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Tokyo’s Taiwan Conundrum: What Can Japan Do to Prevent War? 东京的台湾难题:日本能做些什么来防止战争?
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2127881
M. Mochizuki
In response to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan, Chinese missile firings, with some landing in Japan’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), vividly confirmed for many Japanese the notion that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.” Even before this latest flareup in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Japanese officials and defense analysts were increasingly focused on how a military crisis over Taiwan could embroil Japan. Japan confronts a strategic conundrum regarding the Taiwan question. It prefers the status quo of Taiwan maintaining political autonomy, and it wants to avoid a cross-strait war that would be catastrophic for Japan. But this status quo is becoming more precarious, and Tokyo faces vexing dilemmas in fashioning a policy to prevent a war over Taiwan. Geographic location makes Japan a pivotal actor in a Taiwan contingency; and as a consequence, it is virtually impossible to avoid becoming involved either as a military target or as a military asset. Given its reliance on the United States for security, Tokyo has to deal with the classic alliance dilemma between abandonment and entrapment. But domestic constitutional, legal and political constraints make it difficult for Japan to become a great power in a traditional sense and thereby liberate itself from this alliance dilemma. And in the
作为对众议院议长南希·佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi) 2022年8月访问台湾的回应,中国发射的导弹,其中一些落在了日本声称的专属经济区(EEZ),生动地证实了许多日本人的观念,即“台湾的突发事件就是日本的突发事件”。甚至在台湾海峡紧张局势最近升级之前,日本官员和防务分析人士就越来越关注台湾军事危机会如何将日本卷入其中。日本在台湾问题上面临着一个战略难题。它更希望台湾保持政治自治的现状,并希望避免对日本来说是灾难性的两岸战争。但这种现状正变得越来越不稳定,东京在制定防止台湾战争的政策方面面临着令人烦恼的两难境地。地理位置使日本成为台湾偶发事件中的关键角色;因此,无论是作为军事目标还是作为军事资产,几乎不可能避免卷入其中。考虑到日本在安全上对美国的依赖,日本必须应对传统的同盟困境,要么放弃,要么陷入困境。但国内的宪法、法律和政治制约,使日本难以成为传统意义上的大国,从而摆脱这种同盟困境。在
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引用次数: 1
China: Revolutionary or Revisionist? 中国:革命派还是修正主义者?
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124017
Rana Mitter
Is China a revolutionary or revisionist power in the international order? Debates along these lines run the danger of creating an opposition which isn’t really there. China’s stake in the global order is dependent on material factors, as well as the desire over time to shift norms so that ideas of aggregate economic growth and national sovereignty take precedence over transnational concepts of individual rights. Unlike Russia, which has a clear interest in destroying key parts of the existing global infrastructure particularly in Europe and the Middle East, China has many motivations to preserve or slowly adapt aspects of the existing international order. China is central to the global economy in a way that Russia is not, energy aside; that means that many more countries are dependent on links to China, but also that China itself would find disruption all the more damaging. However, China certainly finds many aspects of the contemporary order deeply irksome, such as its concentration on individual civil liberties as a core element of the human rights agenda, or the continuing debate over the “responsibility to protect” across sovereign borders. Its priority has been to find ways to maintain the structures of contemporary order while seeking to redefine or reinhabit them in ways that better suit its interests.
在国际秩序中,中国是革命大国还是修正主义大国?沿着这条路线进行的辩论有可能产生一个根本不存在的反对派。中国在全球秩序中的利益取决于物质因素,以及随着时间的推移改变规范的愿望,以便经济总量增长和国家主权的观念优先于个人权利的跨国概念。俄罗斯在破坏现有全球基础设施的关键部分(尤其是在欧洲和中东)方面有着明显的利益,而中国不同,它有很多动机来维护或慢慢适应现有国际秩序的各个方面。除了能源以外,中国在全球经济中扮演着重要角色,而俄罗斯则不然;这意味着更多的国家依赖与中国的联系,但也意味着中国自己会发现,这种破坏更具破坏性。然而,中国肯定发现当代秩序的许多方面都令人深感不快,比如将个人公民自由作为人权议程的核心要素,或者跨越主权边界的“保护责任”的持续辩论。它的首要任务是找到维持当代秩序结构的方法,同时寻求以更符合其利益的方式重新定义或重新利用这些结构。
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引用次数: 1
Sino-Russian Splits: Divergences in Autocratic Coercion 中俄分裂:专制胁迫的分歧
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016
Jessica E. Brandt, Zack Cooper
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many international observers are asking whether China will adopt a similar approach to Taiwan. Debates surrounding “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” are becoming more frequent, with some suggesting that Beijing could mimic Moscow’s behavior. The two countries have very different strategic circumstances and domestic political structures, but each has reason to learn from the other’s foreign policy successes and failures. To what degree do their coercive strategies overlap or diverge? It is true that Russia and China share certain nearto medium-term interests and objectives which underpin the emerging similarities between their strategies for influencing foreign countries. Both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping seek to establish a world safe for autocracy. To this end, they endeavor to undermine the attractiveness of liberal institutions and governments. Doing so has two advantages. First, it makes liberalism less appealing to democracy and human rights advocates within Russia and China. Second, it creates fissures among liberal governments which makes it more difficult for them to act together to constrain Moscow and Beijing. Thus, Putin and Xi both seek to stifle criticism of their illiberal practices from foreign individuals or governments in order to normalize or justify those practices, and to prevent would-be critics from organizing
在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后,许多国际观察人士都在问,中国是否会对台湾采取类似的做法。围绕“今天是乌克兰,明天是台湾”的争论正变得越来越频繁,一些人暗示北京可能会效仿莫斯科的行为。两国的战略环境和国内政治结构截然不同,但双方都有理由从对方外交政策的成功和失败中吸取教训。他们的强制策略在多大程度上重叠或分歧?的确,俄罗斯和中国有某些共同的中短期利益和目标,这些利益和目标支撑着两国影响外国的战略之间出现的相似之处。为此,他们竭力削弱自由制度和政府的吸引力。这样做有两个好处。首先,它降低了自由主义对俄罗斯和中国国内民主和人权倡导者的吸引力。其次,它在自由派政府之间制造了裂痕,使它们更难以共同行动,约束莫斯科和北京。
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引用次数: 0
Ukraine’s Implications for Indo-Pacific Alignment 乌克兰对印太结盟的影响
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126112
Jin-a Kim
Russia’s actions in Ukraine since February 2022 have sent shockwaves globally. Attention has understandably focused on the change in European attitudes toward security threats posed by Moscow, with the United States leading coalition-building responses including naming and shaming, imposing sanctions, and supplying military assistance to Ukraine. The demonstrative effect of the strength, unity and speed of the Western response must ring alarm bells for Beijing, but it also leads to interesting questions about each state’s choice of alignment globally. In Europe, most states have chosen shared common security interests with one side of a great-power rivalry (in this case, with the US over Russia and China). Undeniably, the assistance of key US partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia and Japan, in imposing sanctions on Russia and providing military support to Ukraine, shows that US allies and partners around the world are remarkably united. However, the broader response of Indo-Pacific powers to Russia has been divided, and runs the gamut between strong opposition, support, and ambivalence. While the United States has received quick and robust support from many close allies in the region, it has had difficulties in gathering full-fledged support from some of its partners such as India, Singapore and Thailand. The world is analyzing developments in Ukraine and gleaning lessons that can be applied beyond Europe. Arguably, the likelihood of a new Cold War with the
自2022年2月以来,俄罗斯在乌克兰的行动在全球范围内引发了冲击。可以理解的是,人们的注意力集中在欧洲对莫斯科构成的安全威胁态度的变化上,美国领导的联盟建设应对措施包括点名羞辱、实施制裁和向乌克兰提供军事援助。西方反应的力量、团结和速度的示范效应一定给北京敲响了警钟,但这也引发了关于各国在全球范围内选择结盟的有趣问题。在欧洲,大多数国家都选择了与大国竞争的一方(在这种情况下,与美国在俄罗斯和中国问题上)拥有共同的安全利益。不可否认,美国在印太地区的主要伙伴,如澳大利亚和日本,在对俄罗斯实施制裁和向乌克兰提供军事支持方面的援助,表明美国在世界各地的盟友和伙伴非常团结。然而,印太大国对俄罗斯的更广泛反应存在分歧,包括强烈的反对、支持和矛盾心理。尽管美国得到了该地区许多亲密盟友的迅速而有力的支持,但它在获得印度、新加坡和泰国等一些伙伴的全面支持方面遇到了困难。全世界都在分析乌克兰的事态发展,并收集可以在欧洲以外应用的经验教训。可以说,与
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引用次数: 0
How South Korea Can Contribute to the Defense of Taiwan 韩国如何为台湾防务做出贡献
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126586
O. Mastro, Sungmin Cho
It is rare that American strategists, scholars and government officials generally agree, but the centrality of alliances to US power is one such area. The US alliance network is considered by most to be “one of the most enduring and successful elements of US foreign policy since World War II.” The institutionalization of close defense relationships not only helps the United States project power globally, they also facilitate strong trade relations and the promotion of shared values in international institutions, which are the US’ comparative advantage vis-à-vis China. Unsurprisingly then, the United States has emphasized strengthening its alliance relationships to counter nefarious Chinese activities, deter Chinese aggression, and outcompete China’s attempts to revise the US-led world order. In his major speech on US policy toward China, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken summed up the Biden administration’s strategy in three words: “invest, align, compete.” Among these three verbs, “align” strongly underscores the US’ desire to closely coordinate efforts vis-à-vis China with its allies and partners. This priority notwithstanding, the role of South Korea is often of secondary consideration, if not completely left out, when it comes to formulating the specifics of countering Chinese aggression. South Korea is often mentioned in
美国战略家、学者和政府官员很少达成一致,但联盟对美国力量的中心地位就是这样一个领域。大多数人认为,美国的联盟网络是“二战以来美国外交政策中最持久、最成功的因素之一”。密切防务关系的制度化不仅有助于美国在全球投射力量,还促进了牢固的贸易关系和在国际机构中促进共同价值观,这是美国相对于中国的比较优势。不出所料,美国强调加强其联盟关系,以对抗中国的邪恶活动,阻止中国的侵略,并击败中国修改美国领导的世界秩序的企图。在关于美国对华政策的重要演讲中,国务卿安东尼·布林肯用三个词总结了拜登政府的战略:“投资、结盟、竞争”。在这三个动词中,“结盟”强烈强调了美国希望与其盟友和伙伴密切协调对中国的努力。尽管有这一优先事项,但在制定对抗中国侵略的具体措施时,韩国的作用往往是次要考虑的,如果不是完全被排除在外的话。韩国经常在
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引用次数: 1
Will Europe Defend Taiwan? 欧洲会保卫台湾吗?
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2128565
Sheryn Lee, Benjamin Schreer
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led European powers, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all to realize that significant steps were needed to redress the European security order. They responded to the invasion by imposing major economic sanctions against Moscow, delivering arms and other assistance to Kyiv, and revitalizing NATO. As NATO’s new Strategic Concept of June 2022 noted, the Euro-Atlantic area is now defined by “strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks.” Importantly, it termed the Russian Federation a “direct threat” to allies’ security, the first such usage since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Russia’s actions have raised concerns in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the United States that China will also ramp up its political as well as economic pressure and military aggression to unify its claimed territories. To this end, NATO’s Strategic Concept also stated that China’s “ambitions and coercive policies” challenged NATO’s interests, security and values. It further added that the “deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.” Finally, NATO pledged to “address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.” One of those challenges for Europe is whether to support Taiwan, an island which Beijing seeks to bring under its political control, through the use of military force if
俄罗斯入侵乌克兰导致欧洲大国、欧盟和北大西洋公约组织都意识到,需要采取重大措施来纠正欧洲安全秩序。作为对入侵的回应,他们对莫斯科实施了重大经济制裁,向基辅提供了武器和其他援助,并振兴了北约。正如北约2022年6月的新战略概念所指出的,欧洲-大西洋地区现在被定义为“战略竞争、普遍的不稳定和反复的冲击”。重要的是,它将俄罗斯联邦称为对盟友安全的“直接威胁”,这是自冷战结束以来的首次此类使用。此外,俄罗斯的行动引起了欧洲、印太地区和美国的担忧,即中国也将加大政治、经济压力和军事侵略,以统一其声称拥有的领土。为此,北约的《战略构想》还指出,中国的“野心和胁迫政策”挑战了北约的利益、安全和价值观。它进一步补充说,“中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦之间不断深化的战略伙伴关系,以及他们相互强化的削弱基于规则的国际秩序的企图,与我们的价值观和利益背道而驰。”最后,北约承诺“应对中华人民共和对欧洲-大西洋安全构成的系统性挑战。”。“欧洲面临的挑战之一是,如果
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引用次数: 0
A Potential Conflict over Taiwan: A View from India 台湾潜在冲突:印度视角
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126585
J. T. Jacob
China’s August 2022 military exercises around Taiwan in the wake of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island set off concerns about another potential regional conflagration following on the heels of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the exercises have ceased, they were another opportunity for Beijing to underline its willingness to use force to take over Taiwan. This ever-present Chinese threat to regional peace and security throws up several questions for key players in the Indo-Pacific about how they might respond. Given Indian interests in the region—a substantial flow of its trade runs though the South China Sea—its own ongoing boundary dispute with China, as well as its status as a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, how does India view a potential Taiwan contingency? This paper attempts to answer this question by examining two aspects of the issue. One, it looks at the likelihood of a Taiwan conflict from India’s perspective, including examining whether the Russian invasion of Ukraine has influenced New Delhi’s calculus on its probability. It puts forth a couple of reasons why the hitherto predominant Indian view of the low likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might be changing. Two, it explores India’s interests and responses in the case of a conflict through the prism of India’s relations with Taiwan, with China, and with the United States. This section also lays out what India’s expectations of the US would be in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The article concludes by stating that a military role for India looks infeasible, but outlines what some plausible means of Indian involvement in the case of a conflict might be.
在美国众议院议长佩洛西(Nancy Pelosi)访问台湾之后,中国将于2022年8月在台湾附近举行军事演习,这引发了人们对继俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后可能再次发生地区冲突的担忧。尽管军演已经停止,但这是北京方面强调其使用武力接管台湾意愿的又一次机会。中国对地区和平与安全的威胁无处不在,这给印太地区的主要参与者提出了几个问题,即他们可能如何应对。考虑到印度在该地区的利益——印度大量的贸易往来要经过南中国海——印度与中国之间持续的边界争端,以及印度作为四方安全对话(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)关键成员的地位,印度如何看待潜在的台湾突发事件?本文试图通过考察这一问题的两个方面来回答这个问题。首先,它从印度的角度看待台湾冲突的可能性,包括研究俄罗斯入侵乌克兰是否影响了新德里对其可能性的计算。它提出了几个原因,为什么迄今为止占主导地位的印度人认为中国入侵台湾的可能性很低的观点可能会改变。第二,它通过印度与台湾、中国和美国的关系来探讨印度在冲突情况下的利益和反应。本节还列出了在中国入侵台湾的情况下,印度对美国的期望。文章最后指出,印度的军事角色似乎不可行,但概述了印度在冲突中可能参与的一些合理手段。
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引用次数: 0
Taiwan: What Could, Should and Will Australia Do? 台湾:澳大利亚能做什么、应该做什么、会做什么?
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-07-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2126113
Brendan Taylor
Australia was once famously described as “The Frightened Country”: a strategically anxious nation that sees more danger than opportunity emanating from the Asian continent to its north. Consistent with this characterization, Australian security practitioners and pundits alike have for several years now been warning of the prospects of a Taiwan conflict and its potential consequences for Australia. Three distinct positions have emerged as to how Canberra should respond to the growing risk of war. One camp calls for Australia to make clear its commitment to joining with the United States and others in defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack, with a view to deterring Beijing from ever taking this path. A second perspective maintains that Taiwan’s defense is not a vital Australian interest, and that Canberra should be candid with Washington and Taipei regarding this reality well in advance of hostilities erupting. A third school, and one associated most closely with Australia’s new Anthony Albanese-led Labor government, holds that talking up even the chances of conflict is illadvised. Instead, this camp argues, Canberra should adhere to the tried-andtrue approach of its American ally, maintaining a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding how it would respond in the event of a Taiwan conflict. The war in Ukraine has functioned as something of a Rorschach test in this sometimes heated Australian debate, with participants largely doubling down on the positions they held prior to the Russian invasion. Domestic politics have also been influential, as popular concerns on issues including Chinese
澳大利亚曾被著名地描述为“恐惧的国家”:一个战略焦虑的国家,看到的危险多于机遇来自其北部的亚洲大陆。与这种定性相一致的是,澳大利亚安全从业人员和权威人士几年来一直在警告台湾冲突的前景及其对澳大利亚的潜在后果。对于堪培拉应该如何应对日益增长的战争风险,已经出现了三种不同的立场。一个阵营呼吁澳大利亚明确承诺与美国和其他国家一道,保护台湾免受中国的袭击,以阻止北京走这条路。第二种观点认为,台湾的防务不是澳大利亚的重大利益,堪培拉应该在敌对行动爆发之前就这一现实与华盛顿和台北开诚布公。第三所学校,也是与澳大利亚新的安东尼·阿尔巴内塞领导的工党政府关系最密切的一所学校,认为即使是冲突的可能性也会受到阻碍。相反,这一阵营认为,堪培拉应该坚持其美国盟友屡战屡败的做法,在发生台湾冲突时如何应对的问题上保持“战略模糊”政策。在这场有时激烈的澳大利亚辩论中,乌克兰战争有点像罗夏测验,参与者在很大程度上加倍强调了他们在俄罗斯入侵前的立场。国内政治也很有影响力,因为民众对包括中国在内的问题的关注
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引用次数: 0
Great-Power Competition Isn’t a Foreign Policy 大国竞争不是外交政策
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090763
Ali S. Wyne
The past year has witnessed two major developments that have trained the sights of US policymakers more sharply on America’s chief strategic competitors. First, the conclusion of a protracted US intervention in Afghanistan would seem to offer Russia and China an opening to make strategic inroads across Central Asia. Second, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of a military confrontation between nuclear-armed powers and revealed China to be, while not actively supporting Russian atrocities, then at least concerningly unmoved by them. Both developments have elicited a vigorous debate in Washington over some of the most fundamental questions of US power, policy, and purpose. How efficacious is military force in achieving political objectives? Which of America’s national interests are vital—as opposed to “merely” important or secondary? What role should the United States aim to play in world affairs? This essay does not attempt to answer them. It aims, less ambitiously, to assess the competitive challenges that Russia and China respectively pose to the United States—an assessment that should inform considerations of the aforementioned questions and, therefore, efforts to sketch the contours of US foreign policy in the early years of this decade. The first section notes that while recent developments in world affairs have understandably deepened America’s focus on Russia and China, it would be risky for the United States to treat “great-power competition” as a comprehensive blueprint for foreign policy when, in truth, that construct is at most a partial
过去一年发生了两件大事,使美国政策制定者更加敏锐地将目光投向了美国的主要战略竞争对手。首先,美国结束对阿富汗的长期干预,似乎将为俄罗斯和中国在整个中亚地区进行战略入侵提供一个机会。其次,俄罗斯对乌克兰的野蛮入侵引发了核大国之间军事对抗的幽灵,并表明中国虽然没有积极支持俄罗斯的暴行,但至少对这些暴行无动于衷。这两个事态发展都在华盛顿引发了一场关于美国实力、政策和目标的一些最根本问题的激烈辩论。军事力量在实现政治目标方面有多有效?美国的哪些国家利益是至关重要的,而不是“仅仅”重要或次要的?美国在国际事务中应该扮演什么样的角色?本文并不试图回答这些问题。它的目标,不那么雄心勃勃,是评估俄罗斯和中国分别对美国构成的竞争性挑战——这一评估应该为考虑上述问题提供信息,从而努力勾勒出本世纪初美国外交政策的轮廓。第一部分指出,虽然最近世界事务的发展可以理解地加深了美国对俄罗斯和中国的关注,但对美国来说,将“大国竞争”视为外交政策的全面蓝图是有风险的,而事实上,这种构想充其量只是一部分
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引用次数: 0
Between Guilt and Responsibility: The Legacy of Spheres in Germany 罪恶与责任之间:德国领域的遗产
IF 1.7 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2022-04-03 DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2092279
L. Fix
History sometimes has a way of repeating itself. Russia’s war against Ukraine marks the definite return of spheres of influence on the European continent. A new Iron Curtain is descending. This time, the frontier is further east than it was during the Cold War. It runs from Belarus to the North to the Black Sea in the South—and the exact line of the front is as yet unclear. Will it run through and divide Ukraine? Will it encompass Moldova? The current Russian regime sees all these countries and territories as “theirs”—not only as within their sphere of influence, but also as a sphere of occupation, wherein Russia’s imperial ambitions are impressed on these countries with brutal military force. The return of spheres of influence evokes particularly negative memories in Germany. Divided Germany was on the frontlines of the Cold War. The Iron Curtain ran right through Germany—from Lübeck to the North to Neustadt bei Coburg in the South. And crucially, it ran through Berlin. Thirty-two years later, this divide is less visible in the city’s landscape to the untrained eye. Stretches of former no-man’s land have been rebuilt with modern architecture. But the divide is still there: Berlin has two zoo parks—East and West. Two Berlin State libraries. And one can walk along the Northern border-crossing checkpoint near Bornholmer Strasse, one of the first to open its gates in 1989, under beautiful cherry trees donated by Japan to celebrate German reunification. Why does this matter? It matters because the history of divided Germany and of its reunification helps to understand Germany’s reaction to Russia’s war in Ukraine—and to the return of spheres of influence in Europe. On March 13,
历史有时会重演。俄罗斯对乌克兰的战争标志着其势力范围在欧洲大陆的明确回归。新的铁幕正在降下。这一次,边界比冷战时期更向东。这条战线北起白俄罗斯,南至黑海,具体的战线尚不清楚。它会穿过并分裂乌克兰吗?它会包括摩尔多瓦吗?当前的俄罗斯政权认为所有这些国家和领土都是“他们的”——不仅是在他们的势力范围内,而且是一个占领范围,俄罗斯的帝国野心用残酷的军事力量给这些国家留下了深刻的印象。势力范围的回归在德国唤起了特别负面的记忆。分裂的德国处于冷战的前线。铁幕横贯德国——从北部的莱尔贝克到南部的北科堡新城。最重要的是,它穿过了柏林。32年后,对于外行人来说,这个鸿沟在城市景观中已经不那么明显了。以前的大片无人区已经用现代建筑重建起来。但分歧依然存在:柏林有两个动物园——东动物园和西动物园。两座柏林国立图书馆。人们可以沿着博恩霍尔默大街(Bornholmer Strasse)附近的北部边境检查站(1989年第一批开放的检查站之一),在日本为庆祝德国统一而捐赠的美丽樱花树下散步。为什么这很重要?这很重要,因为德国分裂和统一的历史有助于理解德国对俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争的反应,以及对欧洲势力范围回归的反应。3月13日,
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引用次数: 2
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Washington Quarterly
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