the most powerful and visible challengers of a West-centric conception of international order. This has led to assertions that Russia is a revisionist state. However, such assertions largely gloss over the “intermediate” stages that Russia has occupied between the two extremes of status quo and revisionist power throughout the post–Cold War era. They also reveal an understanding of international order that is mostly uniform. Employing an English School framework, this paper shows how Russia only became a fully revisionist state in the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. And using a theoretical model which outlines the impact of contestation on international society, it outlines the consequences of Russia's recent descent into revisionism for the so-called rules-based international order.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"54 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135429954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1177/00207020231213601
Ye Xue
This article attempts to comprehend China's foreign policy as the nation takes on the status of a great power. By adopting the Chinese concept of “face” as an analytical tool, my paper illustrates why face as a cultural expression of desire for collective “self-esteem” has been increasingly important to China's current foreign policy, and how the cultural mandate of face informs China's interactions with other nations in order to strive for national self-esteem. It reveals the motivational, cognitive, and behavioural logic behind China's decision to participate in global governance and partnership diplomacy, as well as its use of coercion. The article suggests that China as a great power is neither innately pacifist in maintaining the status quo nor hardwired with revisionist aims to overthrow the existing international order. Instead, its behavioural tendencies largely depend on how other parties can fulfil its desire for face.
{"title":"China as a great power: Reconsidering face culture in Chinese foreign policy","authors":"Ye Xue","doi":"10.1177/00207020231213601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231213601","url":null,"abstract":"This article attempts to comprehend China's foreign policy as the nation takes on the status of a great power. By adopting the Chinese concept of “face” as an analytical tool, my paper illustrates why face as a cultural expression of desire for collective “self-esteem” has been increasingly important to China's current foreign policy, and how the cultural mandate of face informs China's interactions with other nations in order to strive for national self-esteem. It reveals the motivational, cognitive, and behavioural logic behind China's decision to participate in global governance and partnership diplomacy, as well as its use of coercion. The article suggests that China as a great power is neither innately pacifist in maintaining the status quo nor hardwired with revisionist aims to overthrow the existing international order. Instead, its behavioural tendencies largely depend on how other parties can fulfil its desire for face.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"135 11‐12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135392501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1177/00207020231197208
É. Mottet, F. Lasserre, Barthélémy Courmont
L’espace Indo-Pacifique est pour la France une réalité géographique, stratégique et sécuritaire. À ce titre, l’Indo-Pacifique est devenu un des axes prioritaires de l’action internationale de la France à travers une approche cohérente et structurée dont l’objectif est de maintenir un espace Indo-Pacifique libre, ouvert et inclusif, vision que Paris partage avec ses grands partenaires, notamment l’Inde, le Japon et l’ASEAN. Par opposition, l'AUKUS, construit dans le plus grand secret entre trois puissances anglo-saxonnes (États-Unis, Royaume-Uni et Australie). Toutefois, si l’AUKUS reconnaît la valeur stratégique que la France pourrait apporter à l’Indo-Pacifique, il compromet l’ambition de Paris de mettre en place des mini-coalitions innovantes qui empêcheraient l’effet de polarisation résultant d’une rivalité frontale entre Washington et Pékin.
{"title":"La France et l’AUKUS : quelles politiques et quelles limites stratégiques en Indo-Pacifique ?","authors":"É. Mottet, F. Lasserre, Barthélémy Courmont","doi":"10.1177/00207020231197208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231197208","url":null,"abstract":"L’espace Indo-Pacifique est pour la France une réalité géographique, stratégique et sécuritaire. À ce titre, l’Indo-Pacifique est devenu un des axes prioritaires de l’action internationale de la France à travers une approche cohérente et structurée dont l’objectif est de maintenir un espace Indo-Pacifique libre, ouvert et inclusif, vision que Paris partage avec ses grands partenaires, notamment l’Inde, le Japon et l’ASEAN. Par opposition, l'AUKUS, construit dans le plus grand secret entre trois puissances anglo-saxonnes (États-Unis, Royaume-Uni et Australie). Toutefois, si l’AUKUS reconnaît la valeur stratégique que la France pourrait apporter à l’Indo-Pacifique, il compromet l’ambition de Paris de mettre en place des mini-coalitions innovantes qui empêcheraient l’effet de polarisation résultant d’une rivalité frontale entre Washington et Pékin.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"335 - 344"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45695402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1177/00207020231197785
Laxman Kumar Behera
The rollout of AUKUS represents a tectonic shift in the geopolitical rivalry between China and other Indo-Pacific nations. The coming together of three major democratic countries in a strategic technology pact to counter the authoritarian China in the Indo-Pacific could not have come at a more opportune time for India, which is facing increasing Chinese hostility on its northern land borders and strategic encirclement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This article discusses AUKUS's potential impacts on India and examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, its participation in the Quad, and its naval strategy. I argue that, on balance, AUKUS's benefits for India far outweigh its costs.
{"title":"AUKUS and India's Indo-Pacific Strategy","authors":"Laxman Kumar Behera","doi":"10.1177/00207020231197785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231197785","url":null,"abstract":"The rollout of AUKUS represents a tectonic shift in the geopolitical rivalry between China and other Indo-Pacific nations. The coming together of three major democratic countries in a strategic technology pact to counter the authoritarian China in the Indo-Pacific could not have come at a more opportune time for India, which is facing increasing Chinese hostility on its northern land borders and strategic encirclement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This article discusses AUKUS's potential impacts on India and examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, its participation in the Quad, and its naval strategy. I argue that, on balance, AUKUS's benefits for India far outweigh its costs.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"375 - 393"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43666674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1177/00207020231201575
Yui Nishimura, Atsushi Tago
Do shared values make a military partnership attractive to potential member countries and strengthen perceptions of that partnership's deterrent effects? While military cooperation attracts potential members through strategic benefits such as military capabilities, recent security cooperation initiatives like AUKUS emphasize liberal democratic values and human rights as their core values. This study focuses on Japan as a potential member of AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific region and explores how the Japanese public evaluates Japan's future participation in AUKUS and the agreement's anticipated deterrence effects. The results indicate that emphasizing liberal democratic values does not boost support for AUKUS or reinforce a belief in the agreement's ability to deter potential enemies. However, the findings highlight the connection between support for security cooperation and the expansion of membership, irrespective of regime types. In particular, the domestic audience exhibits selective attitudes towards South Korea, a democratic government that should be an important candidate for partnership. These findings suggest a cynical view among third-party audiences regarding the efficacy of shared values in security cooperation, as well as a double standard among the Japanese in shaping new security cooperation in the region.
{"title":"Are Shared Values Valuable? Liberal Democracy and Human Rights among AUKUS and its Future Membership","authors":"Yui Nishimura, Atsushi Tago","doi":"10.1177/00207020231201575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231201575","url":null,"abstract":"Do shared values make a military partnership attractive to potential member countries and strengthen perceptions of that partnership's deterrent effects? While military cooperation attracts potential members through strategic benefits such as military capabilities, recent security cooperation initiatives like AUKUS emphasize liberal democratic values and human rights as their core values. This study focuses on Japan as a potential member of AUKUS in the Indo-Pacific region and explores how the Japanese public evaluates Japan's future participation in AUKUS and the agreement's anticipated deterrence effects. The results indicate that emphasizing liberal democratic values does not boost support for AUKUS or reinforce a belief in the agreement's ability to deter potential enemies. However, the findings highlight the connection between support for security cooperation and the expansion of membership, irrespective of regime types. In particular, the domestic audience exhibits selective attitudes towards South Korea, a democratic government that should be an important candidate for partnership. These findings suggest a cynical view among third-party audiences regarding the efficacy of shared values in security cooperation, as well as a double standard among the Japanese in shaping new security cooperation in the region.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135254700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-01DOI: 10.1177/00207020231195109
Stephanie Carvin, T. Juneau
In September 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced a new security arrangement, dubbed AUKUS, focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear submarines. This caused anxiety in Canada, especially as it emerged that Canadian officials had been caught unaware. In this paper, we argue that AUKUS 1.0 (now increasingly referred to as the first pillar) is not a problem for Canada, despite this early concern: Canada may need to renew its aging submarine fleet, but it is unlikely to acquire nuclear submarines in the foreseeable future. That said, there are broader reasons for Canada to be worried: its exclusion from AUKUS is illustrative of its neglect of foreign, defence, and national security policy more generally. Moreover, as the pact evolves into AUKUS 2.0 (or the second pillar) and broadens its remit to cooperation on emerging defence technologies, Canada's absence from its proliferating working groups risks imposing serious costs.
{"title":"Why AUKUS and not CAUKUS? It's a Potluck, not a Party","authors":"Stephanie Carvin, T. Juneau","doi":"10.1177/00207020231195109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231195109","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced a new security arrangement, dubbed AUKUS, focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear submarines. This caused anxiety in Canada, especially as it emerged that Canadian officials had been caught unaware. In this paper, we argue that AUKUS 1.0 (now increasingly referred to as the first pillar) is not a problem for Canada, despite this early concern: Canada may need to renew its aging submarine fleet, but it is unlikely to acquire nuclear submarines in the foreseeable future. That said, there are broader reasons for Canada to be worried: its exclusion from AUKUS is illustrative of its neglect of foreign, defence, and national security policy more generally. Moreover, as the pact evolves into AUKUS 2.0 (or the second pillar) and broadens its remit to cooperation on emerging defence technologies, Canada's absence from its proliferating working groups risks imposing serious costs.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"359 - 374"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41642838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-31DOI: 10.1177/00207020231197197
H. Mouritzen
The AUKUS deterrence strategy towards China contrasts with the more cooperative EU Indo-Pacific strategy. In Europe, this can be traced to the fact that the UK and France/Germany support different geopolitical world views. European (and possibly Western) cohesion requires that geographical and geo-economic heterogeneities, together with Chinese wedging, are overcome. This can only happen, if at all, if the expensive partner receives a significant “solidarity reward.”
{"title":"Europe: Divided Over AUKUS and China","authors":"H. Mouritzen","doi":"10.1177/00207020231197197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231197197","url":null,"abstract":"The AUKUS deterrence strategy towards China contrasts with the more cooperative EU Indo-Pacific strategy. In Europe, this can be traced to the fact that the UK and France/Germany support different geopolitical world views. European (and possibly Western) cohesion requires that geographical and geo-economic heterogeneities, together with Chinese wedging, are overcome. This can only happen, if at all, if the expensive partner receives a significant “solidarity reward.”","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"454 - 462"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42239349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-31DOI: 10.1177/00207020231198201
Jessi A. J. Gilchrist
Most revisionist scholars would agree that the British Empire was far from a benign actor. It was an extraordinarily brutal and violent one. In her new monograph, Caroline Elkins proposes to deepen our understanding of why British imperialists not only embraced large-scale violent measures, but how they legitimated them over time. Elkins takes the existing revisionist view one step further with the provocative argument that violence was in fact at the very core of liberal imperialist ideology. Legacy of Violence narrows in on exceptional episodes from the mid-eighteenth century onward to show that crises of imperial legitimacy served to justify the increasing use of both physical and epistemological violence in imperial governance. Within the civilizing mission, violence had a particular “moral effect.” For Elkins, it is this combination of reform and repression inherent in liberalism that explains why the British Empire remained so resilient for centuries. The major contribution in Part I, “Imperial Nation,” is to the scholarly debate on Britain’s “first” and “second” empire. Scholars such as C.A. Bayly have argued that Britain’s “first” empire in the pre-nineteenth century Americas embraced the widespread use of violence through enslaved labour and dispossession, but that this violence diminished in the nineteenth century when liberalism emerged at home and the “second” empire took on more grandiose global aims. Elkins counters that the roots of British imperial violence in the twentieth century grew out of nearly two hundred years of ideas, debates, and practices circulating across the empire. Part I begins in 1756 with the well-known story of the Warren Hastings’s impeachment trial for his widespread corruption and misconduct in Bengal. The evolving debate about accountability and legitimacy emerging from this case marked the “beginnings of a consolidated liberal imperialism.” From then on, Britain’s “second” empire repeatedly confronted the question not of how to mitigate state violence, but of how to incorporate it into the rule of law and the principles of good governance.
{"title":"Book Review: Legacy of Violence: A History of the British Empire","authors":"Jessi A. J. Gilchrist","doi":"10.1177/00207020231198201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231198201","url":null,"abstract":"Most revisionist scholars would agree that the British Empire was far from a benign actor. It was an extraordinarily brutal and violent one. In her new monograph, Caroline Elkins proposes to deepen our understanding of why British imperialists not only embraced large-scale violent measures, but how they legitimated them over time. Elkins takes the existing revisionist view one step further with the provocative argument that violence was in fact at the very core of liberal imperialist ideology. Legacy of Violence narrows in on exceptional episodes from the mid-eighteenth century onward to show that crises of imperial legitimacy served to justify the increasing use of both physical and epistemological violence in imperial governance. Within the civilizing mission, violence had a particular “moral effect.” For Elkins, it is this combination of reform and repression inherent in liberalism that explains why the British Empire remained so resilient for centuries. The major contribution in Part I, “Imperial Nation,” is to the scholarly debate on Britain’s “first” and “second” empire. Scholars such as C.A. Bayly have argued that Britain’s “first” empire in the pre-nineteenth century Americas embraced the widespread use of violence through enslaved labour and dispossession, but that this violence diminished in the nineteenth century when liberalism emerged at home and the “second” empire took on more grandiose global aims. Elkins counters that the roots of British imperial violence in the twentieth century grew out of nearly two hundred years of ideas, debates, and practices circulating across the empire. Part I begins in 1756 with the well-known story of the Warren Hastings’s impeachment trial for his widespread corruption and misconduct in Bengal. The evolving debate about accountability and legitimacy emerging from this case marked the “beginnings of a consolidated liberal imperialism.” From then on, Britain’s “second” empire repeatedly confronted the question not of how to mitigate state violence, but of how to incorporate it into the rule of law and the principles of good governance.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"487 - 490"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41909596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1177/00207020231198210
Alina Dixon
A critical challenge faced by both peacebuilding scholars and practitioners is the failure of a normative approach to peacebuilding, one that is largely technocratic and programmatic, to achieve lasting peace. Following the limited successes of what is now referred to as the “liberal peace paradigm” after conflicts in places such as Rwanda, the DRC, Iraq, and many others in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many have suggested shifting towards more locally guided peacebuilding. As alternatives such as this “local turn” have been proposed, a rift has emerged between status-quo technocrats and advocates for transformative change through more “radical” or critical ideologies. At the heart of this debate is a question of the relevancy of liberal peacebuilding norms in societies where such norms have little, if any, resonance. In her new book, Peacebuilding Legacy: Programming for Change and Young People’s Attitude to Peace, Sukanya Podder tackles the fissure between technocratic and transformative peacebuilding. She addresses the extent to which peacebuilding initiatives positively shape attitudes towards peace over the long term. To do so, she investigates the fundamental question of whether a technocratic approach to peacebuilding is effective in building sustainable change after conflict. More specifically, Podder examines the uptake of liberal norms in peacebuilding programs and the ability of these norms to transform intergeneration and intergroup relations at the local level. Peacebuilding Legacy contributes to an important conversation regarding the relationship between the theoretical ideals of peacebuilding and their practical application and therefore is relevant for both scholarly and practitioner audiences.
{"title":"Book Review: Peacebuilding Legacy: Programming for Change and Young People’s Attitude to Peace","authors":"Alina Dixon","doi":"10.1177/00207020231198210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231198210","url":null,"abstract":"A critical challenge faced by both peacebuilding scholars and practitioners is the failure of a normative approach to peacebuilding, one that is largely technocratic and programmatic, to achieve lasting peace. Following the limited successes of what is now referred to as the “liberal peace paradigm” after conflicts in places such as Rwanda, the DRC, Iraq, and many others in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many have suggested shifting towards more locally guided peacebuilding. As alternatives such as this “local turn” have been proposed, a rift has emerged between status-quo technocrats and advocates for transformative change through more “radical” or critical ideologies. At the heart of this debate is a question of the relevancy of liberal peacebuilding norms in societies where such norms have little, if any, resonance. In her new book, Peacebuilding Legacy: Programming for Change and Young People’s Attitude to Peace, Sukanya Podder tackles the fissure between technocratic and transformative peacebuilding. She addresses the extent to which peacebuilding initiatives positively shape attitudes towards peace over the long term. To do so, she investigates the fundamental question of whether a technocratic approach to peacebuilding is effective in building sustainable change after conflict. More specifically, Podder examines the uptake of liberal norms in peacebuilding programs and the ability of these norms to transform intergeneration and intergroup relations at the local level. Peacebuilding Legacy contributes to an important conversation regarding the relationship between the theoretical ideals of peacebuilding and their practical application and therefore is relevant for both scholarly and practitioner audiences.","PeriodicalId":46226,"journal":{"name":"International Journal","volume":"78 1","pages":"490 - 492"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43017533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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