Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463120920416
C. Jennings, Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow
In recent decades, there has been increased tolerance within many countries towards a range of previous out-groups. This has been displayed most dramatically in the growing acceptance of the LGBT community. Some radical right organisations are also expressing tolerance towards the very same out-groups which they once reviled. We postulate that the radical right strategically uses tolerance to increase its own support and to impose costs on another out-group – Muslims – who are judged to be hostile to the tolerated groups. We provide a theoretical analysis and contrasting case studies that help explain the conditions under which radical right organisations will, or will not, display tolerance towards out-groups.
{"title":"Selective tolerance and the radical right","authors":"C. Jennings, Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow","doi":"10.1177/1043463120920416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120920416","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, there has been increased tolerance within many countries towards a range of previous out-groups. This has been displayed most dramatically in the growing acceptance of the LGBT community. Some radical right organisations are also expressing tolerance towards the very same out-groups which they once reviled. We postulate that the radical right strategically uses tolerance to increase its own support and to impose costs on another out-group – Muslims – who are judged to be hostile to the tolerated groups. We provide a theoretical analysis and contrasting case studies that help explain the conditions under which radical right organisations will, or will not, display tolerance towards out-groups.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120920416","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42660204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463120919380
Fabian Winter, M. Kataria
We study the existence of homophily (i.e. the tendency for people to be friends with people who are similar to themselves) with respect to trustworthiness. We ask whether two friends show similarly trustworthy behavior toward strangers, and whether such behavior is expected by a third party. We develop a simple model of Bayesian learning in trust games and test the derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with the same trustor, where the trustees depending on treatment are either friends or strangers to each other. We confirm the existence of homophily with respect to trustworthiness. The trustors’ beliefs about the trustees’ trustfulness are not affected by the knowledge about the (non-)existent friendship between the trustees. Behaviorally, however, they indirectly reciprocate the (un-)trustworthy behavior of one trustee toward his or her friends in later interactions.
{"title":"You are who your friends are?","authors":"Fabian Winter, M. Kataria","doi":"10.1177/1043463120919380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120919380","url":null,"abstract":"We study the existence of homophily (i.e. the tendency for people to be friends with people who are similar to themselves) with respect to trustworthiness. We ask whether two friends show similarly trustworthy behavior toward strangers, and whether such behavior is expected by a third party. We develop a simple model of Bayesian learning in trust games and test the derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with the same trustor, where the trustees depending on treatment are either friends or strangers to each other. We confirm the existence of homophily with respect to trustworthiness. The trustors’ beliefs about the trustees’ trustfulness are not affected by the knowledge about the (non-)existent friendship between the trustees. Behaviorally, however, they indirectly reciprocate the (un-)trustworthy behavior of one trustee toward his or her friends in later interactions.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120919380","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43485564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463120921255
Chien-hang Liu
How a social norm emerges has been studied extensively. However, how a norm collapses has rarely been addressed in the literature. In this article, extending the theories of norm emergence by Coleman and Axelrod, I propose a theory of norm collapse. This theory specifies one micro mechanism and macro–micro–macro process through which a norm likely decays and eventually collapses. Then, as a test, I use computer simulation to simulate the process of the norm emergence and collapse. The result of the computer simulation demonstrates that the proposed theory has internal logical consistency. Finally, I conclude by discussing some implication of this research.
{"title":"A theory of norm collapse","authors":"Chien-hang Liu","doi":"10.1177/1043463120921255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120921255","url":null,"abstract":"How a social norm emerges has been studied extensively. However, how a norm collapses has rarely been addressed in the literature. In this article, extending the theories of norm emergence by Coleman and Axelrod, I propose a theory of norm collapse. This theory specifies one micro mechanism and macro–micro–macro process through which a norm likely decays and eventually collapses. Then, as a test, I use computer simulation to simulate the process of the norm emergence and collapse. The result of the computer simulation demonstrates that the proposed theory has internal logical consistency. Finally, I conclude by discussing some implication of this research.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120921255","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47006169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-13DOI: 10.1177/1043463120904051
Björn Toelstede
Social hierarchies exist in democracies as well as in authoritarian societies. However, their nature is different. Democratic hierarchies are built bottom-up through election while autocratic hierarchies are built top-down through domination. Both, however, have power asymmetries between the weaker citizens and the stronger politicians, which are amplified the stronger the hierarchies are. This manuscript introduces a model that combines pro-/anti-social behavior with different degrees of hierarchies. It is argued that this model has the power to categorize countries according to these criteria and indicate when and how societies move between democracy and authoritarianism. Importantly, I illustrate that the balance between power asymmetries and principal-agent chains is key for understanding when and why democracies sometimes transcend into authoritarianism.
{"title":"Social hierarchies in democracies and authoritarianism: The balance between power asymmetries and principal-agent chains","authors":"Björn Toelstede","doi":"10.1177/1043463120904051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120904051","url":null,"abstract":"Social hierarchies exist in democracies as well as in authoritarian societies. However, their nature is different. Democratic hierarchies are built bottom-up through election while autocratic hierarchies are built top-down through domination. Both, however, have power asymmetries between the weaker citizens and the stronger politicians, which are amplified the stronger the hierarchies are. This manuscript introduces a model that combines pro-/anti-social behavior with different degrees of hierarchies. It is argued that this model has the power to categorize countries according to these criteria and indicate when and how societies move between democracy and authoritarianism. Importantly, I illustrate that the balance between power asymmetries and principal-agent chains is key for understanding when and why democracies sometimes transcend into authoritarianism.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120904051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44750090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-02-10DOI: 10.1177/1043463120904049
Tom Lane
This article measures discrimination in the reality TV show Big Brother, a high-stakes environment. Data on contestants’ nominations are taken from 35 series of the British version of the show, covering the years 2000–2016. Race and age discrimination are found, with contestants more likely to nominate those of a different race and those different in age from themselves. However, no discrimination is identified on the basis of gender, geographical region of origin, or level of education. Racial discrimination is driven by males, but females exhibit stronger age discrimination than males. Age discrimination is driven by the younger contestants discriminating against the older. Regional differences emerge, particularly between contestants from Greater London and those from the north of England; northerners have a stronger tendency to engage in racial and age discrimination, and to discriminate in favour of the opposite gender.
{"title":"Along which identity lines does 21st-century Britain divide? Evidence from Big Brother","authors":"Tom Lane","doi":"10.1177/1043463120904049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120904049","url":null,"abstract":"This article measures discrimination in the reality TV show Big Brother, a high-stakes environment. Data on contestants’ nominations are taken from 35 series of the British version of the show, covering the years 2000–2016. Race and age discrimination are found, with contestants more likely to nominate those of a different race and those different in age from themselves. However, no discrimination is identified on the basis of gender, geographical region of origin, or level of education. Racial discrimination is driven by males, but females exhibit stronger age discrimination than males. Age discrimination is driven by the younger contestants discriminating against the older. Regional differences emerge, particularly between contestants from Greater London and those from the north of England; northerners have a stronger tendency to engage in racial and age discrimination, and to discriminate in favour of the opposite gender.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120904049","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45795981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-31DOI: 10.1177/1043463120902279
Minsun Song, Kyujin Jung, Namhoon Ki, R. Feiock
The study investigates the effect of embeddedness, defined as a property of interdependent relations in which organizations are integrated in a network, on collaboration risk emerging from relational uncertainty. Despite efforts to understand the structural effects of network governance, embedded relationships and their influence on collaboration remain relatively unexplored. A case of intergovernmental collaboration for emergency management is used as a test bed to examine the role of embeddedness in disaster networks and to extend the knowledge of collaboration risk within the institutional collective action framework. We hypothesize and test the effect of relational and structural embeddedness on the level of collaboration risk that an organization perceives. Our analysis of 69 organizations engaged in emergency management operations in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, South Korea reveals that both structural and relational embeddedness facilitate organizations to mitigate perceived collaboration risk. The results suggest that reachability secures relief of relational risk, and that commitment relationships bind participants.
{"title":"Testing structural and relational embeddedness in collaboration risk","authors":"Minsun Song, Kyujin Jung, Namhoon Ki, R. Feiock","doi":"10.1177/1043463120902279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120902279","url":null,"abstract":"The study investigates the effect of embeddedness, defined as a property of interdependent relations in which organizations are integrated in a network, on collaboration risk emerging from relational uncertainty. Despite efforts to understand the structural effects of network governance, embedded relationships and their influence on collaboration remain relatively unexplored. A case of intergovernmental collaboration for emergency management is used as a test bed to examine the role of embeddedness in disaster networks and to extend the knowledge of collaboration risk within the institutional collective action framework. We hypothesize and test the effect of relational and structural embeddedness on the level of collaboration risk that an organization perceives. Our analysis of 69 organizations engaged in emergency management operations in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, South Korea reveals that both structural and relational embeddedness facilitate organizations to mitigate perceived collaboration risk. The results suggest that reachability secures relief of relational risk, and that commitment relationships bind participants.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120902279","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48379297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-31DOI: 10.1177/1043463119894582
Armando Razo
Scholarly consensus that social ties resolve social dilemmas is largely predicated on common knowledge of networks. But what happens when people do not know all relevant social ties? Does network uncertainty translate into worse outcomes? I address these concerns by advancing the notion of a Network Estimation Bayesian Equilibrium to examine cooperative behavior under different epistemic conditions. When networks are common knowledge, I find that all possible outcomes of an original cooperation game can be realized in equilibrium, albeit with a higher likelihood of defection for more connected players. Variable knowledge of the network also has a distributional impact. With incomplete network knowledge, it’s possible to observe reversed equilibrium behavior when more connected players actually cooperate more often than less connected ones. In fact, aggregate network uncertainty in some social contexts incentivizes more mutual cooperation than would be the case with common knowledge of all social ties.
{"title":"Social dilemmas with manifest and unknown networks","authors":"Armando Razo","doi":"10.1177/1043463119894582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119894582","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarly consensus that social ties resolve social dilemmas is largely predicated on common knowledge of networks. But what happens when people do not know all relevant social ties? Does network uncertainty translate into worse outcomes? I address these concerns by advancing the notion of a Network Estimation Bayesian Equilibrium to examine cooperative behavior under different epistemic conditions. When networks are common knowledge, I find that all possible outcomes of an original cooperation game can be realized in equilibrium, albeit with a higher likelihood of defection for more connected players. Variable knowledge of the network also has a distributional impact. With incomplete network knowledge, it’s possible to observe reversed equilibrium behavior when more connected players actually cooperate more often than less connected ones. In fact, aggregate network uncertainty in some social contexts incentivizes more mutual cooperation than would be the case with common knowledge of all social ties.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119894582","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48980397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-17DOI: 10.1177/1043463119900327
Andrew Greenland, Damon Proulx, D. Savage
This article explores the impact that belief in an infinite afterlife has on end-of-life decisions, specifically on those viewed at the extreme, such as martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators. We extend a simplified expected utility-based model to include variations of infinitely rewarding afterlife’s and explore how this may impact the expected utility and rationality of earthly actions and decisions of individuals when the expected utility payoff is infinite. We show that the decision process for suicide and euthanasia is closely linked to martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators, such that all these individuals make rational decisions to regards to the end of their own life.
{"title":"Dying for the cause: The rationality of martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators","authors":"Andrew Greenland, Damon Proulx, D. Savage","doi":"10.1177/1043463119900327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119900327","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the impact that belief in an infinite afterlife has on end-of-life decisions, specifically on those viewed at the extreme, such as martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators. We extend a simplified expected utility-based model to include variations of infinitely rewarding afterlife’s and explore how this may impact the expected utility and rationality of earthly actions and decisions of individuals when the expected utility payoff is infinite. We show that the decision process for suicide and euthanasia is closely linked to martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators, such that all these individuals make rational decisions to regards to the end of their own life.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119900327","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42156713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-04DOI: 10.1177/1043463119894581
E. Piano, Byron Carson
At their arrival in North America, travelers from the Old Continent were exposed to a radically different civilization. Among the many practices that captured their imagination was scalp-taking. During a battle, the Native American warrior would often stop after having killed or subdued the enemy and cut off his scalp. In this article, we develop an economic theory of this gruesome practice. We argue that scalp-taking constituted an institutional solution to the problem of monitoring warriors’ behavior in the battlefield under conditions of high information costs.
{"title":"Scalp-taking","authors":"E. Piano, Byron Carson","doi":"10.1177/1043463119894581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119894581","url":null,"abstract":"At their arrival in North America, travelers from the Old Continent were exposed to a radically different civilization. Among the many practices that captured their imagination was scalp-taking. During a battle, the Native American warrior would often stop after having killed or subdued the enemy and cut off his scalp. In this article, we develop an economic theory of this gruesome practice. We argue that scalp-taking constituted an institutional solution to the problem of monitoring warriors’ behavior in the battlefield under conditions of high information costs.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119894581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42119870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463119885189
S. Wilson
This article tests whether latent class conflict exists in Russia. It does so by theorizing that if class conflict exists, it should be reflected in the tax policy. The article constructs an original formal model of the authoritarian tax policy choice, finding equilibria in which the local government takes into account public sentiment even in the absence of elections, in an effect that resembles a market. This public sentiment is operationalized by performing a large-n latent Dirichlet allocation topic analysis of Russian regional newspaper articles dealing with the middle and working classes. In empirically testing its formal model, this article finds evidence that certain tax policy is driven by class conflict.
{"title":"Modeling and measuring class conflict in Russia’s regions","authors":"S. Wilson","doi":"10.1177/1043463119885189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119885189","url":null,"abstract":"This article tests whether latent class conflict exists in Russia. It does so by theorizing that if class conflict exists, it should be reflected in the tax policy. The article constructs an original formal model of the authoritarian tax policy choice, finding equilibria in which the local government takes into account public sentiment even in the absence of elections, in an effect that resembles a market. This public sentiment is operationalized by performing a large-n latent Dirichlet allocation topic analysis of Russian regional newspaper articles dealing with the middle and working classes. In empirically testing its formal model, this article finds evidence that certain tax policy is driven by class conflict.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119885189","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48679377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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