Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133
S. Moller, S. Rynning
As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) once again finds itself at a crossroads. Diplomats and transatlantic supporters on both sides of the Atlantic collectively expelled a sigh of relief last November that a second Trump term —which many feared might spell the end of the 72-year-old alliance—had not come to pass. However, the mood is far from celebratory in either Washington or European capitals because all parties understand that, to steer clear of irrelevancy and remain “fit for purpose,”NATO needs renewal—the question is how? If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its first in a decade. NATO’s current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010 and reflects NATO’s thinking on how to cope with the divisive nature of the War on Terror, and it is inadequate for a changed world of great power rivalry. A new Strategic Concept has long been on the agenda in the corridors of NATO diplomacy, but no one dared open this Pandora’s Box during the Trump presidency. Following the November 2020 US presidential elections, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stepped forward to sketch a calendar for strategic change: a mandate for a Strategic Concept review from the NATO heads of
{"title":"Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond","authors":"S. Moller, S. Rynning","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133","url":null,"abstract":"As the United States and the world begins to adjust to a Biden presidency, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) once again finds itself at a crossroads. Diplomats and transatlantic supporters on both sides of the Atlantic collectively expelled a sigh of relief last November that a second Trump term —which many feared might spell the end of the 72-year-old alliance—had not come to pass. However, the mood is far from celebratory in either Washington or European capitals because all parties understand that, to steer clear of irrelevancy and remain “fit for purpose,”NATO needs renewal—the question is how? If the allies are not careful, domestic contentions and international disputes over trade and technology regulation could consume their political energy, breaking the promise of transatlantic renewal before it has even begun. To stave off this dim prospect, NATO is embarking on a strategy of transatlantic renewal, the centerpiece of which will be a new Strategic Concept—its first in a decade. NATO’s current Strategic Concept dates back to 2010 and reflects NATO’s thinking on how to cope with the divisive nature of the War on Terror, and it is inadequate for a changed world of great power rivalry. A new Strategic Concept has long been on the agenda in the corridors of NATO diplomacy, but no one dared open this Pandora’s Box during the Trump presidency. Following the November 2020 US presidential elections, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stepped forward to sketch a calendar for strategic change: a mandate for a Strategic Concept review from the NATO heads of","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"177 - 197"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1896133","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48503570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027
M. Wigell
Western democracy is being attacked like never before, but not through overhyped "hybrid warfare " It is in reality threatened more acutely by hybrid interference, attacks that are often subtle, manipulating for cover the very same liberal democratic values that the attack is designed to subvert The cornerstones of Western democracy--state restraint, pluralism, free media, and economic openness--provide openings for authoritarian actors to interfere in democratic society through a host of covert, non-military means calibrated to undermine their internal cohesion and accelerate political polarization For instance, disinformation campaigns have become increasingly evident since the 2016 US elections and have stepped up in the midst of the COVID 19 crisis Financial support is also being channeled to radical political parties and movements to accelerate centrifugal forces within and among Western democracies Part of this toolbox involves exploiting the economic openness of Western democracies to capture strategic sectors of the economy--such as critical infrastructure, finance, and media--by which these authoritarian actors can attempt to destabilize Western democracies and purposefully corrupt them
{"title":"Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference","authors":"M. Wigell","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027","url":null,"abstract":"Western democracy is being attacked like never before, but not through overhyped \"hybrid warfare \" It is in reality threatened more acutely by hybrid interference, attacks that are often subtle, manipulating for cover the very same liberal democratic values that the attack is designed to subvert The cornerstones of Western democracy--state restraint, pluralism, free media, and economic openness--provide openings for authoritarian actors to interfere in democratic society through a host of covert, non-military means calibrated to undermine their internal cohesion and accelerate political polarization For instance, disinformation campaigns have become increasingly evident since the 2016 US elections and have stepped up in the midst of the COVID 19 crisis Financial support is also being channeled to radical political parties and movements to accelerate centrifugal forces within and among Western democracies Part of this toolbox involves exploiting the economic openness of Western democracies to capture strategic sectors of the economy--such as critical infrastructure, finance, and media--by which these authoritarian actors can attempt to destabilize Western democracies and purposefully corrupt them","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"49 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48055796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893022
Carla Norrlöf
The return of great power rivalry has been the defining feature of the 21st century. Since the beginning of the new millennium, China and Russia have openly defied the United States and upset the stability of the liberal international order. Both China and Russia share physical and material attributes possessed by the United States that are traditionally required for great power status: land mass, a sea portal, a large population, and technology to field and develop a competitive military capability. Most scholars and policymakers agree that China presents the largest challenge to US interests and the US-led liberal international order. Economic and military growth in China has been astounding, surpassing Russian expansion. China’s outward extension is not primarily resource-based as is Russia’s but multidimensional, posing a structural challenge to US military and economic dominance. Much ink has been spilled over the nature of US-China rivalry and whether the two great powers are destined for war. Structural factors figure prominently when predicting US-China relations. A famous deadly Greek trap describes how the fear of a hegemonic power sparks catastrophic war with a rising power. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides writes, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” Thucydides’ statement has been widely adopted as a metaphor for the dangers associated with great-power transition. Both A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory and Robert Gilpin’s realism see great-power wars as
{"title":"The Ibn Khaldûn Trap and Great Power Competition with China","authors":"Carla Norrlöf","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893022","url":null,"abstract":"The return of great power rivalry has been the defining feature of the 21st century. Since the beginning of the new millennium, China and Russia have openly defied the United States and upset the stability of the liberal international order. Both China and Russia share physical and material attributes possessed by the United States that are traditionally required for great power status: land mass, a sea portal, a large population, and technology to field and develop a competitive military capability. Most scholars and policymakers agree that China presents the largest challenge to US interests and the US-led liberal international order. Economic and military growth in China has been astounding, surpassing Russian expansion. China’s outward extension is not primarily resource-based as is Russia’s but multidimensional, posing a structural challenge to US military and economic dominance. Much ink has been spilled over the nature of US-China rivalry and whether the two great powers are destined for war. Structural factors figure prominently when predicting US-China relations. A famous deadly Greek trap describes how the fear of a hegemonic power sparks catastrophic war with a rising power. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides writes, “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” Thucydides’ statement has been widely adopted as a metaphor for the dangers associated with great-power transition. Both A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory and Robert Gilpin’s realism see great-power wars as","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":"7 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47392093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894723
Xiangfeng Yang
No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations. Clashes routinely run the gamut between Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; its...
再多的粉饰也不能低估当前中美关系压力的深度和范围。冲突通常涉及北京对新疆、香港和台湾的处理；它的
{"title":"US-China Crossroads Ahead: Perils and Opportunities for Biden","authors":"Xiangfeng Yang","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894723","url":null,"abstract":"No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations. Clashes routinely run the gamut between Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; its...","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"129 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894723","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42809404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513
Min Ye
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated geopolitical tensions between the United States and China while restricting policy dialogues, amplifying extreme sentiments, and sidestepping rational observations The outcomes are extremist and divided narratives, emphasizing China's triumphalism on one hand and inherent weaknesses on the other Under such narratives, China's policy voices and actions in combatting the pandemic and economic fallout were under-studied and discounted, with harmful impacts on the US response to the virus, economic recession, and shifting globalization This paper studies China's official statements, research reports, and scholarly opinion networks in 2020 and finds that, though there were various policy discussions, the general argument was for expanding China's globalism during and after the pandemic Meanwhile, China's policy actors--national agencies, local governments, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)--strive to continue globalization and adapt to new realities after COVID-19 This article first discusses the effect of COVID-19 on US-China relations, focusing on the gap between narratives and realities It then synthesizes the US narratives on China in 2020, highlighting their extreme and divided nature
{"title":"The COVID-19 Effect: US-China Narratives and Realities","authors":"Min Ye","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated geopolitical tensions between the United States and China while restricting policy dialogues, amplifying extreme sentiments, and sidestepping rational observations The outcomes are extremist and divided narratives, emphasizing China's triumphalism on one hand and inherent weaknesses on the other Under such narratives, China's policy voices and actions in combatting the pandemic and economic fallout were under-studied and discounted, with harmful impacts on the US response to the virus, economic recession, and shifting globalization This paper studies China's official statements, research reports, and scholarly opinion networks in 2020 and finds that, though there were various policy discussions, the general argument was for expanding China's globalism during and after the pandemic Meanwhile, China's policy actors--national agencies, local governments, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs)--strive to continue globalization and adapt to new realities after COVID-19 This article first discusses the effect of COVID-19 on US-China relations, focusing on the gap between narratives and realities It then synthesizes the US narratives on China in 2020, highlighting their extreme and divided nature","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"89 - 105"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893513","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42130268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894709
Eric Heginbotham, Richard J. Samuels
Despite rising threats and challenges in Northeast Asia, the US commitment to its allies there has become less certain. In part, this is by design. President Trump argued that less categorical signals would encourage US allies to do more, either in their own defense or to support (and finance) forward deployed US forces. Hearing this, Japanese and South Korean (ROK) leaders have been led to consider alternatives to the status quo. They increased defense budgets, a welcome development in Washington, but they also have taken measures that may complicate alliance dynamics, undermine crisis stability, and weaken the broader project of balancing Chinese power. Early in his term, President Biden pledged to improve alliance relations. But confronted with uncertainty, Japan and Korea continue to edge toward offensive systems, including missile forces, which may prove destabilizing in crises. They have also moved away from the rolesand missions-based specialization of military labor that has enhanced alliance efficiencies for decades. The widening discussion of nuclear weapons in both countries is perhaps most striking. While nuclear breakout could strengthen Japanese and South Korean self-defense, it would not necessarily enhance balancing. Indeed, given the
{"title":"Vulnerable US Alliances in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Implications","authors":"Eric Heginbotham, Richard J. Samuels","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894709","url":null,"abstract":"Despite rising threats and challenges in Northeast Asia, the US commitment to its allies there has become less certain. In part, this is by design. President Trump argued that less categorical signals would encourage US allies to do more, either in their own defense or to support (and finance) forward deployed US forces. Hearing this, Japanese and South Korean (ROK) leaders have been led to consider alternatives to the status quo. They increased defense budgets, a welcome development in Washington, but they also have taken measures that may complicate alliance dynamics, undermine crisis stability, and weaken the broader project of balancing Chinese power. Early in his term, President Biden pledged to improve alliance relations. But confronted with uncertainty, Japan and Korea continue to edge toward offensive systems, including missile forces, which may prove destabilizing in crises. They have also moved away from the rolesand missions-based specialization of military labor that has enhanced alliance efficiencies for decades. The widening discussion of nuclear weapons in both countries is perhaps most striking. While nuclear breakout could strengthen Japanese and South Korean self-defense, it would not necessarily enhance balancing. Indeed, given the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"157 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894709","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47922644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894718
Alexander Lanoszka, Luis Simón
The Biden administration has promised to revitalize a transatlantic alliance that has experienced much strain during Donald Trump’s presidency. Trump’s focus on strategic competition with China, equivocal attitude toward Russia, repeated criticisms of NATO and Germany, and insistence that Europeans pay for their own defense have raised questions about the future of US defense strategy in Europe. Nevertheless, his administration in fact committed additional money and troops to deterring Russia from threatening US allies. Amid such confusing signals, one of Trump’s last acts that roiled transatlantic relations was to announce in July 2020 a plan to reduce military personnel stationed in Germany from about 34,500 to 25,000, return some portion of these troops to the United States, regroup someair and commandassets in Italy andBelgium, and reinforce theUSmilitary’s rotational presence in Poland and the Black Sea region. The announcement of these measures stunned European allies, who had not been previously consulted. The Pentagon’s 2020 plan embodied the main themes and contradictions that characterized Trump’s defense strategy in Europe: its net reduction of US forces reflected Europe’s downgraded strategic importance to Washington, partly explained by the need to prioritize Asia and partly by the belief that Europeans must be responsible for their own defense; it punished Germany; and it sought
{"title":"A Military Drawdown in Germany? US Force Posture in Europe from Trump to Biden","authors":"Alexander Lanoszka, Luis Simón","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894718","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration has promised to revitalize a transatlantic alliance that has experienced much strain during Donald Trump’s presidency. Trump’s focus on strategic competition with China, equivocal attitude toward Russia, repeated criticisms of NATO and Germany, and insistence that Europeans pay for their own defense have raised questions about the future of US defense strategy in Europe. Nevertheless, his administration in fact committed additional money and troops to deterring Russia from threatening US allies. Amid such confusing signals, one of Trump’s last acts that roiled transatlantic relations was to announce in July 2020 a plan to reduce military personnel stationed in Germany from about 34,500 to 25,000, return some portion of these troops to the United States, regroup someair and commandassets in Italy andBelgium, and reinforce theUSmilitary’s rotational presence in Poland and the Black Sea region. The announcement of these measures stunned European allies, who had not been previously consulted. The Pentagon’s 2020 plan embodied the main themes and contradictions that characterized Trump’s defense strategy in Europe: its net reduction of US forces reflected Europe’s downgraded strategic importance to Washington, partly explained by the need to prioritize Asia and partly by the belief that Europeans must be responsible for their own defense; it punished Germany; and it sought","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"199 - 218"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1894718","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44892347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893515
Zuo Xiying
Over the past several decades, the United States adopted a policy of engagement to encourage China to join the US-dominated international system and to shape China’s development direction. Meanwhile, for achieving modernization, China endeavored to integrate into the West-dominated international system. On this point, the United States and China together constructed a grand consensus on “integration-engagement” in bilateral relations. However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the “integration-engagement” framework began to collapse due to two major factors. The first was a change in China’s foreign policy, which was criticized to be more assertive. China not only began to more openly display its national power on issues related to the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas, but it also demonstrated the scope of its international ambitions through the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The second was that, as a result of China’s strength and foreign policy changes, many American elites began to alter their perception of China around 2015, viewing the engagement policy as a failure and believing that the United States should adjust its China strategy. During Trump’s presidency, the fundamentals of US-China relations changed, and China was clearly defined as a strategic competitor. To compete with China more vigorously, the Trump administration conducted a policy of maximum pressure, hoping to force China to compromise on a series of issues. Theoretically, maximum pressure is a classic strategy of coercive
{"title":"The Trump Effect: China’s New Thoughts on the United States","authors":"Zuo Xiying","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893515","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past several decades, the United States adopted a policy of engagement to encourage China to join the US-dominated international system and to shape China’s development direction. Meanwhile, for achieving modernization, China endeavored to integrate into the West-dominated international system. On this point, the United States and China together constructed a grand consensus on “integration-engagement” in bilateral relations. However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the “integration-engagement” framework began to collapse due to two major factors. The first was a change in China’s foreign policy, which was criticized to be more assertive. China not only began to more openly display its national power on issues related to the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas, but it also demonstrated the scope of its international ambitions through the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The second was that, as a result of China’s strength and foreign policy changes, many American elites began to alter their perception of China around 2015, viewing the engagement policy as a failure and believing that the United States should adjust its China strategy. During Trump’s presidency, the fundamentals of US-China relations changed, and China was clearly defined as a strategic competitor. To compete with China more vigorously, the Trump administration conducted a policy of maximum pressure, hoping to force China to compromise on a series of issues. Theoretically, maximum pressure is a classic strategy of coercive","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"107 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893515","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45466424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-11DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1849993
Joshua R. Shifrinson
Over the last half decade, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in US foreign policy circles calling for sustained competition with China. The ostensible goals of this competition are to protect the ...
过去5年，美国外交政策圈出现了两党共识，呼吁与中国持续竞争。这场竞赛表面上的目标是保护……
{"title":"Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China","authors":"Joshua R. Shifrinson","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2020.1849993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1849993","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last half decade, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in US foreign policy circles calling for sustained competition with China. The ostensible goals of this competition are to protect the ...","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"09 1","pages":"79-104"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1849993","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59334617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2020.1850005
Š. Ganguly
{"title":"Mangling the COVID Crisis: India’s Response to the Pandemic","authors":"Š. Ganguly","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2020.1850005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1850005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"43 1","pages":"105 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1850005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45021063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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