Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

This article examines an omission in the study of discretionary time that bears on proposals currently being evaluated in this part of political philosophy. Specifically, this is the tendency in many jobs for work time to bleed into what is meant to be protected or discretionary time. I refer to this phenomenon as the relative proximity of labour and capital, which has become more prevalent in the labour market due to increased use of mobile communications technology. Ignored by the literature is the fact that whether a job exhibits a high degree of proximity of labour and capital will influence workers' access to their discretionary time entitlements, including policies such as workplace flexibility and the four-day week. To account for this, I provide a descriptive and normative account of the proximity of labour and capital, in response to which I propose a remedial policy that provides workers with greater autonomy over how and when they take up their discretionary time entitlements.

This article evaluates the moral implications of two leading theories on biodiversity preservation/conservation (Paul Taylor's biocentric egalitarianism and J. Baird Callicott's holistic communitarianism). Taylor argues for the moral equality of all members of the Earth's community of life, calling for an ethic of respect for nature to conserve biodiversity. Callicott argues for the moral consideration of ecosystems to maintain their integrity, stability, and beauty. The article makes two major claims. First, we need a plausible account of moral egalitarianism to disrupt ethical anthropocentrism. Second, the ethics of respect for nature requires a critical bottom-up character-based ethical theory to be morally forceful. These missing elements are central to the ubuntu philosophy about personhood and are significant for enriching egalitarian-communitarian solutions to biodiversity loss.

This article sets out an argument from legitimacy for the proposed Indigenous Voice to Parliament in Australia. The article first sets out an understanding of political legitimacy and of legitimacy deficits and argues that the Australian Government faces a legitimacy deficit with respect to its exercise of political power and authority over Indigenous Australians. The deficit arises, it is argued, because Indigenous Australians face significant structural injustice and there is little hope of redressing this injustice within the prevailing governing conventions. The article then argues that the proposed Indigenous Voice to Parliament ought to be seen as part of a package to address this legitimacy deficit by resetting the governing conventions of Australian society. The argument from legitimacy is then compared favorably with more familiar arguments from sovereignty and the right to self-determination.

This article sets out to describe and solve two puzzles that emerge in segregated labour markets (e.g. the USA or Sweden). First, in many hiring contexts people profess to adhere to egalitarian norms, and specifically to a qualification norm according to which job qualification should be the basis of employment. Still there is evidence of frequent norm violations (discrimination). Surprisingly, the norm persists and people do not frequently protest against such norm violations. The second puzzle is that people are suspicious of the hiring of minorities, perceiving such hirings as evidence that a ‘political correctness’ norm has replaced the qualification norm. The article proposes that both puzzles can be solved within a game-theoretical model of social norm-following, where implicit bias is introduced into an ‘employment game’. Within this model, implicit bias plays a double role. First, it interferes with employers' hiring decisions regarding ethnic majority and minority members, respectively. This is the standard way of understanding the effects of implicit bias. Second, implicit bias interferes with bystander evaluations of hired candidates' qualifications. This is a hitherto overlooked effect of implicit bias. The article concludes that once we understand the double role of implicit bias, the two puzzles are resolved.

A common view has it that since we are far likelier to be killed in some road or household accident than in a terror attack, our fear of the latter is exaggerated. I argue that terrorism's relatively limited death toll need not mean that fearing it is unreasonable, nor does it immediately imply that counter-terrorism policies are unjustified – whatever other, legitimate concerns these policies give rise to. First, I argue that in the special case of terrorism, it is misleading to focus on risk per capita, as critics typically do. Second, while terrorism has a probabilistic component which should be relevant to decision-making, risk is not entirely or even primarily what terrorism is all about. Third, I argue that fearing terrorism may be reasonable even while recognizing the small probability of personal harm. Due to terrorism's random character, the belief that one will escape harm rests on little more than statistical evidence. As I explain, this leaves some room for reasonable doubt, and a justified level of fear.

How might good work – skilled, autonomous work which affords workers opportunities for meaningful social cooperation in decent conditions – be made available to all? I evaluate five commonly advanced strategies: an unregulated labor market, egalitarian redistribution of resources, state regulation, collective bargaining, and workplace democracy. Each, I argue, has significant limitations. An unregulated labor market ignores workers' unduly weak bargaining power vis-à-vis employers. Egalitarian redistribution alone fails to solve this problem due to distinctive and endemic imperfections of labor markets. Direct state regulation is insufficiently context-sensitive and insufficiently dynamic in the face of technological and other developments. Collective bargaining gives workers only indirect and sometimes costly influence over their working conditions. And workplace democracy leaves workers vulnerable to collective action problems induced by competition between firms. I argue, however, that these strategies can be complemented in a promising way by ‘syndicalist economic democracy’: direct worker participation in the government of the economy, largely specific to particular occupations or economic sectors but above the level of the individual workplace.