Pub Date : 2022-04-06DOI: 10.1177/10434631221087998
Holger Reinermann
There is a wide selection of theoretical approaches to explain preferences citizens have for political parties, among them the spatial model of party competition in which voters choose based on proximity in a policy space, such as the left-right dimension. However, it has not ultimately prevailed against its competitors. Thus, a literature has emerged that allows for heterogeneity, asking whose preferences follow this logic and whose do not. However, research on how context affects spatial structuring is still sparse. Therefore, I combine CSES survey data with manifesto data in a sample of established democracies to examine the effects of party competition structure, measured by the “effective” number of parties and the polarization and dimensionality of party positions, on left-right structuration of party preferences in a single model. While I do not find significant context effects with a conventional measure of proximity voting, I propose a different operationalization which shows that while there are systematic effects of the party system, party preferences are mostly quite strongly structured by the left–right dimension.
{"title":"Party competition and the structuring of party preferences by the left-right dimension","authors":"Holger Reinermann","doi":"10.1177/10434631221087998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221087998","url":null,"abstract":"There is a wide selection of theoretical approaches to explain preferences citizens have for political parties, among them the spatial model of party competition in which voters choose based on proximity in a policy space, such as the left-right dimension. However, it has not ultimately prevailed against its competitors. Thus, a literature has emerged that allows for heterogeneity, asking whose preferences follow this logic and whose do not. However, research on how context affects spatial structuring is still sparse. Therefore, I combine CSES survey data with manifesto data in a sample of established democracies to examine the effects of party competition structure, measured by the “effective” number of parties and the polarization and dimensionality of party positions, on left-right structuration of party preferences in a single model. While I do not find significant context effects with a conventional measure of proximity voting, I propose a different operationalization which shows that while there are systematic effects of the party system, party preferences are mostly quite strongly structured by the left–right dimension.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"185 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47251289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-06DOI: 10.1177/10434631221092749
A. Diekmann
In crisis situations, people have to change their behavior. A collective learning process begins and new patterns of order emerge. Externalities of behavior lead to the emergence of new social norms. But are the social norms also followed? A closer examination must take into account the different character of social norms. Following the theory of Ullmann-Margalit, coordination norms or conventions have different consequences for norm-oriented behavior than cooperation norms. This distinction is also important for lawmaking. There is no “free-rider problem” with coordination norms, but there is one with cooperation norms. This paper examines the question of the characteristics of new norms which emerged during the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis, such as the requirement for distance, the obligation to wear masks and cooperation in the digital tracing of infection chains. This study is based on how Germany has coped with the first wave of the pandemic in spring 2020. However, the analysis leads to conditions which in general may explain the degree of compliance with different types of new social norms.
{"title":"Emergence of and compliance with new social norms: The example of the COVID crisis in Germany","authors":"A. Diekmann","doi":"10.1177/10434631221092749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221092749","url":null,"abstract":"In crisis situations, people have to change their behavior. A collective learning process begins and new patterns of order emerge. Externalities of behavior lead to the emergence of new social norms. But are the social norms also followed? A closer examination must take into account the different character of social norms. Following the theory of Ullmann-Margalit, coordination norms or conventions have different consequences for norm-oriented behavior than cooperation norms. This distinction is also important for lawmaking. There is no “free-rider problem” with coordination norms, but there is one with cooperation norms. This paper examines the question of the characteristics of new norms which emerged during the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis, such as the requirement for distance, the obligation to wear masks and cooperation in the digital tracing of infection chains. This study is based on how Germany has coped with the first wave of the pandemic in spring 2020. However, the analysis leads to conditions which in general may explain the degree of compliance with different types of new social norms.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"129 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42528429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-05DOI: 10.1177/10434631221092759
Pavol Minarik
When faced with oppression from the state, some groups and individuals choose costly opposition rather than a compromise. This may be caused by the cost of compromise being higher than the cost of opposition. However, it is also possible that the persistent opposition is due to some past decisions. The paper proposes a model explaining persistent opposition as a result of group-specific investment in human capital that traps individuals in an opposition group even when she would be better off outside the group. The model is illustrated with the case of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the largest group opposing the Communist regime. Within that context, the model contributes to the explanation of the persistence and growth of the underground church under Communist rule as well as the post-Communist religious revival. The same model may also be applied to malign opposition groups, such as terrorist and criminal organizations, and it provides clues about how to deal with them.
{"title":"The persistence of opposition in an oppressive regime: The case of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia","authors":"Pavol Minarik","doi":"10.1177/10434631221092759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221092759","url":null,"abstract":"When faced with oppression from the state, some groups and individuals choose costly opposition rather than a compromise. This may be caused by the cost of compromise being higher than the cost of opposition. However, it is also possible that the persistent opposition is due to some past decisions. The paper proposes a model explaining persistent opposition as a result of group-specific investment in human capital that traps individuals in an opposition group even when she would be better off outside the group. The model is illustrated with the case of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the largest group opposing the Communist regime. Within that context, the model contributes to the explanation of the persistence and growth of the underground church under Communist rule as well as the post-Communist religious revival. The same model may also be applied to malign opposition groups, such as terrorist and criminal organizations, and it provides clues about how to deal with them.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"218 - 236"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42016705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01Epub Date: 2022-04-21DOI: 10.21315/mjms2022.29.2.1
Manickam Ravichandran, Hui Xian Tew, Guruswamy Prabhakaran, Subramani Parasuraman, Mohd Nor Norazmi
Cholera, a diarrheal disease caused by Vibrio cholerae (V. cholerae) O139 and O1 strains, remains a public health problem. The existing World Health Organization (WHO)-licenced, killed, multiple-dose oral cholera vaccines demand 'cold-chain supply' at 2 °C-8 °C. Therefore, a live, single-dose, cold-chain-free vaccine would relieve significant bottlenecks and costs of cholera vaccination campaigns. Our cholera vaccine development journey started in 2000 at Universiti Sains Malaysia with isolation of the hemA gene from V. cholerae, followed by development of a gene mutant vaccine candidate VCUSM2 against V. cholerae O139 in 2006. In 2010, VCUSM2 reactogenicity was reduced by replacing its two wild-type ctxA gene copies with mutated ctxA to produce strain VCUSM14. Introducing the hemA gene into VCUSM14 created VCUSM14P, a strain with the 5-aminolaevulinic acid (ALA) prototrophic trait and excellent colonisation and immunological properties (100% protection to wild-type challenged rabbits). It was further refined in Asian Institute of Medicine, Science and Technology (AIMST University), with completion of single- and repeated-dose toxicity evaluations in 2019 in Sprague Dawley (SD) rats, followed by development of a novel cold-chain-free VCUSM14P formulation in 2020. VCUSM14P is unique for its intact cholera toxin B, a known mucosal adjuvant. The built-in adjuvant makes VCUSM14P an ideal vaccine delivery platform for emerging diseases (e.g. severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 [SARS-CoV-2] and tuberculosis). Our vaccine formulation mimics natural infection, remains non-reactogenic and immunogenic in vivo, and protects against infection and disease. It will also cost less and be less cumbersome to distribute due to its stability at room temperature. These features could revolutionise the outreach of this and other vaccines to meet global immunisation programmes, particularly in low-resourced areas. The next stage of our journey will be meeting the requisite regulatory requirements to produce the vaccine for rollout to countries where it is most needed.
{"title":"Live, Genetically Attenuated, Cold-Chain-Free Cholera Vaccine-A Research and Development Journey: Light at the End of a Long Tunnel.","authors":"Manickam Ravichandran, Hui Xian Tew, Guruswamy Prabhakaran, Subramani Parasuraman, Mohd Nor Norazmi","doi":"10.21315/mjms2022.29.2.1","DOIUrl":"10.21315/mjms2022.29.2.1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cholera, a diarrheal disease caused by <i>Vibrio cholerae</i> (<i>V. cholerae</i>) O139 and O1 strains, remains a public health problem. The existing World Health Organization (WHO)-licenced, killed, multiple-dose oral cholera vaccines demand 'cold-chain supply' at 2 °C-8 °C. Therefore, a live, single-dose, cold-chain-free vaccine would relieve significant bottlenecks and costs of cholera vaccination campaigns. Our cholera vaccine development journey started in 2000 at Universiti Sains Malaysia with isolation of the <i>hem</i>A gene from <i>V. cholerae</i>, followed by development of a gene mutant vaccine candidate VCUSM2 against <i>V. cholerae</i> O139 in 2006. In 2010, VCUSM2 reactogenicity was reduced by replacing its two wild-type <i>ctx</i>A gene copies with mutated <i>ctx</i>A to produce strain VCUSM14. Introducing the <i>hem</i>A gene into VCUSM14 created VCUSM14P, a strain with the 5-aminolaevulinic acid (ALA) prototrophic trait and excellent colonisation and immunological properties (100% protection to wild-type challenged rabbits). It was further refined in Asian Institute of Medicine, Science and Technology (AIMST University), with completion of single- and repeated-dose toxicity evaluations in 2019 in Sprague Dawley (SD) rats, followed by development of a novel cold-chain-free VCUSM14P formulation in 2020. VCUSM14P is unique for its intact cholera toxin B, a known mucosal adjuvant. The built-in adjuvant makes VCUSM14P an ideal vaccine delivery platform for emerging diseases (e.g. severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 [SARS-CoV-2] and tuberculosis). Our vaccine formulation mimics natural infection, remains non-reactogenic and immunogenic in vivo, and protects against infection and disease. It will also cost less and be less cumbersome to distribute due to its stability at room temperature. These features could revolutionise the outreach of this and other vaccines to meet global immunisation programmes, particularly in low-resourced areas. The next stage of our journey will be meeting the requisite regulatory requirements to produce the vaccine for rollout to countries where it is most needed.</p>","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"33 1","pages":"1-7"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9036929/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88163131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-23DOI: 10.1177/10434631221074689
Daniela Bellani, Luis Ortiz-Gervasi
This paper contributes to the literature on Relative Risk Aversion theory in two ways: first, by considering that the effect of time preferences may differ according to both children’s gender and social origin; second, by exploring this possibility for different educational outcomes: upper secondary school choices and university enrollment. We use data of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth, which contains questions specifically addressed to capture an individual’s time discounting preference, to further explore the association between time discounting preference and the effect of social origin on educational outcomes in Italy. In line with prior research, we find that time preferences only have a meaningful effect among children of lowly educated parents. But such an effect, in turn, differs by gender: parental time preferences matter more for sons than for daughters of lowly educated parents. This gender effect is found both for upper secondary choices and for entry into higher education.
{"title":"Parental time preferences and educational choices: The role of children’s gender and of social origin","authors":"Daniela Bellani, Luis Ortiz-Gervasi","doi":"10.1177/10434631221074689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221074689","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to the literature on Relative Risk Aversion theory in two ways: first, by considering that the effect of time preferences may differ according to both children’s gender and social origin; second, by exploring this possibility for different educational outcomes: upper secondary school choices and university enrollment. We use data of the Survey of Household Income and Wealth, which contains questions specifically addressed to capture an individual’s time discounting preference, to further explore the association between time discounting preference and the effect of social origin on educational outcomes in Italy. In line with prior research, we find that time preferences only have a meaningful effect among children of lowly educated parents. But such an effect, in turn, differs by gender: parental time preferences matter more for sons than for daughters of lowly educated parents. This gender effect is found both for upper secondary choices and for entry into higher education.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"96 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43379005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-11DOI: 10.1177/10434631211073326
Andreas Bergh, P. Wichardt
This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35% vs. 52%). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63
{"title":"Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games","authors":"Andreas Bergh, P. Wichardt","doi":"10.1177/10434631211073326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211073326","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35% vs. 52%). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"78 - 95"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42887123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.1177/10434631211065738
A. Young
Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics—residual claimancy and sovereignty—imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians’ description of the “feudal anarchy” that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly delineated and stable boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the 11th and 12th centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages.
{"title":"The Peace of God","authors":"A. Young","doi":"10.1177/10434631211065738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211065738","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have argued that the politically fractured landscape of medieval Western Europe was foundational to the evolution of constitutionalism and rule of law. In making this argument, Salter and Young (2019) have recently emphasized that the constellation of political property rights in the High Middle Ages was polycentric and hierarchical; holders of those rights were residual claimants to the returns on their governance and sovereign. The latter characteristics—residual claimancy and sovereignty—imply a clear delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and their integrity. However, historians’ description of the “feudal anarchy” that followed the tenth-century disintegration of the Carolingian Empire does not suggest clearly delineated and stable boundaries. In this paper, I highlight the role of the Peace of God movement in the 11th and 12th centuries in delineating and stabilizing the structure of political property rights. In terms of historical political economy, the Peace of God movement provides an important link between the early medieval era and the constitutional arrangements of the High Middle Ages.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"28 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46518558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-13DOI: 10.1177/10434631211043205
Ahrum Chang
Different from a classic Weberian bureaucracy, public service bureaucrats directly interact with citizens at the frontlines of government. These first responders use their discretion to meet some citizens’ needs but deliberately overlook the other clients. What lies beneath the street-level bureaucrats’ behavior in their contacts with citizens? This study develops a model to explain how street-level bureaucrats are motivated to move toward the public and the extent to which they are engaged in helping their citizens. The model is driven by costs and benefits of behavior based on the assumption that street-level bureaucrats are rational actors trying to maximize their utility. However, utility here is defined as more than self-interest; it is the set of outcomes valued by the bureaucrats such as reducing job-related stress, pursuing work-generated ends, serving needy citizens, and implementing good public policy.
{"title":"A formal model of street-level bureaucracy","authors":"Ahrum Chang","doi":"10.1177/10434631211043205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211043205","url":null,"abstract":"Different from a classic Weberian bureaucracy, public service bureaucrats directly interact with citizens at the frontlines of government. These first responders use their discretion to meet some citizens’ needs but deliberately overlook the other clients. What lies beneath the street-level bureaucrats’ behavior in their contacts with citizens? This study develops a model to explain how street-level bureaucrats are motivated to move toward the public and the extent to which they are engaged in helping their citizens. The model is driven by costs and benefits of behavior based on the assumption that street-level bureaucrats are rational actors trying to maximize their utility. However, utility here is defined as more than self-interest; it is the set of outcomes valued by the bureaucrats such as reducing job-related stress, pursuing work-generated ends, serving needy citizens, and implementing good public policy.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 1","pages":"6 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41947092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1177/10434631211034933
A. Flache
{"title":"Editorial transition at Rationality and Society: A note from the incoming editor","authors":"A. Flache","doi":"10.1177/10434631211034933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211034933","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"33 1","pages":"279 - 281"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10434631211034933","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46430072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-27DOI: 10.1177/10434631211035198
Nicolás M. Somma
Using social exchange theory, this article presents a new theory for understanding the strategic choices made by social movement leaders—the “movement exchanges” theory. It looks at how leaders engage in exchanges of valued rewards with constituencies, institutional political players, bystander publics, and voluntary organizations. Leaders receive from these players important rewards (like committed activists, political leverage, and resources) for achieving movement goals. In turn, leaders make strategic choices (expressed in frames, tactics, targets, and claims) that other players find rewarding, favoring persistent exchanges across time. By considering movements’ simultaneous exchanges with several players, the theory makes sense of choices that remain puzzling for major movement theories. It also blends strategic behavior with culture (in the form of utopias, ideology, and emotions) but does not require the maximizing assumption of the homo economicus. I use the case of the contemporary Chilean student movement to illustrate the theory.
{"title":"Social movements and exchanges: Sketch of a theory","authors":"Nicolás M. Somma","doi":"10.1177/10434631211035198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631211035198","url":null,"abstract":"Using social exchange theory, this article presents a new theory for understanding the strategic choices made by social movement leaders—the “movement exchanges” theory. It looks at how leaders engage in exchanges of valued rewards with constituencies, institutional political players, bystander publics, and voluntary organizations. Leaders receive from these players important rewards (like committed activists, political leverage, and resources) for achieving movement goals. In turn, leaders make strategic choices (expressed in frames, tactics, targets, and claims) that other players find rewarding, favoring persistent exchanges across time. By considering movements’ simultaneous exchanges with several players, the theory makes sense of choices that remain puzzling for major movement theories. It also blends strategic behavior with culture (in the form of utopias, ideology, and emotions) but does not require the maximizing assumption of the homo economicus. I use the case of the contemporary Chilean student movement to illustrate the theory.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"33 1","pages":"480 - 511"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10434631211035198","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42500360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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