Pub Date : 2019-01-07DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1463820
R. Krempel
Abstract Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language.
Jerry Fodor声称他已经解决了思想和语言孰先孰后的传统问题。他说，组合性会给我们答案，因为至少有一个必须是组合的，如果其中只有一个是，那就是具有语义内容的那个。他认为自然语言不是组合的，因此语言的内容来源于思想的内容。我认为，语言不是组合的观点与他关于思想语言存在的生产力和系统性论点相冲突。我还将证明Fodor对这个问题的解决方案是失败的，因为他的主要论点是循环的。最后，我认为Fodor反对语言的组合性的论点并不是决定性的，我们仍然可以将至少某种程度的组合性归因于语言。
{"title":"Can Compositionality Solve the Thought-or-Language Problem?","authors":"R. Krempel","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2018.1463820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1463820","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"265 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2018.1463820","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47376097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1585200
Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere
Abstract The notion of world government is anathema to most political theorists. This is the case due to the arguments that a world government is infeasible, undesirable and unnecessary. This threefold argument is partly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. On the one hand, if this assumption is correct, then a world government is likely to be illegitimate. On the other hand, if the assumption is wrong, then it is not far-fetched to consider a world government to be legitimate. Considering a world government that emerges from a global social contract, this paper contends that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the social contract.
{"title":"World Government, Social Contract and Legitimacy","authors":"Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1585200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585200","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The notion of world government is anathema to most political theorists. This is the case due to the arguments that a world government is infeasible, undesirable and unnecessary. This threefold argument is partly predicated on the assumption that in world politics the larger a geographical and political entity is, the greater the chance of it becoming unstable, ungovernable and, ultimately, illegitimate. On the one hand, if this assumption is correct, then a world government is likely to be illegitimate. On the other hand, if the assumption is wrong, then it is not far-fetched to consider a world government to be legitimate. Considering a world government that emerges from a global social contract, this paper contends that the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a world government and the extent to which it is legitimate or illegitimate depends on the kind of social contract that produces it and the extent to which it fulfils or fails to fulfil the conditions of the social contract.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"30 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585200","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42201248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1585202
Joachim Wündisch
Abstract National governments have failed spectacularly to mitigate anthropogenic climate change and a sustainable approach to mitigation remains out of sight. This circumstance alone demonstrates the need for institutional reform. However, climate change is causing and will continue to cause large-scale loss and damage. Perhaps the most striking kind of that loss is territorial. Climate change induced sea level rise threatens not only vast coastal areas but also entire states. Therefore, mitigation is no longer sufficient. From the collective failure to mitigate climate change arises the collective duty to compensate. Compensating for territorial loss puts the spotlight on institutional deficiencies—which is why I explore them here. Specifically, I argue that (i) providing compensation for territorial loss is both morally required and politically advantageous and that (ii) it cannot be implemented effectively or efficiently without creating a global institution in charge of coordinating the process. Further, I (iii) make design recommendations for creating a global compensatory climate fund, (iv) situate my proposal within the debate on ideal and non-ideal theory, and (v) contend that the proposed institution would be a tool of world governance rather than a form of world government.
{"title":"Territorial Loss as a Challenge for World Governance","authors":"Joachim Wündisch","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1585202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585202","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract National governments have failed spectacularly to mitigate anthropogenic climate change and a sustainable approach to mitigation remains out of sight. This circumstance alone demonstrates the need for institutional reform. However, climate change is causing and will continue to cause large-scale loss and damage. Perhaps the most striking kind of that loss is territorial. Climate change induced sea level rise threatens not only vast coastal areas but also entire states. Therefore, mitigation is no longer sufficient. From the collective failure to mitigate climate change arises the collective duty to compensate. Compensating for territorial loss puts the spotlight on institutional deficiencies—which is why I explore them here. Specifically, I argue that (i) providing compensation for territorial loss is both morally required and politically advantageous and that (ii) it cannot be implemented effectively or efficiently without creating a global institution in charge of coordinating the process. Further, I (iii) make design recommendations for creating a global compensatory climate fund, (iv) situate my proposal within the debate on ideal and non-ideal theory, and (v) contend that the proposed institution would be a tool of world governance rather than a form of world government.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"155 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585202","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43766575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1588153
Eva Erman
Abstract The question of whether global democracy requires a world state has with few exceptions been answered with an unequivocal ‘No’. A world state, it is typically argued, is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, different forms of global governance arrangements have been suggested, involving non-hierarchical and multilayered models with dispersed authority. The overall aim of this paper is to addresses the question of whether global democracy requires a world state, adopting a so-called ‘function-sensitive’ approach. It is shown that such an approach is equipped to resist the predominant binary view of a world state (either accepting it or rejecting it) and offer a more differentiated and nuanced answer to this question. In brief, a basic presumption of a function-sensitive approach is that the content, justification and status of principles of democracy are dependent on the aim they are set out to achieve, what functions they are intended to regulate (e.g., decision-making, implementation, enforcement and evaluation), and the relationship between those functions. More specifically, within a function-sensitive framework, the paper sketches the contours of an account of global democracy consisting of five regulative principles and argues—utilizing the notion of ‘sufficient stateness’—that it would require supranational legislative entities and perhaps supranational judicial entities but not necessarily supranational executive entities.
{"title":"Does Global Democracy Require a World State?","authors":"Eva Erman","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1588153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1588153","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The question of whether global democracy requires a world state has with few exceptions been answered with an unequivocal ‘No’. A world state, it is typically argued, is neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, different forms of global governance arrangements have been suggested, involving non-hierarchical and multilayered models with dispersed authority. The overall aim of this paper is to addresses the question of whether global democracy requires a world state, adopting a so-called ‘function-sensitive’ approach. It is shown that such an approach is equipped to resist the predominant binary view of a world state (either accepting it or rejecting it) and offer a more differentiated and nuanced answer to this question. In brief, a basic presumption of a function-sensitive approach is that the content, justification and status of principles of democracy are dependent on the aim they are set out to achieve, what functions they are intended to regulate (e.g., decision-making, implementation, enforcement and evaluation), and the relationship between those functions. More specifically, within a function-sensitive framework, the paper sketches the contours of an account of global democracy consisting of five regulative principles and argues—utilizing the notion of ‘sufficient stateness’—that it would require supranational legislative entities and perhaps supranational judicial entities but not necessarily supranational executive entities.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"123 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1588153","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45785575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1585204
Attila Tanyi
Theorizing about world government has a long and pedigreed history. Formulations of some version of the idea already appear in Chinese, Indian as well as ancient Greek thought and later supporters include Dante and Erasmus (while others, such as Bentham and Kant, offered qualified support only). Today the idea appears to enjoy a small renaissance (as it did, briefly, after the Second World War for, perhaps, obvious reasons). This is not surprising. The world is encountering several global existential challenges, among them climate change, global injustice, and the threat of (nuclear) war. Some, such as Luis Cabrera (2004) or Torbjörn Tännsjö (2008), think that there is only one adequate answer to these challenges: to create a world state that governs the entire globe. Does the ‘world’ agree? For a long a time after the last great war it looked like it did (or, to be more precise, that it was in ‘qualified agreement’): for many decades after 1945, the world has seen the continuous development of multilateral, international, supranational institutions, the crowning achievement of which, arguably, was the setting up of the European Union. Of course, all these developments fell well short of anything like a world government, but one could see—especially if one wanted to, driven by, for example, certain theoretical assumptions or commitments—a perhaps inevitable path to this ultimate end-state.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Attila Tanyi","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1585204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585204","url":null,"abstract":"Theorizing about world government has a long and pedigreed history. Formulations of some version of the idea already appear in Chinese, Indian as well as ancient Greek thought and later supporters include Dante and Erasmus (while others, such as Bentham and Kant, offered qualified support only). Today the idea appears to enjoy a small renaissance (as it did, briefly, after the Second World War for, perhaps, obvious reasons). This is not surprising. The world is encountering several global existential challenges, among them climate change, global injustice, and the threat of (nuclear) war. Some, such as Luis Cabrera (2004) or Torbjörn Tännsjö (2008), think that there is only one adequate answer to these challenges: to create a world state that governs the entire globe. Does the ‘world’ agree? For a long a time after the last great war it looked like it did (or, to be more precise, that it was in ‘qualified agreement’): for many decades after 1945, the world has seen the continuous development of multilateral, international, supranational institutions, the crowning achievement of which, arguably, was the setting up of the European Union. Of course, all these developments fell well short of anything like a world government, but one could see—especially if one wanted to, driven by, for example, certain theoretical assumptions or commitments—a perhaps inevitable path to this ultimate end-state.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"1 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585204","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48343790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1585203
T. Tännsjö
Abstract There exist existential global problems we cannot solve unless we resort to a world government. It is desirable that such a government can be held responsible by a democratically elected world parliament. Hence, global democracy is desirable. However, the road to global democracy is blocked by similar problems that render it necessary in the first place: collective decision problems of a different but related sort. And time is short. In particular we face an emergent need to tend to problems to do with global warming. This means that we have to investigate the possibility and desirability of a last resort to global despotism.
{"title":"Global Democracy and the Resort to Despotism: Global Democracy Revisited","authors":"T. Tännsjö","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1585203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585203","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There exist existential global problems we cannot solve unless we resort to a world government. It is desirable that such a government can be held responsible by a democratically elected world parliament. Hence, global democracy is desirable. However, the road to global democracy is blocked by similar problems that render it necessary in the first place: collective decision problems of a different but related sort. And time is short. In particular we face an emergent need to tend to problems to do with global warming. This means that we have to investigate the possibility and desirability of a last resort to global despotism.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"101 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585203","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49470502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1584541
Samuel Director
Abstract In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason.
{"title":"Global Public Reason, Diversity, and Consent","authors":"Samuel Director","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1584541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1584541","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I examine global public reason as a method of justifying a global state. Ultimately, I conclude that global public reason fails to justify a global state. This is the case, because global public reason faces an unwinnable dilemma. The global public reason theorist must endorse either a hypothetical theory of consent or an actual theory of consent; if she endorses a theory of hypothetical consent, then she fails to justify her principles; and if she endorses a theory of actual consent, her theory will lead to a highly unstable political system. On either side of the dilemma, global public reason faces untenable implications. Although similar criticisms have been advanced against domestic public reason, my argument is not repeating points made before me. My argument is new, in that it raises these objections specifically against global public reason, and in that it shows how, due to increased diversity of belief in the global arena, these problems are more pressing for global public reason than they are for domestic public reason.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"31 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1584541","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47696900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1585201
S. Clark
Abstract The notion of a ‘cosmopolites’ has diverged quite far from its philosophical origins, but may eventually serve a similar function. The hope of a global peace or any sort of global management is probably better fulfilled in a federation or complex network of self-governing communities than in a global empire. With or without such an empire though we need some widely shared ‘morale’ or ‘religion’ that will sustain cooperation and obedience to the common good. There are many such competing ‘religions’ and utopian ideals, such that an ongoing global war between superficially distinct but also alarmingly similar power blocks (as described by Orwell) may seem inevitable. A more hopeful future would be one where bourgeois values, a new respect for other terrestrial life, and an awareness of the vastness and strangeness of the cosmos provide a backdrop for such cooperation, on Earth or out among the stars, as we can manage. The rules of trade and transport in such a future may be in the hands of something like Kipling’s Aerial Board of Control, staffed by a new sort of cosmopolitan, subject to occasional popular rebuke. Whether such an order would avoid division must be doubtful still.
{"title":"Citizens of the World and their Religion","authors":"S. Clark","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1585201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585201","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The notion of a ‘cosmopolites’ has diverged quite far from its philosophical origins, but may eventually serve a similar function. The hope of a global peace or any sort of global management is probably better fulfilled in a federation or complex network of self-governing communities than in a global empire. With or without such an empire though we need some widely shared ‘morale’ or ‘religion’ that will sustain cooperation and obedience to the common good. There are many such competing ‘religions’ and utopian ideals, such that an ongoing global war between superficially distinct but also alarmingly similar power blocks (as described by Orwell) may seem inevitable. A more hopeful future would be one where bourgeois values, a new respect for other terrestrial life, and an awareness of the vastness and strangeness of the cosmos provide a backdrop for such cooperation, on Earth or out among the stars, as we can manage. The rules of trade and transport in such a future may be in the hands of something like Kipling’s Aerial Board of Control, staffed by a new sort of cosmopolitan, subject to occasional popular rebuke. Whether such an order would avoid division must be doubtful still.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"103 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1585201","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45095769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2019.1586573
O. Táíwò
Abstract Contemporary political philosophy often operates on a ‘two-tiered’ theoretical treatment of global politics, on which domestic political systems and the principles governing their internal dynamics constitute one tier, and on which the relationships between states and governing multinational institutions constitute a second. One way of grounding and justifying this approach, preferred by Rawls, is called constructivism. Constructivists describe the world as containing specific domains and domain-types of political and social interaction, and relativizes principles of justice to important versions of these—states, in the case of contemporary two-tiered political philosophy. In this paper I argue against the specifically Rawlsian account of uniting these three commitments (two-tiered political theory, constructivism, and statism) and gesture towards a general argument against the coherence of this bundle of views.
{"title":"States Are Not Basic Structures: Against State-Centric Political Theory","authors":"O. Táíwò","doi":"10.1080/05568641.2019.1586573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2019.1586573","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contemporary political philosophy often operates on a ‘two-tiered’ theoretical treatment of global politics, on which domestic political systems and the principles governing their internal dynamics constitute one tier, and on which the relationships between states and governing multinational institutions constitute a second. One way of grounding and justifying this approach, preferred by Rawls, is called constructivism. Constructivists describe the world as containing specific domains and domain-types of political and social interaction, and relativizes principles of justice to important versions of these—states, in the case of contemporary two-tiered political philosophy. In this paper I argue against the specifically Rawlsian account of uniting these three commitments (two-tiered political theory, constructivism, and statism) and gesture towards a general argument against the coherence of this bundle of views.","PeriodicalId":46780,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Papers","volume":"48 1","pages":"59 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/05568641.2019.1586573","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44438396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-29DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2018.1462668
Kathy Behrendt
Abstract There is a fear of death that persistently eludes adequate explanation from contemporary philosophers of death. The reason for this is their focus on mortal harm issues, such as why death is bad for the person who dies. Claims regarding the fear of death are assumed to be contingent on the resolution of questions about the badness of death. In practice, however, consensus on some mortal harm issues has not resulted in comparable clarity on mortal fear. I contend we cannot do justice to fear of death unless we detach it from theories about the badness of death, including the overwhelmingly popular deprivation theory. The case for this involves disambiguation of certain aspects of mortal harm, a broad conception of what is involved in accounting for an emotion, and close attention to the nature of the fear in question. The source of fear of death is our departure from a context in which self-directed emotions have coherent application; our attitudes become ‘unmoored’, in Samuel Scheffler’s phrase. While this does not result in a fear that is sui generis, it does demand that we remove the object of fear from the realm of well-being in order to make sense of it.
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