{"title":"The Life you do Not Save: Reflections on the Causal Element in the Notion of a Decision's Consequences","authors":"W. Lübbe","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Consumer Misperception in a Hotelling Model: With and Without Price Discrimination","authors":"N. Persico","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Causality in the Law and in the Social Sciences","authors":"C. Engel, U. Schweizer","doi":"10.1628/jite-2020-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When parties negotiate over surplus, incumbents, or agenda-setters, tend to spend more resources than challengers to keep their power in making a proposal. This is often attributed to the fact that incumbents usually have better access to resources. We experimentally investigate whether incumbents spend more resources even when they have no advantage. Specifically, we consider a twostage game where in the first stage, players compete to be recognized as a proposer, and in the second stage, they play an ultimatum bargaining game. Our treatment concerns whether one of the subjects is endowed with proposal right (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We find that subjects who were framed to be incumbents spent significantly more resources to keep the proposal right than others. This suggests that even without any resource advantage, the parties who have the power would incur higher costs to keep it, and thus, the allocation of power is likely to persist. Our finding is new in the sense that the endowment effect does not concern “property right†as in previous studies but “proposal right.â€
{"title":"Endowment Effects in Proposal Rights Contests","authors":"Youjin Hahn, Chulyoung Kim, Sang‐Hyun Kim","doi":"10.1628/jite-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"When parties negotiate over surplus, incumbents, or agenda-setters, tend to spend more resources than challengers to keep their power in making a proposal. This is often attributed to the fact that incumbents usually have better access to resources. We experimentally investigate whether incumbents spend more resources even when they have no advantage. Specifically, we consider a twostage game where in the first stage, players compete to be recognized as a proposer, and in the second stage, they play an ultimatum bargaining game. Our treatment concerns whether one of the subjects is endowed with proposal right (without any material advantage) in the beginning of the game. We find that subjects who were framed to be incumbents spent significantly more resources to keep the proposal right than others. This suggests that even without any resource advantage, the parties who have the power would incur higher costs to keep it, and thus, the allocation of power is likely to persist. Our finding is new in the sense that the endowment effect does not concern “property right†as in previous studies but “proposal right.â€","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42133975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assigning Protection: Can Refugee Rights and State Preferences be Reconciled?","authors":"U. Becker","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2019-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2019-0007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":"46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76605362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The German copyright law was reformed in the end of 2016 with the purpose of ensuring reasonable pecuniary compensation to authors. It proposes an option which entitles authors to negotiate copyright transfers with an additional publisher after a vesting period of ten years. The results of a two-stage bargaining model show that the proposed copyright system may actually harm authors, as publishers may internalize a potential impairment on profits from increased competition within contract negotiations. This paper also demonstrates that the publisher's willingness to invest into an author's career is strictly decreasing as the level of expected rivalry increases.
{"title":"More Rights, Less Income?: An Economic Analysis of the New Copyright Law in Germany","authors":"Michael Karas, Roland Kirstein","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2019-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2019-0029","url":null,"abstract":"The German copyright law was reformed in the end of 2016 with the purpose of ensuring reasonable pecuniary compensation to authors. It proposes an option which entitles authors to negotiate copyright transfers with an additional publisher after a vesting period of ten years. The results of a two-stage bargaining model show that the proposed copyright system may actually harm authors, as publishers may internalize a potential impairment on profits from increased competition within contract negotiations. This paper also demonstrates that the publisher's willingness to invest into an author's career is strictly decreasing as the level of expected rivalry increases.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I consider a canonical bilateral trade setting in which the agents can exert non-verifiable investments, before they play a revelation mechanism and subsequently advance to the trading stage, where they take nondurable actions. Watson (2007) has demonstrated in a similar setting that the set of implementable outcomes is largest (i) when renegotiation can be ruled out, (ii) decreases when renegotiation takes place before the mechanism is played, and (iii) is the smallest when renegotiation takes place after the play of the mechanism. The present paper seeks to clarify the meaning of the second statement. More precisely, I show that the agents can often attain the first best in case (ii), which implies that the fact that the set of implementable outcomes in situation (ii) is smaller compared to situation (i) may not matter much from an efficiency perspective.
{"title":"Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: An Optimal Contract when Interim Renegotiation Is Possible","authors":"D. Göller","doi":"10.1628/jite-2019-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2019-0033","url":null,"abstract":"I consider a canonical bilateral trade setting in which the agents can exert non-verifiable investments, before they play a revelation mechanism and subsequently advance to the trading stage, where they take nondurable actions. Watson (2007) has demonstrated in a similar setting that the set of implementable outcomes is largest (i) when renegotiation can be ruled out, (ii) decreases when renegotiation takes place before the mechanism is played, and (iii) is the smallest when renegotiation takes place after the play of the mechanism. The present paper seeks to clarify the meaning of the second statement. More precisely, I show that the agents can often attain the first best in case (ii), which implies that the fact that the set of implementable outcomes in situation (ii) is smaller compared to situation (i) may not matter much from an efficiency perspective.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Arnold, Eric Darmon, Sylvain Dejean, T. Pénard
Graduated response policies (e.g., three-strikes laws) are often adopted to deter repeated criminal activity. In 2009 France passed the Hadopi three-strikes law targeting digital piracy. We model the individual intertemporal decision to engage in illegal activity before and after receiving each strike and, contingent on this decision, the level of illegal content acquisition (piracy) within each stage. We find that monitoring efforts typically believed to deter criminal activity can have unintended results. For example, an increase in the probability of detection can increase piracy. An increase in the punishment is the only policy that unambiguously deters illegal activity.
{"title":"Digital Piracy under a Graduated Response Policy","authors":"Michael Arnold, Eric Darmon, Sylvain Dejean, T. Pénard","doi":"10.1628/JITE-2018-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/JITE-2018-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Graduated response policies (e.g., three-strikes laws) are often adopted to deter repeated criminal activity. In 2009 France passed the Hadopi three-strikes law targeting digital piracy. We model the individual intertemporal decision to engage in illegal activity before and after receiving each strike and, contingent on this decision, the level of illegal content acquisition (piracy) within each stage. We find that monitoring efforts typically believed to deter criminal activity can have unintended results. For example, an increase in the probability of detection can increase piracy. An increase in the punishment is the only policy that unambiguously deters illegal activity.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Limited Liability, Liability Cap, and Pretrial Negotiation","authors":"H. Jeong, Jeong‐Yoo Kim","doi":"10.1628/jite-2019-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2019-0027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Microfinance is an important component of the fight against poverty. We ask whether access to microfinance loans by the poor relates to their prosocial behaviors. A lab-in-the-field study in southern, rural Uganda is done. A public-good game is used to measure subjects' willingness to free-ride. We document higher levels of contributions by those who have previously received a microloan. We explore potential explanations such as differing social-norm assessments, measurable income effects, or sample selection bias. Receiving a microloan continuesto have an independent effect on prosociality. The results suggest that exposureto microfinance correlates with social preferences.
{"title":"Microfinance and Prosocial Behaviors: Experimental Evidence of Public-Good Contributions in Uganda","authors":"Bryan C. McCannon, Zachary B Rodriguez","doi":"10.1628/jite-2018-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2018-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Microfinance is an important component of the fight against poverty. We ask whether access to microfinance loans by the poor relates to their prosocial behaviors. A lab-in-the-field study in southern, rural Uganda is done. A public-good game is used to measure subjects' willingness to free-ride. We document higher levels of contributions by those who have previously received a microloan. We explore potential explanations such as differing social-norm assessments, measurable income effects, or sample selection bias. Receiving a microloan continuesto have an independent effect on prosociality. The results suggest that exposureto microfinance correlates with social preferences.","PeriodicalId":46932,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67506075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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