Why do US presidents form collaborative relationships with private organizations in matters of national security? This paper argues that these symbiotic relationships are initiated by ambitious presidents facing public resistance and congressional opposition. They enlist extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) to help mobilize public support to pressure Congress to grant its consent. EGOs are able to launder information because of their ostensible political independence and their freedom of expression, which permits them to circumvent anti-propaganda laws that constrain the executive branch. The paper further argues that the ecosystem of extra-governmental influence reflects a bias in the structure of US national security politics that favors presidential collaboration with interventionist organizations. Original archival research into the politics of the Vietnam War covering three phases of the conflict, Americanization, disenchantment, and Vietnamization, supports the paper's claims. The broader historical context shows that EGO collaborations have shaped the political development of the US national security establishment. ¿Por qué los presidentes estadounidenses establecen relaciones de colaboración con organizaciones privadas en materia de seguridad nacional? En este artículo, se sostiene que estas relaciones simbióticas son iniciadas por presidentes ambiciosos que se enfrentan a la resistencia pública y a la oposición del Congreso. Consiguen que las organizaciones extragubernamentales (Extra-Governmental Organizations, EGO) ayuden a movilizar el apoyo público para presionar al Congreso a fin de que otorgue su consentimiento. Las EGO pueden blanquear información debido a su ostensible independencia política y a su libertad de expresión, lo que les permite eludir las leyes antipropaganda que limitan al poder ejecutivo. El artículo sostiene, además, que el ecosistema de influencia extragubernamental refleja un sesgo en la estructura de la política de seguridad nacional estadounidense que favorece la colaboración presidencial con las organizaciones intervencionistas. Una investigación de archivos originales sobre la política de la guerra de Vietnam que abarca tres fases del conflicto (la americanización, el desencanto y la vietnamización) respalda las afirmaciones del artículo. El contexto histórico más amplio muestra que las colaboraciones de las EGO dieron forma al desarrollo político del establishment de la seguridad nacional estadounidense. Pourquoi les présidents américains établissent-ils des relations de collaboration avec des sociétés privées pour des questions de sécurité nationale? Cet article soutient que ces relations symbiotiques sont initiées par des présidents ambitieux confrontés à une résistance publique et à une opposition du Congrès. Ils font appel à des organisations extra-gouvernementales pour les aider à mobiliser le soutien du public et ainsi faire pression sur le Congrès pour qu'il leur donne son consentement. Ces org
为什么美国总统在国家安全问题上与私人组织建立合作关系?本文认为，这些共生关系是由面临公众抵制和国会反对的雄心勃勃的总统发起的。他们争取政府外组织(EGOs)帮助动员公众支持，向国会施压，使其同意。自我组织能够洗白信息，是因为他们表面上的政治独立性和言论自由，这使他们能够绕过限制行政部门的反宣传法律。本文进一步认为，政府外影响的生态系统反映了美国国家安全政治结构中的一种偏见，即倾向于总统与干预主义组织合作。对越南战争政治的原始档案研究涵盖了冲突的三个阶段，美国化，祛魅化和越南化，支持了论文的说法。更广泛的历史背景表明，EGO合作塑造了美国国家安全机构的政治发展。总统、私人组织和国家安全机构之间的关系是什么?En este artículo, se sostiene que estas relaciones simbióticas, as iniciadas, as贫穷总统的野心，se enstiene que estas relaciones pública, a la oposición del congress。政府外组织(conigen que las organizaciones extragubernamentales, EGO)是一项具有动员意义的活动público临时国会(para - pressionalcongress)。Las EGO pueden blanquear información debido a su表面上的独立política通过su libertad de expresión, lo que les permite eludir Las leves反宣传que有限的政治执行。1 . artículo . sostiene, además . queel ecosistema de influencia . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . gov . además网址:网址:网址:investigación网址:网址:política网址:网址:网址:americanización，网址:vietnamización)网址:网址:artículo。El context . histórico más国家安全与发展中心的合作与发展中心político国家安全与发展中心的建立。我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，我是说，第6篇:“人际关系的共生关系”，即:与初始组织、组织、组织、组织、组织、组织、组织的关系。我呼吁各组织，政府以外的组织，提供更多的援助，动员更多的公众，让更多的人参与，让更多的人参与，让更多的人同意。这两家组织提供了一种新的能力，即在政治上和表面上都提供了信息，在政治上和表面上都提供了信息，在表达上都提供了信息，在政治上都提供了信息，在政治上都提供了信息，在政治上都提供了信息，在政治上都提供了信息。这篇文章肯定了在政府外的影响下，交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、交换系统、组织干预等方面的合作。一个研究档案的起源是由三个阶段的冲突所决定的，这些阶段是由三个阶段的冲突、三个阶段的冲突、三个阶段的冲突、三个阶段的冲突和三个阶段的冲突所决定的。“历史背景”加上“大型项目”，“合作项目”和“组织项目”，“非政府项目”和“组织项目”，“组织项目”，“组织项目”，“组织项目”，“组织项目”，“组织项目”，“组织项目”，“国家项目”，“组织项目”。
{"title":"Partners in Persuasion: Extra-Governmental Organizations in the Vietnam War","authors":"C. Levinson","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orab021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why do US presidents form collaborative relationships with private organizations in matters of national security? This paper argues that these symbiotic relationships are initiated by ambitious presidents facing public resistance and congressional opposition. They enlist extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) to help mobilize public support to pressure Congress to grant its consent. EGOs are able to launder information because of their ostensible political independence and their freedom of expression, which permits them to circumvent anti-propaganda laws that constrain the executive branch. The paper further argues that the ecosystem of extra-governmental influence reflects a bias in the structure of US national security politics that favors presidential collaboration with interventionist organizations. Original archival research into the politics of the Vietnam War covering three phases of the conflict, Americanization, disenchantment, and Vietnamization, supports the paper's claims. The broader historical context shows that EGO collaborations have shaped the political development of the US national security establishment.\u0000 ¿Por qué los presidentes estadounidenses establecen relaciones de colaboración con organizaciones privadas en materia de seguridad nacional? En este artículo, se sostiene que estas relaciones simbióticas son iniciadas por presidentes ambiciosos que se enfrentan a la resistencia pública y a la oposición del Congreso. Consiguen que las organizaciones extragubernamentales (Extra-Governmental Organizations, EGO) ayuden a movilizar el apoyo público para presionar al Congreso a fin de que otorgue su consentimiento. Las EGO pueden blanquear información debido a su ostensible independencia política y a su libertad de expresión, lo que les permite eludir las leyes antipropaganda que limitan al poder ejecutivo. El artículo sostiene, además, que el ecosistema de influencia extragubernamental refleja un sesgo en la estructura de la política de seguridad nacional estadounidense que favorece la colaboración presidencial con las organizaciones intervencionistas. Una investigación de archivos originales sobre la política de la guerra de Vietnam que abarca tres fases del conflicto (la americanización, el desencanto y la vietnamización) respalda las afirmaciones del artículo. El contexto histórico más amplio muestra que las colaboraciones de las EGO dieron forma al desarrollo político del establishment de la seguridad nacional estadounidense.\u0000 Pourquoi les présidents américains établissent-ils des relations de collaboration avec des sociétés privées pour des questions de sécurité nationale? Cet article soutient que ces relations symbiotiques sont initiées par des présidents ambitieux confrontés à une résistance publique et à une opposition du Congrès. Ils font appel à des organisations extra-gouvernementales pour les aider à mobiliser le soutien du public et ainsi faire pression sur le Congrès pour qu'il leur donne son consentement. Ces org","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45835771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brendan J. Connell, Samantha L Moya, Adrian J. Shin
The dominant narrative on economic coercion focuses on institutional, cultural, and reputational factors to explain why some countries use economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. In this article, we argue that the linkage between economic sanctions and migration is an important consideration for potential sanction givers. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries that host a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Hence, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to reduce migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction. ∗We would like to thank Nicole Rae Baerg, David Bearce, and Stefanie Walter for their comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own. In February 2011, the European Union (EU) deliberated the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s regime for its perpetuation of violence on its own people. Although the proposal received overwhelming support from prominent Western European liberal democracies, such as Germany and France, Italy and Malta strongly opposed this act of coercion, which in part led to the EU’s overall refrain of issuing immediate sanctions against Libya as talks came to an end. Instead, the EU agreed on a symbolic joint communique condemning the “unacceptable use of force against civilians” in February 2011. It was only after the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 was adopted on March 12, 2011 that the Council of the European Union adopted legislation to implement sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. Why were Italy and Malta against imposing economic sanctions on Libya? More generally, why do some countries favor the use economic sanctions, while others are more reluctant to resort to sanctions as a foreign policy tool? Italy and Malta present an interesting empirical puzzle considering their shared EU membership status with the other 26 member states who preferred the use of sanctions. Existing explanations of economic coercion are also unconvincing in the case of Libya given the series of institutional, economic, and cultural similarities between Italy, Malta, and the EU member states. Historically, states have imposed economic sanctions as punishment for the target country’s violation of international norms, for non-compliance with international agreements, or to shift the target country’s behavior in a way that serves the interests of sending country (Masters 2017). Conventional wisdom too holds that liberal democracies often impose sanctions on autocratic regimes that violate international norms or international humanitarian law. But while it is seen that demo
关于经济胁迫的主流叙述侧重于制度、文化和声誉因素，以解释为什么一些国家将经济制裁作为外交政策工具。在本文中，我们认为经济制裁与移民之间的联系是潜在制裁给予者的重要考虑因素。经济制裁往往会增加目标国家的经济困境，这反过来又导致更多的人迁移到其共同种族居住的国家。当制裁增加来自目标国家的移民时，收容大量目标国家国民的国家面临不成比例的高移民压力。因此，这些国家的政策制定者反对通过对目标国家实施经济制裁来减少移民。通过分析2011 - 2015年欧洲议会的制裁法案，我们发现了实证支持我们的预测。我们谨感谢尼科尔·雷·伯格、大卫·贝尔斯和斯蒂芬妮·沃尔特提出的意见和建议。所有的错误都是我们自己的。2011年2月，欧盟(EU)审议了对利比亚领导人穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲(Muammar Gaddafi)政权实施经济制裁的可能性，原因是该政权对自己的人民持续实施暴力。尽管这项提议得到了西欧自由民主国家的压倒性支持，如德国和法国，但意大利和马耳他强烈反对这种胁迫行为，这在一定程度上导致欧盟在谈判结束时总体上没有立即对利比亚实施制裁。相反，欧盟于2011年2月签署了一份象征性的联合公报，谴责“对平民使用武力是不可接受的”。直到2011年3月12日联合国安理会通过1973号决议(UNSCR)后，欧盟理事会才通过立法，对卡扎菲政权实施制裁。为什么意大利和马耳他反对对利比亚实施经济制裁?更普遍的是，为什么有些国家倾向于使用经济制裁，而另一些国家则不愿将制裁作为外交政策工具?考虑到意大利和马耳他与其他26个倾向于使用制裁的欧盟成员国共同的欧盟成员国身份，它们提出了一个有趣的经验难题。鉴于意大利、马耳他和欧盟成员国在制度、经济和文化上的一系列相似之处，现有的经济胁迫解释在利比亚的情况下也难以令人信服。从历史上看，各国实施经济制裁是为了惩罚被制裁国违反国际规范、不遵守国际协议，或使被制裁国的行为朝着有利于派遣国利益的方向转变(Masters 2017)。传统观点也认为，自由民主国家往往会对违反国际准则或国际人道主义法的专制政权实施制裁。但是，虽然可以看到民主国家实施了更多的制裁(Lektzian and Souva 2003)，而且主要是针对专制国家而不是其他民主国家(Cox and Drury 2006)，但这种经验规律并不能解释为什么完全民主的意大利和马耳他政府反对对利比亚采取限制措施。其他关于经济胁迫的理论，如国内利益集团动力学，则是有争议的
{"title":"Migration and Economic Coercion","authors":"Brendan J. Connell, Samantha L Moya, Adrian J. Shin","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB019","url":null,"abstract":"The dominant narrative on economic coercion focuses on institutional, cultural, and reputational factors to explain why some countries use economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. In this article, we argue that the linkage between economic sanctions and migration is an important consideration for potential sanction givers. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries that host a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Hence, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to reduce migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction. ∗We would like to thank Nicole Rae Baerg, David Bearce, and Stefanie Walter for their comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own. In February 2011, the European Union (EU) deliberated the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s regime for its perpetuation of violence on its own people. Although the proposal received overwhelming support from prominent Western European liberal democracies, such as Germany and France, Italy and Malta strongly opposed this act of coercion, which in part led to the EU’s overall refrain of issuing immediate sanctions against Libya as talks came to an end. Instead, the EU agreed on a symbolic joint communique condemning the “unacceptable use of force against civilians” in February 2011. It was only after the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 was adopted on March 12, 2011 that the Council of the European Union adopted legislation to implement sanctions on the Gaddafi regime. Why were Italy and Malta against imposing economic sanctions on Libya? More generally, why do some countries favor the use economic sanctions, while others are more reluctant to resort to sanctions as a foreign policy tool? Italy and Malta present an interesting empirical puzzle considering their shared EU membership status with the other 26 member states who preferred the use of sanctions. Existing explanations of economic coercion are also unconvincing in the case of Libya given the series of institutional, economic, and cultural similarities between Italy, Malta, and the EU member states. Historically, states have imposed economic sanctions as punishment for the target country’s violation of international norms, for non-compliance with international agreements, or to shift the target country’s behavior in a way that serves the interests of sending country (Masters 2017). Conventional wisdom too holds that liberal democracies often impose sanctions on autocratic regimes that violate international norms or international humanitarian law. But while it is seen that demo","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42030574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper suggests a framework for studying how remedial actions are deployed following diplomatic crisis. On the basis of thirty-four case studies and twenty-one interviews with senior statespersons, we offer a novel typology of remedial strategies employed for diffusing interstate tension and pinpoint the various calculations taken by decision-makers in performing them. The analysis reveals three primary strategies for restoring diplomatic relations, the last of which was neglected thus far in the literature: reframing, wherein state actors negotiate the definition of transgressions and their responsibility for its occurrence; remorse, wherein the accused actors acknowledge ranging degrees of responsibility for committing wrongdoing; and finally, reassurance, wherein actors channel the remedial focus to the future relationship between the involved parties. Moreover, statespersons articulated several considerations taken into account when selecting a specific remedial strategy: the perceived value of the offended party, domestic political criticism, levels of publicity, adjusting a specific remedy to the target audience, and self-image. We conclude by discussing the value of remedial work for the study of diplomatic crises. Cet article suggère un cadre pour l’étude de la manière dont des actions correctives sont déployées suite à une crise diplomatique. Nous nous sommes basés sur trente-quatre études de cas et vingt-et-un entretiens avec des hauts responsables d’État pour proposer une nouvelle typologie des stratégies correctives employées pour atténuer la tension entre États et identifier les divers calculs effectués par les décideurs pour les exécuter. Cette analyse révèle trois principales stratégies de restauration des relations diplomatiques, et la dernière d'entre elles a jusqu'ici été négligée par la littérature: celle du recadrage, dans laquelle les acteurs étatiques négocient la définition des transgressions et leur responsabilité dans leur manifestation; celle du remords, dans laquelle les acteurs accusés admettent leurs divers degrés de responsabilité dans l'engagement dans une mauvaise conduite; et enfin, celle de la réassurance, dans laquelle les acteurs canalisent leur attention corrective sur la future relation entre les parties impliquées. De plus, les responsables d’État ont articulé plusieurs considérations prises en compte lors de la sélection d'une stratégie corrective spécifique: la valeur perçue de la partie offensée, la critique politique intérieure, les niveaux de publicité, l'adaptation d'une action corrective spécifique au public cible et l'image de soi. Nous concluons par une discussion sur la valeur du travail correctif pour l’étude des crises diplomatiques. Este artículo sugiere un marco para estudiar cómo se implementan las acciones correctivas tras una crisis diplomática. Sobre la base de treinta y cuatro estudios de casos y veintiuna entrevistas con altos cargos del estado, ofrecemos una novedosa tipología de
本文提出了一个研究外交危机后如何部署补救行动的框架。基于三十四个案例研究和对高级政治家的二十一次访谈，我们提供了一种用于传播州际紧张局势的补救策略的新类型学，并指出决策者在执行这些策略时进行的各种计算。分析揭示了恢复外交关系的三个主要战略，其中最后一个战略在文献中被忽略：重新思考，国家行为者谈判违法行为的定义及其发生的责任；悔恨，如果被告承认犯错误的责任程度；最后，在保证的情况下，演员们将补救重点放在有关各方之间的未来关系上。此外，各国在选择具体补救战略时阐述了若干考虑因素：被定罪方的感知价值、国内政治批评、宣传水平、为目标受众调整具体补救措施以及自我形象。最后，我们讨论了外交危机研究中补救工作的价值。本文提出了一个研究外交危机后如何部署纠正措施的框架。我们利用34个案例研究和21次对高级政府官员的访谈，提出了一种新的纠正战略类型，用于缓解国家间紧张局势，并确定决策者为执行这些战略而进行的各种计算。这一分析揭示了恢复外交关系的三个主要战略，其中最后一个战略迄今为止被文献忽略：重新界定战略，其中国家行为者就违法行为的定义及其表现责任进行谈判；悔恨，其中被指控的行为者承认他们对参与不当行为负有不同程度的责任；最后，再保险，参与者将纠正注意力集中在相关方之间的未来关系上。此外，国家官员阐述了在选择具体补救战略时考虑的几个因素：被冒犯方的感知价值、国内政治批评、宣传水平、针对目标受众的具体补救措施的调整以及自我形象。最后，我们讨论了纠正工作在外交危机研究中的价值。Este artículo sugiere un marco para estudiar cómo se implementan las acciones correctivas tras una crisis diplomatica。sobre la base de treinta y cuatro estudios de casos y veintiuna entrevistas con altos cargos del estado，ofrecemos una novedosa tipología de las estrategias correctivas empleadas para rebajar las tensiones interestatales y señalamos los distintos cálculos realizados por los responsables al llevarlas a cabo。el análisis revela tres estrategias principales para el restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomaáticas，estaúltima se no se había tenido en cuenta hasta ahora en la bibliografía:el replantamiento，en el que los actores estatales negocian la definición de las transgresiones y su responsibilidad；El remordimento，en el que los actores acusados reconocen distintos grados de responsibilidad por cometer delitos；y、porúltimo，la reafirmación，en la que los actores canalizan el enfoque correctivo hacia la futura relación entre las partes implicadas。además，los cargos del estado expresaron varias consideraciones que se tienen en cuenta a la hora de seleccionar una estrategia correctiva specífica:el valor percibido por la parte ofendida，la crítica política interna，los niveles de publicidad，el ajuste de las acciones correctivas specíficas al público y la imagen propia。关于外交危机研究的结论。
{"title":"Reframing, Remorse, and Reassurance: Remedial Work in Diplomatic Crises","authors":"Lee Aldar, Zohar Kampf, G. Heimann","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper suggests a framework for studying how remedial actions are deployed following diplomatic crisis. On the basis of thirty-four case studies and twenty-one interviews with senior statespersons, we offer a novel typology of remedial strategies employed for diffusing interstate tension and pinpoint the various calculations taken by decision-makers in performing them. The analysis reveals three primary strategies for restoring diplomatic relations, the last of which was neglected thus far in the literature: reframing, wherein state actors negotiate the definition of transgressions and their responsibility for its occurrence; remorse, wherein the accused actors acknowledge ranging degrees of responsibility for committing wrongdoing; and finally, reassurance, wherein actors channel the remedial focus to the future relationship between the involved parties. Moreover, statespersons articulated several considerations taken into account when selecting a specific remedial strategy: the perceived value of the offended party, domestic political criticism, levels of publicity, adjusting a specific remedy to the target audience, and self-image. We conclude by discussing the value of remedial work for the study of diplomatic crises.\u0000 Cet article suggère un cadre pour l’étude de la manière dont des actions correctives sont déployées suite à une crise diplomatique. Nous nous sommes basés sur trente-quatre études de cas et vingt-et-un entretiens avec des hauts responsables d’État pour proposer une nouvelle typologie des stratégies correctives employées pour atténuer la tension entre États et identifier les divers calculs effectués par les décideurs pour les exécuter. Cette analyse révèle trois principales stratégies de restauration des relations diplomatiques, et la dernière d'entre elles a jusqu'ici été négligée par la littérature: celle du recadrage, dans laquelle les acteurs étatiques négocient la définition des transgressions et leur responsabilité dans leur manifestation; celle du remords, dans laquelle les acteurs accusés admettent leurs divers degrés de responsabilité dans l'engagement dans une mauvaise conduite; et enfin, celle de la réassurance, dans laquelle les acteurs canalisent leur attention corrective sur la future relation entre les parties impliquées. De plus, les responsables d’État ont articulé plusieurs considérations prises en compte lors de la sélection d'une stratégie corrective spécifique: la valeur perçue de la partie offensée, la critique politique intérieure, les niveaux de publicité, l'adaptation d'une action corrective spécifique au public cible et l'image de soi. Nous concluons par une discussion sur la valeur du travail correctif pour l’étude des crises diplomatiques.\u0000 Este artículo sugiere un marco para estudiar cómo se implementan las acciones correctivas tras una crisis diplomática. Sobre la base de treinta y cuatro estudios de casos y veintiuna entrevistas con altos cargos del estado, ofrecemos una novedosa tipología de","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45620344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to contribute to the evolving dialogue between Foreign Policy Analysis and Public Policy with reference to John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach (MSA). It problematises how one of the key concepts of MSA - policy windows- has been used in applications to foreign policy and suggests that policy windows may be more difficult to exploit than illustrations of successful foreign policy entrepreneurship indicate. Indeed, the article argues that policy windows can be either small or large; their size will likely differ not least because policy windows are situated within numerous contexts. With reference to instances of foreign policy redirection, the paper highlights four such contexts: the placement and access of foreign policy entrepreneurs; the level of contestation surrounding a problematic but prevailing policy; geopolitical pressures; and ideas guiding foreign policy. The article moreover suggests that by contextualising policy windows and considering also how contingency may affect policy windows, it seems possible to integrate insights from foreign policy analysis into current theorizing about foreign policy entrepreneurship drawing on the multiple streams framework. The empirical illustration examines the policy window that opened up for policy entrepreneurs to recast longstanding US policy toward military-run Myanmar as the Obama administration took office.
{"title":"Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs, Policy Windows, and “Pragmatic Engagement”: Reconsidering Insights of the Multiple Streams Framework and the Obama Administration's 2009 Policy Shift Toward Military-Run Myanmar","authors":"J. Haacke","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB017","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to contribute to the evolving dialogue between Foreign Policy Analysis and Public Policy with reference to John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach (MSA). It problematises how one of the key concepts of MSA - policy windows- has been used in applications to foreign policy and suggests that policy windows may be more difficult to exploit than illustrations of successful foreign policy entrepreneurship indicate. Indeed, the article argues that policy windows can be either small or large; their size will likely differ not least because policy windows are situated within numerous contexts. With reference to instances of foreign policy redirection, the paper highlights four such contexts: the placement and access of foreign policy entrepreneurs; the level of contestation surrounding a problematic but prevailing policy; geopolitical pressures; and ideas guiding foreign policy. The article moreover suggests that by contextualising policy windows and considering also how contingency may affect policy windows, it seems possible to integrate insights from foreign policy analysis into current theorizing about foreign policy entrepreneurship drawing on the multiple streams framework. The empirical illustration examines the policy window that opened up for policy entrepreneurs to recast longstanding US policy toward military-run Myanmar as the Obama administration took office.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49076277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing research explains variation in trade attitudes by pitting explanations rooted in the foreign part of foreign economic policy, like nativism, against economic beliefs like a commitment to free market principles. But what happens when these factors create significant cross-pressures—how do free market-oriented nativists think about trade? We argue that nativism is a higher-order belief that constrains the relationship between lower-order economic attitudes and beliefs about international trade. We test our argument using representative samples from the United States and United Kingdom. First, we analyze observational data and find a significant interaction whereby nativism moderates the relationship between free market attitudes and beliefs that trade provides national and global benefits. Second, we report results from a survey experiment to show that a message about the long-term benefits from free trade increases support for free trade in both samples. Importantly, we also find that nativist values weaken the treatment effect in the US sample. As long as international relations scholars focus on cultural or economic antecedents on their own, we miss much about how elements in belief systems interact.
{"title":"Going Nativist: How Nativism and Economic Ideology Interact to Shape Beliefs about Global Trade","authors":"Kathleen E Powers, Jason Reifler, T. Scotto","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Existing research explains variation in trade attitudes by pitting explanations rooted in the foreign part of foreign economic policy, like nativism, against economic beliefs like a commitment to free market principles. But what happens when these factors create significant cross-pressures—how do free market-oriented nativists think about trade? We argue that nativism is a higher-order belief that constrains the relationship between lower-order economic attitudes and beliefs about international trade. We test our argument using representative samples from the United States and United Kingdom. First, we analyze observational data and find a significant interaction whereby nativism moderates the relationship between free market attitudes and beliefs that trade provides national and global benefits. Second, we report results from a survey experiment to show that a message about the long-term benefits from free trade increases support for free trade in both samples. Importantly, we also find that nativist values weaken the treatment effect in the US sample. As long as international relations scholars focus on cultural or economic antecedents on their own, we miss much about how elements in belief systems interact.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43829839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite several high-profile cases of cooperation between sanctioned states, little is understood about how being sanctioned affects target states’ incentives to cooperate with one another and what forms that cooperation might take. I theorize that sanctioned states will tend to seek out sanctions-surviving assistance from nonsanctioned states in most cases. Being sanctioned constrains how much useful assistance that sanctioned states can provide to one another, as they suffer from similar trade constraints, levels of economic turmoil, and governmental resource limitations. I test my theory's predictions that sanctioned states are less likely to cooperate with one another via two different large-n tests involving cooperation via engaging in trade-based sanctions-busting and civil nuclear cooperation. Both of these distinct tests provide strong support for my theory. The final portion of the study conducts an exploratory analysis of why sanctioned states still sometimes cooperate with one another, finding that such cooperation may involve risky or taboo transactions, like arms sales, and that sanctioned parties have incentives to keep their cooperation a secret in such cases. These findings improve our understanding of the various cooperative strategies that states employ to survive sanctions.
{"title":"Birds of a Feather, Do Sanctioned States Flock Together?","authors":"B. Early","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite several high-profile cases of cooperation between sanctioned states, little is understood about how being sanctioned affects target states’ incentives to cooperate with one another and what forms that cooperation might take. I theorize that sanctioned states will tend to seek out sanctions-surviving assistance from nonsanctioned states in most cases. Being sanctioned constrains how much useful assistance that sanctioned states can provide to one another, as they suffer from similar trade constraints, levels of economic turmoil, and governmental resource limitations. I test my theory's predictions that sanctioned states are less likely to cooperate with one another via two different large-n tests involving cooperation via engaging in trade-based sanctions-busting and civil nuclear cooperation. Both of these distinct tests provide strong support for my theory. The final portion of the study conducts an exploratory analysis of why sanctioned states still sometimes cooperate with one another, finding that such cooperation may involve risky or taboo transactions, like arms sales, and that sanctioned parties have incentives to keep their cooperation a secret in such cases. These findings improve our understanding of the various cooperative strategies that states employ to survive sanctions.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48241022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Current research highlights that ideology decisively affects political contestation concerning peace and security operations in European countries. In particular, recent studies suggest that party preferences on this issue follow a curvilinear distribution along the left-right axis, delineating a conflict between moderate and extreme parties. However, the impact of this cleavage on the use of strategic narratives to either support or criticize these missions requires more attention. This article aims to fill this gap by employing seeded latent Dirichlet allocation, a semi-supervised automated text analysis method, to analyze parliamentary debates on Italy's most significant troop deployments between 1994 and 2013. We expect to find that while moderates express a supportive narrative aimed at justifying the use of force, extremists attempt to delegitimize military interventions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that moderate parties emphasize more on the multilateral and humanitarian framework of a mission, while extremist parties focus more on its military means. The empirical findings largely confirm our hypotheses. By means of its method and results, the article contributes both empirically and methodologically to the debate on the party politics of military interventions in Europe.
{"title":"Committed Moderates and Uncommitted Extremists: Ideological Leaning and Parties’ Narratives on Military Interventions in Italy","authors":"L. Curini, V. Vignoli","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Current research highlights that ideology decisively affects political contestation concerning peace and security operations in European countries. In particular, recent studies suggest that party preferences on this issue follow a curvilinear distribution along the left-right axis, delineating a conflict between moderate and extreme parties. However, the impact of this cleavage on the use of strategic narratives to either support or criticize these missions requires more attention. This article aims to fill this gap by employing seeded latent Dirichlet allocation, a semi-supervised automated text analysis method, to analyze parliamentary debates on Italy's most significant troop deployments between 1994 and 2013. We expect to find that while moderates express a supportive narrative aimed at justifying the use of force, extremists attempt to delegitimize military interventions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that moderate parties emphasize more on the multilateral and humanitarian framework of a mission, while extremist parties focus more on its military means. The empirical findings largely confirm our hypotheses. By means of its method and results, the article contributes both empirically and methodologically to the debate on the party politics of military interventions in Europe.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43602334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent scholarship on parties and foreign policy argues that foreign policy preferences seem to be split along the same lines as the general policy disputes. We use spatial modeling to analyze whether this is indeed the case. Drawing on the unique complete sample of all votes in the Slovakia's National Council from 2002 through 2019, our results suggest that the split over foreign policy is much smaller than the general policy divide. Contrary to expectations, this split does not follow the left–right distinction. The results suggest that the government–opposition split remains in the foreign policy as well.
{"title":"Dimensionality of Party Politics of Foreign Policy: Spatial Modeling of Slovakia's National Council","authors":"M. Onderco, Rik Joosen","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Recent scholarship on parties and foreign policy argues that foreign policy preferences seem to be split along the same lines as the general policy disputes. We use spatial modeling to analyze whether this is indeed the case. Drawing on the unique complete sample of all votes in the Slovakia's National Council from 2002 through 2019, our results suggest that the split over foreign policy is much smaller than the general policy divide. Contrary to expectations, this split does not follow the left–right distinction. The results suggest that the government–opposition split remains in the foreign policy as well.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/FPA/ORAB012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49573158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Foreign policy has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. This paper investigates the extent to which this division extends to arguably one of the most bipartisan foreign policy issues: policies toward rogue states. Our examination of congressional voting and sponsorship data related to rogue states since 1991 finds that, while there is a high degree of bipartisanship on the issue, there are nuanced but significant partisan differences. First, we find that Democrats are significantly more likely to support a rogue state bill dealing with human rights concerns, whereas Republicans are significantly less likely to support a conciliatory bill. We also find that members of Congress are less likely to propose and support a rogue state bill in the presence of a co-partisan president. We thus conclude that, despite the overall high degree of bipartisanship on rogue state issues, partisanship plays an important role in influencing legislative behavior.
{"title":"The US Congress and Rogue States","authors":"Shereen Kotb, Gyung-Ho Jeong","doi":"10.1093/fpa/orab011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Foreign policy has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. This paper investigates the extent to which this division extends to arguably one of the most bipartisan foreign policy issues: policies toward rogue states. Our examination of congressional voting and sponsorship data related to rogue states since 1991 finds that, while there is a high degree of bipartisanship on the issue, there are nuanced but significant partisan differences. First, we find that Democrats are significantly more likely to support a rogue state bill dealing with human rights concerns, whereas Republicans are significantly less likely to support a conciliatory bill. We also find that members of Congress are less likely to propose and support a rogue state bill in the presence of a co-partisan president. We thus conclude that, despite the overall high degree of bipartisanship on rogue state issues, partisanship plays an important role in influencing legislative behavior.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/fpa/orab011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49440941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.
{"title":"Alliance Embeddedness: Rodrigo Duterte and the Resilience of the US–Philippine Alliance","authors":"Gregory H. Winger","doi":"10.1093/FPA/ORAB013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/FPA/ORAB013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.","PeriodicalId":46954,"journal":{"name":"Foreign Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42859620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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