Norms for judicial and clinical decisions under uncertainty differ. When clinicians are uncertain about patient health, they view the patient as a member of a population with similar attributes and make care decisions using available knowledge about the distribution of health in this population. In contrast, legal systems typically do not permit a defendant to be convicted of a crime based on a justification that persons with similar attributes often commit this crime. This paper examines the implications if, emulating clinical practice, judges making conviction decisions were to use knowledge of rates of crime commission.
{"title":"Judicial and Clinical Decision-Making under Uncertainty","authors":"C. Manski","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Norms for judicial and clinical decisions under uncertainty differ. When clinicians are uncertain about patient health, they view the patient as a member of a population with similar attributes and make care decisions using available knowledge about the distribution of health in this population. In contrast, legal systems typically do not permit a defendant to be convicted of a crime based on a justification that persons with similar attributes often commit this crime. This paper examines the implications if, emulating clinical practice, judges making conviction decisions were to use knowledge of rates of crime commission.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judicial and Clinical Decision-Making under Uncertainty","authors":"J. Rost","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Life you do Not Save: Reflections on the Causal Element in the Notion of a Decision's Consequences","authors":"K. Hoover","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because of its effect of weakening quantity competition. However, it is not adopted without industry associations. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR without the industry associations and they choose a higher level of ECSR with the industry associations. Second, we consider emission intensity commitments (commitment to per-output emissions) and find that it is less likely to restrict market competition.
{"title":"Noncooperative and Cooperative Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Kosuke Hirose, Sang‐Ho Lee, Toshihiro Matsumura","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0035","url":null,"abstract":"We formulate several quantity and price competition models that investigate the adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) by firms competing in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitments. Under quantity competition, ECSR is adopted by joint-profit-maximizing industry associations because of its effect of weakening quantity competition. However, it is not adopted without industry associations. By contrast, under price competition, individual firms voluntarily adopt ECSR without the industry associations and they choose a higher level of ECSR with the industry associations. Second, we consider emission intensity commitments (commitment to per-output emissions) and find that it is less likely to restrict market competition.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertain Judges","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We combine in the same theoretical framework two related phenomena that can be present in organizations – ingratiation of subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards some of their employees. There are three actors in the model: a worker, a manager supervising the worker, and a firm that employs the worker and the manager. Ingratiation is defined as a strategic behavior of the worker to make himself more attractive to the manager. In our model ingratiation is expressed by opinion conformity which is exerted by the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is based on using a bias when reporting to the firm her observation of the worker's performance. First, we determine to optimal level of the effort and the reported opinion of the worker, and the level of bias of the manager. Then, we investigate the effects of favoritism and ingratiation on the expected wages and utilities of the worker and the manager, and on the expected profit of the firm.
{"title":"Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations","authors":"A. Rusinowska, V. Vergopoulos","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2020-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2020-0032","url":null,"abstract":"We combine in the same theoretical framework two related phenomena that can be present in organizations – ingratiation of subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards some of their employees. There are three actors in the model: a worker, a manager supervising the worker, and a firm that employs the worker and the manager. Ingratiation is defined as a strategic behavior of the worker to make himself more attractive to the manager. In our model ingratiation is expressed by opinion conformity which is exerted by the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is based on using a bias when reporting to the firm her observation of the worker's performance. First, we determine to optimal level of the effort and the reported opinion of the worker, and the level of bias of the manager. Then, we investigate the effects of favoritism and ingratiation on the expected wages and utilities of the worker and the manager, and on the expected profit of the firm.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73043911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Considering the sale of an asset by a first-price sealed-bid auction, we analyze the effect of a right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) clause, under which a buyer can match the highest bidder. When the buyers do not exactly know their competitors' degree of risk aversion, we compare their optimal bidding strategies with and without an ROFR. Then, when the seller does not exactly know each buyer's degreeof risk aversion, we determine some sufficient conditions under which an ROFR cannot increase the seller's expected revenue. However, when she knows that information and when two buyers compete, we show that granting an ROFR can increase her expected revenue.
{"title":"The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders","authors":"Karine Brisset, F. Cochard, F. Maréchal","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Considering the sale of an asset by a first-price sealed-bid auction, we analyze the effect of a right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) clause, under which a buyer can match the highest bidder. When the buyers do not exactly know their competitors' degree of risk aversion, we compare their optimal bidding strategies with and without an ROFR. Then, when the seller does not exactly know each buyer's degreeof risk aversion, we determine some sufficient conditions under which an ROFR cannot increase the seller's expected revenue. However, when she knows that information and when two buyers compete, we show that granting an ROFR can increase her expected revenue.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"537 1","pages":"526"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79644755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causation and Incentives in Updating Courts","authors":"Alan D. Miller","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0017","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"09 1","pages":"152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88726056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A model of capital production that generates U-shaped long-run average-cost curves due to scale effects caused by uncertainty and complementarity among components is presented. Increasing returns to scale are not caused by indivisibilities, and decreasing returns to scale are not caused by fixed factors or substitution. Indivisibilities are created from the profit-maximizing exploitation of returns to scale. Returns to scale cause economies of scale and support a variety of market contexts. Replication and perfect competition are not observationally inconsistent with variable returns to scale, but they are limiting abstract concepts in the face of variable returns to scale.
{"title":"Replication, Uncertainty, Complementarity, and Returns to Scale in the Production of Resilience","authors":"Kenneth I. Carlaw","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0026","url":null,"abstract":"A model of capital production that generates U-shaped long-run average-cost curves due to scale effects caused by uncertainty and complementarity among components is presented. Increasing returns to scale are not caused by indivisibilities, and decreasing returns to scale are not caused by fixed factors or substitution. Indivisibilities are created from the profit-maximizing exploitation of returns to scale. Returns to scale cause economies of scale and support a variety of market contexts. Replication and perfect competition are not observationally inconsistent with variable returns to scale, but they are limiting abstract concepts in the face of variable returns to scale.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"45 1","pages":"351-376"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89862354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Choosing a Production Joint Venture Partner","authors":"R. Ding, Chiu Yu Ko, Bo Shen","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"16 1","pages":"665"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90645319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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