Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463119883959
Lina Eriksson
Social norm emergence is commonly explained by stating that norms serve certain functions – for example, solving cooperation or coordination problems. But critics argue that examples of norms that do not seem to serve functions show that functions cannot explain social norms. However, both sides tend to make assumptions about how explanations of social norms in terms of functions would work. By discussing four problems for these assumptions, I will show that they are over-simplified. Instead of asking whether norms serve functions, we need to ask more specific questions about the relationship between the norm and the function it supposedly serves.
{"title":"Rational reconstructions and the question of function","authors":"Lina Eriksson","doi":"10.1177/1043463119883959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119883959","url":null,"abstract":"Social norm emergence is commonly explained by stating that norms serve certain functions – for example, solving cooperation or coordination problems. But critics argue that examples of norms that do not seem to serve functions show that functions cannot explain social norms. However, both sides tend to make assumptions about how explanations of social norms in terms of functions would work. By discussing four problems for these assumptions, I will show that they are over-simplified. Instead of asking whether norms serve functions, we need to ask more specific questions about the relationship between the norm and the function it supposedly serves.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119883959","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48965456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-09DOI: 10.1177/1043463120961779
D. Read
This paper investigates strategic thinking in the fictional world of Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Purloined Letter’. This short story has been rightly celebrated for its explicit analysis of strategic reasoning in which players attempt to outwit one another, which involves accounting for how they are all attempting to outwit one another. I differ from previous analyses by examining how the actors can often be wrong in their explicit analysis and consider the strategic actions they take rather than those they claim to take. Using elementary game theory, I describe the five games (and suggest a sixth) that make up the strategic heart of the story. These include games of signalling, screening, negotiation, revenge and a unique game called the ‘pincer’. I consider how literary sources like ‘The Purloined Letter’ can provide insights into the applicability of strategic analysis in the ‘real world’.
{"title":"The five games of Mr Edgar Allan Poe: A study of strategic thought in ‘The Purloined Letter’","authors":"D. Read","doi":"10.1177/1043463120961779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120961779","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates strategic thinking in the fictional world of Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Purloined Letter’. This short story has been rightly celebrated for its explicit analysis of strategic reasoning in which players attempt to outwit one another, which involves accounting for how they are all attempting to outwit one another. I differ from previous analyses by examining how the actors can often be wrong in their explicit analysis and consider the strategic actions they take rather than those they claim to take. Using elementary game theory, I describe the five games (and suggest a sixth) that make up the strategic heart of the story. These include games of signalling, screening, negotiation, revenge and a unique game called the ‘pincer’. I consider how literary sources like ‘The Purloined Letter’ can provide insights into the applicability of strategic analysis in the ‘real world’.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120961779","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49017193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-05DOI: 10.1177/1043463119872566
W. Raub, V. Buskens, Vincenz Frey
Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed.
{"title":"Strategic tie formation for long-term exchange relations","authors":"W. Raub, V. Buskens, Vincenz Frey","doi":"10.1177/1043463119872566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119872566","url":null,"abstract":"Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119872566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47879035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-13DOI: 10.1177/1043463119869007
Marek Hudík
I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10
{"title":"Two interpretations of the rational choice theory and the relevance of behavioral critique","authors":"Marek Hudík","doi":"10.1177/1043463119869007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119869007","url":null,"abstract":"I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119869007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41914565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-07DOI: 10.1177/1043463119869080
S. Lindenberg, L. Steg, M. Milovanovic, A. Schipper
It is always an honor when, after one publishes a study, somebody takes the time and effort to figure out how it could have been done better (Lindenberg et al., 2018; Przepiorka, 2019). It is a public service, and we are grateful for the effort. Although we are and remain quite proud of our studies and their results, there is, as in any study, always room for improvement and it is certainly important to test hypotheses also via other designs. However, we feel there are a number of misinterpretations, omissions, and confusions in Dr. Przepiorka’s comments, each of which we would like to discuss.
当一个人发表一项研究后，有人花时间和精力找出如何做得更好时，这总是一种荣誉（Lindenberg et al.，2018；Przepiorka，2019）。这是一项公共服务，我们对此表示感谢。尽管我们现在和现在都为我们的研究及其结果感到骄傲，但与任何研究一样，总有改进的空间，通过其他设计来检验假设当然也很重要。然而，我们觉得普热皮奥尔卡博士的评论中有许多误解、遗漏和混淆，我们想讨论每一个。
{"title":"Reply to Wojtek Przepiorka: Testing goal-framing and hedonic hypocrisy","authors":"S. Lindenberg, L. Steg, M. Milovanovic, A. Schipper","doi":"10.1177/1043463119869080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119869080","url":null,"abstract":"It is always an honor when, after one publishes a study, somebody takes the time and effort to figure out how it could have been done better (Lindenberg et al., 2018; Przepiorka, 2019). It is a public service, and we are grateful for the effort. Although we are and remain quite proud of our studies and their results, there is, as in any study, always room for improvement and it is certainly important to test hypotheses also via other designs. However, we feel there are a number of misinterpretations, omissions, and confusions in Dr. Przepiorka’s comments, each of which we would like to discuss.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119869080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47216388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463120921254
Daniel A. Newark
This article considers how desire leads to pleasure through choice. A typical assumption of rational choice models is that decision makers experience pleasure or utility primarily when their desires are satisfied by decision outcomes. This article proposes that, in addition to desire yielding pleasure through its satisfaction, desiring can also yield pleasure directly during choice. Beyond the pleasures of getting what we want, there may be pleasures in the wanting. In particular, four psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which desire can yield pleasure during choosing are identified: imagining the desired object, learning about the desired object, constructing one’s self while clarifying the desired object, and pursuing the desired object. This said, although desire may, through these mechanisms, offer considerable immediate pleasure, this article posits that indulging these pleasures tends to foster subsequent disappointment with decision outcomes. The article concludes by considering the implications for decision making of this expanded view of desire’s relationship to pleasure in choice.
{"title":"Desire and pleasure in choice","authors":"Daniel A. Newark","doi":"10.1177/1043463120921254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120921254","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers how desire leads to pleasure through choice. A typical assumption of rational choice models is that decision makers experience pleasure or utility primarily when their desires are satisfied by decision outcomes. This article proposes that, in addition to desire yielding pleasure through its satisfaction, desiring can also yield pleasure directly during choice. Beyond the pleasures of getting what we want, there may be pleasures in the wanting. In particular, four psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which desire can yield pleasure during choosing are identified: imagining the desired object, learning about the desired object, constructing one’s self while clarifying the desired object, and pursuing the desired object. This said, although desire may, through these mechanisms, offer considerable immediate pleasure, this article posits that indulging these pleasures tends to foster subsequent disappointment with decision outcomes. The article concludes by considering the implications for decision making of this expanded view of desire’s relationship to pleasure in choice.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120921254","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45821296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-12DOI: 10.1177/1043463119863061
W. Przepiorka
Lindenberg et al. report experimental evidence for the effect of hedonic shifts on subjects’ propensity to engage in moral hypocrisy. Hedonic shifts are changes in individuals’ cognitive states that can be triggered by cues in these individuals’ environments such as ambient smells. Individuals in a hedonic cognitive state aim at doing what makes them feel good. Hence, the authors hypothesize that (1) individuals who are in a bad mood and are put in a hedonic cognitive state will more often take a moral stance and (2) when asked to act morally refuse to do so, (3) especially when the costs for acting morally are high, and (4) even if the moral issue upon which they are asked to act is unrelated to the issue pertaining to the moral stance they took. The authors test these four hypotheses in two laboratory experiments and conclude that their results support these hypotheses. In this comment, I highlight design, measurement, and data analysis issues arising with the two studies that challenge this conclusion. Throughout my comment, I give some indications as to how a laboratory experiment testing these four hypotheses could be designed and conducted.
{"title":"No evidence for hedonic shifts to bring about more moral hypocrisy: A comment on Lindenberg et al. (2018)","authors":"W. Przepiorka","doi":"10.1177/1043463119863061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119863061","url":null,"abstract":"Lindenberg et al. report experimental evidence for the effect of hedonic shifts on subjects’ propensity to engage in moral hypocrisy. Hedonic shifts are changes in individuals’ cognitive states that can be triggered by cues in these individuals’ environments such as ambient smells. Individuals in a hedonic cognitive state aim at doing what makes them feel good. Hence, the authors hypothesize that (1) individuals who are in a bad mood and are put in a hedonic cognitive state will more often take a moral stance and (2) when asked to act morally refuse to do so, (3) especially when the costs for acting morally are high, and (4) even if the moral issue upon which they are asked to act is unrelated to the issue pertaining to the moral stance they took. The authors test these four hypotheses in two laboratory experiments and conclude that their results support these hypotheses. In this comment, I highlight design, measurement, and data analysis issues arising with the two studies that challenge this conclusion. Throughout my comment, I give some indications as to how a laboratory experiment testing these four hypotheses could be designed and conducted.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119863061","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45892874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1177/1043463119858788
A. Peshkovskaya, Tatiana S Babkina, M. Myagkov
Numerous researches have indicated that men’s and women’s cooperation varied from no differences to significant differences under the influence of different contextual characteristics. In this study, we investigated how social factors together with a gender composition of a group affected gender differences in cooperation. We found that mixed-sex groups were the most effective in cooperation. At the same time, cooperation level in same-sex groups varied significantly. Besides, in same-sex groups, men demonstrated a higher level of trust and gratitude than women. Among women, in same-sex groups, a tendency toward mutual distrust and competition was revealed more often than among men.
{"title":"Gender effects and cooperation in collective action: A laboratory experiment","authors":"A. Peshkovskaya, Tatiana S Babkina, M. Myagkov","doi":"10.1177/1043463119858788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119858788","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous researches have indicated that men’s and women’s cooperation varied from no differences to significant differences under the influence of different contextual characteristics. In this study, we investigated how social factors together with a gender composition of a group affected gender differences in cooperation. We found that mixed-sex groups were the most effective in cooperation. At the same time, cooperation level in same-sex groups varied significantly. Besides, in same-sex groups, men demonstrated a higher level of trust and gratitude than women. Among women, in same-sex groups, a tendency toward mutual distrust and competition was revealed more often than among men.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119858788","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47194301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-12DOI: 10.1177/1043463119853543
P. Marx
Political behaviour research is divided into several explanatory approaches. They have in common that they disregard, to varying extents, the social bases of their explanatory concepts. To fill this void, the present article explores the theoretical advantages of applying Randal Collins’s ritual theory to political behaviour. The central claim is that any cognitive factor, such as interests, values, norms or identities has to be infused with emotional resonance in concrete social interaction in order to become a relevant motivation for political behaviour. Based on this argument, the article develops four testable propositions and discusses how they relate to existing approaches. The article concludes that ritual-based emotions are a unified motivational basis for political behaviour, which help understand which cognitive factor becomes politically relevant in a specific situation. The theoretical discussion is complemented with suggestions of how to study political rituals empirically.
{"title":"Should we study political behaviour as rituals? Towards a general micro theory of politics in everyday life","authors":"P. Marx","doi":"10.1177/1043463119853543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119853543","url":null,"abstract":"Political behaviour research is divided into several explanatory approaches. They have in common that they disregard, to varying extents, the social bases of their explanatory concepts. To fill this void, the present article explores the theoretical advantages of applying Randal Collins’s ritual theory to political behaviour. The central claim is that any cognitive factor, such as interests, values, norms or identities has to be infused with emotional resonance in concrete social interaction in order to become a relevant motivation for political behaviour. Based on this argument, the article develops four testable propositions and discusses how they relate to existing approaches. The article concludes that ritual-based emotions are a unified motivational basis for political behaviour, which help understand which cognitive factor becomes politically relevant in a specific situation. The theoretical discussion is complemented with suggestions of how to study political rituals empirically.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119853543","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44700985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-09DOI: 10.1177/1043463119853893
Carlos Maximiliano Senci, Hipólito Hasrun, Rodrigo Moro, E. Freidin
In most bribery games in the literature, there is no mention of rights and duties associated to participants’ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loaded frames, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitly signal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants’ interpretation of these factors may not be univocal. In this study, a participant in the role of a common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetary benefit and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role of public official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providing the benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditions with/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/absence of negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official’s duty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other bribery games in the literature which rely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information on rights and duties. We found that both the presence of externalities and information about rights were effective bribery deterrents, and that bribe offers and acceptances were most discouraged with their synergic effect. Interestingly, officials followed prescriptive information even when it was inefficient to do so (when there were no externalities), and implied choosing against their material self-interest (by rejecting a bribe), and not reciprocating bribe offers. We conclude by highlighting the limits of making generalizations from results without explicit normative information and the relevance of present findings as anti-corruption behavioral insights.
{"title":"The influence of prescriptive norms and negative externalities on bribery decisions in the lab","authors":"Carlos Maximiliano Senci, Hipólito Hasrun, Rodrigo Moro, E. Freidin","doi":"10.1177/1043463119853893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119853893","url":null,"abstract":"In most bribery games in the literature, there is no mention of rights and duties associated to participants’ roles. Authors have hitherto relied on loaded frames, negative externalities, and the possibility of sanctions to implicitly signal prescriptive norms. We argue that participants’ interpretation of these factors may not be univocal. In this study, a participant in the role of a common citizen either did or did not acquire the right to obtain a monetary benefit and could offer a bribe to an associated participant in the role of public official. This participant, in turn, had an explicit duty of providing the benefit only if the citizen acquired the right to it. Conditions with/without the acquisition of the right were crossed with the presence/absence of negative externalities associated with transgressions of the official’s duty. One last (fifth) condition mimicked other bribery games in the literature which rely on loaded frames and negative externalities but no information on rights and duties. We found that both the presence of externalities and information about rights were effective bribery deterrents, and that bribe offers and acceptances were most discouraged with their synergic effect. Interestingly, officials followed prescriptive information even when it was inefficient to do so (when there were no externalities), and implied choosing against their material self-interest (by rejecting a bribe), and not reciprocating bribe offers. We conclude by highlighting the limits of making generalizations from results without explicit normative information and the relevance of present findings as anti-corruption behavioral insights.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119853893","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45164331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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