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Erasing History as a Form of Defensive Forgetting 抹去历史是一种防御性遗忘
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12774
Anja Berninger

It has sometimes been suggested that removing statues of problematic historical figures such as Cecil Rhodes from the public realm amounts to ‘erasing history’ and should therefore be avoided. In philosophy, this approach has generally been rejected. In this article, I try to develop a more plausible version of the erasing history argument. I suggest that sometimes societies aim to forget for defensive reasons (i.e. to cover up past wrongdoing). I also suggest that such past wrongdoing can also consist in the widespread acceptance of a problematic monument (and therewith complicity in the insult it represents). I conclude that in such cases, to avoid defensive forgetting, we should aim to recontextualize rather than remove the monument. I also discuss which forms such recontextualization may take.

有时有人建议,把像塞西尔·罗兹这样有问题的历史人物的雕像从公共领域移走相当于“抹杀历史”,因此应该避免。在哲学中,这种方法通常被拒绝。在这篇文章中,我试图提出一个更合理的版本的抹去历史的论点。我认为,有时社会的目的是为了防御(即掩盖过去的不法行为)而忘记。我还认为,这种过去的错误行为也可能包括对一个有问题的纪念碑的广泛接受(从而与它所代表的侮辱串通一气)。我的结论是,在这种情况下,为了避免防御性遗忘,我们应该重新定位背景,而不是移除纪念碑。我还讨论了这种重新语境化可能采取的形式。
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引用次数: 0
Climate Displacement. J. Draper, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 272 pp, £90 (hb) 气候位移。J. Draper, 2023。牛津,牛津大学出版社,272页,90英镑(磅)
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-11-25 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12775
Harrison Munday
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引用次数: 0
Procreative Prerogatives and Climate Change 生育特权与气候变化
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12773
Felix Pinkert, Martin Sticker

One of the most provocative claims in current climate ethics is that we ought to have fewer children, because procreation brings new people into existence and thereby causes large amounts of additional greenhouse gas emissions. The public debate about procreation and climate change is frequently framed in terms of the question of whether people may still have any children at all. Yet in the academic debate it is a common position that, despite the large carbon impact of procreation, it is still permissible to have one or two children per couple, if having children is needed for the parents' lives to go well. In this article, we propose a defence and a principled formulation of this procreative prerogative: agents are permitted to procreate if the goods that procreation provides are essential to their lives going well and cannot be replaced by other goods, nor be realized by lower-emissions alternatives. This principle implies that procreative decisions require case-by-case assessment in which agents' self-reflection, individual circumstances, and social context play a significant role.

在当前的气候伦理中,最具挑衅性的主张之一是,我们应该少生孩子,因为生育会带来新的人类,从而导致大量额外的温室气体排放。关于生育和气候变化的公众辩论经常被框定在人们是否还可以有孩子的问题上。然而,在学术辩论中,一个普遍的立场是,尽管生育对碳的影响很大,但如果父母的生活顺利需要生育孩子,一对夫妇仍然可以生育一到两个孩子。在本文中,我们为这种生育特权提出了辩护和原则性表述:如果生育所提供的物品对他们的生活很重要,并且不能被其他物品所取代,也不能被低排放的替代品所实现,那么代理人就被允许生育。这一原则意味着,生育决策需要个案评估,其中主体的自我反思、个人情况和社会背景发挥着重要作用。
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引用次数: 0
‘Why Is the Chubby Guy Running?’: Trans Pregnancy, Fatness, and Cultural Intelligibility “胖男人为什么要跑步?”:跨性别怀孕、肥胖和文化可理解性
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-11-05 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12772
Francis Ray White, Ruth Pearce, Damien W. Riggs, Carla A. Pfeffer, Sally Hines

Since the late 2000s trans pregnancy has received increasing public and academic attention, and stories of the ‘pregnant man’ have become a media staple. Existing research has critiqued such spectacularization and the supposed tension between maleness, masculinity, and pregnancy that underpins it. Extending that work, this article draws on interview data from an international study of trans reproductive practices and analyzes participants' experiences of being, and expecting themselves to be, perceived in public space not as spectacularly ‘pregnant men’, but as fat men. As a starting point we take the experience of one participant whose heavily pregnant participation in a five-kilometer race prompted the question: ‘Why is the chubby guy running?’ Using Judith Butler's concept of the cultural intelligibility of gender, we ask why the question asked was not: ‘Why is the pregnant guy running?’ We further consider the degree to which pregnant trans people manage their unintelligibility within the matrix of pregnancy, fatness, and trans/gender and how this reveals the limits of gender intelligibility itself.

自2000年代末以来,跨性别怀孕受到了越来越多的公众和学术界的关注,“怀孕男人”的故事已经成为媒体的主要内容。现有的研究批评了这种引人注目的现象,以及支撑这种现象的所谓男性、男子气概和怀孕之间的紧张关系。在此基础上,本文借鉴了一项关于跨性别生殖实践的国际研究的访谈数据,分析了参与者在公共场所被视为胖子而不是引人注目的“怀孕男人”的经历,以及他们对自己的期望。作为起点,我们以一位参与者的经历为例,她怀着身孕参加了一场五公里的比赛,这引发了一个问题:“为什么这个胖乎乎的家伙要跑步?”利用朱迪思·巴特勒(Judith Butler)关于性别的文化可理解性的概念,我们要问为什么这个问题不是:“为什么这个怀孕的家伙要跑步?”“我们进一步考虑怀孕的跨性别者在怀孕、肥胖和跨性别/性别的矩阵中管理其不可理解性的程度,以及这如何揭示性别可理解性本身的局限性。”
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引用次数: 0
Ethics and Situational Crime Prevention. T.S. Petersen, 2024. New York, Routledge. 162 pp, £130 (hb) 道德与情境犯罪预防。T.S.彼得森,2024。纽约,劳特利奇出版社,162页,130英镑(hb)
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-10-22 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12771
Karl de Fine Licht
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引用次数: 0
Environmental Just Wars: Jus ad Bellum and the Natural Environment 环境正义之战:正义与自然环境
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-10-21 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12770
Tamar Meisels

War is bad for the environment, yet the environmental ramifications of warfare have not been widely addressed by just war theorists and revisionist philosophers of war. The law and legal scholars have paid more attention to protecting nature during armed conflict. But because the law focuses invariably on rules mitigating the conduct of hostilities rather than on objective justice of cause, environmental jus ad bellum has been explored even less extensively than environmental ethics in war. Setting out with the presumption against the use of force and its exceptions, this article considers whether environmental harm can trigger a new justification for war, at whose behest, and what might be a proportionate response to aggressive or negligent harm to nature. Force is clearly justified against military attacks. Where environmental harm is not caused by military aggression, proportionality points towards a response short of war. Full-scale warfare will likely be counterproductive in protecting nature. This is less true if war is fought by drones destroying specific targets, or by cyber-war, or by alternatives (or supplements) to war such as boycotts, ‘lawfare’, and ‘information/media warfare’. Responding in ways that minimize harm to nature also helps demonstrate ‘right intention’.

战争对环境有害,然而战争对环境的影响还没有被正义的战争理论家和修正主义的战争哲学家广泛地讨论过。在武装冲突中对自然的保护受到了法律和法学学者的越来越多的关注。但是,由于法律总是侧重于减轻敌对行为的规则,而不是客观的原因正义,环境正义与战争的探讨甚至比战争中的环境伦理更少。本文从反对使用武力及其例外的假设出发,考虑环境损害是否可以在其要求下引发新的战争理由,以及对侵略性或过失性自然损害的相称反应。武力对付军事攻击显然是正当的。在环境损害不是由军事侵略造成的情况下,相称性指向一种不需要战争的反应。全面战争在保护自然方面可能会适得其反。如果战争是通过无人机摧毁特定目标,或者通过网络战争,或者通过抵制、“法律战”和“信息/媒体战”等战争的替代(或补充)来进行的,那么这种情况就不那么正确了。以尽量减少对自然伤害的方式作出反应也有助于表明“正确的意图”。
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引用次数: 0
Self-Deception in Human–Sex Robot Intimacy 人与机器人亲密关系中的自我欺骗
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12761
Jin Hee Lee, Christina Chuang

A common sentiment among anti-sex-robot scholars is the apprehension that sex robots will normalize and perpetuate sexual violence towards humans. In this new chapter within the feminist sex war, the authors of this article tend to agree with anti-sex-robot concerns and seek to further identify potential harms of sex robots. However, instead of characterizing the harm in terms of what the robots represent and symbolize, we are primarily interested in the internal state of the user and the type of relationship that will emerge between human users and sex robots, which we argue is an unprecedented sexual relation. Unlike other comparable sex products and services, sex robots occupy a liminal space between being perceived as both a sexual property and agent, oscillating based on the preferences and convenience of the user. We argue that this oscillation that enables human–sex robot intimacy requires self-deception, which in turn entails individual moral responsibility. Thus, we articulate a novel virtue-based approach of examining human–robot intimacy that focuses on cultivating erotic flourishing. We conclude that people have a moral responsibility to exhibit self-awareness within the dynamics of their intimate relationship with sex robots and the (contradictory) beliefs required to maintain such intimacy.

反对性爱机器人的学者普遍认为,性爱机器人将使针对人类的性暴力正常化并使之永久化。在女权主义性爱战争的新篇章中,本文的作者倾向于同意反性爱机器人的担忧,并寻求进一步识别性爱机器人的潜在危害。然而,我们不是用机器人代表和象征的东西来描述伤害,而是主要对用户的内部状态以及人类用户和性爱机器人之间将出现的关系类型感兴趣,我们认为这是一种前所未有的性关系。与其他类似的性产品和服务不同,性爱机器人在被视为性财产和性代理之间占据了一个有限的空间,它会根据用户的偏好和方便程度而波动。我们认为,这种使人类与机器人之间产生亲密关系的振荡需要自我欺骗,这反过来又需要个人的道德责任。因此,我们阐述了一种新的基于美德的方法来研究人类与机器人的亲密关系,重点是培养色情繁荣。我们的结论是,在与性爱机器人的亲密关系中,人们有道德责任表现出自我意识,以及维持这种亲密关系所需的(相互矛盾的)信念。
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引用次数: 0
City of Equals. J. Wolff and A. de-Shalit, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. xii + 201 pp, open access 平等之城。J. Wolff和A. de-Shalit, 2023。牛津,牛津大学出版社。Xii + 201 pp,开放获取
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-10-14 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12769
Elisabetta Gobbo
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引用次数: 0
Debts of Gratitude in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Confucian and Western Ethics 跨文化视角下的感恩之债:儒家与西方伦理
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-10-07 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12767
George Tsai, Lok Chui Choo

This article examines the contrasting conceptions of gratitude in Early Confucian and Western philosophy. It focuses on a key difference: the presence of the notion of ‘debts of gratitude’ in Western thought and its absence in Confucianism. We explore how this difference is rooted in contrasting ethical outlooks and values. Western philosophy often conceives of gratitude as a duty of reciprocation, furthering the values of social equality and individual autonomy. By contrast, Early Confucians viewed gratitude as proper acknowledgement that strengthens social relationships that are part of an ongoing collective project, spanning generations. This view reflects the importance of values such as community, harmony, and ritual propriety in Confucianism. Unlike the Western context, in the Early Confucian social world, there was no role for ‘debts of gratitude’ to play. There were no Confucian values that ‘debts of gratitude’ would help to realize, or would be responsive to, in the way that debts of gratitude further the values of equality and independence in the West. We conclude by noting that some Western philosophers express ideas about gratitude in collaborative contexts that align with Confucian ideas, suggesting some shared elements between Confucian and Western ethical outlooks.

本文考察了早期儒家和西方哲学中感恩观念的差异。它关注的是一个关键的区别:西方思想中有“感恩之债”的概念,而儒家思想中没有。我们将探讨这种差异是如何植根于不同的道德观和价值观。西方哲学通常将感恩视为一种回报的义务,促进了社会平等和个人自主的价值观。相比之下,早期儒家认为感恩是一种适当的承认,可以加强社会关系,这是一个持续的、跨越几代人的集体项目的一部分。这种观点反映了儒家思想中社区、和谐、礼制等价值观的重要性。与西方不同的是,在早期的儒家社会中,“感恩之债”并没有发挥作用。儒家的价值观中没有“感恩之债”可以帮助实现,或者像西方的感恩之债那样促进平等和独立的价值观。最后,我们注意到一些西方哲学家在合作的背景下表达的感恩思想与儒家思想一致,这表明儒家和西方伦理观点之间存在一些共同的元素。
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引用次数: 0
Does Lack of Commitment Undermine the Hypocrite's Standing to Blame? 缺乏承诺会削弱伪君子的责任吗?
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2024-09-30 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12766
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen

According to an influential account of standing, hypocritical blamers lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norm etc. which they invoke. Nevertheless, the commitment account has the wrong shape for it to explain why hypocrites lack standing to blame. Building on the lessons of that critique I propose a novel account of what undermines standing to blame – the comparative fairness account. This differs from the commitment account and the other prominent account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame offered in the literature: the moral equality account. Finally, I observe that, intuitively, lack of commitment undermines standing to blame and that many hypocrites might lack standing for that reason also. Moreover, typically the hypocrite's failure to address their own faults is a feature in virtue of which, other things being equal, the hypocrite is less committed to the norm in question. These two observations provide the basis for an error theory of the commitment account's appeal, despite its inability to explain why, qua hypocritical blamer, one lacks standing to blame.

根据一份有影响力的关于地位的报告,伪善的指责者由于缺乏对他们所援引的规范等的承诺而缺乏可指责的地位。然而,承诺说的形式是错误的,它不能解释为什么伪君子没有责任。基于这一批判的教训,我提出了一种新颖的解释,即比较公平解释。这不同于承诺说,也不同于文学作品中关于伪君子为何缺乏责任的另一个重要解释:道德平等说。最后,我观察到,凭直觉,缺乏承诺会削弱指责的地位,许多伪君子也可能因为这个原因而缺乏地位。此外,一般来说,伪君子无法解决自己的错误是一个特征,在其他条件相同的情况下,伪君子不太遵守相关规范。这两个观察结果为承诺说的吸引力的错误理论提供了基础,尽管它无法解释为什么,作为虚伪的责备者,一个人缺乏责备的立场。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Applied Philosophy
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