Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018794
Michael C. Horowitz, L. Kahn
The role of artificial intelligence (AI) in military use has been the subject of intense debates in the national security community in recent years— not only the potential for AI to reshape capabilities, but also the potential for unintentional conflict and escalation. For many analysts, fear that military applications of AI would lead to increased risk of accidents and inadvertent escalation looms large, regardless of the potential benefits. Those who are concerned can cite a plethora of potential ways things can go awry with algorithms: brittleness, biased or poisoned training data, hacks by adversaries, or just increased speed of decision-making leading to fear-based escalation. Yet, given its importance for the future of military power, it is imperative that the United States moves forward with responsible speed in designing, integrating, and deploying relevant military applications of AI. How should the United States simultaneously pursue AI swiftly while reducing the risk of unintentional conflict or escalation in the United States or elsewhere? The answer may lie in US leadership to promote responsible norms and standards of behavior for AI as part of a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) tailored to reduce the likelihood of these scenarios.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456
Melissa Deehring
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The First Political Order Melissa Deehring To cite this article: Melissa Deehring (2021) Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The First Political Order, The Washington Quarterly, 44:4, 7-28, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456
{"title":"Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The First Political Order","authors":"Melissa Deehring","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456","url":null,"abstract":"ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The First Political Order Melissa Deehring To cite this article: Melissa Deehring (2021) Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The First Political Order, The Washington Quarterly, 44:4, 7-28, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020456","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"7 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43154263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457
Clifford A. Kupchan
Bipolarity is no longer returning—it is here, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. News today is dominated by US-China relations, indicating a recognition of today’s bipolar system, and China continues to close the gap in the economic realm. The effects of this bipolarity have substantially deepened as elites in both Washington and Beijing have become aware of the new global structure and are acting accordingly. Structure and beliefs are amplifying each other. Because the world now has a bipolar distribution of capabilities, it will be more peaceful than expected by the consensus view. Bipolar structures deductively and empirically tend to be peaceful (stable); regarding great power war—it is unlikely to happen. That prognosis for the current period is strengthened because balancing or competition between China and the United States will occur in the economic arena to a far greater extent than in the more dangerous military realm. The term “Cold Peace” best captures the current system; it will be broadly peaceful but by no means warm. Nationalist views in both the United States and China present a potential risk to the stability forecast by bipolarity, primarily through the specter of military conflict over Taiwan. This risk, however, is much overhyped—predictability and nuclear deterrence will very likely deter an invasion and preserve the Cold Peace.
{"title":"Bipolarity is Back: Why It Matters","authors":"Clifford A. Kupchan","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020457","url":null,"abstract":"Bipolarity is no longer returning—it is here, and it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. News today is dominated by US-China relations, indicating a recognition of today’s bipolar system, and China continues to close the gap in the economic realm. The effects of this bipolarity have substantially deepened as elites in both Washington and Beijing have become aware of the new global structure and are acting accordingly. Structure and beliefs are amplifying each other. Because the world now has a bipolar distribution of capabilities, it will be more peaceful than expected by the consensus view. Bipolar structures deductively and empirically tend to be peaceful (stable); regarding great power war—it is unlikely to happen. That prognosis for the current period is strengthened because balancing or competition between China and the United States will occur in the economic arena to a far greater extent than in the more dangerous military realm. The term “Cold Peace” best captures the current system; it will be broadly peaceful but by no means warm. Nationalist views in both the United States and China present a potential risk to the stability forecast by bipolarity, primarily through the specter of military conflict over Taiwan. This risk, however, is much overhyped—predictability and nuclear deterrence will very likely deter an invasion and preserve the Cold Peace.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"123 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48253861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020460
A. Ohanyan
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy toward Russia has combined elements of principled pragmatism, selective engagement, and containment. This at times self-contradictory approach by successive US administrations has left the United States without a sustainable policy toward Russia, oscillating repeatedly between euphoria and despair. The Biden administration has inherited this approach and a poisonous partisan atmosphere in Washington. Thanks to President Trump’s fixation on “getting along” with Russian leader Vladimir Putin and the swirl of Russia-related investigations during his presidency, Russia policy became excessively personalized and de-institutionalized. The Biden team has indicated that they believe that the foundations of Russia policy needed a complete overhaul as well as a reappraisal of what has and has not worked since the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014. Nevertheless, there is hardly any controversy about the enduring nature of the current crisis or about US priorities: restoring the credibility of the US commitment to NATO, defending frontline countries from a more assertive Russia, and supporting Ukraine. To meet those goals, calls have emerged for the Biden team to reprise
{"title":"The Road Not Yet Taken: Regionalizing US Policy Toward Russia","authors":"A. Ohanyan","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020460","url":null,"abstract":"Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy toward Russia has combined elements of principled pragmatism, selective engagement, and containment. This at times self-contradictory approach by successive US administrations has left the United States without a sustainable policy toward Russia, oscillating repeatedly between euphoria and despair. The Biden administration has inherited this approach and a poisonous partisan atmosphere in Washington. Thanks to President Trump’s fixation on “getting along” with Russian leader Vladimir Putin and the swirl of Russia-related investigations during his presidency, Russia policy became excessively personalized and de-institutionalized. The Biden team has indicated that they believe that the foundations of Russia policy needed a complete overhaul as well as a reappraisal of what has and has not worked since the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014. Nevertheless, there is hardly any controversy about the enduring nature of the current crisis or about US priorities: restoring the credibility of the US commitment to NATO, defending frontline countries from a more assertive Russia, and supporting Ukraine. To meet those goals, calls have emerged for the Biden team to reprise","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"29 - 47"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42800931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020459
M. O'hanlon
Should the United States commit to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese attack? Should Washington extend to Taiwan something like NATO’s Article V mutual-defense promise or America’s solemn vow in Article V of the US-Japan Treaty to protect Japan against foreign aggression? Unlike those other treaties, Washington no longer has treaty pledges or any other kind of formal status in its dealings with Taiwan and does not even recognize Taiwan as a country. For four decades, under a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” the United States has refused to tip its hand, declaring instead that any decision on whether to use military power in defense of Taiwan would depend upon how a conflict began. Such deliberate muddying of the deterrence waters has had an unredeeming legacy from Korea to Kuwait and beyond. For Taiwan, however, such a policy has enjoyed support for four decades. The debate over whether to change America’s strategic stance has picked up steam in the current era of a return to great power competition, as codified in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Even though Trump himself was highly controversial as president, these documents, and what they said about Russia and China, were
{"title":"How to Defend Taiwan: Leading with Economic Warfare","authors":"M. O'hanlon","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020459","url":null,"abstract":"Should the United States commit to defend Taiwan in the event of Chinese attack? Should Washington extend to Taiwan something like NATO’s Article V mutual-defense promise or America’s solemn vow in Article V of the US-Japan Treaty to protect Japan against foreign aggression? Unlike those other treaties, Washington no longer has treaty pledges or any other kind of formal status in its dealings with Taiwan and does not even recognize Taiwan as a country. For four decades, under a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” the United States has refused to tip its hand, declaring instead that any decision on whether to use military power in defense of Taiwan would depend upon how a conflict began. Such deliberate muddying of the deterrence waters has had an unredeeming legacy from Korea to Kuwait and beyond. For Taiwan, however, such a policy has enjoyed support for four decades. The debate over whether to change America’s strategic stance has picked up steam in the current era of a return to great power competition, as codified in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Even though Trump himself was highly controversial as president, these documents, and what they said about Russia and China, were","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"183 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47724870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458
T. Marple
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 Updating Dollar Diplomacy: Leading on Digital Currency Standards Tim Marple To cite this article: Tim Marple (2021) Updating Dollar Diplomacy: Leading on Digital Currency Standards, The Washington Quarterly, 44:4, 107-120, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458
{"title":"Updating Dollar Diplomacy: Leading on Digital Currency Standards","authors":"T. Marple","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458","url":null,"abstract":"ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 Updating Dollar Diplomacy: Leading on Digital Currency Standards Tim Marple To cite this article: Tim Marple (2021) Updating Dollar Diplomacy: Leading on Digital Currency Standards, The Washington Quarterly, 44:4, 107-120, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2020458","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"107 - 120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49068339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795
Suisheng Zhao
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China Suisheng Zhao To cite this article: Suisheng Zhao (2021) From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China, The Washington Quarterly, 44:4, 141-161, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795
{"title":"From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China","authors":"Suisheng Zhao","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795","url":null,"abstract":"ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rwaq20 From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China Suisheng Zhao To cite this article: Suisheng Zhao (2021) From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China, The Washington Quarterly, 44:4, 141-161, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2018795","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"141 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46013823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.2022856
B. Radzinsky
China is significantly expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear forces. Over the summer of 2021, researchers using satellite imagery discovered three separate fields of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos under construction in the deserts of north-central China. If each silo is eventually equipped with a missile, the Chinese nuclear arsenal capable of striking the continental US could triple in size. The US government estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal could number 1000 warheads by 2030, with at least 200 deployed on long-range platforms. In addition to expanding its silo-based missile force, Beijing is building more robust and effective road-mobile missiles capable of striking targets in Asia and the continental United States. China will also soon join the United States and Russia as the only nuclear powers with a complete nuclear triad—the capability to launch nuclear weapons from land-based missiles, submarines, and bomber aircraft. China is also exploring new kinds of nuclear weapons delivery platforms, including a hypersonic “fractional orbital bombardment system” and possibly autonomous underwater drones. As a result, US military commanders have assessed that China is “no longer a lesser-included case” of the “pacing” nuclear threat posed by Russia. Taking note of China’s nuclear expansion, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently observed that “China’s military is on pace
{"title":"The Strategic Implications of the Evolving US-China Nuclear Balance","authors":"B. Radzinsky","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.2022856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.2022856","url":null,"abstract":"China is significantly expanding the size and sophistication of its nuclear forces. Over the summer of 2021, researchers using satellite imagery discovered three separate fields of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos under construction in the deserts of north-central China. If each silo is eventually equipped with a missile, the Chinese nuclear arsenal capable of striking the continental US could triple in size. The US government estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal could number 1000 warheads by 2030, with at least 200 deployed on long-range platforms. In addition to expanding its silo-based missile force, Beijing is building more robust and effective road-mobile missiles capable of striking targets in Asia and the continental United States. China will also soon join the United States and Russia as the only nuclear powers with a complete nuclear triad—the capability to launch nuclear weapons from land-based missiles, submarines, and bomber aircraft. China is also exploring new kinds of nuclear weapons delivery platforms, including a hypersonic “fractional orbital bombardment system” and possibly autonomous underwater drones. As a result, US military commanders have assessed that China is “no longer a lesser-included case” of the “pacing” nuclear threat posed by Russia. Taking note of China’s nuclear expansion, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently observed that “China’s military is on pace","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"163 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41975990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970905
J. Mankoff
Russia has come to occupy an anomalous position in Western strategic thought. While former US president Barack Obama dismissed Russia as a “regional power” following its 2014 occupation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, both the Trump and Biden administrations have identified Russia as one of the United States’ principal rivals in an era defined by strategic competition among great powers. To a significant degree, though, the United States continues to think about Russia as more of a disruptor than a true great power rival. Though widespread, that view misreads both the nature and the durability of Russian power and underestimates the extent to which Russia remains a potent competitor whose preferences Western leaders will have to take into account. Even as Russia has invaded its neighbors, deployed forces to Syria, positioned itself as a key partner for regimes worldwide concerned about Western-backed democracy promotion, and shaken political systems throughout the West itself, the perception of Russia as little more than a nuisance, a terminally declining state that should dispense with its great power ambitions and allow the United States to focus on the "pacing threat" of China, persists. This distinction is captured by the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which differentiates between “an increasingly assertive China and [a] destabilizing Russia” that “remains determined to... play a disruptive role on the world stage.” The US National Intelligence Council’s 2021 Global Trends report likewise notes that, while Russia is “likely to remain a disruptive
俄罗斯在西方战略思想中已经占据了一个异常的地位。在俄罗斯2014年占领克里米亚和入侵乌克兰东部后，美国前总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)将俄罗斯视为“地区大国”，而特朗普和拜登政府都将俄罗斯视为美国在大国战略竞争时代的主要竞争对手之一。不过，在很大程度上，美国仍然认为俄罗斯更像是一个破坏者，而不是一个真正的大国竞争对手。尽管这种观点很普遍，但它误解了俄罗斯权力的性质和持久性，低估了俄罗斯仍然是一个强有力的竞争对手的程度，西方领导人必须考虑到俄罗斯的偏好。尽管俄罗斯入侵了邻国，向叙利亚部署了军队，将自己定位为全世界关注西方支持的民主推进的政权的关键伙伴，并动摇了整个西方的政治制度，但人们仍然认为俄罗斯只不过是一个讨厌的家伙，一个即将衰落的国家，应该放弃其大国野心，让美国专注于中国的“节奏威胁”。拜登政府的《临时国家安全战略指南》(Interim National Security Strategic Guidance)抓住了这一区别，该指南区分了“日益自信的中国和破坏稳定的俄罗斯”，后者“仍决心……在世界舞台上发挥破坏性作用。”美国国家情报委员会的《2021年全球趋势》报告同样指出，尽管俄罗斯“可能仍然具有颠覆性”
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Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970904
A. Lukin
Russian-Chinese rapprochement is one of the most important modern geopolitical shifts. Recently, it seems that those who argue that closer relations between Moscow and Beijing stem from their converging interests, values, and worldviews have won out over those who claimed theirs is essentially a marriage of convenience—a tactical arrangement for countering attacks by the United States and its allies. According to some forecasts, the mutual understanding between the two countries will deepen in the foreseeable future and they will form, if not a formal then at least a de facto, alliance. Events indicate that, in fact, Russia and China have strengthened their interaction. Butwill this trendcontinue?Recentdevelopments, such asBeijing’s assertivenew foreign policy, its “wolf warrior” diplomacy (which is beginning to annoy Russia’s political elite), and several political repercussions from the coronavirus pandemic suggest that the peak of Russian-Chinese rapprochement has probably passed.
{"title":"Have We Passed the Peak of Sino-Russian Rapprochement?","authors":"A. Lukin","doi":"10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970904","url":null,"abstract":"Russian-Chinese rapprochement is one of the most important modern geopolitical shifts. Recently, it seems that those who argue that closer relations between Moscow and Beijing stem from their converging interests, values, and worldviews have won out over those who claimed theirs is essentially a marriage of convenience—a tactical arrangement for countering attacks by the United States and its allies. According to some forecasts, the mutual understanding between the two countries will deepen in the foreseeable future and they will form, if not a formal then at least a de facto, alliance. Events indicate that, in fact, Russia and China have strengthened their interaction. Butwill this trendcontinue?Recentdevelopments, such asBeijing’s assertivenew foreign policy, its “wolf warrior” diplomacy (which is beginning to annoy Russia’s political elite), and several political repercussions from the coronavirus pandemic suggest that the peak of Russian-Chinese rapprochement has probably passed.","PeriodicalId":46957,"journal":{"name":"Washington Quarterly","volume":"44 1","pages":"155 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43674863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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