Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2190632
M. Skalamera
ong-term
长期
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Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2189343
William J. Norris
When and if a Taiwan contingency were to ever unfold, there is likely to be a natural tendency to refer to the Ukraine experience as a reference from which to draw strategic lessons. While there are some structural similarities between the Ukraine war and some future Taiwan scenario—and certain preferences and courses of action may look familiar—attention ought to be more focused on areas in which they diverge. Drawing on US economic statecraft responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I suggest that a Taiwan contingency may prove more challenging, and that parts of the US government should proactively take measures today to enhance our position in any future conflict involving Taiwan. Across the more than 30 departments and agencies in the US government that are responsible for some element of economic statecraft, there is a pressing institutional need to engage in economic statecraft capacity building. Economic statecraft takes on a wide variety of forms well beyond sanctions. We need to improve both our understanding of economic statecraft as well as our institutional capacity to wield this important tool of national power. The time to do that is now, not in the middle of an acute crisis.
{"title":"The Devil’s in the Differences: Ukraine and a Taiwan Contingency","authors":"William J. Norris","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2189343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2189343","url":null,"abstract":"When and if a Taiwan contingency were to ever unfold, there is likely to be a natural tendency to refer to the Ukraine experience as a reference from which to draw strategic lessons. While there are some structural similarities between the Ukraine war and some future Taiwan scenario—and certain preferences and courses of action may look familiar—attention ought to be more focused on areas in which they diverge. Drawing on US economic statecraft responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I suggest that a Taiwan contingency may prove more challenging, and that parts of the US government should proactively take measures today to enhance our position in any future conflict involving Taiwan. Across the more than 30 departments and agencies in the US government that are responsible for some element of economic statecraft, there is a pressing institutional need to engage in economic statecraft capacity building. Economic statecraft takes on a wide variety of forms well beyond sanctions. We need to improve both our understanding of economic statecraft as well as our institutional capacity to wield this important tool of national power. The time to do that is now, not in the middle of an acute crisis.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"137 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42607128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2190218
Takuya Matsuda
In December 2022, Japan defined its security policy for the coming decade by releasing three documents: a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a Defense Buildup Program. This long-anticipated set of documents have proven to be transformational by bringing about significant and positive changes in the US-Japan alliance. The past decade has been a critical—and evolutionary—juncture in Tokyo’s security policy. The series of security reforms implemented throughout the decade have paved the way to facilitate a more integrated military alliance with the United States by bolstering Tokyo’s decision-making apparatus and untangling some of the peculiar legal constraints on the use of force in Japan. The newly unveiled documents further accelerate these trends by illustrating ways to explore closer strategic and institutional integration between the two allies. Japan’s expanding investment innational defense—in terms of bothbudget andnewmilitary capabilities—have attracted attention. Yet, material upgrades alone do not produce effective military power. The question that deserves our attention is whether and how these security reforms contribute to enhancing Japan’s overall military effectiveness, especially through its alliance with the United States.
{"title":"Japan’s Emerging Security Strategy","authors":"Takuya Matsuda","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2190218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2190218","url":null,"abstract":"In December 2022, Japan defined its security policy for the coming decade by releasing three documents: a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a Defense Buildup Program. This long-anticipated set of documents have proven to be transformational by bringing about significant and positive changes in the US-Japan alliance. The past decade has been a critical—and evolutionary—juncture in Tokyo’s security policy. The series of security reforms implemented throughout the decade have paved the way to facilitate a more integrated military alliance with the United States by bolstering Tokyo’s decision-making apparatus and untangling some of the peculiar legal constraints on the use of force in Japan. The newly unveiled documents further accelerate these trends by illustrating ways to explore closer strategic and institutional integration between the two allies. Japan’s expanding investment innational defense—in terms of bothbudget andnewmilitary capabilities—have attracted attention. Yet, material upgrades alone do not produce effective military power. The question that deserves our attention is whether and how these security reforms contribute to enhancing Japan’s overall military effectiveness, especially through its alliance with the United States.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"85 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46592068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137
Karsten Jung
Since the end of the ColdWar, the idea of reviving concert diplomacy as a means to manage order and security in a reunited Europe has been repeatedly discussed in theory, but never pursued in practice. While some more limited forms of concerted crisis management have been tried, the broader task of maintaining continental order has been left to a network of ostensibly “interlocking institutions and relationships” including formal multilateral organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the EU, as well as various forms of more or less institutionalized cooperation like NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), the NATORussia-Council (NRC), and the EU’s Neighborhood Policy (ENP). With the gradual demise of the liberal order underpinning it, this elaborate arrangement has progressively eroded over the course of the past decade. And with the start of Russia’s all-out attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it has—for all practical intents and purposes—essentially collapsed. Most of its inclusive institutions have either been dissolved or deadlocked, and its most fundamental norms and principles undermined by their constant and blatant violation. To restore continental order and security when and however the war ends, therefore, new arrangements will be needed that go far beyond the immediate conditions of a peace deal. Given the apparent failure of prevailing liberal norms and institutions to prevent Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, such a reform of the European order will likely lead to a more pragmatic, realist approach to continental security. This new realism, however, comes in two seemingly conflicting varieties. One posits that, for the foreseeable future, security in Europe will be security from Russia and
{"title":"A New Concert for Europe: Security and Order After the War","authors":"Karsten Jung","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192137","url":null,"abstract":"Since the end of the ColdWar, the idea of reviving concert diplomacy as a means to manage order and security in a reunited Europe has been repeatedly discussed in theory, but never pursued in practice. While some more limited forms of concerted crisis management have been tried, the broader task of maintaining continental order has been left to a network of ostensibly “interlocking institutions and relationships” including formal multilateral organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the EU, as well as various forms of more or less institutionalized cooperation like NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), the NATORussia-Council (NRC), and the EU’s Neighborhood Policy (ENP). With the gradual demise of the liberal order underpinning it, this elaborate arrangement has progressively eroded over the course of the past decade. And with the start of Russia’s all-out attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it has—for all practical intents and purposes—essentially collapsed. Most of its inclusive institutions have either been dissolved or deadlocked, and its most fundamental norms and principles undermined by their constant and blatant violation. To restore continental order and security when and however the war ends, therefore, new arrangements will be needed that go far beyond the immediate conditions of a peace deal. Given the apparent failure of prevailing liberal norms and institutions to prevent Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, such a reform of the European order will likely lead to a more pragmatic, realist approach to continental security. This new realism, however, comes in two seemingly conflicting varieties. One posits that, for the foreseeable future, security in Europe will be security from Russia and","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"25 - 43"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45093474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188829
Caileigh Glenn
Government actors and other observers across Europe and the United States called the multilateral sanctions imposed on Russia in early 2022 “unprecedented.” Even Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged their severity when he stressed “the need to counter economic restrictions that were imposed on us, which are truly unprecedented without any exaggeration.” Part of the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these financial and trade sanctions—imposed on Russia by Western governments—target key firms in the financial and energy sectors, debt financing, technology, Russia’s foreign currency reserves, and more recently, most Russian oil and transportation insurers. Debates quickly emerged surrounding the success, or lack thereof, of the sanctions in curtailing Russian government aggression against Ukraine. The threat of severe sanctions issued in December 2021 did not deter Russia from invading Ukraine. The imposition of sanctions following the invasion two months later sought to curb the Russian government’s ability to continue its “harmful foreign activities.” Some noted the shift from an environment of deterrence to one of attrition, and the current approach may be categorized as one of
{"title":"Lessons in Sanctions-Proofing from Russia","authors":"Caileigh Glenn","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188829","url":null,"abstract":"Government actors and other observers across Europe and the United States called the multilateral sanctions imposed on Russia in early 2022 “unprecedented.” Even Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged their severity when he stressed “the need to counter economic restrictions that were imposed on us, which are truly unprecedented without any exaggeration.” Part of the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, these financial and trade sanctions—imposed on Russia by Western governments—target key firms in the financial and energy sectors, debt financing, technology, Russia’s foreign currency reserves, and more recently, most Russian oil and transportation insurers. Debates quickly emerged surrounding the success, or lack thereof, of the sanctions in curtailing Russian government aggression against Ukraine. The threat of severe sanctions issued in December 2021 did not deter Russia from invading Ukraine. The imposition of sanctions following the invasion two months later sought to curb the Russian government’s ability to continue its “harmful foreign activities.” Some noted the shift from an environment of deterrence to one of attrition, and the current approach may be categorized as one of","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"105 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43558109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192136
Vinícius Guilherme Rodrigues Vieira
During his first speech following a run-off victory over far-right Brazilian incumbent Jair Bolsonaro on October 30, 2022, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva characterized his understanding of democracy “not only as a beautiful word, written in the law, but something actually tangible, which we can feel touching our skin and collectively build on an everyday basis.” With this, the former labor union leader and president of two terms (2003-2010), who was jailed from 20182020 and later released after being cleared of corruption charges, sought to signal to Brazil and the world that his incoming government would, above all, address the nation’s demand for egalitarian economic development driven by popular participation. By implication, this entails pursuing a foreign policy that attracts foreign investment to generate jobs in high-added value sectors, a first step in reducing dependence on commodity exporting. What are the implications of such goals for Brazil’s foreign policy, and for the country’s comeback after four years of Bolsonaro’s Trumpian anti-multilateralism and isolationism? In the same speech, Lula dropped sundry hints about his strategic plan to revitalize the multilateral ties Bolsonaro had damaged by promoting a religious-based
路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦（Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva）在2022年10月30日击败极右翼巴西现任总统贾伊尔·博索纳罗（Jair Bolsonaro，这位前工会领袖和两届总统（2003-2010年）从2018-2020年被监禁，后来因腐败指控被无罪释放。他试图向巴西和世界发出信号，他的新政府将首先满足国家对民众参与推动的平等经济发展的需求。言下之意，这需要奉行吸引外国投资的外交政策，在高附加值行业创造就业机会，这是减少对商品出口依赖的第一步。这些目标对巴西的外交政策，以及在博索纳罗的特朗普式反多边主义和孤立主义四年后该国的复兴有什么影响？在同一次演讲中，卢拉暗示了他的战略计划，以重振博索纳罗因促进基于宗教的关系而破坏的多边关系
{"title":"Embedded Nationalism in a Fragmented World: Lula’s Brazil","authors":"Vinícius Guilherme Rodrigues Vieira","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192136","url":null,"abstract":"During his first speech following a run-off victory over far-right Brazilian incumbent Jair Bolsonaro on October 30, 2022, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva characterized his understanding of democracy “not only as a beautiful word, written in the law, but something actually tangible, which we can feel touching our skin and collectively build on an everyday basis.” With this, the former labor union leader and president of two terms (2003-2010), who was jailed from 20182020 and later released after being cleared of corruption charges, sought to signal to Brazil and the world that his incoming government would, above all, address the nation’s demand for egalitarian economic development driven by popular participation. By implication, this entails pursuing a foreign policy that attracts foreign investment to generate jobs in high-added value sectors, a first step in reducing dependence on commodity exporting. What are the implications of such goals for Brazil’s foreign policy, and for the country’s comeback after four years of Bolsonaro’s Trumpian anti-multilateralism and isolationism? In the same speech, Lula dropped sundry hints about his strategic plan to revitalize the multilateral ties Bolsonaro had damaged by promoting a religious-based","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"45 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42814018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192138
Adam P. Liff
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s January 2023 summit with President Biden capped one of the most significant months for Japanese defense policy in decades. On December 16, Kishida’s government announced a strikingly ambitious revision of Japan’s national security strategy—the first since 2013. Part of a package of three major security documents also including Japan’s new national defense strategy and defense buildup plan, last December’s announcements are as remarkable for the substantive ambition and breadth of the pledges contained within as for what they reveal about rapidly worsening concerns in Japan about regional and global geopolitical and geo-economic trends. Confronting what they call “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII” and stating that the world is at a “historical inflection point,” Japan’s new strategies call for “fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s capabilities,” “reinforc[ing] joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-US alliance,” and “reinforce[ing] collaboration with like-minded countries ... to cooperate in upholding and reinforcing a free and open international order.” Included within the three documents are, inter alia, two headline-grabbing and unprecedented pledges: to surge Japan’s official defense budget—for decades unofficially pegged to 1 percent of GDP—by nearly two-thirds by 2027, and to acquire long-range missiles capable of striking military targets
{"title":"Kishida the Accelerator: Japan's Defense Evolution After Abe","authors":"Adam P. Liff","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2192138","url":null,"abstract":"Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s January 2023 summit with President Biden capped one of the most significant months for Japanese defense policy in decades. On December 16, Kishida’s government announced a strikingly ambitious revision of Japan’s national security strategy—the first since 2013. Part of a package of three major security documents also including Japan’s new national defense strategy and defense buildup plan, last December’s announcements are as remarkable for the substantive ambition and breadth of the pledges contained within as for what they reveal about rapidly worsening concerns in Japan about regional and global geopolitical and geo-economic trends. Confronting what they call “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII” and stating that the world is at a “historical inflection point,” Japan’s new strategies call for “fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s capabilities,” “reinforc[ing] joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-US alliance,” and “reinforce[ing] collaboration with like-minded countries ... to cooperate in upholding and reinforcing a free and open international order.” Included within the three documents are, inter alia, two headline-grabbing and unprecedented pledges: to surge Japan’s official defense budget—for decades unofficially pegged to 1 percent of GDP—by nearly two-thirds by 2027, and to acquire long-range missiles capable of striking military targets","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"63 - 83"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49319692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188828
Aaron Arnold
It has been a year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the West’s subsequent response with coordinated financial and economic sanctions. It was not only Moscow, however, that was caught off-guard by Washington’s unprecedented speed at leveraging not only its own sanctions regime, but also coordinating with its partners and allies. Beijing, too, was equally unnerved by how quickly and how extensively the sanctions regime against Russia unfolded. What lessons, then, might China take away from US-led sanctions against Russia? Can China feasibly fortify its financial and economic system against the potential for a largescale, coordinated sanctions effort? For its part, Beijing is keenly aware that its financial system and major sectors of its economy remain vulnerable to US sanctions—either directly or through secondary sanctions. Partially to mitigate against US sanctions, China has embarked on an ambitious long-term strategy to further internationalize its currency—the renminbi, or “RMB”—as well as to implement legal and regulatory reforms that could threaten or even undermine Washington’s ability to impose sanctions at a future point, such as if China invades Taiwan. How, then, can Washington skirt China’s efforts to “sanctions-proof” its economy? To be sure, one of the most consequential actions is to maintain a strong US dollar. While US monetary policy is outside the scope of this article, it is important to recognize the reality that a strong preference for the
{"title":"Curbing China’s Resilience to US Coercive Economic Statecraft","authors":"Aaron Arnold","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188828","url":null,"abstract":"It has been a year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the West’s subsequent response with coordinated financial and economic sanctions. It was not only Moscow, however, that was caught off-guard by Washington’s unprecedented speed at leveraging not only its own sanctions regime, but also coordinating with its partners and allies. Beijing, too, was equally unnerved by how quickly and how extensively the sanctions regime against Russia unfolded. What lessons, then, might China take away from US-led sanctions against Russia? Can China feasibly fortify its financial and economic system against the potential for a largescale, coordinated sanctions effort? For its part, Beijing is keenly aware that its financial system and major sectors of its economy remain vulnerable to US sanctions—either directly or through secondary sanctions. Partially to mitigate against US sanctions, China has embarked on an ambitious long-term strategy to further internationalize its currency—the renminbi, or “RMB”—as well as to implement legal and regulatory reforms that could threaten or even undermine Washington’s ability to impose sanctions at a future point, such as if China invades Taiwan. How, then, can Washington skirt China’s efforts to “sanctions-proof” its economy? To be sure, one of the most consequential actions is to maintain a strong US dollar. While US monetary policy is outside the scope of this article, it is important to recognize the reality that a strong preference for the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"153 - 167"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46254474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188830
Audrye Wong
Economic statecraft has become an increasingly prominent part of China’s foreign policy toolkit. Beijing has often sought to use both economic coercion and inducements to achieve its political goals, albeit to mixed results. In that vein, Chinese leaders have attentively watched how the United States has deployed its economic power, including US-led sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. This recent episode has underscored America’s continued global financial power and highlighted to Beijing its potential economic vulnerabilities, as well as the risks of international opprobrium. At the same time, Washington faces challenges in assembling a durable global coalition to exert pressure on Moscow, due to economic dependencies on Russian energy and political reticence outside of a core bloc of allies. I provide an overview of China’s approaches to economic statecraft and examine some of the key lessons that Beijing’s leaders are likely to draw from Russia’s war in Ukraine. I then discuss the implications for China’s economic statecraft going forward. Beijing is likely to redouble its efforts to increase economic self-reliance in critical technologies and sectors, better insulate the country from financial sanctions through de-dollarization, and continue to dangle economic inducements to peel allies and partners away from the United States, thus weakening US and allied leverage over China during a potential future crisis.
{"title":"China’s Economic Statecraft: Lessons Learned from Ukraine","authors":"Audrye Wong","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188830","url":null,"abstract":"Economic statecraft has become an increasingly prominent part of China’s foreign policy toolkit. Beijing has often sought to use both economic coercion and inducements to achieve its political goals, albeit to mixed results. In that vein, Chinese leaders have attentively watched how the United States has deployed its economic power, including US-led sanctions on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. This recent episode has underscored America’s continued global financial power and highlighted to Beijing its potential economic vulnerabilities, as well as the risks of international opprobrium. At the same time, Washington faces challenges in assembling a durable global coalition to exert pressure on Moscow, due to economic dependencies on Russian energy and political reticence outside of a core bloc of allies. I provide an overview of China’s approaches to economic statecraft and examine some of the key lessons that Beijing’s leaders are likely to draw from Russia’s war in Ukraine. I then discuss the implications for China’s economic statecraft going forward. Beijing is likely to redouble its efforts to increase economic self-reliance in critical technologies and sectors, better insulate the country from financial sanctions through de-dollarization, and continue to dangle economic inducements to peel allies and partners away from the United States, thus weakening US and allied leverage over China during a potential future crisis.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"46 1","pages":"121 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42056955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2149169
Michael Malley, J. Wirtz
deterring a land war in Central Europe. The incentives and opportunities faced by members of a maritime coalition are different from those faced by members of a coalition of land powers. The remainder of this article explores the political dynamics and specific considerations that flow from the growing importance of the US-led coalition in the effort to deter Chinese aggression in the western Pacific
{"title":"Maritime Coalitions and Deterrence: Beware the Melian Choice","authors":"Michael Malley, J. Wirtz","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2149169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2149169","url":null,"abstract":"deterring a land war in Central Europe. The incentives and opportunities faced by members of a maritime coalition are different from those faced by members of a coalition of land powers. The remainder of this article explores the political dynamics and specific considerations that flow from the growing importance of the US-led coalition in the effort to deter Chinese aggression in the western Pacific","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"99 - 111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44660085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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