Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2127881
M. Mochizuki
In response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, Chinese missile firings, with some landing in Japan’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), vividly confirmed for many Japanese the notion that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.” Even before this latest flareup in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Japanese officials and defense analysts were increasingly focused on how a military crisis over Taiwan could embroil Japan. Japan confronts a strategic conundrum regarding the Taiwan question. It prefers the status quo of Taiwan maintaining political autonomy, and it wants to avoid a cross-strait war that would be catastrophic for Japan. But this status quo is becoming more precarious, and Tokyo faces vexing dilemmas in fashioning a policy to prevent a war over Taiwan. Geographic location makes Japan a pivotal actor in a Taiwan contingency; and as a consequence, it is virtually impossible to avoid becoming involved either as a military target or as a military asset. Given its reliance on the United States for security, Tokyo has to deal with the classic alliance dilemma between abandonment and entrapment. But domestic constitutional, legal and political constraints make it difficult for Japan to become a great power in a traditional sense and thereby liberate itself from this alliance dilemma. And in the
{"title":"Tokyo’s Taiwan Conundrum: What Can Japan Do to Prevent War?","authors":"M. Mochizuki","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2127881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2127881","url":null,"abstract":"In response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, Chinese missile firings, with some landing in Japan’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), vividly confirmed for many Japanese the notion that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.” Even before this latest flareup in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Japanese officials and defense analysts were increasingly focused on how a military crisis over Taiwan could embroil Japan. Japan confronts a strategic conundrum regarding the Taiwan question. It prefers the status quo of Taiwan maintaining political autonomy, and it wants to avoid a cross-strait war that would be catastrophic for Japan. But this status quo is becoming more precarious, and Tokyo faces vexing dilemmas in fashioning a policy to prevent a war over Taiwan. Geographic location makes Japan a pivotal actor in a Taiwan contingency; and as a consequence, it is virtually impossible to avoid becoming involved either as a military target or as a military asset. Given its reliance on the United States for security, Tokyo has to deal with the classic alliance dilemma between abandonment and entrapment. But domestic constitutional, legal and political constraints make it difficult for Japan to become a great power in a traditional sense and thereby liberate itself from this alliance dilemma. And in the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"81 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48032283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124017
Rana Mitter
Is China a revolutionary or revisionist power in the international order? Debates along these lines run the danger of creating an opposition which isn’t really there. China’s stake in the global order is dependent on material factors, as well as the desire over time to shift norms so that ideas of aggregate economic growth and national sovereignty take precedence over transnational concepts of individual rights. Unlike Russia, which has a clear interest in destroying key parts of the existing global infrastructure particularly in Europe and the Middle East, China has many motivations to preserve or slowly adapt aspects of the existing international order. China is central to the global economy in a way that Russia is not, energy aside; that means that many more countries are dependent on links to China, but also that China itself would find disruption all the more damaging. However, China certainly finds many aspects of the contemporary order deeply irksome, such as its concentration on individual civil liberties as a core element of the human rights agenda, or the continuing debate over the “responsibility to protect” across sovereign borders. Its priority has been to find ways to maintain the structures of contemporary order while seeking to redefine or reinhabit them in ways that better suit its interests.
{"title":"China: Revolutionary or Revisionist?","authors":"Rana Mitter","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124017","url":null,"abstract":"Is China a revolutionary or revisionist power in the international order? Debates along these lines run the danger of creating an opposition which isn’t really there. China’s stake in the global order is dependent on material factors, as well as the desire over time to shift norms so that ideas of aggregate economic growth and national sovereignty take precedence over transnational concepts of individual rights. Unlike Russia, which has a clear interest in destroying key parts of the existing global infrastructure particularly in Europe and the Middle East, China has many motivations to preserve or slowly adapt aspects of the existing international order. China is central to the global economy in a way that Russia is not, energy aside; that means that many more countries are dependent on links to China, but also that China itself would find disruption all the more damaging. However, China certainly finds many aspects of the contemporary order deeply irksome, such as its concentration on individual civil liberties as a core element of the human rights agenda, or the continuing debate over the “responsibility to protect” across sovereign borders. Its priority has been to find ways to maintain the structures of contemporary order while seeking to redefine or reinhabit them in ways that better suit its interests.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"7 - 21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41560661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016
Jessica E. Brandt, Zack Cooper
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many international observers are asking whether China will adopt a similar approach to Taiwan. Debates surrounding “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” are becoming more frequent, with some suggesting that Beijing could mimic Moscow’s behavior. The two countries have very different strategic circumstances and domestic political structures, but each has reason to learn from the other’s foreign policy successes and failures. To what degree do their coercive strategies overlap or diverge? It is true that Russia and China share certain nearto medium-term interests and objectives which underpin the emerging similarities between their strategies for influencing foreign countries. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping seek to establish a world safe for autocracy. To this end, they endeavor to undermine the attractiveness of liberal institutions and governments. Doing so has two advantages. First, it makes liberalism less appealing to democracy and human rights advocates within Russia and China. Second, it creates fissures among liberal governments which makes it more difficult for them to act together to constrain Moscow and Beijing. Thus, Putin and Xi both seek to stifle criticism of their illiberal practices from foreign individuals or governments in order to normalize or justify those practices, and to prevent would-be critics from organizing
{"title":"Sino-Russian Splits: Divergences in Autocratic Coercion","authors":"Jessica E. Brandt, Zack Cooper","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many international observers are asking whether China will adopt a similar approach to Taiwan. Debates surrounding “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” are becoming more frequent, with some suggesting that Beijing could mimic Moscow’s behavior. The two countries have very different strategic circumstances and domestic political structures, but each has reason to learn from the other’s foreign policy successes and failures. To what degree do their coercive strategies overlap or diverge? It is true that Russia and China share certain nearto medium-term interests and objectives which underpin the emerging similarities between their strategies for influencing foreign countries. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping seek to establish a world safe for autocracy. To this end, they endeavor to undermine the attractiveness of liberal institutions and governments. Doing so has two advantages. First, it makes liberalism less appealing to democracy and human rights advocates within Russia and China. Second, it creates fissures among liberal governments which makes it more difficult for them to act together to constrain Moscow and Beijing. Thus, Putin and Xi both seek to stifle criticism of their illiberal practices from foreign individuals or governments in order to normalize or justify those practices, and to prevent would-be critics from organizing","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"23 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48032771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126112
Jin-a Kim
Russia’s actions in Ukraine since February 2022 have sent shockwaves globally. Attention has understandably focused on the change in European attitudes toward security threats posed by Moscow, with the United States leading coalition-building responses including naming and shaming, imposing sanctions, and supplying military assistance to Ukraine. The demonstrative effect of the strength, unity and speed of the Western response must ring alarm bells for Beijing, but it also leads to interesting questions about each state’s choice of alignment globally. In Europe, most states have chosen shared common security interests with one side of a great-power rivalry (in this case, with the US over Russia and China). Undeniably, the assistance of key US partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia and Japan, in imposing sanctions on Russia and providing military support to Ukraine, shows that US allies and partners around the world are remarkably united. However, the broader response of Indo-Pacific powers to Russia has been divided, and runs the gamut between strong opposition, support, and ambivalence. While the United States has received quick and robust support from many close allies in the region, it has had difficulties in gathering full-fledged support from some of its partners such as India, Singapore and Thailand. The world is analyzing developments in Ukraine and gleaning lessons that can be applied beyond Europe. Arguably, the likelihood of a new Cold War with the
{"title":"Ukraine’s Implications for Indo-Pacific Alignment","authors":"Jin-a Kim","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126112","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s actions in Ukraine since February 2022 have sent shockwaves globally. Attention has understandably focused on the change in European attitudes toward security threats posed by Moscow, with the United States leading coalition-building responses including naming and shaming, imposing sanctions, and supplying military assistance to Ukraine. The demonstrative effect of the strength, unity and speed of the Western response must ring alarm bells for Beijing, but it also leads to interesting questions about each state’s choice of alignment globally. In Europe, most states have chosen shared common security interests with one side of a great-power rivalry (in this case, with the US over Russia and China). Undeniably, the assistance of key US partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia and Japan, in imposing sanctions on Russia and providing military support to Ukraine, shows that US allies and partners around the world are remarkably united. However, the broader response of Indo-Pacific powers to Russia has been divided, and runs the gamut between strong opposition, support, and ambivalence. While the United States has received quick and robust support from many close allies in the region, it has had difficulties in gathering full-fledged support from some of its partners such as India, Singapore and Thailand. The world is analyzing developments in Ukraine and gleaning lessons that can be applied beyond Europe. Arguably, the likelihood of a new Cold War with the","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"47 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44774400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126586
O. Mastro, Sungmin Cho
It is rare that American strategists, scholars and government officials generally agree, but the centrality of alliances to US power is one such area. The US alliance network is considered by most to be “one of the most enduring and successful elements of US foreign policy since World War II.” The institutionalization of close defense relationships not only helps the United States project power globally, they also facilitate strong trade relations and the promotion of shared values in international institutions, which are the US’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis China. Unsurprisingly then, the United States has emphasized strengthening its alliance relationships to counter nefarious Chinese activities, deter Chinese aggression, and outcompete China’s attempts to revise the US-led world order. In his major speech on US policy toward China, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken summed up the Biden administration’s strategy in three words: “invest, align, compete.” Among these three verbs, “align” strongly underscores the US’ desire to closely coordinate efforts vis-à-vis China with its allies and partners. This priority notwithstanding, the role of South Korea is often of secondary consideration, if not completely left out, when it comes to formulating the specifics of countering Chinese aggression. South Korea is often mentioned in
{"title":"How South Korea Can Contribute to the Defense of Taiwan","authors":"O. Mastro, Sungmin Cho","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126586","url":null,"abstract":"It is rare that American strategists, scholars and government officials generally agree, but the centrality of alliances to US power is one such area. The US alliance network is considered by most to be “one of the most enduring and successful elements of US foreign policy since World War II.” The institutionalization of close defense relationships not only helps the United States project power globally, they also facilitate strong trade relations and the promotion of shared values in international institutions, which are the US’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis China. Unsurprisingly then, the United States has emphasized strengthening its alliance relationships to counter nefarious Chinese activities, deter Chinese aggression, and outcompete China’s attempts to revise the US-led world order. In his major speech on US policy toward China, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken summed up the Biden administration’s strategy in three words: “invest, align, compete.” Among these three verbs, “align” strongly underscores the US’ desire to closely coordinate efforts vis-à-vis China with its allies and partners. This priority notwithstanding, the role of South Korea is often of secondary consideration, if not completely left out, when it comes to formulating the specifics of countering Chinese aggression. South Korea is often mentioned in","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"109 - 129"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45057015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2128565
Sheryn Lee, Benjamin Schreer
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led European powers, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all to realize that significant steps were needed to redress the European security order. They responded to the invasion by imposing major economic sanctions against Moscow, delivering arms and other assistance to Kyiv, and revitalizing NATO. As NATO’s new Strategic Concept of June 2022 noted, the Euro-Atlantic area is now defined by “strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks.” Importantly, it termed the Russian Federation a “direct threat” to allies’ security, the first such usage since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Russia’s actions have raised concerns in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the United States that China will also ramp up its political as well as economic pressure and military aggression to unify its claimed territories. To this end, NATO’s Strategic Concept also stated that China’s “ambitions and coercive policies” challenged NATO’s interests, security and values. It further added that the “deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.” Finally, NATO pledged to “address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.” One of those challenges for Europe is whether to support Taiwan, an island which Beijing seeks to bring under its political control, through the use of military force if
{"title":"Will Europe Defend Taiwan?","authors":"Sheryn Lee, Benjamin Schreer","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2128565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2128565","url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led European powers, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all to realize that significant steps were needed to redress the European security order. They responded to the invasion by imposing major economic sanctions against Moscow, delivering arms and other assistance to Kyiv, and revitalizing NATO. As NATO’s new Strategic Concept of June 2022 noted, the Euro-Atlantic area is now defined by “strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks.” Importantly, it termed the Russian Federation a “direct threat” to allies’ security, the first such usage since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Russia’s actions have raised concerns in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the United States that China will also ramp up its political as well as economic pressure and military aggression to unify its claimed territories. To this end, NATO’s Strategic Concept also stated that China’s “ambitions and coercive policies” challenged NATO’s interests, security and values. It further added that the “deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.” Finally, NATO pledged to “address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.” One of those challenges for Europe is whether to support Taiwan, an island which Beijing seeks to bring under its political control, through the use of military force if","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"163 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47979263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126585
J. T. Jacob
China’s August 2022 military exercises around Taiwan in the wake of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island set off concerns about another potential regional conflagration following on the heels of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the exercises have ceased, they were another opportunity for Beijing to underline its willingness to use force to take over Taiwan. This ever-present Chinese threat to regional peace and security throws up several questions for key players in the Indo-Pacific about how they might respond. Given Indian interests in the region—a substantial flow of its trade runs though the South China Sea—its own ongoing boundary dispute with China, as well as its status as a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, how does India view a potential Taiwan contingency? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining two aspects of the issue. One, it looks at the likelihood of a Taiwan conflict from India’s perspective, including examining whether the Russian invasion of Ukraine has influenced New Delhi’s calculus on its probability. It puts forth a couple of reasons why the hitherto predominant Indian view of the low likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might be changing. Two, it explores India’s interests and responses in the case of a conflict through the prism of India’s relations with Taiwan, with China, and with the United States. This section also lays out what India’s expectations of the US would be in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The article concludes by stating that a military role for India looks infeasible, but outlines what some plausible means of Indian involvement in the case of a conflict might be.
{"title":"A Potential Conflict over Taiwan: A View from India","authors":"J. T. Jacob","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126585","url":null,"abstract":"China’s August 2022 military exercises around Taiwan in the wake of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island set off concerns about another potential regional conflagration following on the heels of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the exercises have ceased, they were another opportunity for Beijing to underline its willingness to use force to take over Taiwan. This ever-present Chinese threat to regional peace and security throws up several questions for key players in the Indo-Pacific about how they might respond. Given Indian interests in the region—a substantial flow of its trade runs though the South China Sea—its own ongoing boundary dispute with China, as well as its status as a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, how does India view a potential Taiwan contingency? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining two aspects of the issue. One, it looks at the likelihood of a Taiwan conflict from India’s perspective, including examining whether the Russian invasion of Ukraine has influenced New Delhi’s calculus on its probability. It puts forth a couple of reasons why the hitherto predominant Indian view of the low likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might be changing. Two, it explores India’s interests and responses in the case of a conflict through the prism of India’s relations with Taiwan, with China, and with the United States. This section also lays out what India’s expectations of the US would be in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The article concludes by stating that a military role for India looks infeasible, but outlines what some plausible means of Indian involvement in the case of a conflict might be.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"147 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45745278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126113
Brendan Taylor
Australia was once famously described as “The Frightened Country”: a strategically anxious nation that sees more danger than opportunity emanating from the Asian continent to its north. Consistent with this characterization, Australian security practitioners and pundits alike have for several years now been warning of the prospects of a Taiwan conflict and its potential consequences for Australia. Three distinct positions have emerged as to how Canberra should respond to the growing risk of war. One camp calls for Australia to make clear its commitment to joining with the United States and others in defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack, with a view to deterring Beijing from ever taking this path. A second perspective maintains that Taiwan’s defense is not a vital Australian interest, and that Canberra should be candid with Washington and Taipei regarding this reality well in advance of hostilities erupting. A third school, and one associated most closely with Australia’s new Anthony Albanese-led Labor government, holds that talking up even the chances of conflict is illadvised. Instead, this camp argues, Canberra should adhere to the tried-andtrue approach of its American ally, maintaining a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding how it would respond in the event of a Taiwan conflict. The war in Ukraine has functioned as something of a Rorschach test in this sometimes heated Australian debate, with participants largely doubling down on the positions they held prior to the Russian invasion. Domestic politics have also been influential, as popular concerns on issues including Chinese
{"title":"Taiwan: What Could, Should and Will Australia Do?","authors":"Brendan Taylor","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126113","url":null,"abstract":"Australia was once famously described as “The Frightened Country”: a strategically anxious nation that sees more danger than opportunity emanating from the Asian continent to its north. Consistent with this characterization, Australian security practitioners and pundits alike have for several years now been warning of the prospects of a Taiwan conflict and its potential consequences for Australia. Three distinct positions have emerged as to how Canberra should respond to the growing risk of war. One camp calls for Australia to make clear its commitment to joining with the United States and others in defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack, with a view to deterring Beijing from ever taking this path. A second perspective maintains that Taiwan’s defense is not a vital Australian interest, and that Canberra should be candid with Washington and Taipei regarding this reality well in advance of hostilities erupting. A third school, and one associated most closely with Australia’s new Anthony Albanese-led Labor government, holds that talking up even the chances of conflict is illadvised. Instead, this camp argues, Canberra should adhere to the tried-andtrue approach of its American ally, maintaining a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding how it would respond in the event of a Taiwan conflict. The war in Ukraine has functioned as something of a Rorschach test in this sometimes heated Australian debate, with participants largely doubling down on the positions they held prior to the Russian invasion. Domestic politics have also been influential, as popular concerns on issues including Chinese","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"131 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44481695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090763
Ali S. Wyne
The past year has witnessed two major developments that have trained the sights of US policymakers more sharply on America’s chief strategic competitors. First, the conclusion of a protracted US intervention in Afghanistan would seem to offer Russia and China an opening to make strategic inroads across Central Asia. Second, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of a military confrontation between nuclear-armed powers and revealed China to be, while not actively supporting Russian atrocities, then at least concerningly unmoved by them. Both developments have elicited a vigorous debate in Washington over some of the most fundamental questions of US power, policy, and purpose. How efficacious is military force in achieving political objectives? Which of America’s national interests are vital—as opposed to “merely” important or secondary? What role should the United States aim to play in world affairs? This essay does not attempt to answer them. It aims, less ambitiously, to assess the competitive challenges that Russia and China respectively pose to the United States—an assessment that should inform considerations of the aforementioned questions and, therefore, efforts to sketch the contours of US foreign policy in the early years of this decade. The first section notes that while recent developments in world affairs have understandably deepened America’s focus on Russia and China, it would be risky for the United States to treat “great-power competition” as a comprehensive blueprint for foreign policy when, in truth, that construct is at most a partial
{"title":"Great-Power Competition Isn’t a Foreign Policy","authors":"Ali S. Wyne","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090763","url":null,"abstract":"The past year has witnessed two major developments that have trained the sights of US policymakers more sharply on America’s chief strategic competitors. First, the conclusion of a protracted US intervention in Afghanistan would seem to offer Russia and China an opening to make strategic inroads across Central Asia. Second, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of a military confrontation between nuclear-armed powers and revealed China to be, while not actively supporting Russian atrocities, then at least concerningly unmoved by them. Both developments have elicited a vigorous debate in Washington over some of the most fundamental questions of US power, policy, and purpose. How efficacious is military force in achieving political objectives? Which of America’s national interests are vital—as opposed to “merely” important or secondary? What role should the United States aim to play in world affairs? This essay does not attempt to answer them. It aims, less ambitiously, to assess the competitive challenges that Russia and China respectively pose to the United States—an assessment that should inform considerations of the aforementioned questions and, therefore, efforts to sketch the contours of US foreign policy in the early years of this decade. The first section notes that while recent developments in world affairs have understandably deepened America’s focus on Russia and China, it would be risky for the United States to treat “great-power competition” as a comprehensive blueprint for foreign policy when, in truth, that construct is at most a partial","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":"7 - 21"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42628160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2092279
L. Fix
History sometimes has a way of repeating itself. Russia’s war against Ukraine marks the definite return of spheres of influence on the European continent. A new Iron Curtain is descending. This time, the frontier is further east than it was during the Cold War. It runs from Belarus to the North to the Black Sea in the South—and the exact line of the front is as yet unclear. Will it run through and divide Ukraine? Will it encompass Moldova? The current Russian regime sees all these countries and territories as “theirs”—not only as within their sphere of influence, but also as a sphere of occupation, wherein Russia’s imperial ambitions are impressed on these countries with brutal military force. The return of spheres of influence evokes particularly negative memories in Germany. Divided Germany was on the frontlines of the Cold War. The Iron Curtain ran right through Germany—from Lübeck to the North to Neustadt bei Coburg in the South. And crucially, it ran through Berlin. Thirty-two years later, this divide is less visible in the city’s landscape to the untrained eye. Stretches of former no-man’s land have been rebuilt with modern architecture. But the divide is still there: Berlin has two zoo parks—East and West. Two Berlin State libraries. And one can walk along the Northern border-crossing checkpoint near Bornholmer Strasse, one of the first to open its gates in 1989, under beautiful cherry trees donated by Japan to celebrate German reunification. Why does this matter? It matters because the history of divided Germany and of its reunification helps to understand Germany’s reaction to Russia’s war in Ukraine—and to the return of spheres of influence in Europe. On March 13,
{"title":"Between Guilt and Responsibility: The Legacy of Spheres in Germany","authors":"L. Fix","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2022.2092279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2092279","url":null,"abstract":"History sometimes has a way of repeating itself. Russia’s war against Ukraine marks the definite return of spheres of influence on the European continent. A new Iron Curtain is descending. This time, the frontier is further east than it was during the Cold War. It runs from Belarus to the North to the Black Sea in the South—and the exact line of the front is as yet unclear. Will it run through and divide Ukraine? Will it encompass Moldova? The current Russian regime sees all these countries and territories as “theirs”—not only as within their sphere of influence, but also as a sphere of occupation, wherein Russia’s imperial ambitions are impressed on these countries with brutal military force. The return of spheres of influence evokes particularly negative memories in Germany. Divided Germany was on the frontlines of the Cold War. The Iron Curtain ran right through Germany—from Lübeck to the North to Neustadt bei Coburg in the South. And crucially, it ran through Berlin. Thirty-two years later, this divide is less visible in the city’s landscape to the untrained eye. Stretches of former no-man’s land have been rebuilt with modern architecture. But the divide is still there: Berlin has two zoo parks—East and West. Two Berlin State libraries. And one can walk along the Northern border-crossing checkpoint near Bornholmer Strasse, one of the first to open its gates in 1989, under beautiful cherry trees donated by Japan to celebrate German reunification. Why does this matter? It matters because the history of divided Germany and of its reunification helps to understand Germany’s reaction to Russia’s war in Ukraine—and to the return of spheres of influence in Europe. On March 13,","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":"75 - 91"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46174277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}