EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY最新文献

英文中文

Acting on reasons: Synchronic executive control 根据理由行事同步执行控制

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-31 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12925

Arthur Schipper

There is a wide variety of cases of alienation, including (a) when an agent is alienated from her own motivational states and (b) deviant causal cases when an agent's motivational states cause her intended actions but via a deviant causal pathway. Reflecting on the variety of kinds of alienation reveals that action explanation still needs to account for the positive role that agents play in non-alienated actions in general. To fill this gap, this paper identifies a sui generis but crucial notion of control, what I call “synchronic executive control,” where agents act on their reasons, which must be distinguished from (a) endorsing one's reasons as reasonable or as the reasons for action (from the autonomy literature), and (b) other, diachronic notions of executive control such as competence, skills-based control, planning-based control, and counterfactual control generally (from especially the deviant causation literature). The presence of such executive control is crucial for explaining the role of agents in non-alienated actions, and its absence explains the lack of agency in alienation cases. The result is the identification of a relationship agents have with their reasons which unifies the variety of non-alienated actions in a novel way.

异化的情况多种多样，包括：（a）行为主体与其自身的动机状态发生异化；（b）行为主体的动机状态导致其预期行动，但其因果途径有偏差。对各种异化情况的反思表明，行动解释仍然需要解释行为主体在一般非异化行动中发挥的积极作用。为了填补这一空白，本文提出了一个自成一类但又至关重要的控制概念，我称之为 "同步执行控制"，即行为主体根据自己的理由采取行动，它必须区别于（a）认可自己的理由是合理的或行动的理由（来自自主性文献），以及（b）其他非同步的执行控制概念，如能力、基于技能的控制、基于计划的控制和一般意义上的反事实控制（来自偏离因果关系文献）。这种执行控制的存在对于解释代理人在非异化行动中的作用至关重要，而它的缺失则解释了异化情况下代理人的缺失。其结果是确定了代理人与其理由之间的关系，这种关系以一种新颖的方式统一了各种非异化行为。

{"title":"Acting on reasons: Synchronic executive control","authors":"Arthur Schipper","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12925","url":null,"abstract":"There is a wide variety of cases of alienation, including (a) when an agent is alienated from her own motivational states and (b) deviant causal cases when an agent's motivational states cause her intended actions but via a deviant causal pathway. Reflecting on the variety of kinds of alienation reveals that action explanation still needs to account for the positive role that agents play in non-alienated actions in general. To fill this gap, this paper identifies a sui generis but crucial notion of control, what I call “synchronic executive control,” where agents act on their reasons, which must be distinguished from (a) endorsing one's reasons as reasonable or as the reasons for action (from the autonomy literature), and (b) other, diachronic notions of executive control such as competence, skills-based control, planning-based control, and counterfactual control generally (from especially the deviant causation literature). The presence of such executive control is crucial for explaining the role of agents in non-alienated actions, and its absence explains the lack of agency in alienation cases. The result is the identification of a relationship agents have with their reasons which unifies the variety of non-alienated actions in a novel way.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139680149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Hume and Kant on imaginative resistance 休谟和康德论想象力的阻力

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12935

Emine Hande Tuna

The topic of imaginative resistance attracted considerable philosophical attention in recent years. Yet, with a few exceptions, no historical investigation of the phenomenon has been carried out. This paper amends this gap in the literature by constructing a Humean and a Kantian explanation. The main contributions of this historical analysis to this debate are to make room for emotions in explanations of resistance reactions and to upset the polarization between rival accounts by suggesting that our possible responses to morally flawed works can vary. In some cases, we resist imagining counter-evaluative claims due to our unwillingness to do so, and in others, due to our inability.

近年来，"想象的阻力 "这一话题引起了哲学界的广泛关注。然而，除了少数例外，还没有人对这一现象进行过历史研究。本文通过构建休谟和康德的解释，弥补了这一文献空白。这一历史分析对这一争论的主要贡献在于，在解释抵制反应时为情感留出了空间，并通过表明我们对有道德瑕疵的作品可能做出的反应可能各不相同，打破了对立观点之间的两极分化。在某些情况下，我们抗拒想象反评价的主张是因为我们不愿意这样做，而在另一些情况下，则是因为我们没有能力这样做。

引用次数: 0

The whitewashing of blame 粉饰责任

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12937

Eugene Chislenko

I argue that influential recent discussions have whitewashed blame, characterizing it in ways that deemphasize or ignore its morally problematic features. I distinguish “definitional,” “creeping,” and “emphasis” whitewash, and argue that they play a central role in overall endorsements of blame by T.M. Scanlon, George Sher, and Miranda Fricker. In particular, these endorsements treat blame as appropriate by definition (Scanlon), or as little more than a wish (Sher), and infer from blame's having one useful function that it is a good practice overall (Fricker). I use an analogy with revenge to illustrate the mechanisms of whitewashing, including broadening a concept to include available alternatives to it and inference from one feature of a practice to an overall conclusion about that practice. Several features of blame make it particularly prone to whitewashing, including blamers' personal or emotional stake in blaming and widespread disagreement about the nature of blame. I argue that a non-whitewashing treatment of blame must pay closer attention both to blame's harms, and to comparisons between blame and alternative, non-blaming reactions.

我认为，近期颇具影响力的讨论粉饰了责难，以不强调或忽视其道德问题特征的方式来描述责难。我区分了 "定义性"、"爬行性 "和 "强调性 "粉饰，并认为它们在斯坎伦（T.M. Scanlon）、乔治-谢尔（George Sher）和米兰达-弗里克（Miranda Fricker）对责备的总体认可中扮演了核心角色。特别是，这些认可将责备定义为适当的（斯坎伦），或仅仅是一种愿望（谢尔），并从责备具有一种有用的功能推断出它是一种总体良好的做法（弗里克）。我用 "复仇 "来类比说明粉饰的机制，包括扩大一个概念的范围，使其包括可替代的概念，以及从一种做法的一个特征推断出该做法的总体结论。指责的几个特点使其特别容易被粉饰，包括指责者在指责中的个人或情感利害关系，以及对指责性质的广泛分歧。我认为，要想不粉饰指责，就必须更密切地关注指责的危害，以及指责与其他非指责反应之间的比较。

引用次数: 0

The origins of sedimentation in Husserl's phenomenology 胡塞尔现象学中的沉积起源

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12931

S. Geniusas

Husserl is the philosopher who transformed the geological metaphor of sedimentation into a philosophical concept. While tracing the development of Husserl's reflections on sedimentation, I argue that the distinctive feature of Husserl's approach lies in his preoccupation with the question concerning the origins of sedimentations. The paper demonstrates that in different frameworks of analysis, Husserl understood these origins in significantly different ways. In the works concerned with the phenomenology of time consciousness, Husserl searched for the origins of sedimentation in the field of subjective experience, and more precisely, in impressional consciousness. By contrast, in the later works concerned with history, he maintained that the origins of sedimentations lie in the field of historical past that stretches beyond the reach of individual experience. Building on the basis of these resources, I argue that the Husserlian concept of sedimentation has three distinct components of senses: static, genetic, and generative. In the static sense, sedimentations are modifications of retentions and necessary conditions of recollection. In the genetic sense, sedimentations are necessary for the formation of types, habits and moods, and as such, they shape present experiences. In the generative sense, sedimentations refer to what consciousness inherits from the historical tradition.

胡塞尔是将沉积这一地质学隐喻转化为哲学概念的哲学家。在追溯胡塞尔对沉积问题思考的发展过程时，我认为胡塞尔方法的独特之处在于他对沉积起源问题的关注。本文表明，在不同的分析框架中，胡塞尔对这些起源的理解大相径庭。在有关时间意识现象学的著作中，胡塞尔在主观经验领域，更确切地说，是在印象意识中寻找沉积的起源。相比之下，在后来有关历史的著作中，他坚持认为沉积的起源在于超越个体经验的历史过去领域。在这些资源的基础上，我认为胡塞尔的沉积概念有三个不同的感官组成部分：静态的、遗传的和生成的。在静态意义上，沉积是对保留的修改，是回忆的必要条件。在遗传意义上，沉淀是形成类型、习惯和情绪的必要条件，因此，沉淀塑造了当下的经验。在生成的意义上，沉淀指的是意识从历史传统中继承的东西。

{"title":"The origins of sedimentation in Husserl's phenomenology","authors":"S. Geniusas","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12931","url":null,"abstract":"Husserl is the philosopher who transformed the geological metaphor of sedimentation into a philosophical concept. While tracing the development of Husserl's reflections on sedimentation, I argue that the distinctive feature of Husserl's approach lies in his preoccupation with the question concerning the origins of sedimentations. The paper demonstrates that in different frameworks of analysis, Husserl understood these origins in significantly different ways. In the works concerned with the phenomenology of time consciousness, Husserl searched for the origins of sedimentation in the field of subjective experience, and more precisely, in impressional consciousness. By contrast, in the later works concerned with history, he maintained that the origins of sedimentations lie in the field of historical past that stretches beyond the reach of individual experience. Building on the basis of these resources, I argue that the Husserlian concept of sedimentation has three distinct components of senses: static, genetic, and generative. In the static sense, sedimentations are modifications of retentions and necessary conditions of recollection. In the genetic sense, sedimentations are necessary for the formation of types, habits and moods, and as such, they shape present experiences. In the generative sense, sedimentations refer to what consciousness inherits from the historical tradition.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140483393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

“Belief” and Belief "信念 "与信仰

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-28 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12934

Eric Marcus

Our interest in understanding belief stems partly from our being creatures who think. However, the term ‘belief’ is used to refer to many states: from the fully conscious rational state that partly constitutes knowledge to the fanciful states of alarm clocks. Which of the many ‘belief’ states must a theory of belief be answerable to? This is the scope question. I begin my answer with a reply to a recent argument that belief is invariably weak, i.e., that the evidential standards that are required for belief are low. Although one state we refer to using the term ‘belief’ fits this profile, other ‘belief’ states do not. Crucially, when ‘belief’ is heard in a weak sense, it attributes a state that only a rational creature can be in. I will use this observation as a starting point for an argument that the study of (our) belief should not be constrained by the requirement that the illuminated state be held in common with any non-rational being. This lends support to the Transformative Theory of Rationality, according to which rationality does not merely add powers or complexity to the animal mind, but transforms it into a different kind of mind altogether.

我们之所以对理解信念感兴趣，部分原因在于我们是会思考的生物。然而，"信念 "一词被用来指代多种状态：从部分构成知识的完全有意识的理性状态，到闹钟的幻想状态。在众多的 "信念 "状态中，信念理论必须回答哪些状态？这是一个范围问题。在回答这个问题时，我首先要回答最近提出的一个论点，即信念总是脆弱的，也就是说，信念所要求的证据标准很低。虽然我们用 "信念 "一词所指的一种状态符合这一特征，但其他 "信念 "状态却不符合这一特征。最重要的是，当 "信念 "被弱化时，它是一种只有理性生物才会有的状态。我将以这一观点为出发点，论证对（我们的）信念的研究不应受制于任何非理性生物所共同拥有的被照亮状态这一要求。根据这一理论，理性并不只是增加动物心智的力量或复杂性，而是将其转变为一种完全不同的心智。

引用次数: 0

Is Margaret Cavendish a naïve realist? 玛格丽特-卡文迪什是一个天真的现实主义者吗？

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12914

Daniel Whiting

Perception plays a central and wide-ranging role in the philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. In this paper, I argue that Cavendish holds a naïve realist theory of perception. The case draws on what Cavendish has to say about perceptual presentation, the role of sympathy in experience, the natures of hallucination and of illusion, and the individuation of kinds. While Cavendish takes perception to have representational content, I explain how this is consistent with naïve realism. In closing, I address challenges to the interpretation, one of which turns on whether Cavendish allows for action at a distance. I argue that she does.

在玛格丽特-卡文迪什的哲学中，知觉起着核心和广泛的作用。在本文中，我将论证卡文迪什持有一种天真的现实主义知觉理论。这一论证借鉴了卡文迪什关于知觉呈现、同情在经验中的作用、幻觉和错觉的性质以及种类的个性化的论述。虽然卡文迪什认为知觉具有表象内容，但我解释了这如何与天真的现实主义相一致。最后，我讨论了对这一解释的质疑，其中之一是卡文迪什是否允许远距离行动。我认为她是允许的。

引用次数: 0

Representation in action 行动中的代表性

IF 0.7 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12932

Alec Hinshelwood

When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge that one is intentionally doing that thing. And I argue that this knowledge must itself be one's intentionally doing that thing. I aim to show, then, that insofar as representing practically just is knowing practically, it is equally acting intentionally.

当一个人有意去做某件事时，他就会把这件事当作一个要完成的目标。这就是实际表述。我们应该如何进一步描述这种实际表征呢？在本文中，我认为，当一个人有意做某件事情时，他将其表征为一个要完成的目标，这也必须是他有意做这件事的知识。而且我认为，这种知识本身必须是一个人有意在做的事情。因此，我的目的是要证明，只要实践表征就是实践认知，它就同样是有意为之的行为。

引用次数: 0

Correction to ‘On the eve of the “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”: Cassirer and Hegel’ 对《"符号形式哲学 "的前夜》的更正：卡西勒与黑格尔

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12930

Ferrari, M. On the eve of the “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”: Cassirer and Hegel. European Journal of Philosophy, 31, 1125–1134.

The article by Ferrari (2023) has been corrected online to incorporate the following edits that were missed during production. The updated article can be accessed at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12915.

The author's affiliation has been updated (department name).
Amended a mention of “Hegelian” to “Hegelianism” in the 2nd paragraph of the main text.
Updated text for clarity (For example: “entangled” to “intertwined”; “Twenties” to “1920s”; “long dominated” to “long time”; “appointed” instead of “called”; “publication” instead of “edition”).
Typographical errors have been corrected.
Mention of “Hegelian” to “Hegelianism” in the 2nd paragraph of the main text.
These in-text citations have been updated include more details or to correct the citation year:
- Kroner (1921)
- Cassier (1996)
- Lasson (1922)
The following changes have been made in the reference list:
- Cassirer (1910)—Added
- Cassirer (1979)—Updated
- Cassirer (2009)—Removed
- Cassirer (1920)—Updated
- Cassirer (1958)—Updated
- Cassirer (1996)—Updated
- Cassirer (1999)—Updated
- Cassirer (2001)—Updated
- Cassirer (2004)—Updated
- Cassirer (2006)—Updated
- Cassirer (2021a)—Updated
- Cassirer (2021b)—Updated
- Cassirer (2021c)—Updated
- Dilthey (1963)—Updated
- Kroner (1921)—Updated
- Gadamer (1958)—Updated
- Natorp (1958)—Updated
- Natorp (2015)—Updated

We apologize for these errors.

Ferrari, M. On the eve of the "Philosophy of Symbolic Forms"：Cassirer and Hegel.European Journal of Philosophy, 31, 1125-1134.Ferrari (2023)的文章已在网上更正，加入了以下在制作过程中遗漏的编辑内容。更新后的文章可在 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12915 上查阅。更新了作者单位（系名）。将正文第 2 段中的 "黑格尔 "改为 "黑格尔主义"："将正文第 2 段中的 "黑格尔 "一词改为 "黑格尔主义"：Kroner (1921)、Cassier (1996)、Lasson (1922)：Cassirer (1910)-已添加Cassirer (1979)-已更新Cassirer (2009)-已删除Cassirer (1920)-已更新Cassirer (1958)-已更新Cassirer (1996)-已更新Cassirer (1999)-已更新Cassirer (2001)-已更新Cassirer (2004)-已更新Cassirer (2006)-已更新Cassirer (2007)-已删除Cassirer (2007)-已删除Cassirer (2007)-已删除Cassirer (2007)-已删除(2006)-UpdatedCassirer (2021a)-UpdatedCassirer (2021b)-UpdatedCassirer (2021c)-UpdatedDilthey (1963)-UpdatedKroner (1921)-UpdatedGadamer (1958)-UpdatedNatorp (1958)-UpdatedNatorp (2015)-Updated我们对这些错误表示歉意。

{"title":"Correction to ‘On the eve of the “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”: Cassirer and Hegel’","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12930","url":null,"abstract":"Ferrari, M. On the eve of the “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”: Cassirer and Hegel. European Journal of Philosophy, 31, 1125–1134.\u0000<div>The article by Ferrari (2023) has been corrected online to incorporate the following edits that were missed during production. The updated article can be accessed at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12915. <ul>\u0000<li>The author's affiliation has been updated (department name).</li>\u0000<li>Amended a mention of “Hegelian” to “Hegelianism” in the 2nd paragraph of the main text.</li>\u0000<li>Updated text for clarity (For example: “entangled” to “intertwined”; “Twenties” to “1920s”; “long dominated” to “long time”; “appointed” instead of “called”; “publication” instead of “edition”).</li>\u0000<li>Typographical errors have been corrected.</li>\u0000<li>Mention of “Hegelian” to “Hegelianism” in the 2nd paragraph of the main text.</li>\u0000<li>\u0000These in-text citations have been updated include more details or to correct the citation year: <ul>\u0000<li>Kroner (1921)</li>\u0000<li>Cassier (1996)</li>\u0000<li>Lasson (1922)</li>\u0000</ul>\u0000\u0000</li>\u0000<li>\u0000The following changes have been made in the reference list: <ul>\u0000<li>Cassirer (1910)—Added</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (1979)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2009)—Removed</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (1920)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (1958)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (1996)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (1999)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2001)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2004)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2006)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2021a)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2021b)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Cassirer (2021c)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Dilthey (1963)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Kroner (1921)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Gadamer (1958)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Natorp (1958)—Updated</li>\u0000<li>Natorp (2015)—Updated</li>\u0000</ul>\u0000\u0000</li>\u0000</ul>\u0000</div>\u0000We apologize for these errors.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139496204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Emulative envy and loving admiration 羡慕和爱慕

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12927

Luke Brunning

Would you rather your friends, family, and partners envy you, or admire you, when you flourish? Many people would prefer to be admired, and so we often strive to tame our envy. Recently, however, Sara Protasi offered an intriguing defence of “emulative envy” which apparently improves us and our relationships, and is compatible with love. I find her account unconvincing, and defend loving admiration in this article. In Section 2, I summarize Protasi's nuanced account of envy. In Section 2, I argue that irrespective of how we analyze emotions in general we can argue that it is preferable to prioritize the cultivation of some emotions over others. In Section 4, I challenge Protasi's assumptions about the affinity between love and envy. My core argument is in Section 5 where I examine envy's impact on the envier, the envied, and relationships. Envy impedes an authentic relationship to the goods and goals in the envier's life, alienates the envied, and stifles joint-action. From all perspectives admiration typically fares better. After briefly considering the objection that admiration may impede love in Section 6, I conclude, in section seven, that admiration should be preferred to emulative envy in our intimate relationships.

当你蓬勃发展时，你是希望你的朋友、家人和合作伙伴羡慕你，还是钦佩你？很多人都希望自己被人钦佩，因此我们常常努力抑制自己的嫉妒心。然而，最近萨拉-普罗塔西（Sara Protasi）为 "模仿性嫉妒 "做了一个耐人寻味的辩护。我认为她的说法难以令人信服，并在本文中为爱的钦佩辩护。在第 2 节中，我总结了普罗塔西关于嫉妒的细微论述。在第 2 节中，我论证了无论我们如何分析一般情感，我们都可以认为优先培养某些情感比培养其他情感更可取。在第 4 节中，我对普罗塔西关于爱与嫉妒之间亲和力的假设提出质疑。我的核心论点在第 5 节，我将探讨嫉妒对嫉妒者、被嫉妒者和人际关系的影响。妒忌阻碍了与羡慕者生活中的物品和目标之间的真实关系，疏远了被羡慕者，并扼杀了共同行动。从所有角度来看，钦佩通常都更胜一筹。在第 6 节中，我简要地考虑了 "钦佩可能会妨碍爱情 "这一反对意见，然后在第 7 节中得出结论，在我们的亲密关系中，钦佩应该比模仿性嫉妒更受欢迎。

{"title":"Emulative envy and loving admiration","authors":"Luke Brunning","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12927","url":null,"abstract":"Would you rather your friends, family, and partners envy you, or admire you, when you flourish? Many people would prefer to be admired, and so we often strive to tame our envy. Recently, however, Sara Protasi offered an intriguing defence of “emulative envy” which apparently improves us and our relationships, and is compatible with love. I find her account unconvincing, and defend loving admiration in this article. In Section 2, I summarize Protasi's nuanced account of envy. In Section 2, I argue that irrespective of how we analyze emotions in general we can argue that it is preferable to prioritize the cultivation of some emotions over others. In Section 4, I challenge Protasi's assumptions about the affinity between love and envy. My core argument is in Section 5 where I examine envy's impact on the envier, the envied, and relationships. Envy impedes an authentic relationship to the goods and goals in the envier's life, alienates the envied, and stifles joint-action. From all perspectives admiration typically fares better. After briefly considering the objection that admiration may impede love in Section 6, I conclude, in section seven, that admiration should be preferred to emulative envy in our intimate relationships.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139496226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Schelling's late philosophy in confrontation with Hegel. By Peter Dews, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022. pp. 344. $110 (hardback) 谢林晚期哲学与黑格尔的对峙。牛津大学出版社牛津大学出版社。2022. pp.344.110美元（精装本）

IF 0.9 2区哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12924

Eliza Starbuck Little

引用次数: 0

首页上一页

下一页尾页

类型

全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

数据库

全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

期刊

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.

﹀