Pub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2277446
Evan W. Sandlin
ABSTRACTRecent polling shows significant levels of radical partisanship among the US public in the form of violent partisan schadenfreude and violent partisan attitudes. Previous research shows that the partisan intensity underlying these sentiments increases around presidential elections and when political actors use violent rhetoric. Has lethal mass partisanship declined in the years after the 2020 election, especially now that one of the main purveyors of violent rhetoric has left office? This paper uses panel data from the Understanding America Study (UAS) to show how levels of radical partisanship have changed from the post-election period of 2020 to the same time period in 2021 and 2022. The results demonstrate that rates of violent partisan attitudes have declined in 2021 and 2022 compared to 2020, especially amongst those who were most supportive of former President Donald Trump. However, changes in partisan schadenfreude have no discernable pattern. The results demonstrate both that radical partisanship is not on a uniformly upward trajectory but likely decreases and increases with changes in political context, and that elements of radical partisanship do not vary in parallel. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kalmoe and Mason (Citation2019) originally termed the attitudes that make up the focus of this paper as “lethal mass partisanship.” Kalmoe and Mason (Citation2022) have since referred to these attitudes as “radical partisanship.” For the sake of clarity, I use their more recent terminology.2 The UAS received all necessary ethics approvals (approval number: BRANY IRB # 22-065-1044).3 Exact question wording and coding details can be found in the appendix.4 All schadenfreude and violence question items were only asked of those who had a Republican or Democrat partisan affiliation.5 See appendix for demographics.6 Statistical significance was ascertained using a weighted difference in means test.7 These results do not change substantially when including all participants.8 While variables such as race and gender may be seen as time invariant, data for these variables is collected on a quarterly basis for UAS respondents with the opportunity to update past answers.9 The question on approval for Trump (post-November 3rd) comes from a UAS post-election survey (UAS 318). The survey had 7,279 respondents with a response rate of 80.91%(USC Dornsife Center for Economic and Social Research Citation2020) .10 These models are not estimated with fixed effects since the question about Trump support was only asked in 2020 and is therefore time-invariant.11 See appendix for this and other robustness checks.
{"title":"Have heads cooled? Changes in radical partisanship from 2020–2022","authors":"Evan W. Sandlin","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2277446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2277446","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRecent polling shows significant levels of radical partisanship among the US public in the form of violent partisan schadenfreude and violent partisan attitudes. Previous research shows that the partisan intensity underlying these sentiments increases around presidential elections and when political actors use violent rhetoric. Has lethal mass partisanship declined in the years after the 2020 election, especially now that one of the main purveyors of violent rhetoric has left office? This paper uses panel data from the Understanding America Study (UAS) to show how levels of radical partisanship have changed from the post-election period of 2020 to the same time period in 2021 and 2022. The results demonstrate that rates of violent partisan attitudes have declined in 2021 and 2022 compared to 2020, especially amongst those who were most supportive of former President Donald Trump. However, changes in partisan schadenfreude have no discernable pattern. The results demonstrate both that radical partisanship is not on a uniformly upward trajectory but likely decreases and increases with changes in political context, and that elements of radical partisanship do not vary in parallel. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kalmoe and Mason (Citation2019) originally termed the attitudes that make up the focus of this paper as “lethal mass partisanship.” Kalmoe and Mason (Citation2022) have since referred to these attitudes as “radical partisanship.” For the sake of clarity, I use their more recent terminology.2 The UAS received all necessary ethics approvals (approval number: BRANY IRB # 22-065-1044).3 Exact question wording and coding details can be found in the appendix.4 All schadenfreude and violence question items were only asked of those who had a Republican or Democrat partisan affiliation.5 See appendix for demographics.6 Statistical significance was ascertained using a weighted difference in means test.7 These results do not change substantially when including all participants.8 While variables such as race and gender may be seen as time invariant, data for these variables is collected on a quarterly basis for UAS respondents with the opportunity to update past answers.9 The question on approval for Trump (post-November 3rd) comes from a UAS post-election survey (UAS 318). The survey had 7,279 respondents with a response rate of 80.91%(USC Dornsife Center for Economic and Social Research Citation2020) .10 These models are not estimated with fixed effects since the question about Trump support was only asked in 2020 and is therefore time-invariant.11 See appendix for this and other robustness checks.","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"134 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136352103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-12DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2281381
Thomas Karv, Kim Strandberg
Consultative referendums are becoming more widely used as a way of responding to rising public discontent with the workings of representative democracy. Consequently, consultative referendums have become an integral part of democratic decision-making processes across the world. However, how the population reacts to the referendum outcome is expected to differ among the population as referendums, by design, divides the participants into winners and losers. In turn, creating a winner-loser gap with potentially polarizing societal consequences. This study therefore seeks to explore how this winner-loser gap is associated with several types of referendum attitudes following the outcome of a local referendum. Using survey data (N = 3113) gathered after a high stakes local referendum in Finland, the more explicit research purpose is therefore to analyze how individual-level opinions about referendums, turnout thresholds and margin of victory thresholds are related to the winner-loser gap. Additionally, we also control for whether these associations are moderated by external efficacy and political trust. The results clearly imply that the winner-loser gap have consequences for several types of referendum attitudes, contributing to scholarship about the effects derived from the winner-loser gap.
{"title":"Only losers use excuses? Exploring the association between the winner-loser gap and referendum attitudes following a local referendum","authors":"Thomas Karv, Kim Strandberg","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2281381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2281381","url":null,"abstract":"Consultative referendums are becoming more widely used as a way of responding to rising public discontent with the workings of representative democracy. Consequently, consultative referendums have become an integral part of democratic decision-making processes across the world. However, how the population reacts to the referendum outcome is expected to differ among the population as referendums, by design, divides the participants into winners and losers. In turn, creating a winner-loser gap with potentially polarizing societal consequences. This study therefore seeks to explore how this winner-loser gap is associated with several types of referendum attitudes following the outcome of a local referendum. Using survey data (N = 3113) gathered after a high stakes local referendum in Finland, the more explicit research purpose is therefore to analyze how individual-level opinions about referendums, turnout thresholds and margin of victory thresholds are related to the winner-loser gap. Additionally, we also control for whether these associations are moderated by external efficacy and political trust. The results clearly imply that the winner-loser gap have consequences for several types of referendum attitudes, contributing to scholarship about the effects derived from the winner-loser gap.","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135036774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-09DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2281374
Samuel Franklin Harper
ABSTRACTDo ballot initiatives increase voter turnout? Some studies find a strong impact while others find the relationship to be modest and/or conditional. Either way, the underlying mechanism is not well understood. Here, we build on past work by hypothesizing that signing a ballot petition acts as a personalized form of campaign contact, increasing the likelihood of turnout. Previous investigations have been aggregate in nature, or have had to rely on either samples of petition signers or county-level inferences. We procured the complete lists of initiative petitions signers for two recent, high-profile state ballot measures in Arkansas, among the most frequent direct democracy users among the American states. By supplementing these individual-level data with the state voter file, we assess the impact of having signed a petition, controlling for age and vote history. Our results confirm earlier findings that signing a petition increases the probability of voter turnout, especially among irregular voters. This has consequences for both candidate and initiative elections in jurisdictions that, like Arkansas, conduct both elections at the same time. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Still other thinkers have hypothesized a role for ideology in the initiative-turnout relationship. Popularly-initiated same-sex marriage bans and marijuana-legalization measures, for example, have been said to have energized conservative and progressive turnout, respectively (e.g., Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel Citation2006). However, Biggers (Citation2014) finds no evidence that such measures increased turnout for any particular group, nor were there marked turnout increases among voters generally perceived as being concerned with moral issues, such as poorer, older, or fundamentalist Christian voters.2 The 2014 minimum-wage initiative was “An Act to Increase the Arkansas Minimum Wage.” The measure gradually increased the state’s minimum wage from $6.25 an hour to $8.50 an hour by 2017 (UADA Public Policy Center Citation2014). The 2016 marijuana initiative was “The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016,” and stood to legalize the medical use of cannabis in the State of Arkansas (UADA Public Policy Center Citation2016).3 Arkansas law establishes the minimum number of signers for a petition to be put to vote as eight percent of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election for initiated acts. The 2014 petition therefore required 62,547 signatures (eight percent of the 2010 election), and the 2016 petition, a constitutional amendment, required 67,887 (eight percent of the 2014 election).4 To test the robustness of these models, we conducted four additional analyses with controls for county-level percent Black and Hispanic and county median income. The results of these models are reported in the appendix and do not affect the robustness of the individual-level-only models.5 We estimate marginal effect
{"title":"The effect of signing ballot petitions on turnout","authors":"Samuel Franklin Harper","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2281374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2281374","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDo ballot initiatives increase voter turnout? Some studies find a strong impact while others find the relationship to be modest and/or conditional. Either way, the underlying mechanism is not well understood. Here, we build on past work by hypothesizing that signing a ballot petition acts as a personalized form of campaign contact, increasing the likelihood of turnout. Previous investigations have been aggregate in nature, or have had to rely on either samples of petition signers or county-level inferences. We procured the complete lists of initiative petitions signers for two recent, high-profile state ballot measures in Arkansas, among the most frequent direct democracy users among the American states. By supplementing these individual-level data with the state voter file, we assess the impact of having signed a petition, controlling for age and vote history. Our results confirm earlier findings that signing a petition increases the probability of voter turnout, especially among irregular voters. This has consequences for both candidate and initiative elections in jurisdictions that, like Arkansas, conduct both elections at the same time. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Still other thinkers have hypothesized a role for ideology in the initiative-turnout relationship. Popularly-initiated same-sex marriage bans and marijuana-legalization measures, for example, have been said to have energized conservative and progressive turnout, respectively (e.g., Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel Citation2006). However, Biggers (Citation2014) finds no evidence that such measures increased turnout for any particular group, nor were there marked turnout increases among voters generally perceived as being concerned with moral issues, such as poorer, older, or fundamentalist Christian voters.2 The 2014 minimum-wage initiative was “An Act to Increase the Arkansas Minimum Wage.” The measure gradually increased the state’s minimum wage from $6.25 an hour to $8.50 an hour by 2017 (UADA Public Policy Center Citation2014). The 2016 marijuana initiative was “The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016,” and stood to legalize the medical use of cannabis in the State of Arkansas (UADA Public Policy Center Citation2016).3 Arkansas law establishes the minimum number of signers for a petition to be put to vote as eight percent of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election for initiated acts. The 2014 petition therefore required 62,547 signatures (eight percent of the 2010 election), and the 2016 petition, a constitutional amendment, required 67,887 (eight percent of the 2014 election).4 To test the robustness of these models, we conducted four additional analyses with controls for county-level percent Black and Hispanic and county median income. The results of these models are reported in the appendix and do not affect the robustness of the individual-level-only models.5 We estimate marginal effect","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":" 92","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135191535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-05DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2277450
John Taden, Daniel K. Banini, Agomor Kingsley
An increasing number of African countries are experiencing electoral power shifts, indicating that more voters are switching loyalties between parties and candidates. Theories that pin electoral change in Africa on clientelism, patronage, and ethnic cleavages fail to account for the dynamics surrounding these shifting loyalties. This study probes the factors that pry swing voters away from core supporters in African elections. Using data from a nationally representative sample of over 3000 voters across Ghana, we find evidence that voters exempted from positive clientelist inducements (gifts) were more likely to cast swing votes. We also find that voters exposed to negative clientelism (wary of violence or forceful forfeiture of benefits after elections) were more likely to cast swing votes. Nonetheless, voters wary of violence but who have received gifts in exchange for their votes were less likely to swing their vote, indicating that negative clientelism is only effective when accompanied by positive inducements. Finally, we find that voters who prioritize parties’ performance records were more likely to switch their votes from one party to another. Our results imply that the rising political power shifts on the continent are driven by an increasing share of voters unencumbered by clientelist inducements and a rising determination to prioritize national interests over parochial benefits.
{"title":"Determinants of swing voting in Africa: evidence from Ghana's elections","authors":"John Taden, Daniel K. Banini, Agomor Kingsley","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2277450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2277450","url":null,"abstract":"An increasing number of African countries are experiencing electoral power shifts, indicating that more voters are switching loyalties between parties and candidates. Theories that pin electoral change in Africa on clientelism, patronage, and ethnic cleavages fail to account for the dynamics surrounding these shifting loyalties. This study probes the factors that pry swing voters away from core supporters in African elections. Using data from a nationally representative sample of over 3000 voters across Ghana, we find evidence that voters exempted from positive clientelist inducements (gifts) were more likely to cast swing votes. We also find that voters exposed to negative clientelism (wary of violence or forceful forfeiture of benefits after elections) were more likely to cast swing votes. Nonetheless, voters wary of violence but who have received gifts in exchange for their votes were less likely to swing their vote, indicating that negative clientelism is only effective when accompanied by positive inducements. Finally, we find that voters who prioritize parties’ performance records were more likely to switch their votes from one party to another. Our results imply that the rising political power shifts on the continent are driven by an increasing share of voters unencumbered by clientelist inducements and a rising determination to prioritize national interests over parochial benefits.","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"55 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135725288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2277429
Kyung Joon Han
ABSTRACTWhich voters hold polarized affects for political parties in Western Europe? We consider distinct characteristics of different political issues that shape political actors’ behaviors and argue that voters are more affectively polarized when they put salience on cultural issues because their stances on the issues are embedded in their deep-seated identity, value, belief, and morality. Empirically, we use measures of affective polarization that incorporate the multiparty systems of Western European countries. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module 3), we find that voters who put salience on cultural issues are more affectively polarized than others. The result implies that rising affective polarization in the past decades might have been related to increasing priorities on cultural issues. It also implies that political parties may potentially weaken voters’ affective polarization by manipulating their issue agenda. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2277429Notes1 Literature on affective polarization distinguishes voters’ positive and negative feelings on political parties, their elites (e.g., party leaders), and their supporters. Affective polarization on one of these does not necessarily lead to that on others (e.g., Knudsen Citation2021). We limit our concept of affective polarization to a voter’s different and contrasting feelings toward political parties.2 Unlike the concept of voters’ ideological polarization, which indicates that voters come to have more different ideologies each other, voters’ affective polarization is basically an individual-level concept because it means that each voter comes to have more different affects for different political parties.3 Consequently, while there is one clear way to measure affective polarization in the two-party system (i.e., the difference in party affects toward two political parties), we need an alternative way to measure how diverse voters’ affects toward multiple political parties are (Wagner Citation2021).4 In this paper, we use the term of “cultural issues” to describe “new politics” or “post-materialism” issues (Flanagan and Lee Citation2003).5 Voters may dislike only political parties that belong to a rival party bloc. Nonetheless, in addition to grand coalitions that include both (left-wing and right-wing) major parties, coalition governments that embrace political parties from both sides of the political spectrum (typically a major party from one side and a minor party from the other side) have occurred in many Western European countries. For example, the Social Democratic Party government in Denmark in 1990 invited the Christian People’s Party, and the Finnish right-wing government in 2007 invited the Green League.6 As far as we are aware, there is no empirical analysis that examines how voters’ affects t
{"title":"Issue salience and affective polarization","authors":"Kyung Joon Han","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2277429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2277429","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhich voters hold polarized affects for political parties in Western Europe? We consider distinct characteristics of different political issues that shape political actors’ behaviors and argue that voters are more affectively polarized when they put salience on cultural issues because their stances on the issues are embedded in their deep-seated identity, value, belief, and morality. Empirically, we use measures of affective polarization that incorporate the multiparty systems of Western European countries. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Module 3), we find that voters who put salience on cultural issues are more affectively polarized than others. The result implies that rising affective polarization in the past decades might have been related to increasing priorities on cultural issues. It also implies that political parties may potentially weaken voters’ affective polarization by manipulating their issue agenda. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2277429Notes1 Literature on affective polarization distinguishes voters’ positive and negative feelings on political parties, their elites (e.g., party leaders), and their supporters. Affective polarization on one of these does not necessarily lead to that on others (e.g., Knudsen Citation2021). We limit our concept of affective polarization to a voter’s different and contrasting feelings toward political parties.2 Unlike the concept of voters’ ideological polarization, which indicates that voters come to have more different ideologies each other, voters’ affective polarization is basically an individual-level concept because it means that each voter comes to have more different affects for different political parties.3 Consequently, while there is one clear way to measure affective polarization in the two-party system (i.e., the difference in party affects toward two political parties), we need an alternative way to measure how diverse voters’ affects toward multiple political parties are (Wagner Citation2021).4 In this paper, we use the term of “cultural issues” to describe “new politics” or “post-materialism” issues (Flanagan and Lee Citation2003).5 Voters may dislike only political parties that belong to a rival party bloc. Nonetheless, in addition to grand coalitions that include both (left-wing and right-wing) major parties, coalition governments that embrace political parties from both sides of the political spectrum (typically a major party from one side and a minor party from the other side) have occurred in many Western European countries. For example, the Social Democratic Party government in Denmark in 1990 invited the Christian People’s Party, and the Finnish right-wing government in 2007 invited the Green League.6 As far as we are aware, there is no empirical analysis that examines how voters’ affects t","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"164 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135372080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-08DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2253729
Michael Jankowski, Christina-Marie Juen, Markus Tepe
{"title":"Voting against parties: populist attitudes, party supply, and support for non-partisan actors","authors":"Michael Jankowski, Christina-Marie Juen, Markus Tepe","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2253729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2253729","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76204819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-29DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2243586
Eliana Alvarez, Juan A. Bogliaccini, P. Enns, Martín Opertti, R. Queirolo
{"title":"Policy mood and thermostatic representation in developing democracies: taking the temperature in Uruguay","authors":"Eliana Alvarez, Juan A. Bogliaccini, P. Enns, Martín Opertti, R. Queirolo","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2243586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2243586","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77557959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-14DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2246371
L. Bernardi, I. Gotlib, Fortunato Bernardi
{"title":"Depressive rumination and political engagement","authors":"L. Bernardi, I. Gotlib, Fortunato Bernardi","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2246371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2246371","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77696586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2243587
Paul D. Kenny, Boris Bizumic
{"title":"Is there a populist personality? Populist attitudes, personality, and voter preference in Australian public opinion","authors":"Paul D. Kenny, Boris Bizumic","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2243587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2243587","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87582585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2023.2241817
Francesco Visconti
{"title":"Voting across borders? The electoral consequences of individual transnationalism","authors":"Francesco Visconti","doi":"10.1080/17457289.2023.2241817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2241817","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46791,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties","volume":"97 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82011998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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