Pub Date : 2022-06-06DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2084077
Andrey Shcherbak
ABSTRACT Russian politics is often described as having taken a “conservative turn” since the start of Putin's third term. This refers to the rise in the political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the ideological shift to traditional values, and the growth of authoritarianism. This study aims to explore ordinary Russians' commitment to this conservatism using data from European Social Survey, 2010–2018. I suggest a four-factor model for measuring popular conservatism in Russia: Loyalism, Conformity, Religiosity, and Traditionalism/Security. The study reveals a surge in conservative attitudes in 2014–2016 and a steady decline thereafter.
{"title":"Russia’s “conservative turn” after 2012: evidence from the European Social Survey","authors":"Andrey Shcherbak","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2084077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2084077","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Russian politics is often described as having taken a “conservative turn” since the start of Putin's third term. This refers to the rise in the political influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the ideological shift to traditional values, and the growth of authoritarianism. This study aims to explore ordinary Russians' commitment to this conservatism using data from European Social Survey, 2010–2018. I suggest a four-factor model for measuring popular conservatism in Russia: Loyalism, Conformity, Religiosity, and Traditionalism/Security. The study reveals a surge in conservative attitudes in 2014–2016 and a steady decline thereafter.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76923026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-23DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2077726
A. Bracic
The Language of Political Incorporation is a remarkable book. In it, Amy H. Liu explores how migrant networks shape the political incorporation of migrant populations, ranging from engagement with local authorities to civic involvement. Liu studies this relationship using original data that she collected over five years in Chinese migrant communities in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Croatia. While the scope of her fieldwork alone is impressive, Liu also shows that the arguments set forth in the book generalise beyond Central-Eastern Europe and its Chinese migrant communities. The literature that explores migrant inclusion tends to either focus on the individual (migrant) or the country (host or home). Liu breaks new ground by focusing on a different unit of analysis altogether: the migrant network. A migrant network consists of migrants and brokers who help migrants find lodging, secure jobs and navigate host country bureaucracy. Liu’s theory identifies two types of networks, defined by language: bridging and bonding. A bridging network is built around a lingua franca, like Mandarin. If a language that connects migrants is spoken by many diverse individuals – not only from different parts of the country but also, possibly, from communities in other countries that speak the same language – network entry barriers are lower and membership is more diverse. Brokers can therefore recruit clients from a large community and have less to lose reputationally when service provision falters. Members of bridging networks automatically interact with others who speak the lingua franca, but who might be from an outgroup. This regular contact, posits Liu, leads to building intergroup trust, which is then reinforced by the benefits that a member accrues from the network. Since intergroup trust is instrumental for political incorporation, Liu suggests that we should expect to find more incorporation in bridging networks. A bonding network is built around a language that is only spoken by a select group of migrants (e.g. Zhejiangese). Brokers who provide services to migrants in bonding networks are typically better at delivering services, partly because group homogeneity leads to a better understanding of members’ preferences and partly because brokers’ reputations are built on a small constituency that extends back to the home country. Because membership in a bonding network is language-dependent, such networks are both exclusionary and homogenous. As a result, members are more likely to interact with ingroup members on a daily basis, building less intergroup trust. Less intergroup trust, in turn, likely leads to less political incorporation. Liu then situates networks in the political space and studies their reactions to government policies that target migrants – directly or indirectly. Bonding networks produce stronger relationships and are better able to withstand shocks. Bridging networks, however, are more diverse and thus more sensitive to shocks. In
{"title":"The language of political incorporation: Chinese migrants in Europe","authors":"A. Bracic","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2077726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2077726","url":null,"abstract":"The Language of Political Incorporation is a remarkable book. In it, Amy H. Liu explores how migrant networks shape the political incorporation of migrant populations, ranging from engagement with local authorities to civic involvement. Liu studies this relationship using original data that she collected over five years in Chinese migrant communities in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Croatia. While the scope of her fieldwork alone is impressive, Liu also shows that the arguments set forth in the book generalise beyond Central-Eastern Europe and its Chinese migrant communities. The literature that explores migrant inclusion tends to either focus on the individual (migrant) or the country (host or home). Liu breaks new ground by focusing on a different unit of analysis altogether: the migrant network. A migrant network consists of migrants and brokers who help migrants find lodging, secure jobs and navigate host country bureaucracy. Liu’s theory identifies two types of networks, defined by language: bridging and bonding. A bridging network is built around a lingua franca, like Mandarin. If a language that connects migrants is spoken by many diverse individuals – not only from different parts of the country but also, possibly, from communities in other countries that speak the same language – network entry barriers are lower and membership is more diverse. Brokers can therefore recruit clients from a large community and have less to lose reputationally when service provision falters. Members of bridging networks automatically interact with others who speak the lingua franca, but who might be from an outgroup. This regular contact, posits Liu, leads to building intergroup trust, which is then reinforced by the benefits that a member accrues from the network. Since intergroup trust is instrumental for political incorporation, Liu suggests that we should expect to find more incorporation in bridging networks. A bonding network is built around a language that is only spoken by a select group of migrants (e.g. Zhejiangese). Brokers who provide services to migrants in bonding networks are typically better at delivering services, partly because group homogeneity leads to a better understanding of members’ preferences and partly because brokers’ reputations are built on a small constituency that extends back to the home country. Because membership in a bonding network is language-dependent, such networks are both exclusionary and homogenous. As a result, members are more likely to interact with ingroup members on a daily basis, building less intergroup trust. Less intergroup trust, in turn, likely leads to less political incorporation. Liu then situates networks in the political space and studies their reactions to government policies that target migrants – directly or indirectly. Bonding networks produce stronger relationships and are better able to withstand shocks. Bridging networks, however, are more diverse and thus more sensitive to shocks. In","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89542453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-19DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2077725
Stefano Braghiroli, A. Makarychev
ABSTRACT U-turns by populist parties are not a new phenomenon. The 2021 electoral campaign in Estonia was marked by episodes that combined cultural hybridity and political opportunism. The nationalist Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) was reprimanded by the Language Inspectorate for using Russian-language campaign posters with no Estonian translation. The same party was celebrating Estonian independence with a concert performing Soviet-time popular music. These episodes appeared quite surprising in the Estonian context, but not unique in a wider European perspective. We tackle the following question: why and how national conservative parties appeal to groups previously treated as domestic others.
{"title":"Сonservative populism in Italy and Estonia: playing the multicultural card and engaging “domestic others”","authors":"Stefano Braghiroli, A. Makarychev","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2077725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2077725","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT U-turns by populist parties are not a new phenomenon. The 2021 electoral campaign in Estonia was marked by episodes that combined cultural hybridity and political opportunism. The nationalist Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) was reprimanded by the Language Inspectorate for using Russian-language campaign posters with no Estonian translation. The same party was celebrating Estonian independence with a concert performing Soviet-time popular music. These episodes appeared quite surprising in the Estonian context, but not unique in a wider European perspective. We tackle the following question: why and how national conservative parties appeal to groups previously treated as domestic others.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87183493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-24DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2055551
P. Żuk
ABSTRACT This article aims to outline the media and thematic framework within which environmentalists were described by the right-wing pro-government media in Poland from 2016 to 2020 and to explain the main ideological conflicts over ecology. On the other hand, the author shows how these conservative stereotypes about the environmental movement affect the opinions of Polish society. The author defends the thesis that the anti-ecological phobias of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) government have politicised environmental issues and revived ecological conflicts. The results presented show the importance of cultural, political and spatial dimensions for the development of the environmental movement in Poland.
{"title":"“Eco-terrorists”: right-wing populist media about “ecologists” and the public opinion on the environmental movement in Poland","authors":"P. Żuk","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2055551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2055551","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article aims to outline the media and thematic framework within which environmentalists were described by the right-wing pro-government media in Poland from 2016 to 2020 and to explain the main ideological conflicts over ecology. On the other hand, the author shows how these conservative stereotypes about the environmental movement affect the opinions of Polish society. The author defends the thesis that the anti-ecological phobias of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) government have politicised environmental issues and revived ecological conflicts. The results presented show the importance of cultural, political and spatial dimensions for the development of the environmental movement in Poland.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73894097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-22DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2052049
Sanja Hajdinjak
ABSTRACT The present article examines how voters’ support for populist parties and the degree of political power wielded by populist parties influence political trust in Central Europe. In countries where a populist party has undivided power, populist supporters are, when compared to supporters of other parties, more likely to trust political institutions. These differences result from ideological congruence as well as favourable assessments of how democratically a country is governed. Where populists do not control the government, only populist parties' supporters who have very favourable assessments of democratic governance in their own country are more likely to trust political institutions compared with supporters of other parties.
{"title":"Populism as a political trust booster? Populist support and degrees of political power in Central Europe","authors":"Sanja Hajdinjak","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2052049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2052049","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The present article examines how voters’ support for populist parties and the degree of political power wielded by populist parties influence political trust in Central Europe. In countries where a populist party has undivided power, populist supporters are, when compared to supporters of other parties, more likely to trust political institutions. These differences result from ideological congruence as well as favourable assessments of how democratically a country is governed. Where populists do not control the government, only populist parties' supporters who have very favourable assessments of democratic governance in their own country are more likely to trust political institutions compared with supporters of other parties.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74608196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-15DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2045962
M. Laruelle
ABSTRACT This article argues that interpreting Russia's conservatism exclusively as a top-down phenomenon has obscured the possibility that there might exist a grassroots conservatism founded on very different bases than the state narrative, and which predates the state's embrace of conservatism. It thus takes a fine-grained view of Russians' conservative values by looking at (1) the existence since the 1990s of a situational conservatism that preceded the state's “conservative turn”; (2) the fact that conservative attitudes are shared by almost all post-socialist countries; (3) the rise of moral conservatism and its limits; (4) attitudes toward the Church, which encapsulate the gap between discourse and practice; and (5) the polarisation of Russian society into conservative and non-conservative constituencies.
{"title":"A grassroots conservatism? Taking a fine-grained view of conservative attitudes among Russians","authors":"M. Laruelle","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2045962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2045962","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that interpreting Russia's conservatism exclusively as a top-down phenomenon has obscured the possibility that there might exist a grassroots conservatism founded on very different bases than the state narrative, and which predates the state's embrace of conservatism. It thus takes a fine-grained view of Russians' conservative values by looking at (1) the existence since the 1990s of a situational conservatism that preceded the state's “conservative turn”; (2) the fact that conservative attitudes are shared by almost all post-socialist countries; (3) the rise of moral conservatism and its limits; (4) attitudes toward the Church, which encapsulate the gap between discourse and practice; and (5) the polarisation of Russian society into conservative and non-conservative constituencies.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83230928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079
M. Laruelle
ABSTRACT Illiberalism is an emerging concept in social sciences that remains to be tested by different disciplines and approaches. Here, I advance a fine-grained frame that should help to “stabilize” the concept by stating that we should 1/ look at illiberalism as an ideology and dissociate it from the literature on regime types, 2/ consider illiberalism to be in permanent situational relation to liberalism. To make that demonstration, I advance a pilot definition of illiberalism as a new ideological universe that, even if doctrinally fluid and context-based, is to some degree coherent.
{"title":"Illiberalism: a conceptual introduction","authors":"M. Laruelle","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Illiberalism is an emerging concept in social sciences that remains to be tested by different disciplines and approaches. Here, I advance a fine-grained frame that should help to “stabilize” the concept by stating that we should 1/ look at illiberalism as an ideology and dissociate it from the literature on regime types, 2/ consider illiberalism to be in permanent situational relation to liberalism. To make that demonstration, I advance a pilot definition of illiberalism as a new ideological universe that, even if doctrinally fluid and context-based, is to some degree coherent.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88200117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-23DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2022.2038571
Daniel Kovarek, L. Littvay
ABSTRACT The Hungarian municipal elections of October 2019 were the first ray of hope for the numerous political forces aiming to topple the decade-long Fidesz rule. In this election, the opposition won Budapest's mayoral seat and 10 of the 23 larger cities (turning 8). They also won majorities in the capital's assembly and among the 23 district mayors (turning 10). This was possible through unprecedented coordination of all viable opposition parties, electoral innovations like primaries, effective messaging, and a major Fidesz scandal. We discuss the story of this election and the impact of COVID-19 on the newly elected opposition mayors.
{"title":"Greater than the sum of its part(ie)s: opposition comeback in the 2019 Hungarian local elections","authors":"Daniel Kovarek, L. Littvay","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2022.2038571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2038571","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Hungarian municipal elections of October 2019 were the first ray of hope for the numerous political forces aiming to topple the decade-long Fidesz rule. In this election, the opposition won Budapest's mayoral seat and 10 of the 23 larger cities (turning 8). They also won majorities in the capital's assembly and among the 23 district mayors (turning 10). This was possible through unprecedented coordination of all viable opposition parties, electoral innovations like primaries, effective messaging, and a major Fidesz scandal. We discuss the story of this election and the impact of COVID-19 on the newly elected opposition mayors.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81985372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-21DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2021.2024516
Aizada Arystanbek
ABSTRACT This study investigates how standards of hegemonic femininity in Kazakhstan are utilised by the public in online spaces to police Kazakh women’s bodies, glorify national culture, and normalise violence against women who do not conform to these standards. Drawing upon discourse analysis as the primary method for examining available comments on Facebook and Instagram, this paper is one of the first studies of modern Kazakh nationalism from a critical gendered perspective that situates discourses about Kazakh women in the context of sexual violence and demonstrates the “weaponisation” of women’s bodies and the normalisation of violence against them in online spaces.
{"title":"“Can you beat your wife, yes or no?”: a study of hegemonic femininity in Kazakhstan’s online discourses","authors":"Aizada Arystanbek","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2021.2024516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2021.2024516","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study investigates how standards of hegemonic femininity in Kazakhstan are utilised by the public in online spaces to police Kazakh women’s bodies, glorify national culture, and normalise violence against women who do not conform to these standards. Drawing upon discourse analysis as the primary method for examining available comments on Facebook and Instagram, this paper is one of the first studies of modern Kazakh nationalism from a critical gendered perspective that situates discourses about Kazakh women in the context of sexual violence and demonstrates the “weaponisation” of women’s bodies and the normalisation of violence against them in online spaces.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83186232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2021.2015687
Courtney Blackington
ABSTRACT Do partisans process information about conspiracy theories like other standard types of political information – through a partisan lens? Are partisans of ethnopopulist parties more likely to believe in conspiracy theories in general, or only the ones their party endorses? Using data from Poland, I show that when their party elites endorse a specific conspiracy theory, partisans are more likely to believe in it. However, ethnopopulist partisanship is only positively associated with conspiratorial beliefs when an individual's ethnopopulist party pushes a conspiracy theory. Thus, conspiratorial beliefs appear to operate like other sources of political information, which are vulnerable to partisan cueing.
{"title":"Partisanship and plane crashes: can partisanship drive conspiratorial beliefs?","authors":"Courtney Blackington","doi":"10.1080/21599165.2021.2015687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2021.2015687","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Do partisans process information about conspiracy theories like other standard types of political information – through a partisan lens? Are partisans of ethnopopulist parties more likely to believe in conspiracy theories in general, or only the ones their party endorses? Using data from Poland, I show that when their party elites endorse a specific conspiracy theory, partisans are more likely to believe in it. However, ethnopopulist partisanship is only positively associated with conspiratorial beliefs when an individual's ethnopopulist party pushes a conspiracy theory. Thus, conspiratorial beliefs appear to operate like other sources of political information, which are vulnerable to partisan cueing.","PeriodicalId":46570,"journal":{"name":"East European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84155656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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