Pub Date : 2022-01-20DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2024806
Sven T. Siefken
The Bundestag is a key institution in the parliamentary democracy of Germany. Assessing its role in the Covid-19 crisis considers how it adapted to secure parliamentary continuity. Comparing the activities during the pandemic to the year before shows institutional stability and high continuity of legislation and oversight activities but severe challenges to parliamentary communication. To properly understand the role of the Bundestag in the Covid-19 crisis, this analysis draws upon both quantitative and qualitative data and considers formal and informal paths of parliamentary influence. It reveals that a more nuanced assessment of the Bundestag’s role in policy-making throughout the Covid-19 pandemic is in order, and that claims of Parliament having subordinated itself to the Executive appear overly alarmist and unsubstantiated by the available evidence. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of German Politics is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)
{"title":"The Bundestag in the Pandemic Year 2020/21 – Continuity and Challenges in the Covid-19 Crisis","authors":"Sven T. Siefken","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2024806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2024806","url":null,"abstract":"The Bundestag is a key institution in the parliamentary democracy of Germany. Assessing its role in the Covid-19 crisis considers how it adapted to secure parliamentary continuity. Comparing the activities during the pandemic to the year before shows institutional stability and high continuity of legislation and oversight activities but severe challenges to parliamentary communication. To properly understand the role of the Bundestag in the Covid-19 crisis, this analysis draws upon both quantitative and qualitative data and considers formal and informal paths of parliamentary influence. It reveals that a more nuanced assessment of the Bundestag’s role in policy-making throughout the Covid-19 pandemic is in order, and that claims of Parliament having subordinated itself to the Executive appear overly alarmist and unsubstantiated by the available evidence. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of German Politics is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48756648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-28DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2020253
Amandine Crespy, L. Schramm
{"title":"Breaking the Budgetary Taboo: German Preference Formation in the EU's Response to the Covid-19 Crisis","authors":"Amandine Crespy, L. Schramm","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2020253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2020253","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46606135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-28DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2019712
Michael Koß
ABSTRACT This article assesses the impact of reunification on the Bundestag from a historical institutionalist perspective. Accordingly, it focuses on procedural development and parties’ behaviour. More specifically, it analyses parties’ control of the legislative agenda and their willingness to obstruct this agenda. Prior to reunification, the Bundestag emerged as a working legislature with decentralised agenda control. Even though the Bundestag was vulnerable to obstruction, especially by questioning the quorum, obstructive behaviour virtually ceased after 1951. After reunification, the Bundestag’s vulnerability was increased when a plenary ‘core time’ was introduced in 1995. However, all parties, including the one most directly related to reunification, the Left Party, continued to abstain from exploiting procedural loopholes. Only the AfD as the other post-1990 newcomer (albeit less directly related to reunification) did so by questioning the quorum to an unprecedented extent after it entered the Bundestag in 2017. So far, this systematic obstruction has only led to a path-dependent procedural reform. If, however, the AfD continues with this behaviour, it can be regarded as a threat to legislative democracy at least indirectly related to German reunification.
{"title":"Legislative Democracy in the Bundestag After Reunification","authors":"Michael Koß","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2019712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2019712","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article assesses the impact of reunification on the Bundestag from a historical institutionalist perspective. Accordingly, it focuses on procedural development and parties’ behaviour. More specifically, it analyses parties’ control of the legislative agenda and their willingness to obstruct this agenda. Prior to reunification, the Bundestag emerged as a working legislature with decentralised agenda control. Even though the Bundestag was vulnerable to obstruction, especially by questioning the quorum, obstructive behaviour virtually ceased after 1951. After reunification, the Bundestag’s vulnerability was increased when a plenary ‘core time’ was introduced in 1995. However, all parties, including the one most directly related to reunification, the Left Party, continued to abstain from exploiting procedural loopholes. Only the AfD as the other post-1990 newcomer (albeit less directly related to reunification) did so by questioning the quorum to an unprecedented extent after it entered the Bundestag in 2017. So far, this systematic obstruction has only led to a path-dependent procedural reform. If, however, the AfD continues with this behaviour, it can be regarded as a threat to legislative democracy at least indirectly related to German reunification.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"107 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46281433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-26DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2016707
Melanie Dietz, Sigrid Rossteutscher, Philipp Scherer, Lars-Christopher Stövsand
When the Covid-19 pandemic hit internationally in March 2020, governments and political incumbents received exceptionally high approval ratings. Such a sudden spike of public support in times of crisis is often explained as the ‘ rally ‘ round the fl ag ’ e ff ect. This paper has three goals: fi rst, to examine whether a rally e ff ect indeed occurred; second, to analyse whether and how much it is related to (i) a ff ectedness, i.e. the occurrence of infections on individual and aggregate level, and (ii) fear of Covid-19; and third, to examine an assumed moderating e ff ect of partisanship. We merged individual survey data from an online survey conducted in September 2020 as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) with infection rates on the state level (Bundesländer) published by the Robert Koch Institute. We detect a striking rally e ff ect in all partisan camps. Furthermore, we identify fear of Covid-19 as the driving mechanism while there is no evidence that a ff ectedness is a major force behind the rally e ff ect. Furthermore, we show that partisanship takes on a moderating role for fear of Covid-19 regarding satisfaction with government.
{"title":"Rally Effect in the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Role of Affectedness, Fear, and Partisanship","authors":"Melanie Dietz, Sigrid Rossteutscher, Philipp Scherer, Lars-Christopher Stövsand","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2016707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2016707","url":null,"abstract":"When the Covid-19 pandemic hit internationally in March 2020, governments and political incumbents received exceptionally high approval ratings. Such a sudden spike of public support in times of crisis is often explained as the ‘ rally ‘ round the fl ag ’ e ff ect. This paper has three goals: fi rst, to examine whether a rally e ff ect indeed occurred; second, to analyse whether and how much it is related to (i) a ff ectedness, i.e. the occurrence of infections on individual and aggregate level, and (ii) fear of Covid-19; and third, to examine an assumed moderating e ff ect of partisanship. We merged individual survey data from an online survey conducted in September 2020 as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) with infection rates on the state level (Bundesländer) published by the Robert Koch Institute. We detect a striking rally e ff ect in all partisan camps. Furthermore, we identify fear of Covid-19 as the driving mechanism while there is no evidence that a ff ectedness is a major force behind the rally e ff ect. Furthermore, we show that partisanship takes on a moderating role for fear of Covid-19 regarding satisfaction with government.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42797452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-20DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2005029
Sebastian Heidebrecht, Magnus G. Schoeller
The relationship between Austria and Germany is characterised by many political and cultural commonalities and strong economic interdependencies. Moreover, the asymmetry between the two countries, both in terms of economic size and political power, has long time characterised the relationship as one between ‘leader’ and ‘follower’. Yet, despite these strong ties, Austria has assumed an increasingly independent role in recent EMU politics. Therefore, this article asks whether and why the close partnership of the two countries is slowly growing apart. Based on the analysis of three periods of EMU reform, the article shows that Austria followed Germany during the fast-burning phase of the euro crisis (2010–12), became more self-reliant in its slow-burning phase (2012–16), and even opposed German positions in post-crisis reform (2016–20). Converging economic preferences and the strong power asymmetry between the two countries can explain Austria’s cooperative strategy until 2016. By contrast, Austria’s shift from loyal followership towards more pronounced independence is largely caused by domestic developments. The reluctance of the Austrian government to share risks and build joint capacities in EMU reflects a Europe-wide trend, as an increasing ‘constraining dissensus’ at the national level makes it difficult for small state governments to compromise at the European level.
{"title":"The Austrian-German Relationship in EMU Reform: From Asymmetric Partnership to Increased Independence","authors":"Sebastian Heidebrecht, Magnus G. Schoeller","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2005029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2005029","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between Austria and Germany is characterised by many political and cultural commonalities and strong economic interdependencies. Moreover, the asymmetry between the two countries, both in terms of economic size and political power, has long time characterised the relationship as one between ‘leader’ and ‘follower’. Yet, despite these strong ties, Austria has assumed an increasingly independent role in recent EMU politics. Therefore, this article asks whether and why the close partnership of the two countries is slowly growing apart. Based on the analysis of three periods of EMU reform, the article shows that Austria followed Germany during the fast-burning phase of the euro crisis (2010–12), became more self-reliant in its slow-burning phase (2012–16), and even opposed German positions in post-crisis reform (2016–20). Converging economic preferences and the strong power asymmetry between the two countries can explain Austria’s cooperative strategy until 2016. By contrast, Austria’s shift from loyal followership towards more pronounced independence is largely caused by domestic developments. The reluctance of the Austrian government to share risks and build joint capacities in EMU reflects a Europe-wide trend, as an increasing ‘constraining dissensus’ at the national level makes it difficult for small state governments to compromise at the European level.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"240 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46369582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-17DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2007884
D. Auth, Almut Peukert
Since the beginning of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship, German care policy changed considerably. Social policy has gained in prominence and this has affected people with caring responsibilities. Against this background, this paper compares childcare and elderly care policies in terms of gender equality. We focus on policy measures introduced and implemented during the Merkel era and we consider Chancellor Merkel’s role in shaping these policies. Based on interviews with parents of young children as well as male and female elderly carers, our analysis discusses the impacts of Merkel-era care policies on lived experiences. We concentrate on effects on caregivers’ employment status (maintaining, reducing, or leaving gainful employment for caring). Furthermore, we focus on gender equality effects depending on socio-economic status (SES). The comparison of both policy fields shows that gender in/equality and the gendered division of labour are essentially moderated by Merkel’s way of facilitating reconciliation policies. We argue that recent childcare and elderly care policies particularly address middle-class caregivers. In both fields, care policies offer a framework that is used, interpreted, and negotiated differently by individuals, couples, and families, depending on their SES and existing gender norms. Consequently, Merkel-era care policies can reinforce or mitigate gender inequalities.
{"title":"Gender Equality in the Field of Care: Policy Goals and Outcomes During the Merkel Era","authors":"D. Auth, Almut Peukert","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2007884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2007884","url":null,"abstract":"Since the beginning of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship, German care policy changed considerably. Social policy has gained in prominence and this has affected people with caring responsibilities. Against this background, this paper compares childcare and elderly care policies in terms of gender equality. We focus on policy measures introduced and implemented during the Merkel era and we consider Chancellor Merkel’s role in shaping these policies. Based on interviews with parents of young children as well as male and female elderly carers, our analysis discusses the impacts of Merkel-era care policies on lived experiences. We concentrate on effects on caregivers’ employment status (maintaining, reducing, or leaving gainful employment for caring). Furthermore, we focus on gender equality effects depending on socio-economic status (SES). The comparison of both policy fields shows that gender in/equality and the gendered division of labour are essentially moderated by Merkel’s way of facilitating reconciliation policies. We argue that recent childcare and elderly care policies particularly address middle-class caregivers. In both fields, care policies offer a framework that is used, interpreted, and negotiated differently by individuals, couples, and families, depending on their SES and existing gender norms. Consequently, Merkel-era care policies can reinforce or mitigate gender inequalities.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"177 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43804274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-13DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2003331
D. Howarth, J. Schild
German governments and European Union (EU) member states forming the New Hanseatic League (HL) have had very similar preferences on EU / Eurozone financial support mechanisms. We would expect German and HL governments to be close allies on these matters. However, empirically, we detect differences. German governments have repeatedly resisted participating in HL joint positions on EU financial support mechanisms and accepted compromises with France. In order to explain this divergence we consider the relative explanatory merit of economic preferences, based on both material interests and economic ideas—here ordoliberalism—on the one hand, and norms of cooperation—here Franco-German ‘embedded bilateralism’—and geo-strategic interests on the other hand. We disentangle economic preference formation and the choice in favour of a political strategy to pursue these preferences. Economic preferences are one factor explaining the extent of concessions made by Germany to the HL countries and France. However, norms of cooperation and geostrategic interests explain the choice of German governments on how and with whom best to pursue their preferences. German governments have performed a balancing act between the HL and France, skewed towards the latter. The presence of economic crises increases the degree to which this balancing act is skewed towards France.
{"title":"Torn between Two Lovers: German Policy on Economic and Monetary Union, the New Hanseatic League and Franco-German Bilateralism","authors":"D. Howarth, J. Schild","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2003331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2003331","url":null,"abstract":"German governments and European Union (EU) member states forming the New Hanseatic League (HL) have had very similar preferences on EU / Eurozone financial support mechanisms. We would expect German and HL governments to be close allies on these matters. However, empirically, we detect differences. German governments have repeatedly resisted participating in HL joint positions on EU financial support mechanisms and accepted compromises with France. In order to explain this divergence we consider the relative explanatory merit of economic preferences, based on both material interests and economic ideas—here ordoliberalism—on the one hand, and norms of cooperation—here Franco-German ‘embedded bilateralism’—and geo-strategic interests on the other hand. We disentangle economic preference formation and the choice in favour of a political strategy to pursue these preferences. Economic preferences are one factor explaining the extent of concessions made by Germany to the HL countries and France. However, norms of cooperation and geostrategic interests explain the choice of German governments on how and with whom best to pursue their preferences. German governments have performed a balancing act between the HL and France, skewed towards the latter. The presence of economic crises increases the degree to which this balancing act is skewed towards France.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"323 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43710469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-13DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2003782
A. Verdun
ABSTRACT How has the Netherlands sought to influence the redesign of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the financial crisis? Based on the case studies of the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and the ‘Frugal Four’ this study finds, firstly, that the Netherlands chooses strategies of foot-dragging when initiatives are brought up to deepen integration when the Dutch prefer the status quo. Secondly, its strategy is more bargaining-based but at times also persuasion-based; the bargaining occurs in part because the Netherlands builds occasional alliances with like-minded member states to counterbalance the asymmetry of power between it and Germany. Finally, the Netherlands oscillates between trying to influence Germany directly and bypassing it by reaching out to like-minded member states on various dossiers and tempting them to declare their positions in advance.
{"title":"The Greatest of the Small? The Netherlands, the New Hanseatic League and the Frugal Four","authors":"A. Verdun","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2003782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2003782","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 How has the Netherlands sought to influence the redesign of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the financial crisis? Based on the case studies of the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and the ‘Frugal Four’ this study finds, firstly, that the Netherlands chooses strategies of foot-dragging when initiatives are brought up to deepen integration when the Dutch prefer the status quo. Secondly, its strategy is more bargaining-based but at times also persuasion-based; the bargaining occurs in part because the Netherlands builds occasional alliances with like-minded member states to counterbalance the asymmetry of power between it and Germany. Finally, the Netherlands oscillates between trying to influence Germany directly and bypassing it by reaching out to like-minded member states on various dossiers and tempting them to declare their positions in advance.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"302 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47617508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-13DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2002300
Erik Jones
ABSTRACT Franco-German leadership may be necessary for European integration, but it is insufficient. Other countries also have to follow. Sometimes they refuse. Examples include the Dutch rejection of the 1962 Fouchet Plan and the efforts by the new Hanseatic League to block implementation of the 2018 Meseberg Declaration. The opposition of Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden to the Franco-German recovery programme during the Covid-19 pandemic may be a third. Importantly, these are not moments of intergovernmental bargaining, with posturing leading to give-and-take that results in a negotiated compromise; they are moments where small states simply reject the plans the French and Germans put forward. This choice is puzzling. The smaller countries are more dependent upon the rest of Europe than the rest of Europe is on them. Not only do they have an important stake in the success of the European project, but this dependence makes them vulnerable to the threat of exclusion. Hence, France and Germany should be able to exercise the kind of go-it-alone power that will drag the smaller countries along (Gruber 2000, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press). This paper explores two explanations for small state intransigence, one centred on political instability and the other on the politics of shared beliefs.
{"title":"Hard to Follow: Small States and the Franco-German Relationship","authors":"Erik Jones","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2002300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2002300","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Franco-German leadership may be necessary for European integration, but it is insufficient. Other countries also have to follow. Sometimes they refuse. Examples include the Dutch rejection of the 1962 Fouchet Plan and the efforts by the new Hanseatic League to block implementation of the 2018 Meseberg Declaration. The opposition of Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden to the Franco-German recovery programme during the Covid-19 pandemic may be a third. Importantly, these are not moments of intergovernmental bargaining, with posturing leading to give-and-take that results in a negotiated compromise; they are moments where small states simply reject the plans the French and Germans put forward. This choice is puzzling. The smaller countries are more dependent upon the rest of Europe than the rest of Europe is on them. Not only do they have an important stake in the success of the European project, but this dependence makes them vulnerable to the threat of exclusion. Hence, France and Germany should be able to exercise the kind of go-it-alone power that will drag the smaller countries along (Gruber 2000, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press). This paper explores two explanations for small state intransigence, one centred on political instability and the other on the politics of shared beliefs.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"344 - 362"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42269933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-07DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2021.2005028
Magnus G. Schoeller, Gerda. Falkner
ABSTRACT This article introduces the special issue on smaller states and their relation to Germany in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). While there has been a mushrooming literature on the role of Germany in EMU, there has been hardly any research on how smaller states interact with EMU’s most powerful member. However, recent developments such as the rise of populism, Brexit, or the emergence of small state coalitions such as the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and the ‘Frugal Four’ give reason to take a closer look at the role of smaller states. Therefore, this special issue gathers the preferences of smaller EMU members, analyses the strategies they use to pursue them vis-à-vis Germany, and investigates the reasons for their choice as well as Germany’s reaction. At a theoretical level, we put forward an analytical framework providing causal propositions on why and how smaller states adopt certain strategies when they act in the shadow of hegemony. At an empirical level, we present the findings of the single contributions. We conclude by discussing the results in the light of our theoretical expectations.
{"title":"Acting in the Shadow of German Hegemony? The Role of Small States in the Economic and Monetary Union (Introduction to the Special Issue)","authors":"Magnus G. Schoeller, Gerda. Falkner","doi":"10.1080/09644008.2021.2005028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.2005028","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article introduces the special issue on smaller states and their relation to Germany in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). While there has been a mushrooming literature on the role of Germany in EMU, there has been hardly any research on how smaller states interact with EMU’s most powerful member. However, recent developments such as the rise of populism, Brexit, or the emergence of small state coalitions such as the ‘New Hanseatic League’ and the ‘Frugal Four’ give reason to take a closer look at the role of smaller states. Therefore, this special issue gathers the preferences of smaller EMU members, analyses the strategies they use to pursue them vis-à-vis Germany, and investigates the reasons for their choice as well as Germany’s reaction. At a theoretical level, we put forward an analytical framework providing causal propositions on why and how smaller states adopt certain strategies when they act in the shadow of hegemony. At an empirical level, we present the findings of the single contributions. We conclude by discussing the results in the light of our theoretical expectations.","PeriodicalId":46640,"journal":{"name":"German Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"197 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44434675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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