Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059146
Guillame Pitron
In 2010, a team of Pentagon officials and American geologists uncovered Afghanistan’s best kept secret: a plethora of mining resources such as lithium, copper, cobalt—including 1.4 million metric tons of rare-earth elements, estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, all of them essential to modern industry. After this development, Afghanistan, according to The New York Times, rapidly became heralded as a country which could “be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world.” More than a decade later, however, US forces filing out of Afghanistan were leaving these resources untapped, attracting the interest of neighboring nations. In July 2021, China and the Taliban agreed on a pact of non-aggression, ensuring that the former will not meddle in Afghan political affairs, and that the latter will not use its territory as a base for Uyghur separatists. The pact substantiates what The Global Times, a newspaper with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party, reported: “huge opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries, especially in sectors such as utilities and mining.” China expects to soon begin the extraction of copper—an essential resource for manufacturing electric cars—from the Mes Aynak mine in the Logar province, for which the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), one of the
2010年，一个由五角大楼官员和美国地质学家组成的小组发现了阿富汗保守得最好的秘密:大量的矿产资源，如锂、铜、钴，包括140万吨稀土元素，估计价值超过1万亿美元，所有这些都是现代工业所必需的。据《纽约时报》(New York Times)报道，在这一发展之后，阿富汗迅速被誉为一个可以“转变为世界上最重要的采矿中心之一”的国家。然而，十多年后，美国军队从阿富汗撤出，这些资源没有得到开发，引起了邻国的兴趣。2021年7月，中国与塔利班达成互不侵犯条约，确保中国不干涉阿富汗政治事务，塔利班不利用其领土作为维吾尔分裂分子的基地。该协议证实了与中国共产党关系密切的报纸《环球时报》所报道的:“两国之间互利合作的巨大机遇，特别是在公用事业和采矿等领域。”中国预计不久将开始从洛加尔省的Mes Aynak矿开采铜——制造电动汽车的重要资源，中国冶金集团公司(MCC)是该矿的主要开采方之一
{"title":"The Geopolitics of the Rare-Metals Race","authors":"Guillame Pitron","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059146","url":null,"abstract":"In 2010, a team of Pentagon officials and American geologists uncovered Afghanistan’s best kept secret: a plethora of mining resources such as lithium, copper, cobalt—including 1.4 million metric tons of rare-earth elements, estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, all of them essential to modern industry. After this development, Afghanistan, according to The New York Times, rapidly became heralded as a country which could “be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world.” More than a decade later, however, US forces filing out of Afghanistan were leaving these resources untapped, attracting the interest of neighboring nations. In July 2021, China and the Taliban agreed on a pact of non-aggression, ensuring that the former will not meddle in Afghan political affairs, and that the latter will not use its territory as a base for Uyghur separatists. The pact substantiates what The Global Times, a newspaper with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party, reported: “huge opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries, especially in sectors such as utilities and mining.” China expects to soon begin the extraction of copper—an essential resource for manufacturing electric cars—from the Mes Aynak mine in the Logar province, for which the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), one of the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"135 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43805563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2054121
S. Fetter, Charles L. Glaser
the logical use of nuclear weapons in MAD is coercive — threatening costs via attacks against cities, populations, and/or centers of economic activity.
在MAD中使用核武器的逻辑是强制性的——通过攻击城市、人口和/或经济活动中心来威胁成本。
{"title":"Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy","authors":"S. Fetter, Charles L. Glaser","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2054121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2054121","url":null,"abstract":"the logical use of nuclear weapons in MAD is coercive — threatening costs via attacks against cities, populations, and/or centers of economic activity.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"25 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47617687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059143
Andrew J Gawthorpe
Over the previous decade, a bipartisan consensus has emerged on the importance of placing the interests of the middle class near the center of American foreign policy. Of course, lamentations concerning the health of the American middle class and presidential programs to revitalize it have been a staple of postwar history, particularly during economic downturns. But only over this previous decade have they been tied so closely to foreign policy concerns—something which has happened in otherwise very dissimilar administrations. The first time the American middle class was mentioned in a US National Security Strategy (NSS) document was in 2015, when Barack Obama pledged to “strengthen the middle class” by “opening markets and leveling the playing field for American workers and businesses abroad.” In a similar formulation, Donald Trump’s 2017 NSS promised to be one which “creates middle-class jobs” through “rebuilding economic strength at home and preserving a fair and reciprocal international economic system.” The Biden administration has taken this line of thought further than either of its predecessors, with the new president promising that he will run a “foreign
{"title":"Taking US Foreign Policy for the Middle Class Seriously","authors":"Andrew J Gawthorpe","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059143","url":null,"abstract":"Over the previous decade, a bipartisan consensus has emerged on the importance of placing the interests of the middle class near the center of American foreign policy. Of course, lamentations concerning the health of the American middle class and presidential programs to revitalize it have been a staple of postwar history, particularly during economic downturns. But only over this previous decade have they been tied so closely to foreign policy concerns—something which has happened in otherwise very dissimilar administrations. The first time the American middle class was mentioned in a US National Security Strategy (NSS) document was in 2015, when Barack Obama pledged to “strengthen the middle class” by “opening markets and leveling the playing field for American workers and businesses abroad.” In a similar formulation, Donald Trump’s 2017 NSS promised to be one which “creates middle-class jobs” through “rebuilding economic strength at home and preserving a fair and reciprocal international economic system.” The Biden administration has taken this line of thought further than either of its predecessors, with the new president promising that he will run a “foreign","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"57 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44541257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059144
Kristen Hopewell
China’s trade policies have come under intense scrutiny amid the ongoing US-China trade war. Yet with attention focused on trade conflict between the United States and China, the wider effects of China’s trade policies are being largely ignored. The debate about China’s trading practices has been driven primarily by the United States and other advanced economies such as the EU and Japan. These countries have complained that China is using state subsidies and other unfair trading practices to give its firms and industries an edge in global markets and tilt the playing field in its favor. From steel to semiconductors, attention has overwhelmingly focused on the policies that China is using to promote the expansion of its manufacturing and high-tech industries including heavy subsidies, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property violations. In these sectors, China’s policies pose a serious competitive threat to the US and other advanced-industrialized states. What has been widely overlooked, however, is that China is also making use of highly trade-distorting policies in other sectors that are of significant concern to developing countries.WhileChina is primarily seen as amanufacturing powerhouse, it has also emerged as a major power in global agriculture markets and the world’s dominant fishing power. What is more, over the last decade, China has become the world’s largest subsidizer of both agriculture and fisheries. Given China’s aggregate economic might and newfound centrality in both global agriculture and fisheries, the effects of its trade policies are felt worldwide. Likewise, since many
{"title":"The Untold Victims of China’s Trade Policies","authors":"Kristen Hopewell","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059144","url":null,"abstract":"China’s trade policies have come under intense scrutiny amid the ongoing US-China trade war. Yet with attention focused on trade conflict between the United States and China, the wider effects of China’s trade policies are being largely ignored. The debate about China’s trading practices has been driven primarily by the United States and other advanced economies such as the EU and Japan. These countries have complained that China is using state subsidies and other unfair trading practices to give its firms and industries an edge in global markets and tilt the playing field in its favor. From steel to semiconductors, attention has overwhelmingly focused on the policies that China is using to promote the expansion of its manufacturing and high-tech industries including heavy subsidies, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property violations. In these sectors, China’s policies pose a serious competitive threat to the US and other advanced-industrialized states. What has been widely overlooked, however, is that China is also making use of highly trade-distorting policies in other sectors that are of significant concern to developing countries.WhileChina is primarily seen as amanufacturing powerhouse, it has also emerged as a major power in global agriculture markets and the world’s dominant fishing power. What is more, over the last decade, China has become the world’s largest subsidizer of both agriculture and fisheries. Given China’s aggregate economic might and newfound centrality in both global agriculture and fisheries, the effects of its trade policies are felt worldwide. Likewise, since many","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"151 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45914611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113
Ben Sohl
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia’s Grand Strategy Ben Sohl To cite this article: Ben Sohl (2022) Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia’s Grand Strategy, The Washington Quarterly, 45:1, 97-111, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113
{"title":"Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia’s Grand Strategy","authors":"Ben Sohl","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113","url":null,"abstract":"ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia’s Grand Strategy Ben Sohl To cite this article: Ben Sohl (2022) Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia’s Grand Strategy, The Washington Quarterly, 45:1, 97-111, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"97 - 111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48546933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2058185
D. D. Kaye
After decades of wars in the Middle East, growing great power competition, and changing priorities at home, there is much uncertainty about America’s place in the world today. Russia’s brazen invasion of Ukraine has further shaken up debates over America’s global priorities and purpose, including in the Middle East. On one hand, a consensus has emerged across the American political spectrum that after costly investments with little discernable payoff, the United States should do less in the Middle East and more to confront a rising China. President Obama aspired to “pivot to Asia” but new terrorism threats like the Islamic State sidetracked him along the way. Now, by some accounts, Biden is finally completing the pivot, even if the Ukraine war is shifting US attention back to Europe and Russia. On the other hand, tens of thousands of US forces remain in the Middle East, increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Iran and Iranianaligned nonstate actors. All the while, American military strikes against Iranian-aligned groups and major US arms sales to regional partners continue apace. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 added to this policy confusion. Was Afghanistan the opening salvo foreshadowing a reduced American presence in the Middle East, to be followed by more withdrawals as advocated by a “restraint” camp in Washington? Or was it a unique set of circumstances, linked to Biden’s previous convictions and assessments of the
{"title":"America's Role in a Post-American Middle East","authors":"D. D. Kaye","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2058185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2058185","url":null,"abstract":"After decades of wars in the Middle East, growing great power competition, and changing priorities at home, there is much uncertainty about America’s place in the world today. Russia’s brazen invasion of Ukraine has further shaken up debates over America’s global priorities and purpose, including in the Middle East. On one hand, a consensus has emerged across the American political spectrum that after costly investments with little discernable payoff, the United States should do less in the Middle East and more to confront a rising China. President Obama aspired to “pivot to Asia” but new terrorism threats like the Islamic State sidetracked him along the way. Now, by some accounts, Biden is finally completing the pivot, even if the Ukraine war is shifting US attention back to Europe and Russia. On the other hand, tens of thousands of US forces remain in the Middle East, increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Iran and Iranianaligned nonstate actors. All the while, American military strikes against Iranian-aligned groups and major US arms sales to regional partners continue apace. The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 added to this policy confusion. Was Afghanistan the opening salvo foreshadowing a reduced American presence in the Middle East, to be followed by more withdrawals as advocated by a “restraint” camp in Washington? Or was it a unique set of circumstances, linked to Biden’s previous convictions and assessments of the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"7 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47818242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057112
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz
The Biden administration came into office seeking to create a stable and predictable relationship with Russia. Determined to devote more time and attention to China,Washington sought to reduce tensions with Putin’s Russia in order to avoid confrontation that might derail the administration’s agenda. Yet despite Washington’s approach, relations with Russia have turned out to be anything but stable and predictable. On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s war of choice catalyzed a massive shift in international perceptions of Putin and a series of responses—ranging from punishing sanctions on Russia’s financial sector to private sector steps to curtail business operations inside the country—that have fundamentally altered relations with Russia. It is now impossible to imagine that there could be any substantive improvement in USRussia relations while Putin remains in power. If Washington cannot expect confrontation between the United States and Russia to abate so long as Putin is at the helm, the questions that naturally follow are: how much longer will Putin be in office, and what are the prospects that US-Russia relations could be different under a future Russian leader? Although Putin’s attack on Ukraine has increased the challenges he faces at home, he may very well be able to weather the backlash. History is rife with embattled autocrats who successfully maintained power despite domestic economic challenges and significant opposition. High and rising levels of repression, tight
{"title":"After Putin: Lessons from Autocratic Leadership Transitions","authors":"Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057112","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration came into office seeking to create a stable and predictable relationship with Russia. Determined to devote more time and attention to China,Washington sought to reduce tensions with Putin’s Russia in order to avoid confrontation that might derail the administration’s agenda. Yet despite Washington’s approach, relations with Russia have turned out to be anything but stable and predictable. On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s war of choice catalyzed a massive shift in international perceptions of Putin and a series of responses—ranging from punishing sanctions on Russia’s financial sector to private sector steps to curtail business operations inside the country—that have fundamentally altered relations with Russia. It is now impossible to imagine that there could be any substantive improvement in USRussia relations while Putin remains in power. If Washington cannot expect confrontation between the United States and Russia to abate so long as Putin is at the helm, the questions that naturally follow are: how much longer will Putin be in office, and what are the prospects that US-Russia relations could be different under a future Russian leader? Although Putin’s attack on Ukraine has increased the challenges he faces at home, he may very well be able to weather the backlash. History is rife with embattled autocrats who successfully maintained power despite domestic economic challenges and significant opposition. High and rising levels of repression, tight","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"79 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46120350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018793
J. Byun, Do Young Lee
As the rise of Chinese power and North Korea’s nuclear development alter East Asia’s strategic landscape, American foreign policy analysts continue to look for innovative ways to bolster the security position of US allies in the region. MIT political scientists Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels highlight one potential option in a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, arguing that the United States should revitalize its alliances with Japan and South Korea by exploring “the wartime sharing of nuclear weapons,” which might involve “modifying hardware (e.g., certifying allied F-35s for nuclear delivery), acquiring new systems, and training air or naval crews in tactical nuclear strikes and command and control.” Similar proposals are not difficult to encounter in Washington’s policy community. One analysis calls for the “custodial sharing of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities during times of crisis with select Asia-Pacific partners, specifically Japan and the Republic of Korea [ROK].” Likewise, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Brad Roberts writes that “[a] more NATO-like nuclear umbrella makes good sense in Northeast Asia today.” Such arrangements “could be replicated in South Korea,” for example, “with US nuclear weapons permanently deployed there along with dual-capable fighter-bombers that would be flown by pilots from both countries.”
{"title":"The Case Against Nuclear Sharing in East Asia","authors":"J. Byun, Do Young Lee","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018793","url":null,"abstract":"As the rise of Chinese power and North Korea’s nuclear development alter East Asia’s strategic landscape, American foreign policy analysts continue to look for innovative ways to bolster the security position of US allies in the region. MIT political scientists Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels highlight one potential option in a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, arguing that the United States should revitalize its alliances with Japan and South Korea by exploring “the wartime sharing of nuclear weapons,” which might involve “modifying hardware (e.g., certifying allied F-35s for nuclear delivery), acquiring new systems, and training air or naval crews in tactical nuclear strikes and command and control.” Similar proposals are not difficult to encounter in Washington’s policy community. One analysis calls for the “custodial sharing of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities during times of crisis with select Asia-Pacific partners, specifically Japan and the Republic of Korea [ROK].” Likewise, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Brad Roberts writes that “[a] more NATO-like nuclear umbrella makes good sense in Northeast Asia today.” Such arrangements “could be replicated in South Korea,” for example, “with US nuclear weapons permanently deployed there along with dual-capable fighter-bombers that would be flown by pilots from both countries.”","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"67 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45095311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2017645
A. Carr
In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States captured the world’s attention with a technology and capability-sharing partnership known as AUKUS. For many, this was yet another example of the closeness of the alliance between the United States and Australia, which was initially formalized in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), from which New Zealand was suspended in 1986. Yet, however strong the public narrative seems, American and Australian officials have expressed concern and confusion about each other’s behavior in recent years, and well-connected scholars have warned of “complacency” and “expectation gaps” while identifying divergences in the interests, behavior, and outlook of the United States and Australia. During the 2010s, Australia regularly acted in ways that belied its loyal ally identity. Canberra consistently rejected US pressure to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea. It ignored direct US pressure and joined China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), agreed to a Free Trade Agreement with Beijing, and signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) to support the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra was privately skeptical about the US commitment to its region under presidents Barack Obama as well as Joe Biden, and explicitly
{"title":"A Model Alliance? The Strategic Logic of US-Australia Cooperation","authors":"A. Carr","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2017645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2017645","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States captured the world’s attention with a technology and capability-sharing partnership known as AUKUS. For many, this was yet another example of the closeness of the alliance between the United States and Australia, which was initially formalized in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), from which New Zealand was suspended in 1986. Yet, however strong the public narrative seems, American and Australian officials have expressed concern and confusion about each other’s behavior in recent years, and well-connected scholars have warned of “complacency” and “expectation gaps” while identifying divergences in the interests, behavior, and outlook of the United States and Australia. During the 2010s, Australia regularly acted in ways that belied its loyal ally identity. Canberra consistently rejected US pressure to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea. It ignored direct US pressure and joined China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), agreed to a Free Trade Agreement with Beijing, and signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) to support the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra was privately skeptical about the US commitment to its region under presidents Barack Obama as well as Joe Biden, and explicitly","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"51 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46322912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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