Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1177/10434631221093791
E. Bukodi, J. Goldthorpe
A large body of often rather complex findings on intergenerational social mobility has by now come into existence but theoretical development has not kept pace. In this paper, focusing specifically on class mobility in European nations and the US, we aim, first of all, to identify the main empirical regularities that have emerged from research, making the now standard distinction between absolute and relative mobility. Next, we review previous theories of mobility, leading up to what we label as the liberal theory, and we note the difficulties now evident with the latter, associated with its functionalist basis. We then set out our own theory of intergenerational class mobility, grounded in the subjectively rational courses of action followed by the various actors involved. We seek to show how the empirical regularities described can in this way be accounted for, while pointing to additional evidence that supports the theory but also to ways in which it is open to further empirical test. Finally, we consider some more general implications of the theory and, on this basis, venture a number of – conditional – predictions on the future of class mobility in more advanced societies.
{"title":"Intergenerational class mobility in industrial and post-industrial societies: Towards a general theory","authors":"E. Bukodi, J. Goldthorpe","doi":"10.1177/10434631221093791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221093791","url":null,"abstract":"A large body of often rather complex findings on intergenerational social mobility has by now come into existence but theoretical development has not kept pace. In this paper, focusing specifically on class mobility in European nations and the US, we aim, first of all, to identify the main empirical regularities that have emerged from research, making the now standard distinction between absolute and relative mobility. Next, we review previous theories of mobility, leading up to what we label as the liberal theory, and we note the difficulties now evident with the latter, associated with its functionalist basis. We then set out our own theory of intergenerational class mobility, grounded in the subjectively rational courses of action followed by the various actors involved. We seek to show how the empirical regularities described can in this way be accounted for, while pointing to additional evidence that supports the theory but also to ways in which it is open to further empirical test. Finally, we consider some more general implications of the theory and, on this basis, venture a number of – conditional – predictions on the future of class mobility in more advanced societies.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44394124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-12DOI: 10.1177/10434631211015514
M. Tepe, Fabian Paetzel, J. Lorenz, Maximilian Lutz
Income redistribution with an efficiency loss is expected to have a twofold negative effect on support for redistribution, as it lowers egoistic support for redistribution and activates efficiency preferences. This study tests whether such a negative relationship exists, increases with the size of efficiency loss and interacts with group communication and the income position. We present a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive a randomly allocated income and must coordinate on a majority tax rate using a deliberative communication tool. The rate of money lost as a part of the redistribution process is manipulated as a treatment variable (0%, 5%, 20%, or 60%). Experimental evidence shows that efficiency loss exerts a robust negative effect on support for redistribution. The effect shows a tipping point pattern, is stronger at the lower end of the income distribution and is not fully explained by egoistic preferences. Inefficiency matters mostly for the chosen tax rate after group communication. At an efficiency loss of 60%, however, group communication does not affect support for redistribution, which implies that inefficiencies tend to play a minor role in the context of redistribution as long as they are within a moderate range. JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63, D72
{"title":"Efficiency loss and support for income redistribution: Evidence from a laboratory experiment","authors":"M. Tepe, Fabian Paetzel, J. Lorenz, Maximilian Lutz","doi":"10.1177/10434631211015514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211015514","url":null,"abstract":"Income redistribution with an efficiency loss is expected to have a twofold negative effect on support for redistribution, as it lowers egoistic support for redistribution and activates efficiency preferences. This study tests whether such a negative relationship exists, increases with the size of efficiency loss and interacts with group communication and the income position. We present a laboratory experiment in which subjects receive a randomly allocated income and must coordinate on a majority tax rate using a deliberative communication tool. The rate of money lost as a part of the redistribution process is manipulated as a treatment variable (0%, 5%, 20%, or 60%). Experimental evidence shows that efficiency loss exerts a robust negative effect on support for redistribution. The effect shows a tipping point pattern, is stronger at the lower end of the income distribution and is not fully explained by egoistic preferences. Inefficiency matters mostly for the chosen tax rate after group communication. At an efficiency loss of 60%, however, group communication does not affect support for redistribution, which implies that inefficiencies tend to play a minor role in the context of redistribution as long as they are within a moderate range. JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63, D72","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10434631211015514","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41978626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1177/10434631211012504
{"title":"Corrigendum to “The Five Games of Mr Edgar Allan Poe: A study of strategic thought in “The Purloined Letter””","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/10434631211012504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211012504","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10434631211012504","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42052619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-10DOI: 10.1177/10434631211008635
Florian Follert, F. Daumann
Particularly in the social sciences, scientific debates can be understood as a special expression of academic discourse and ideally support the progress of knowledge within a discipline. Very often, there are competing academic schools with greatly differing theoretical foundations, as we have seen, for example, in social sciences-especially by the “Methodenstreit” in economics, or the “Positivismusstreit” in Sociology. This paper aims to introduce a new approach to study academic schools and would like to contribute to the literature on the economics of science. To this end, the paper uses the economic theory of religion in general and the economics of sects in particular by transferring the approach to academic schools for the first time. Our results can help to extend the understanding of scientific decision-making and to explain the membership to an academic school. Although the model is presented in relationship to social sciences in general and economics in particular, the basic model of academic schools is generally transferable. JEL Classification: A12, B13, B21, B40, B53, Z12
{"title":"Faith struggles in science: Academic schools as religious sects","authors":"Florian Follert, F. Daumann","doi":"10.1177/10434631211008635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211008635","url":null,"abstract":"Particularly in the social sciences, scientific debates can be understood as a special expression of academic discourse and ideally support the progress of knowledge within a discipline. Very often, there are competing academic schools with greatly differing theoretical foundations, as we have seen, for example, in social sciences-especially by the “Methodenstreit” in economics, or the “Positivismusstreit” in Sociology. This paper aims to introduce a new approach to study academic schools and would like to contribute to the literature on the economics of science. To this end, the paper uses the economic theory of religion in general and the economics of sects in particular by transferring the approach to academic schools for the first time. Our results can help to extend the understanding of scientific decision-making and to explain the membership to an academic school. Although the model is presented in relationship to social sciences in general and economics in particular, the basic model of academic schools is generally transferable. JEL Classification: A12, B13, B21, B40, B53, Z12","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10434631211008635","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45504204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-26DOI: 10.1177/10434631231177810
Ryan Murphy
Rising Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita data indicates rises in living standards. Nonetheless, cultural pessimism is the received view. This paper makes a series of arguments that we should expect our cultural products (e.g. art or cuisine) to be on an upwards trajectory, just as RGDP per capita is. To do so, I expand on Bill James’s “Peripheral Quality Indicia” in order to argue that analogous indicators for our cultural products strongly suggest that they have improved. I also claim that RGDP per capita is itself a peripheral quality indicium for essentially any good in the economy. I then sketch the conditions under which cultural products are actually lower in quality today than they were in previous periods in order to demonstrate the general unlikelihood of quality declining.
{"title":"The clear expectation of cultural betterment in the face of rising living standards","authors":"Ryan Murphy","doi":"10.1177/10434631231177810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231177810","url":null,"abstract":"Rising Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita data indicates rises in living standards. Nonetheless, cultural pessimism is the received view. This paper makes a series of arguments that we should expect our cultural products (e.g. art or cuisine) to be on an upwards trajectory, just as RGDP per capita is. To do so, I expand on Bill James’s “Peripheral Quality Indicia” in order to argue that analogous indicators for our cultural products strongly suggest that they have improved. I also claim that RGDP per capita is itself a peripheral quality indicium for essentially any good in the economy. I then sketch the conditions under which cultural products are actually lower in quality today than they were in previous periods in order to demonstrate the general unlikelihood of quality declining.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47974689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-24DOI: 10.1177/10434631211001576
R. Nieva
We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain over transfers with one of the two peasants to contest over a piece of land, as property rights for land are not well defined. In any other scenario, neither the grand coalition nor the coalition of two peasants and one enforcer forms, thereby deposing the other enforcer with positive probability. So, social revolutions never occur. If foreign wars weaken an enforcer, such as in China (1911), France, and Russia, adding one unit of capital makes the coalition of the peasant, the now worker, and one of the enforcers (now an industrial political elite) attractive: The excess labor can work with it; the weaker enforcer retaliates less and the stronger one more, if excluded. However, if the weaker one (the still-landed political elite) proposes first, a grand coalition forms in which he or she gets less than the other members do (desertion). There is conflict among peasants and among landed elites; thus, the concept of a coalition is more appropriate than that of a class.
{"title":"Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions","authors":"R. Nieva","doi":"10.1177/10434631211001576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211001576","url":null,"abstract":"We have explained the presence of heterogeneous winning coalitions in social revolutions. In an overcrowded agrarian society, two almost identical non-productive enforcers, the landed political elite, collude and bargain over transfers with one of the two peasants to contest over a piece of land, as property rights for land are not well defined. In any other scenario, neither the grand coalition nor the coalition of two peasants and one enforcer forms, thereby deposing the other enforcer with positive probability. So, social revolutions never occur. If foreign wars weaken an enforcer, such as in China (1911), France, and Russia, adding one unit of capital makes the coalition of the peasant, the now worker, and one of the enforcers (now an industrial political elite) attractive: The excess labor can work with it; the weaker enforcer retaliates less and the stronger one more, if excluded. However, if the weaker one (the still-landed political elite) proposes first, a grand coalition forms in which he or she gets less than the other members do (desertion). There is conflict among peasants and among landed elites; thus, the concept of a coalition is more appropriate than that of a class.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10434631211001576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44179820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-09DOI: 10.1177/1043463121999658
Ashley Harrell
People commonly possess multiple, differentially-valued resources they can use to benefit those in need: contributing money, volunteering time, donating unwanted possessions, posting on social media to raise awareness, and more. But the majority of experimental work on generosity and helping behavior has studied giving when only a single valuable resource is available to give. This project considers: when people have multiple, differentially-valued resources to use to benefit a dependent other, which resources will they use to help, and how much? Results from an experiment show, first, that generosity is higher with lower-value resources. More importantly, when multiple, differentially-valued resources are available to use to benefit others, helping is higher than when a single resource is available, all else being equal. This is because when multiple resources are available, people are especially willing to give away their relatively lower-value resources. Put differently, when people can benefit others using multiple resources, they are more likely to consider how they should help, rather than whether they should.
{"title":"How can I help you? Multiple resource availability promotes generosity with low-value (but not high-value) resources","authors":"Ashley Harrell","doi":"10.1177/1043463121999658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463121999658","url":null,"abstract":"People commonly possess multiple, differentially-valued resources they can use to benefit those in need: contributing money, volunteering time, donating unwanted possessions, posting on social media to raise awareness, and more. But the majority of experimental work on generosity and helping behavior has studied giving when only a single valuable resource is available to give. This project considers: when people have multiple, differentially-valued resources to use to benefit a dependent other, which resources will they use to help, and how much? Results from an experiment show, first, that generosity is higher with lower-value resources. More importantly, when multiple, differentially-valued resources are available to use to benefit others, helping is higher than when a single resource is available, all else being equal. This is because when multiple resources are available, people are especially willing to give away their relatively lower-value resources. Put differently, when people can benefit others using multiple resources, they are more likely to consider how they should help, rather than whether they should.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463121999658","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44430626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463121995969
F. Facchini, L. Jaeck
This article proposes a general model of partisan political dealignment based on the theory of expressive voting. It is based on the Riker and Odershook equation. Voters cast a ballot for a political party if the utility associated with expressing their support for it is more than their expressive costs. Expressive utility is modeled here as a certain utility model. Then, the model is applied to the rise of voting support in favor of French right-wing populists, the National Front (FN). We show that the fall of justification costs of FN ideology along with the decline in stigmatization costs of voting in favor of the extreme right has fostered the popularity of this party. Political dealignment here is only a particular case of a general process of political norms transgression inherited by each voter.
{"title":"Populism and the rational choice model: The case of the French National Front","authors":"F. Facchini, L. Jaeck","doi":"10.1177/1043463121995969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463121995969","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes a general model of partisan political dealignment based on the theory of expressive voting. It is based on the Riker and Odershook equation. Voters cast a ballot for a political party if the utility associated with expressing their support for it is more than their expressive costs. Expressive utility is modeled here as a certain utility model. Then, the model is applied to the rise of voting support in favor of French right-wing populists, the National Front (FN). We show that the fall of justification costs of FN ideology along with the decline in stigmatization costs of voting in favor of the extreme right has fostered the popularity of this party. Political dealignment here is only a particular case of a general process of political norms transgression inherited by each voter.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463121995969","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45768746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-20DOI: 10.1177/1043463121994087
C. Barone, K. Barg, M. Ichou
This work examines the validity of the two main assumptions of relative risk-aversion models of educational inequality. We compare the Breen-Goldthorpe (BG) and the Breen-Yaish (BY) models in terms of their assumptions about status maintenance motives and beliefs about the occupational risks associated with educational decisions. Concerning the first assumption, our contribution is threefold. First, we criticise the assumption of the BG model that families aim only at avoiding downward mobility and are insensitive to the prospects of upward mobility. We argue that the loss-aversion assumption proposed by BY is a more realistic formulation of status-maintenance motives. Second, we propose and implement a novel empirical approach to assess the validity of the loss-aversion assumption. Third, we present empirical results based on a sample of families of lower secondary school leavers indicating that families are sensitive to the prospects of both upward and downward mobility, and that the loss-aversion hypothesis of BY is empirically supported. As regards the risky choice assumption, we argue that families may not believe that more ambitious educational options entail occupational risks relative to less ambitious ones. We present empirical evidence indicating that, in France, the academic path is not perceived as a risky option. We conclude that, if the restrictive assumptions of the BG model are removed, relative-risk aversion needs not drive educational inequalities.
{"title":"Relative risk aversion models: How plausible are their assumptions?","authors":"C. Barone, K. Barg, M. Ichou","doi":"10.1177/1043463121994087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463121994087","url":null,"abstract":"This work examines the validity of the two main assumptions of relative risk-aversion models of educational inequality. We compare the Breen-Goldthorpe (BG) and the Breen-Yaish (BY) models in terms of their assumptions about status maintenance motives and beliefs about the occupational risks associated with educational decisions. Concerning the first assumption, our contribution is threefold. First, we criticise the assumption of the BG model that families aim only at avoiding downward mobility and are insensitive to the prospects of upward mobility. We argue that the loss-aversion assumption proposed by BY is a more realistic formulation of status-maintenance motives. Second, we propose and implement a novel empirical approach to assess the validity of the loss-aversion assumption. Third, we present empirical results based on a sample of families of lower secondary school leavers indicating that families are sensitive to the prospects of both upward and downward mobility, and that the loss-aversion hypothesis of BY is empirically supported. As regards the risky choice assumption, we argue that families may not believe that more ambitious educational options entail occupational risks relative to less ambitious ones. We present empirical evidence indicating that, in France, the academic path is not perceived as a risky option. We conclude that, if the restrictive assumptions of the BG model are removed, relative-risk aversion needs not drive educational inequalities.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463121994087","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45462064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463120985322
Daniel Corstange
How do people keep order in weak states? Formal institutions provide law and order in rich societies, but are feeble and capricious in much of the developing world. Instead, people turn to informal, group-based order that operates through reputation and contingent cooperation. Such order requires people to police social boundaries and contributions, looking for costly signals of membership and commitment to weed out mimics and shirkers. Data from Yemen show that people rely on tribes for security and dispute resolution under customary law. Yemenis use a prominent symbol of tribalism, the iconic tribal dagger, to communicate their affiliations and commitments to their customary responsibilities. Yet people vary in how well they understand the semiotic system, and the accuracy of the link between dagger-wearing and tribalism improves with sophistication. While the most knowledgeable Yemenis reveal their tribal types with the dagger, the least knowledgeable communicate nothing at all.
{"title":"Non-state order and strategic communication via symbolic dress in Yemen","authors":"Daniel Corstange","doi":"10.1177/1043463120985322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120985322","url":null,"abstract":"How do people keep order in weak states? Formal institutions provide law and order in rich societies, but are feeble and capricious in much of the developing world. Instead, people turn to informal, group-based order that operates through reputation and contingent cooperation. Such order requires people to police social boundaries and contributions, looking for costly signals of membership and commitment to weed out mimics and shirkers. Data from Yemen show that people rely on tribes for security and dispute resolution under customary law. Yemenis use a prominent symbol of tribalism, the iconic tribal dagger, to communicate their affiliations and commitments to their customary responsibilities. Yet people vary in how well they understand the semiotic system, and the accuracy of the link between dagger-wearing and tribalism improves with sophistication. While the most knowledgeable Yemenis reveal their tribal types with the dagger, the least knowledgeable communicate nothing at all.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120985322","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45441805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：