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Baylor University roundtable on the corporate mission, CEO pay, and improving the dialogue with investors 贝勒大学圆桌会议:企业使命、首席执行官薪酬以及改善与投资者的对话
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-09-23 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12619
Don Chew
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引用次数: 0
Michael Jensen's contributions to the theory of the firm: A tribute in three acts 迈克尔-詹森对企业理论的贡献:三幕颂歌
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12620
Bartley J. Madden, Douglas E. Stevens
<p>Michael Cole Jensen (1939–2024) passed away on April 2, 2024 in Sarasota, Florida. A number of fitting tributes have appeared celebrating the life of one of the world's most productive and influential financial economists. A tribute to Jensen by Eugene Fama on the University of Chicago website <i>ProMarket</i> emphasizes how Jensen's research contributions put him in the highest echelons of academic finance and economics. Fama cites several of Jensen's seminal papers, including his 1976 paper coauthored with William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.”1 Jensen's paper with Meckling became the most heavily cited paper in the corporate finance literature and established agency theory as the dominant theory of the firm in finance and accounting. Fama also highlights Jensen's role in the transformation of finance into a scientific discipline, noting that he founded the <i>Journal of Financial Economics</i> in 1974 and edited it for over 20 years to drag the <i>Journal of Finance</i> “into the era of scientific research.” Finally, Fama highlights Jensen's leadership and foresight in launching the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) in 1994 to advance research across the social sciences.2</p><p>Another tribute to Jensen on <i>ProMarket</i> by Cambridge Law Professor Brian Cheffins suggests that Jensen's thinking on the public corporation underwent a 180-degree turn. In Cheffins's account, Jensen began his career as a strong advocate of the corporation as a driver of innovation and growth in the economy, calling it “an awesome social invention” in his seminal article with Meckling. After the economic stagnation and rampant inflation of the 1970s, however, Jensen allegedly became a fierce critic of the corporation, expressing skepticism about internal corporate systems and emphasizing the effectiveness of the market for corporate control to discipline manager opportunism. Cheffins highlights Jensen's promotion of the corporate takeover boom of the 1980s and the proliferation of incentive pay for executives based on stock options and earnings targets.</p><p>When the takeover boom suddenly halted in the 1990s, Cheffins notes that Jensen blamed executives and politicians who had put up roadblocks to corporate takeovers. Jensen also criticized self-serving managers and compliant boards who had used incentive pay to shield executives from market risk while adding significantly to their total compensation. Yet, public corporations continued to grow in number and size and were a major contributor to strong economic growth and soaring stock prices throughout the 1990s. But in Cheffins’ view, for all the accomplishments of US public companies, “there would be no reversal of Jensen's 180 degree turn regarding the public company.”3</p><p>In contrast to prior tributes, we focus on Jensen's contributions to the theory of the firm over his illustrious career. We argue that his contributions in this area repre
我们采用这种知识构建循环的方式,剖析艾哈德和詹森提出的关键理念,通过提升管理层的领导技能来改善公司业绩。尽管课程的语言深具哲学意味,但其内容却是务实而实用的。艾哈德和詹森的目标是将学习这门课程的学生培养成领导者。"艾哈德和詹森认为,企业是一个整体系统,在这个系统中,知识积累是管理者和员工共同生活和工作的一个组成部分。埃哈德和詹森认为,企业是一个整体系统,知识的积累是管理者和员工共同生活和工作的一个组成部分。这就导致了一个基本观点,即员工的绩效受到他们对企业、企业员工及其集体能力的看法的深刻影响。这与企业实用主义理论不谋而合。如图 1 所示,知识库包含不同可靠程度的假设。一个人的世界观不仅反映了他的训练和经验,也反映了他为实现自己的目的而穿越知识构建环路所获得的洞察力。至于感知,我们的大脑会储存过去的经验,以便通过与过去的类比进行预测。语言是感知的沉默伙伴,在伪装而非揭示假设方面具有潜在的颠覆性影响。这反过来又意味着,线性因果思维在应用于物理宇宙时的可靠性,在应用于涉及人类行为的复杂系统时,会导致决策者产生错误的自信感。(在我们的框架中,快速有效地穿越知识构建环路可以提供有用的反馈,使人们能够更熟练地采取行动,产生预期的结果)。我们阅读了艾哈德、詹森及其同事的 SSRN 工作文件,证实他们同意图 1 所示的知识构建环路的主要观点。这包括提出更好的问题、使用有效的语言和应用系统思维的重要性。我们的结论是,詹森辉煌职业生涯的第三阶段成果丰硕,为扩展企业理论提供了有益的启示。特别是,詹森开发并推广了一个经过彻底改进的模型,用于预测人们的绩效,其目标是协调变革,从而在维持双赢关系的同时大幅提高绩效。詹森从批评那些只顾自身利益而不顾组织效率的领导力,到为实现伟大的领导力制定切实可行的路线图,经历了一个完整的过程。与代理理论的行为假设不同,詹森的领导力培训强调诚信以及利益相关者理论的有用方面。在这篇向迈克尔-C-詹森致敬的文章中,我们重点介绍了他关于公共企业和管理角色的三个阶段或 "行为"。在第一阶段,詹森以芝加哥学派的新古典经济理论为基础,发展出一套赋予管理层作用的公司理论。在第二幕中,詹森强调公司控制权市场和财务激励机制是对机会主义私利的有效控制。我们重点关注詹森的第三幕,在这一幕中,他试图通过纳入诚信和利益相关者的观点来修正自己的理论,并为领导力培训制定了一个极具创新性的教育计划。尽管我们观察到詹森职业生涯的三个阶段都发生了巨大变化,但我们发现他的思想具有连续性,这为企业理论的未来发展提供了前进的道路。例如,在每一个阶段,我们都能发现詹森是在之前将新古典经济理论应用于企业的基础上发展起来的。特别是,詹森在晚年将诚信、利益相关者理论的有用方面以及领导力培训融入企业的努力,都是建立在新古典经济理论的基础之上的。37 如果这些努力继续下去并取得成果,那么詹森在晚年扩展其公司理论的努力可能会成为他留给后人的最大财富。
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引用次数: 0
Michael C. Jensen: Scholar, mentor, colleague 迈克尔-C-詹森:学者、导师、同事
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12616
Clifford W. Smith
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引用次数: 0
A message from the editor 编辑致辞
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12617
Don Chew
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引用次数: 0
A message from the Editors 编辑致辞
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-07-07 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12614
John McCormack
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引用次数: 0
Executive summaries 第 362 期《江淮论坛》内容提要
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12615
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引用次数: 0
Rational sustainability 合理的可持续性
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12609
Alex Edmans
<p>ESG is under attack from all sides. Opponents object to the incorporation of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues in investment decisions, arguing that it allows fund managers to pursue their own agendas at the expense of client returns. Proposed solutions range from disinvesting from ESG funds to banning ESG outright. In January 2024, Republican lawmakers in New Hampshire introduced a bill to prohibit the state from investing in funds that consider ESG factors; violation would be a felony punishable by up to 20 years in prison.</p><p>Supporters range from true believers, who view ESG as a sure-fire way to achieve both financial returns and social impact, to opportunists who saw ESG – at least historically – as a means to exploit a bubble. Asset managers launched ESG funds; companies courted capital, customers, and colleagues by touting their ESG credentials; and authors, influencers, and professors reinvented themselves as ESG experts even if they never previously cared for the topic. But both true believers and opportunists are recognizing the shifting sands – the former are ploughing ahead but calling it something different; the latter are reversing course and looking for the next fad. In June 2023, BlackRock's Larry Fink, a previously outspoken ESG supporter, announced that he'd no longer use the ESG term because it had become “weaponized,” but not change his actual stance. A January 2024 <i>Financial Times</i> article noted that just six funds citing ESG factors launched in the second half of 2023, as compared with 55 in the first half.1 On the same day, the <i>Wall Street Journal</i> dubbed ESG “the latest dirty word in Corporate America.”2</p><p>Alongside the true believers and opportunists lies a third group of supporters. They believe that the <i>practice</i> of integrating some – but not all – ESG factors, can create value, but the <i>term</i> “ESG” has several problems. In a 2023 article entitled “The End of ESG,” I argued that ESG is “extremely important” because it is critical to long-term value and thus should be of interest to anyone, but the term “ESG” implies that it's niche. I also claimed that it is “nothing special” compared to other intangible assets such as productivity, innovation, and culture, but the term “ESG” puts it on a pedestal.3 This is far more than a semantic issue since the term ends up affecting the practice; the “incorporation” of environmental, social, and governance factors sometimes morphs into their “prioritization” or “exclusive consideration.” Some companies allocate capital to initiatives that can be labelled ESG over those that might create more long-term value, or make misguided decisions designed to improve ESG metrics even when they are not material to the business. Some investors buy a stock that satisfies ESG criteria with little regard for its price, or automatically vote against the appointment of a new director if it does not achieve their board diversity target, irrespective
18 第三,理性可持续发展强调必须明确任何非财务目标。要实现长期目标,就必须说明这些目标是什么。对内,它明确了员工应该追求的目标;对外,它带来了透明度,并允许客户在不一致的情况下选择其他地方。基金可能会选择牺牲财务回报来应对气候变化,但它需要在招股说明书中明确说明这种牺牲,而不是声称一切都是双赢。否则,如果基金最终表现不佳,客户可能会撤回资金,因为他们曾被承诺获得超额收益。上述考虑还可以防范成为 "ESG变色龙 "的风险。一些 ESG 倡导者在宣传 ESG 时,声称 ESG 可以提高财务业绩,并往往以虚假的研究为后盾,标榜 ESG 与股票回报之间的相关性。当这些研究后来被证明因数据挖掘、遗漏变量或样本选择问题而存在缺陷时,他们有时会回应说:"反正这从来不是 ESG 的动机,它是为了拯救世界。当有证据表明 ESG 对社会和环境的影响有限时19 ,他们有时会回答说:"但 ESG 的目的是投资于反映我们价值观的公司"。20 "理性可持续发展 "的放任强调了 "长期价值 "的定义是共和党人和民主党人之间可能存在合理分歧的一个领域,一些政治化是无法避免的。共和党人可能会将长期价值定义为纯粹的经济价值,而民主党人则可能认为它还应包括社会价值。对于应包括哪些社会目标及其相对重要性,也可能存在合理的分歧。但是,无论选择什么目标,都应该以理性和可持续的方式来追求,这一点应该不会有太大的分歧。从理论上讲,没有必要这样强调,因为人们总是应该理性行事--正如从理论上讲,没有必要强调可持续性,因为人们总是应该从长远考虑问题。然而,在许多其他情况下,非理性的证据比比皆是21 ,鉴于确认偏差,可持续发展的非理性可能更加严重。可持续发展的支持者可能认为可持续发展总是有益的,而反对者可能认为可持续发展总是有害的。大量的可持续发展研究比比皆是,这些研究往往是由研究资质有限的商业机构撰写的,其目的是提高公关效果,而不是揭示真相。他们通过宣称人们想听到的东西来达到目的--可持续发展总能提高绩效。通常情况下,这些研究报告会被读者不加批判地接受,因为即使分析不力,读者也会喜欢这些研究结果。在我 2024 年出版的《可能包含谎言》一书22 中,我强调了人们上当受骗的多种方式:标题上写的研究并不存在;研究存在,但没有进行任何分析;作者声称与他们的分析结果相反;分析实际上并没有衡量可持续性或绩效;作者进行了数十项分析,只报告了有效的分析;作者大肆宣扬因果关系,但实际上只有相关关系。这些错误看似非常基本,似乎没有人会上当--结果恰恰相反,你怎么会相信这样的说法呢?- 但当确认偏见发挥作用时,理性就会被抛到九霄云外。与此相反,那些揭示了令人不快的真相的研究却被认为是 "众多研究中的一个",或者是出于政治动机而被嗤之以鼻。对数据进行理性审视后会发现,证据比任何一方通常所说的都要细微得多。一些 ESG 因素与较高的长期财务回报相关,如公司治理、23 员工满意度24 和客户满意度25 。然而,即使是这些结果也不一定具有普遍性:在竞争激烈的行业中,公司治理与回报不相关;26 在劳动力市场监管严格的国家,员工满意度不会带来超额回报;27 ESG 只在危机时期产生高回报28 。 非理性的可持续发展是指仅仅因为某个项目、投资或认证被认为是可持续的,就去追求它。即使它确实是可持续的,并且有真正的好处,而不仅仅是打勾,它也会有成本--投资的直接经济成本,以及从其他创造经济或社会价值的活动中挪用时间的间接成本。此外,投资并不总是越多越好;与任何投资一样,回报都是递减的,甚至会变成负数。"理性可持续发展 "认识到,可持续发展因素与其他因素一样,都受制于万有引力定律。理性的可持续发展认识到,可持续发展因素与其他因素一样受制于万有引力定律。它鼓励我们纵观全局--与其沉迷于利益,不如退一步考虑成本。即使我们的目标不仅仅是经济回报,这一点也同样适用。有必要估算财务成本,以确定额外的社会回报是否足以抵消减少的财务回报,而不是因为社会回报是件 "好事 "而一意孤行。"原则 7 "强调,如果考虑特定的环境、社会和公司治理因素,并非越多越好。这一原则强调了一个经济现实,即更多的环境、社会和公司治理因素并不总是更好。打勾越多,你的 ESG 评级就越高,客户就越不会因为你没有打勾而抵制你。理性的可持续发展认识到,虽然公司对社会负有责任(无论是出于经济原因还是社会原因),但也有限度:如果苹果公司的卓越表现加速了黑莓手机的衰落,或者如果苹果公司的招聘标准阻碍了低质量的求职者获得工作,那么苹果公司不应该承担责任。合理的可持续发展观设定了界限,它建立了一个框架来分析公司的责任应该是什么,不应该是什么。这个框架反过来又指导如何分配资金、员工和时间的决策。这样,公司就有责任履行其规定的责任。没有这样的界限,什么都可以做;不清楚高管应该如何权衡利弊,也不清楚投资者应该让她承担什么责任。在《成长派》中,我提出了两个标准来确立这样的界限38 。沃达丰应该投资 M-Pesa,因为它拥有电信方面的专业知识;它不应该向慈善机构捐款,因为它没有特殊能力来评估哪些慈善机构最有价值或最有效。如果一家公司的唯一目标是经济回报,这就需要考虑商业实质:一家公司应优先考虑那些对其商业模式最重要的利益相关者。苹果公司应投资于专业供应商,如为其 iPhone 提供触摸屏玻璃的康宁公司,但商品供应商的重要性较低。如果公司的目标包括社会回报,这也涉及到内在重要性:公司股东和利益相关者关心的非财务目标(而不是,例如,那些碰巧出现在新闻中的目标)。公司可以选择自己的标准,但有些标准是必须的,否则决策就是武断的。另一种与可持续发展特别相关的行为偏差是从众心理,即由于其他人都在这样做,人们就会扎堆去做某件事情。教授们不顾自己的专业知识,争先恐后地教授有关环境、社会和公司治理的课程;塔吉特、百威淡啤和迪斯尼等公司争先恐后地拥抱自由主义议题,而不考虑其保守的客户;投资者们则对最新的可持续发展投资热潮趋之若鹜。39 投资者们对电动汽车的可持续发展资质--其产生经济回报和应对气候变化的潜力--感到非常兴奋,以至于将电动汽车股票的价值抬高到了无稽的水平。将每家电动汽车公司的价格相加,即使在最乐观的电动汽车普及情况下,整个电动汽车行业的价值也是难以置信的。第二种非理性是 "零风险偏差",它导致人们寻求完全消除风险,即使大幅降低风险就足够了。举个日常的例子,即使发生故障的风险已经很小,消费者也会为高价购买延保服务,以将风险降至零。
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引用次数: 0
Scapulothoracic tenodesis using hamstring tendon graft for treatment of problematic scapula winging: A new surgical technique. 使用腘绳肌腱移植的肩胛胸肌腱膜切除术治疗问题肩胛骨翼状突起:一种新的手术技术。
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-07-01 Epub Date: 2023-05-11 DOI: 10.1177/17585732231174178
Kishan Gokaraju, Ahmed Mahmoud, Daniel Williams, Phillip Fr Duke, Mark Ross

Introduction: Winging of the scapula occurs due to dysfunction of its stabilising muscles, most commonly serratus anterior and/or trapezius, for example in facioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy. Resultant loss of scapular control and abnormal kinematics can decrease shoulder function due to glenohumeral joint instability, loss of range of motion and pain. Previously described treatment for cases resistant to physiotherapy includes scapulothoracic arthrodesis which involves risk of non-union and metalwork failure, as well as reduced respiratory function due to immobilisation of a segment of the adjacent chest wall.

Technique: We present a novel surgical approach to the management of problematic scapular winging by using hamstring graft to achieve a scapulothoracic tenodesis.

Discussion: We believe this technique provides an adequately stable scapula for improved shoulder movement and function, a sufficiently mobile chest wall for improved lung function and avoidance of complications specifically associated with arthrodesis.

导言:肩胛骨的摆动是由于其稳定肌肉(最常见的是前锯肌和/或斜方肌,例如面岬肱肌营养不良症)的功能障碍所致。肩胛骨失去控制和运动异常会导致盂肱关节不稳定、活动范围减小和疼痛,从而降低肩部功能。以往针对物理治疗无效病例的治疗方法包括肩胛胸关节置换术,但这种方法存在不愈合和金属加工失败的风险,而且由于邻近胸壁的一段被固定,呼吸功能也会下降:我们提出了一种新的手术方法,通过使用腘绳肌移植来实现肩胛胸肌腱膜固定,从而解决肩胛翼问题:讨论:我们认为该技术可提供足够稳定的肩胛骨,以改善肩部活动和功能,提供足够活动的胸壁,以改善肺功能,并避免与关节固定术特别相关的并发症。
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引用次数: 0
Corporate social responsibility and the shareholder primacy paradigm 企业社会责任与股东至上范式
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12613
David J. Denis

Recent years have witnessed an explosion in the attention paid to the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the idea that corporations have an obligation to consider the impact of their decisions on a broad set of stakeholders that extends well beyond their investors. Such social concerns are by no means new; they were matters for corporate boardroom and top management discussions long before Milton Friedman published his famous editorial on the social responsibility of business.1 Nonetheless, for at least the past decade and since the passing of the Global Financial Crisis, CSR advocates have more vigorously pursued their mission of incorporating social concerns within the purview of corporate decision-making.

But why so much corporate attention to social matters now? Three possibilities come to mind. First, the urgency of social concerns and the perceived ability of and expectation that corporations will do something about them have increased over time as public companies have become steadily larger and their reach more global. Climate change is the prototype of a social issue whose urgency and scope continue to grow over time. Second is the possibility that, although the social concerns themselves have not changed much over time, individual preferences have changed and various stakeholders have become more sensitive to those concerns than before. A third possibility is that, although social concerns tend to arise from negative “externalities” that most economists assume are best managed through government regulation, growing or widespread skepticism about the ability of government institutions to address these concerns in cost-effective ways could lead to increased demand for corporate investment in addressing social challenges.

Regardless of the reason for the increased attention to CSR, it is almost invariably accompanied by calls for rethinking the idea of shareholder primacy in the corporate objective function. In this article, I address the question of whether the increased focus on CSR requires a paradigm shift away from the traditional shareholder primacy model toward one that gives more voice to stakeholders. My short answer to this question is no, and for three main reasons:

First, the increased focus on CSR has virtually nothing to do with the factors that led to the establishment of shareholder primacy as the dominant paradigm. The theory of shareholder primacy which is a cornerstone of modern corporate finance arose as an efficient solution to “contracting” problems faced by corporations that have a diverse set of stakeholders, each of which often has different preferences about what and how certain corporate decisions get made.2 Such contracting problems—which have long been, and will always be, with us—are likely to become even more intractable with the rising demand for CSR. Which leads to the suggestion: if we thought that shareholder primacy was part of an efficient organizational structure befo

如果公司的利润流和股票价值反映了成本,但没有反映企业社会责任的所有预期收益,那么公司将倾向于减少在企业社会责任方面的投资,因此,可能会给社会带来净成本,从而减少总体社会福利。这种负面经济外部性最突出和最常被引用的例子是公司生产过程中产生的污染对环境造成的破坏。经济学家早已认识到,政府监管机构通常最有能力解决这类经济外部性问题,并在此过程中找到最有效的社会定位。然而,如前所述,对企业行动或企业社会责任的需求增加,可以解释为一种普遍观点的副产品,即政府在解决这些外部性问题方面并不特别有效。在这种情况下,企业管理层有理由采取更加以利益相关者为导向的观点,使企业政策的社会影响成为企业目标函数的一个明确部分。但是,如果不首先获得股东的某种普遍授权,要实施这一解决方案同样会遇到重大障碍--即由于利益相关者本身对个别企业社会责任政策的偏好千差万别,因此很难采取纯粹以利益相关者为导向的方法来应对环境挑战。正如法国 "黄背心 "抗议活动所表明的那样,员工愿意为更大的社会效益做出经济牺牲是有限度的,尤其是那些预计不会在短期内实现的社会效益。换句话说,当股东财富最大化是公司的目标函数时,如果公司将外部性强加给社会,那么在利益相关者优先的制度下,公司至少也有可能这样做。如果我们不能指望政府监管机构有效解决外部性问题,而且在提供社会最优企业社会责任政策方面,一般的利益相关者优先方法并不比股东优先方法更好,那么公司将这一角色简单地委托给公司经理人的可能性又如何呢?这种授权与目前的做法大体一致,即管理者在选择公司政策时已被赋予相当大的自由裁量权,以实现股东财富最大化。根据这一替代方案,首席执行官实质上是企业社会责任的中央规划者,根据商业判断规则,他们在选择政策时将被赋予很大的自由度,以达到某种模糊指定的社会责任目标。把那些已经证明过于复杂、成本过高、无法通过自愿签约来解决的决策权下放给个人,似乎根本没有希望,也不可行。之所以选择首席执行官,是因为他们在如何以最低的价格生产消费者所需的产品方面具有专业知识,而不是因为他们在确定或制定有效的社会政策或裁定不同利益相关群体之间的权衡方面具有经验或智慧。正如汤姆-高斯林(Tom Gosling)在前一篇关于沃尔格林-博茨(Walgreens-Boots)"生活工资 "运动的文章中所指出的那样,要求企业首席执行官在决定什么是大多数员工的 "生活工资 "时忽视或凌驾于劳动力市场定价之上,只会导致管理失误和竞争失败。企业高管如此僭越通常由劳动力市场和其他要素市场提供的职能,将极大地扩大代理冲突的范围--或者可以说,打开了一个名副其实的潘多拉盒子--企业管理者将受到诱惑,利用他们的自由裁量权做出决策,虽然使他们自己的生活更轻松,但最终却损害了股东和其他利益相关者的利益。迈克尔-詹森(Michael Jensen)和威廉-梅克林(William Meckling)在他们的开创性文章--也是迄今为止公司财务文献中被引用最多的文章--中将代理成本理论应用于现代上市公司的特定环境中,在这种环境中,公司的所有权和控制权通常是明确分离的。
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引用次数: 0
Epilogue: Sustainable financial management (and the promise and pitfalls of ESG investing) 后记:可持续财务管理(以及环境、社会和公司治理投资的前景与陷阱)
IF 0.7 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2024-06-06 DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12612
Don Chew
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
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