Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090758
Š. Ganguly
In the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover, three major regional states—Pakistan, India, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—all have significant and overlapping stakes in the future of Afghanistan. As the Taliban struggles to govern an utterly impoverished land, all three have been carefully monitoring developments in the country. Simultaneously, they are keeping a close watch on the choices of the other two. As this essay argues, all three states are keen on ensuring that they will be able to wield a modicum of influence in the country for different as well as overlapping reasons. Pakistan’s goals will remain geostrategic: ensuring that the Taliban maintain their anti-India stance and sympathy for Islamabad’s concerns. The PRC’s interests in the country, meanwhile, will be twofold, both economic and strategic. It will look for ways to obtain access to rare earths and simultaneously attempt to ensure that pan-Islamic sentiment does not percolate from Afghanistan into its restive province of Xinjiang. Chinese and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan are likely to dovetail. Consequently, in all likelihood the US will turn to India to deal with concerns about the PRC, and also for intelligence cooperation purposes. This article will first spell out the underlying interests of all three states, discussing the strategies that they have pursued in the wake of the return of the Taliban to Kabul, and will then explore the possibilities and limits of their likely influence in the country in the foreseeable future. Finally, it concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of this strategic triangle for the United States.
{"title":"Kabul and a Strategic Triangle","authors":"Š. Ganguly","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090758","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover, three major regional states—Pakistan, India, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—all have significant and overlapping stakes in the future of Afghanistan. As the Taliban struggles to govern an utterly impoverished land, all three have been carefully monitoring developments in the country. Simultaneously, they are keeping a close watch on the choices of the other two. As this essay argues, all three states are keen on ensuring that they will be able to wield a modicum of influence in the country for different as well as overlapping reasons. Pakistan’s goals will remain geostrategic: ensuring that the Taliban maintain their anti-India stance and sympathy for Islamabad’s concerns. The PRC’s interests in the country, meanwhile, will be twofold, both economic and strategic. It will look for ways to obtain access to rare earths and simultaneously attempt to ensure that pan-Islamic sentiment does not percolate from Afghanistan into its restive province of Xinjiang. Chinese and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan are likely to dovetail. Consequently, in all likelihood the US will turn to India to deal with concerns about the PRC, and also for intelligence cooperation purposes. This article will first spell out the underlying interests of all three states, discussing the strategies that they have pursued in the wake of the return of the Taliban to Kabul, and will then explore the possibilities and limits of their likely influence in the country in the foreseeable future. Finally, it concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of this strategic triangle for the United States.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"59 - 71"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46412006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091875
D. Wei
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops to invade eastern Ukraine to carry out a “special military operation.” This latest war in Russia’s neighborhood recalls its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its conflict with Georgia in 2008. Many believe that Russia is seeking to establish a sphere of influence in its backyard, with a view toward restoring some of the old influence of various elements of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Since the outbreak of the war, Chinese officials have maintained a delicate balance between recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a sovereign nation and acknowledging Russia’s security concerns. This tightrope-walking strategy has generated much criticism in the Western world. Do Chinese officials and Chinese scholars support the concept of spheres of influence? Does a certain level of Chinese sympathy and understanding for Russia mean that China supports Russia’s efforts to create spheres of influence around it? As China’s power increases, will China seek spheres of influence in its own neighborhood? This paper lays out preliminary answers to these questions, first by examining the associations of the term “sphere of influence” in Chinese political rhetoric and how this view affects China’s visions of both Asian and global security. Next, I discuss the concept of a “security concern,” a phrase which many Chinese analysts tend to use, and how they view a case like the war in Ukraine through this lens. The essential takeaway here is the wisdom of selfrestraint. It is natural that a powerful country might have security concerns
{"title":"Security Concerns are Reasonable, Spheres of Influence are Not","authors":"D. Wei","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091875","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091875","url":null,"abstract":"On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops to invade eastern Ukraine to carry out a “special military operation.” This latest war in Russia’s neighborhood recalls its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its conflict with Georgia in 2008. Many believe that Russia is seeking to establish a sphere of influence in its backyard, with a view toward restoring some of the old influence of various elements of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Since the outbreak of the war, Chinese officials have maintained a delicate balance between recognizing Ukraine’s territorial integrity as a sovereign nation and acknowledging Russia’s security concerns. This tightrope-walking strategy has generated much criticism in the Western world. Do Chinese officials and Chinese scholars support the concept of spheres of influence? Does a certain level of Chinese sympathy and understanding for Russia mean that China supports Russia’s efforts to create spheres of influence around it? As China’s power increases, will China seek spheres of influence in its own neighborhood? This paper lays out preliminary answers to these questions, first by examining the associations of the term “sphere of influence” in Chinese political rhetoric and how this view affects China’s visions of both Asian and global security. Next, I discuss the concept of a “security concern,” a phrase which many Chinese analysts tend to use, and how they view a case like the war in Ukraine through this lens. The essential takeaway here is the wisdom of selfrestraint. It is natural that a powerful country might have security concerns","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"93 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43577819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091874
Hyun-Binn Cho, Ariel Petrovics
Despite the international community’s best efforts to prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons, North Korea has developed an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal since its first nuclear test in 2006. In 2017, the regime tested high-yield warheads, an array of shortto medium-range missiles, and even an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could put most US cities at risk. In 2022, North Korea broke its fouryear moratorium on testing ICBMs and added hypersonic missiles capable of maneuvering at high speed to its list of expanding missile tests. Pyongyang even boasted that it can “shake the world by firing a missile with the US mainland in its range,” highlighting the regime’s willingness to threaten the United States with its new arsenal. North Korea’s growing capabilities have reinvigorated policy debate about the regime’s strategic nuclear thinking. While denuclearization remains a top priority, until North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, the question of how Pyongyang might use its newfound capabilities continues to bedevil outside observers. The reclusive regime has yet to declare an official nuclear doctrine, and experts are divided
{"title":"North Korea’s Strategically Ambiguous Nuclear Posture","authors":"Hyun-Binn Cho, Ariel Petrovics","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091874","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the international community’s best efforts to prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons, North Korea has developed an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal since its first nuclear test in 2006. In 2017, the regime tested high-yield warheads, an array of shortto medium-range missiles, and even an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could put most US cities at risk. In 2022, North Korea broke its fouryear moratorium on testing ICBMs and added hypersonic missiles capable of maneuvering at high speed to its list of expanding missile tests. Pyongyang even boasted that it can “shake the world by firing a missile with the US mainland in its range,” highlighting the regime’s willingness to threaten the United States with its new arsenal. North Korea’s growing capabilities have reinvigorated policy debate about the regime’s strategic nuclear thinking. While denuclearization remains a top priority, until North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, the question of how Pyongyang might use its newfound capabilities continues to bedevil outside observers. The reclusive regime has yet to declare an official nuclear doctrine, and experts are divided","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"39 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47325645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090759
Tae-hyo Kim, Bernard Rowan
Washington’s biggest concern in its relationship with South Korea has been returning to a stance consistent with active engagement in the IndoPacific region. In response to June 2020 remarks by a senior South Korean official that his country had the right to choose between the US and China, the US State Department commented that South Korea had already chosen the US several decades ago when it abandoned authoritarianism and embraced democracy. In October 2021, although Washington officially welcomed the declaration of an end to the Korean War—a proposal that had been promoted for several years by the Moon Jae-in administration—the Biden administration expressed de facto opposition by insisting that it be linked to tangible North Korean denuclearization measures. With the March 2022 election of candidate Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party, expectations are growing that the US-South Korea alliance will return to its previous role and regain its old strength. South Korea’s new president believes that Seoul’s reluctance under Moon to take a firm stand on issues challenging relations between Washington and Beijing, including policy toward
{"title":"The Rise and Fall of South Korea’s 586 Generation: Implications for the US Alliance","authors":"Tae-hyo Kim, Bernard Rowan","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090759","url":null,"abstract":"Washington’s biggest concern in its relationship with South Korea has been returning to a stance consistent with active engagement in the IndoPacific region. In response to June 2020 remarks by a senior South Korean official that his country had the right to choose between the US and China, the US State Department commented that South Korea had already chosen the US several decades ago when it abandoned authoritarianism and embraced democracy. In October 2021, although Washington officially welcomed the declaration of an end to the Korean War—a proposal that had been promoted for several years by the Moon Jae-in administration—the Biden administration expressed de facto opposition by insisting that it be linked to tangible North Korean denuclearization measures. With the March 2022 election of candidate Yoon Suk-yeol of the People Power Party, expectations are growing that the US-South Korea alliance will return to its previous role and regain its old strength. South Korea’s new president believes that Seoul’s reluctance under Moon to take a firm stand on issues challenging relations between Washington and Beijing, including policy toward","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"23 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41836545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090757
Andris Banka
The US exit from Afghanistan, together with other geopolitical tremors, prompted commentary suggesting that Washington’s credibility had been badly shredded such that its allies no longer view it as a trustworthy partner. Yet despite such dire assessments, the three Baltic states remain confident that in their hour of need, the US would marshal its armed forces and come to their aid. While for many the phrase “indispensable nation” provokes scorn and eye-rolling, a majority of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians view the US precisely in that light. How do we account for the fact that this part of Europe has proven to have such fertile and resilient soil for pro-American sentiment? What explains the remarkable staying power of this phenomenon? As the US and Baltic republics mark 100 years of established diplomatic relations in the summer of 2022, this is an opportune time to provide a genealogy of pro-Americanism in the Baltics, disentangle the reasons behind its longevity, and assess the likelihood of its endurance in the future. The core thread that runs through this essay argues that, stripped to its fundamentals, Baltic Atlanticism flows from positive historical encounters with Washington, as well as the conviction among contemporary Baltic officials that, today, only the United States possesses an ample military shield and the willingness to use it in defense of small states in a volatile neighborhood. As this article takes stock of the Baltic states’ pro-Americanism, one important methodological question is in order, namely: is it possible to lump all three Baltic republics together given their cultural and linguistic differences? While clearly
{"title":"The Roots and Resilience of Pro-Americanism in the Baltics","authors":"Andris Banka","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090757","url":null,"abstract":"The US exit from Afghanistan, together with other geopolitical tremors, prompted commentary suggesting that Washington’s credibility had been badly shredded such that its allies no longer view it as a trustworthy partner. Yet despite such dire assessments, the three Baltic states remain confident that in their hour of need, the US would marshal its armed forces and come to their aid. While for many the phrase “indispensable nation” provokes scorn and eye-rolling, a majority of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians view the US precisely in that light. How do we account for the fact that this part of Europe has proven to have such fertile and resilient soil for pro-American sentiment? What explains the remarkable staying power of this phenomenon? As the US and Baltic republics mark 100 years of established diplomatic relations in the summer of 2022, this is an opportune time to provide a genealogy of pro-Americanism in the Baltics, disentangle the reasons behind its longevity, and assess the likelihood of its endurance in the future. The core thread that runs through this essay argues that, stripped to its fundamentals, Baltic Atlanticism flows from positive historical encounters with Washington, as well as the conviction among contemporary Baltic officials that, today, only the United States possesses an ample military shield and the willingness to use it in defense of small states in a volatile neighborhood. As this article takes stock of the Baltic states’ pro-Americanism, one important methodological question is in order, namely: is it possible to lump all three Baltic republics together given their cultural and linguistic differences? While clearly","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"169 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42724073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090762
Lindsey A. O’Rourke, Joshua R. Shifrinson
Whether spheres of influence stabilize or disrupt international security and how the United States should respond to efforts by other actors to establish spheres is at the forefront of contemporary grand strategy debates. For many in Washington, the answer is clear: spheres of influence are dangerous and destabilizing relics of centuries past which have no place in the modern world. In this rendering, spheres contradict American values, threaten to upend the liberal international order, promote great power competition, and ultimately destabilize international politics writ large. And at a time when many in Washington claim that Moscow and Beijing are crafting their own spheres in Eastern Europe and Asia, the policy implications of this position are clear: if a choice must be made between opposing or acknowledging these efforts, the United States must actively resist their creation. Nevertheless, both history and theory offer reasons to be skeptical of this widespread opprobrium. For one, the historical record for recognizing another great power’s sphere shows mixed results. With the benefit of hindsight, for example, we can see that attempts by Britain and the Soviet Union to satiate Hitler’s territorial ambitions by granting Germany a limited sphere of influence —first, the Sudetenland at the Munich Conference in 1938 and then Poland in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939—were strategic disasters. At other junctures, however, great powers struck deals regarding spheres of influence that stabilized interstate relations and, at times, helped protect smaller states from predation. Even a cursory glance at history reveals this
{"title":"Squaring the Circle on Spheres of Influence: The Overlooked Benefits","authors":"Lindsey A. O’Rourke, Joshua R. Shifrinson","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090762","url":null,"abstract":"Whether spheres of influence stabilize or disrupt international security and how the United States should respond to efforts by other actors to establish spheres is at the forefront of contemporary grand strategy debates. For many in Washington, the answer is clear: spheres of influence are dangerous and destabilizing relics of centuries past which have no place in the modern world. In this rendering, spheres contradict American values, threaten to upend the liberal international order, promote great power competition, and ultimately destabilize international politics writ large. And at a time when many in Washington claim that Moscow and Beijing are crafting their own spheres in Eastern Europe and Asia, the policy implications of this position are clear: if a choice must be made between opposing or acknowledging these efforts, the United States must actively resist their creation. Nevertheless, both history and theory offer reasons to be skeptical of this widespread opprobrium. For one, the historical record for recognizing another great power’s sphere shows mixed results. With the benefit of hindsight, for example, we can see that attempts by Britain and the Soviet Union to satiate Hitler’s territorial ambitions by granting Germany a limited sphere of influence —first, the Sudetenland at the Munich Conference in 1938 and then Poland in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939—were strategic disasters. At other junctures, however, great powers struck deals regarding spheres of influence that stabilized interstate relations and, at times, helped protect smaller states from predation. Even a cursory glance at history reveals this","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"105 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43373258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090760
M. Laruelle
Russia’s horrific war in Ukraine has sharply revived debate over charges of Russia’s fascist behavior. The most vocal voices in this debate are Yale historian Timothy Snyder, who has proclaimed that “Putin’s regime... is the world center of fascism,” and authored an op-ed in The New York Times entitled “We Should Say It: Russia Is Fascist.” Similar arguments are advanced by Rutgers political scientist Alexander Motyl, who asserted in a recent piece that Russia fits the textbook definition of fascism. State leaders currently fighting against Russia share that view: Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has labelled Russia’s actions as fascist and drawn parallels between Putin’s Russia and Nazi Germany. Polish President Andrzej Duda followed suit, stating that “today Russian leaders are behaving in exactly the same way, like Hitler, like the German SS, like the German pilots of the fascist army during World War II.” Among Russian social scientists abroad as well as those courageously resisting at home, the debate about Russia’s "fascism" has also become central in discussing post-February 24 transformations, most of them concluding that Russia does not (yet?) fit the typology.
{"title":"So, Is Russia Fascist Now? Labels and Policy Implications","authors":"M. Laruelle","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090760","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s horrific war in Ukraine has sharply revived debate over charges of Russia’s fascist behavior. The most vocal voices in this debate are Yale historian Timothy Snyder, who has proclaimed that “Putin’s regime... is the world center of fascism,” and authored an op-ed in The New York Times entitled “We Should Say It: Russia Is Fascist.” Similar arguments are advanced by Rutgers political scientist Alexander Motyl, who asserted in a recent piece that Russia fits the textbook definition of fascism. State leaders currently fighting against Russia share that view: Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky has labelled Russia’s actions as fascist and drawn parallels between Putin’s Russia and Nazi Germany. Polish President Andrzej Duda followed suit, stating that “today Russian leaders are behaving in exactly the same way, like Hitler, like the German SS, like the German pilots of the fascist army during World War II.” Among Russian social scientists abroad as well as those courageously resisting at home, the debate about Russia’s \"fascism\" has also become central in discussing post-February 24 transformations, most of them concluding that Russia does not (yet?) fit the typology.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"149 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42333159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090761
J. Mankoff
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shockedWestern observers. Seizures of territory, mass expulsions, and all-out assaults on Ukrainian culture hearken back to an earlier, darker era in European history—the era of empire. Indeed, the conflict may be the 21 century’s first imperial war. For President Vladimir Putin and many others in the Russian elite, Ukraine’s underlying provocation lay not so much in its aspiration to join NATO or the European Union, but in the very temerity it displayed in existing at all. Expressing ideas that are widespread among Russian thinkers and politicians, Putin has argued that Ukrainians and Russians are, as he put it in 2014, “one people, a single whole”—and that because he considers Ukraine part of Russia’s own historic patrimony, Moscow retains the right to conquer and reshape it with no regard for its inhabitants. In denying the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood, Putin is also denying the legitimacy of Russia’s current borders, which took shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ever since, Russia has maintained (or secured) de facto control over a range of territories belonging to the internationally recognized territory of other states: Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and of course, Crimea and the “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk (Ukraine). Putin has also established effective political
{"title":"The War in Ukraine and Eurasia’s New Imperial Moment","authors":"J. Mankoff","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090761","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shockedWestern observers. Seizures of territory, mass expulsions, and all-out assaults on Ukrainian culture hearken back to an earlier, darker era in European history—the era of empire. Indeed, the conflict may be the 21 century’s first imperial war. For President Vladimir Putin and many others in the Russian elite, Ukraine’s underlying provocation lay not so much in its aspiration to join NATO or the European Union, but in the very temerity it displayed in existing at all. Expressing ideas that are widespread among Russian thinkers and politicians, Putin has argued that Ukrainians and Russians are, as he put it in 2014, “one people, a single whole”—and that because he considers Ukraine part of Russia’s own historic patrimony, Moscow retains the right to conquer and reshape it with no regard for its inhabitants. In denying the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood, Putin is also denying the legitimacy of Russia’s current borders, which took shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ever since, Russia has maintained (or secured) de facto control over a range of territories belonging to the internationally recognized territory of other states: Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and of course, Crimea and the “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk (Ukraine). Putin has also established effective political","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"127 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42358177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2058186
J. Sherman
Since the Russian government’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election, much has changed: dozens of public and private studies have detailed Russia’s playbook of operations; the intelligence community has become more transparent in publicly reporting on the issue; the US has imposed sanctions on dozens of Russian actors involved in the disinformation ecosystem; and technology platforms have spent millions of dollars on misinformation task forces and content guidelines. Yet one thing remains markedly unchanged: election interference is still an incredibly low-cost, high-gain mechanism of influence for the Russian government. The Kremlin has strong incentives to interfere in US elections again. And with Vladimir Putin’s illegal, aggressive, and large-scale war on Ukraine, it is clear that the Putin regime will continue to target other countries it sees as its enemies with wide-ranging means of attack, influence, sabotage, and subversion. Russian state and state-backed interference in 2016 took many forms, including hacking and leaking campaign documents, building relationships with Trump campaign officials, and spreading disinformation and stoking division on US social media platforms. It is an open empirical question whether those social media posts actually swayed Americans’ voting decisions, and if so, how. The same question could be asked about the media coverage of the leaked Clinton campaign documents, though resulting press coverage was highly critical of Hillary Clinton. Yet assessing modern Russian and even Soviet disinformation purely on this definition of effectiveness misses the
{"title":"Changing the Kremlin’s Election Interference Calculus","authors":"J. Sherman","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2058186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2058186","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Russian government’s interference in the 2016 US presidential election, much has changed: dozens of public and private studies have detailed Russia’s playbook of operations; the intelligence community has become more transparent in publicly reporting on the issue; the US has imposed sanctions on dozens of Russian actors involved in the disinformation ecosystem; and technology platforms have spent millions of dollars on misinformation task forces and content guidelines. Yet one thing remains markedly unchanged: election interference is still an incredibly low-cost, high-gain mechanism of influence for the Russian government. The Kremlin has strong incentives to interfere in US elections again. And with Vladimir Putin’s illegal, aggressive, and large-scale war on Ukraine, it is clear that the Putin regime will continue to target other countries it sees as its enemies with wide-ranging means of attack, influence, sabotage, and subversion. Russian state and state-backed interference in 2016 took many forms, including hacking and leaking campaign documents, building relationships with Trump campaign officials, and spreading disinformation and stoking division on US social media platforms. It is an open empirical question whether those social media posts actually swayed Americans’ voting decisions, and if so, how. The same question could be asked about the media coverage of the leaked Clinton campaign documents, though resulting press coverage was highly critical of Hillary Clinton. Yet assessing modern Russian and even Soviet disinformation purely on this definition of effectiveness misses the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"112 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49489229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145
L. Odgaard
NATO can design this effort to include adversarial behavior from China. The alliance
北约可以将这种努力设计为包括来自中国的敌对行为。联盟
{"title":"NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space","authors":"L. Odgaard","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145","url":null,"abstract":"NATO can design this effort to include adversarial behavior from China. The alliance","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"167 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42009877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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