Pub Date : 2020-01-31DOI: 10.1177/1043463119894582
Armando Razo
Scholarly consensus that social ties resolve social dilemmas is largely predicated on common knowledge of networks. But what happens when people do not know all relevant social ties? Does network uncertainty translate into worse outcomes? I address these concerns by advancing the notion of a Network Estimation Bayesian Equilibrium to examine cooperative behavior under different epistemic conditions. When networks are common knowledge, I find that all possible outcomes of an original cooperation game can be realized in equilibrium, albeit with a higher likelihood of defection for more connected players. Variable knowledge of the network also has a distributional impact. With incomplete network knowledge, it’s possible to observe reversed equilibrium behavior when more connected players actually cooperate more often than less connected ones. In fact, aggregate network uncertainty in some social contexts incentivizes more mutual cooperation than would be the case with common knowledge of all social ties.
{"title":"Social dilemmas with manifest and unknown networks","authors":"Armando Razo","doi":"10.1177/1043463119894582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119894582","url":null,"abstract":"Scholarly consensus that social ties resolve social dilemmas is largely predicated on common knowledge of networks. But what happens when people do not know all relevant social ties? Does network uncertainty translate into worse outcomes? I address these concerns by advancing the notion of a Network Estimation Bayesian Equilibrium to examine cooperative behavior under different epistemic conditions. When networks are common knowledge, I find that all possible outcomes of an original cooperation game can be realized in equilibrium, albeit with a higher likelihood of defection for more connected players. Variable knowledge of the network also has a distributional impact. With incomplete network knowledge, it’s possible to observe reversed equilibrium behavior when more connected players actually cooperate more often than less connected ones. In fact, aggregate network uncertainty in some social contexts incentivizes more mutual cooperation than would be the case with common knowledge of all social ties.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"32 1","pages":"3 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119894582","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48980397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-17DOI: 10.1177/1043463119900327
Andrew Greenland, Damon Proulx, D. Savage
This article explores the impact that belief in an infinite afterlife has on end-of-life decisions, specifically on those viewed at the extreme, such as martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators. We extend a simplified expected utility-based model to include variations of infinitely rewarding afterlife’s and explore how this may impact the expected utility and rationality of earthly actions and decisions of individuals when the expected utility payoff is infinite. We show that the decision process for suicide and euthanasia is closely linked to martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators, such that all these individuals make rational decisions to regards to the end of their own life.
{"title":"Dying for the cause: The rationality of martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators","authors":"Andrew Greenland, Damon Proulx, D. Savage","doi":"10.1177/1043463119900327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119900327","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the impact that belief in an infinite afterlife has on end-of-life decisions, specifically on those viewed at the extreme, such as martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators. We extend a simplified expected utility-based model to include variations of infinitely rewarding afterlife’s and explore how this may impact the expected utility and rationality of earthly actions and decisions of individuals when the expected utility payoff is infinite. We show that the decision process for suicide and euthanasia is closely linked to martyrs, suicide bombers and self-immolators, such that all these individuals make rational decisions to regards to the end of their own life.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"32 1","pages":"115 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119900327","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42156713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-04DOI: 10.1177/1043463119894581
E. Piano, Byron Carson
At their arrival in North America, travelers from the Old Continent were exposed to a radically different civilization. Among the many practices that captured their imagination was scalp-taking. During a battle, the Native American warrior would often stop after having killed or subdued the enemy and cut off his scalp. In this article, we develop an economic theory of this gruesome practice. We argue that scalp-taking constituted an institutional solution to the problem of monitoring warriors’ behavior in the battlefield under conditions of high information costs.
{"title":"Scalp-taking","authors":"E. Piano, Byron Carson","doi":"10.1177/1043463119894581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119894581","url":null,"abstract":"At their arrival in North America, travelers from the Old Continent were exposed to a radically different civilization. Among the many practices that captured their imagination was scalp-taking. During a battle, the Native American warrior would often stop after having killed or subdued the enemy and cut off his scalp. In this article, we develop an economic theory of this gruesome practice. We argue that scalp-taking constituted an institutional solution to the problem of monitoring warriors’ behavior in the battlefield under conditions of high information costs.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"32 1","pages":"40 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119894581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42119870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463119885189
S. Wilson
This article tests whether latent class conflict exists in Russia. It does so by theorizing that if class conflict exists, it should be reflected in the tax policy. The article constructs an original formal model of the authoritarian tax policy choice, finding equilibria in which the local government takes into account public sentiment even in the absence of elections, in an effect that resembles a market. This public sentiment is operationalized by performing a large-n latent Dirichlet allocation topic analysis of Russian regional newspaper articles dealing with the middle and working classes. In empirically testing its formal model, this article finds evidence that certain tax policy is driven by class conflict.
{"title":"Modeling and measuring class conflict in Russia’s regions","authors":"S. Wilson","doi":"10.1177/1043463119885189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119885189","url":null,"abstract":"This article tests whether latent class conflict exists in Russia. It does so by theorizing that if class conflict exists, it should be reflected in the tax policy. The article constructs an original formal model of the authoritarian tax policy choice, finding equilibria in which the local government takes into account public sentiment even in the absence of elections, in an effect that resembles a market. This public sentiment is operationalized by performing a large-n latent Dirichlet allocation topic analysis of Russian regional newspaper articles dealing with the middle and working classes. In empirically testing its formal model, this article finds evidence that certain tax policy is driven by class conflict.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"432 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119885189","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48679377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463119883959
Lina Eriksson
Social norm emergence is commonly explained by stating that norms serve certain functions – for example, solving cooperation or coordination problems. But critics argue that examples of norms that do not seem to serve functions show that functions cannot explain social norms. However, both sides tend to make assumptions about how explanations of social norms in terms of functions would work. By discussing four problems for these assumptions, I will show that they are over-simplified. Instead of asking whether norms serve functions, we need to ask more specific questions about the relationship between the norm and the function it supposedly serves.
{"title":"Rational reconstructions and the question of function","authors":"Lina Eriksson","doi":"10.1177/1043463119883959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119883959","url":null,"abstract":"Social norm emergence is commonly explained by stating that norms serve certain functions – for example, solving cooperation or coordination problems. But critics argue that examples of norms that do not seem to serve functions show that functions cannot explain social norms. However, both sides tend to make assumptions about how explanations of social norms in terms of functions would work. By discussing four problems for these assumptions, I will show that they are over-simplified. Instead of asking whether norms serve functions, we need to ask more specific questions about the relationship between the norm and the function it supposedly serves.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"409 - 431"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119883959","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48965456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-09DOI: 10.1177/1043463120961779
D. Read
This paper investigates strategic thinking in the fictional world of Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Purloined Letter’. This short story has been rightly celebrated for its explicit analysis of strategic reasoning in which players attempt to outwit one another, which involves accounting for how they are all attempting to outwit one another. I differ from previous analyses by examining how the actors can often be wrong in their explicit analysis and consider the strategic actions they take rather than those they claim to take. Using elementary game theory, I describe the five games (and suggest a sixth) that make up the strategic heart of the story. These include games of signalling, screening, negotiation, revenge and a unique game called the ‘pincer’. I consider how literary sources like ‘The Purloined Letter’ can provide insights into the applicability of strategic analysis in the ‘real world’.
{"title":"The five games of Mr Edgar Allan Poe: A study of strategic thought in ‘The Purloined Letter’","authors":"D. Read","doi":"10.1177/1043463120961779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120961779","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates strategic thinking in the fictional world of Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘The Purloined Letter’. This short story has been rightly celebrated for its explicit analysis of strategic reasoning in which players attempt to outwit one another, which involves accounting for how they are all attempting to outwit one another. I differ from previous analyses by examining how the actors can often be wrong in their explicit analysis and consider the strategic actions they take rather than those they claim to take. Using elementary game theory, I describe the five games (and suggest a sixth) that make up the strategic heart of the story. These include games of signalling, screening, negotiation, revenge and a unique game called the ‘pincer’. I consider how literary sources like ‘The Purloined Letter’ can provide insights into the applicability of strategic analysis in the ‘real world’.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"32 1","pages":"369 - 401"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120961779","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49017193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-05DOI: 10.1177/1043463119872566
W. Raub, V. Buskens, Vincenz Frey
Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed.
{"title":"Strategic tie formation for long-term exchange relations","authors":"W. Raub, V. Buskens, Vincenz Frey","doi":"10.1177/1043463119872566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119872566","url":null,"abstract":"Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"490 - 510"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119872566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47879035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-13DOI: 10.1177/1043463119869007
Marek Hudík
I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10
{"title":"Two interpretations of the rational choice theory and the relevance of behavioral critique","authors":"Marek Hudík","doi":"10.1177/1043463119869007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119869007","url":null,"abstract":"I compare two interpretations of the rational choice theory: decision-theoretic and price-theoretic. The former takes the assumption of utility maximization as a literal description of a decision procedure. The latter considers it as a modeling device used to explain changes/variability of behavior on an aggregate level. According to the price-theoretic interpretation, these changes/variability are explained by constraints (“prices”) rather than differences in intrinsic characteristics between human populations (“tastes”). While the decision-theoretic interpretation of rationality represents a possible foundation of the price-theoretic interpretation of rationality, I argue that it is not its only possible foundation. I then show that critiques raised by behavioral economics apply to the decision-theoretic interpretation and much less so to the price-theoretic one. From the perspective of the price theory, behavioral and rational choice models are predominantly complementary. Price-theoretic interpretation helps to explain why the rational choice theory continues to play an important role in economics, even after the behavioral revolution. JEL codes: D01, D03, B41, A10","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"464 - 489"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119869007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41914565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-07DOI: 10.1177/1043463119869080
S. Lindenberg, L. Steg, M. Milovanovic, A. Schipper
It is always an honor when, after one publishes a study, somebody takes the time and effort to figure out how it could have been done better (Lindenberg et al., 2018; Przepiorka, 2019). It is a public service, and we are grateful for the effort. Although we are and remain quite proud of our studies and their results, there is, as in any study, always room for improvement and it is certainly important to test hypotheses also via other designs. However, we feel there are a number of misinterpretations, omissions, and confusions in Dr. Przepiorka’s comments, each of which we would like to discuss.
当一个人发表一项研究后，有人花时间和精力找出如何做得更好时，这总是一种荣誉（Lindenberg et al.，2018；Przepiorka，2019）。这是一项公共服务，我们对此表示感谢。尽管我们现在和现在都为我们的研究及其结果感到骄傲，但与任何研究一样，总有改进的空间，通过其他设计来检验假设当然也很重要。然而，我们觉得普热皮奥尔卡博士的评论中有许多误解、遗漏和混淆，我们想讨论每一个。
{"title":"Reply to Wojtek Przepiorka: Testing goal-framing and hedonic hypocrisy","authors":"S. Lindenberg, L. Steg, M. Milovanovic, A. Schipper","doi":"10.1177/1043463119869080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463119869080","url":null,"abstract":"It is always an honor when, after one publishes a study, somebody takes the time and effort to figure out how it could have been done better (Lindenberg et al., 2018; Przepiorka, 2019). It is a public service, and we are grateful for the effort. Although we are and remain quite proud of our studies and their results, there is, as in any study, always room for improvement and it is certainly important to test hypotheses also via other designs. However, we feel there are a number of misinterpretations, omissions, and confusions in Dr. Przepiorka’s comments, each of which we would like to discuss.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"31 1","pages":"361 - 368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463119869080","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47216388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-01DOI: 10.1177/1043463120921254
Daniel A. Newark
This article considers how desire leads to pleasure through choice. A typical assumption of rational choice models is that decision makers experience pleasure or utility primarily when their desires are satisfied by decision outcomes. This article proposes that, in addition to desire yielding pleasure through its satisfaction, desiring can also yield pleasure directly during choice. Beyond the pleasures of getting what we want, there may be pleasures in the wanting. In particular, four psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which desire can yield pleasure during choosing are identified: imagining the desired object, learning about the desired object, constructing one’s self while clarifying the desired object, and pursuing the desired object. This said, although desire may, through these mechanisms, offer considerable immediate pleasure, this article posits that indulging these pleasures tends to foster subsequent disappointment with decision outcomes. The article concludes by considering the implications for decision making of this expanded view of desire’s relationship to pleasure in choice.
{"title":"Desire and pleasure in choice","authors":"Daniel A. Newark","doi":"10.1177/1043463120921254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463120921254","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers how desire leads to pleasure through choice. A typical assumption of rational choice models is that decision makers experience pleasure or utility primarily when their desires are satisfied by decision outcomes. This article proposes that, in addition to desire yielding pleasure through its satisfaction, desiring can also yield pleasure directly during choice. Beyond the pleasures of getting what we want, there may be pleasures in the wanting. In particular, four psychological and behavioral mechanisms through which desire can yield pleasure during choosing are identified: imagining the desired object, learning about the desired object, constructing one’s self while clarifying the desired object, and pursuing the desired object. This said, although desire may, through these mechanisms, offer considerable immediate pleasure, this article posits that indulging these pleasures tends to foster subsequent disappointment with decision outcomes. The article concludes by considering the implications for decision making of this expanded view of desire’s relationship to pleasure in choice.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"32 1","pages":"168 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1043463120921254","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45821296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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