Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.1177/10434631231219954
Niccolò G. Armandola, Malte Doehne, Katja Rost
Mobilization for revolts poses a significant challenge for rational choice theory because revolts are vulnerable to free-riding, which disincentivizes rational actors from mobilizing. Strong, informal relations such as kinship ties have been identified as factors that can shift the rational calculations of individuals and lead to mobilization for revolts. In social networks that are polarized by the presence of mobilized individuals, such as rebels, and actors opposing the mobilization effort such as the elite, kinship relations have not only a bridging effect but also a diverging one. Building on Tullock’s private interest theory, we develop a framework in which kinship relations determine the extent of individual’s payoffs and costs of mobilization for revolts against an elite. We posit that distant kin of the elite expect high payoffs of mobilization for revolts and face the lowest costs of mobilization for revolts by virtue of their position in the network of kinship relations. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset that reconstructs a revolt in Basel, Switzerland, in 1691, we test our framework and contribute to a better relational understanding of the mechanisms that lead rational actors to mobilize for revolts. Our analyses show that mobilization for revolts is mainly driven by distant kinship relations to the ruling elite rather than close kinship relations to the rebels.
{"title":"Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations","authors":"Niccolò G. Armandola, Malte Doehne, Katja Rost","doi":"10.1177/10434631231219954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231219954","url":null,"abstract":"Mobilization for revolts poses a significant challenge for rational choice theory because revolts are vulnerable to free-riding, which disincentivizes rational actors from mobilizing. Strong, informal relations such as kinship ties have been identified as factors that can shift the rational calculations of individuals and lead to mobilization for revolts. In social networks that are polarized by the presence of mobilized individuals, such as rebels, and actors opposing the mobilization effort such as the elite, kinship relations have not only a bridging effect but also a diverging one. Building on Tullock’s private interest theory, we develop a framework in which kinship relations determine the extent of individual’s payoffs and costs of mobilization for revolts against an elite. We posit that distant kin of the elite expect high payoffs of mobilization for revolts and face the lowest costs of mobilization for revolts by virtue of their position in the network of kinship relations. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset that reconstructs a revolt in Basel, Switzerland, in 1691, we test our framework and contribute to a better relational understanding of the mechanisms that lead rational actors to mobilize for revolts. Our analyses show that mobilization for revolts is mainly driven by distant kinship relations to the ruling elite rather than close kinship relations to the rebels.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138594739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.1177/10434631231219608
Fijnanda van Klingeren, Vincent Buskens
To encourage long-term cooperation in social dilemmas such as common-pool resources, the importance of sanctioning is often stressed. Elinor Ostrom advocates graduated sanctioning: the severity of a defector’s punishment is dependent on the extent of their history of deviant behaviour. In addition, endogenously chosen sanctioning is argued to induce cooperation due to a higher legitimacy. This study compares the effect of graduated and strict mutual sanctioning on cooperation in common-pool resources at the micro and macro level. In addition, we distinguish whether the type of mutual sanction is exogenously determined or endogenously chosen. A Common-Pool Resource game is used in a laboratory experiment, integrating crucial elements of social structure and rule-making mechanisms within a common. Results support the effectiveness of graduated sanctioning compared to strict sanctioning in the long term and partial support using endogenously chosen sanctioning mechanisms versus imposed sanctioning mechanisms.
为了鼓励在公共资源等社会难题上进行长期合作，制裁的重要性经常得到强调。埃莉诺•奥斯特罗姆(Elinor Ostrom)主张分级制裁:对叛逃者的惩罚程度取决于他们越轨行为历史的程度。此外，由于内生选择制裁具有更高的合法性，因此可以诱导合作。本文从微观和宏观两个层面比较了分级制裁和严格制裁对公共资源合作的影响。此外，我们区分了相互制裁的类型是外因决定的还是内因选择的。在一个实验室实验中使用了一个common - pool Resource游戏，将社会结构的关键元素和规则制定机制整合在一个公共资源中。研究结果表明，从长期来看，分级制裁比严格制裁更有效;对内选择的制裁机制比强加的制裁机制更有效。
{"title":"Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test","authors":"Fijnanda van Klingeren, Vincent Buskens","doi":"10.1177/10434631231219608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231219608","url":null,"abstract":"To encourage long-term cooperation in social dilemmas such as common-pool resources, the importance of sanctioning is often stressed. Elinor Ostrom advocates graduated sanctioning: the severity of a defector’s punishment is dependent on the extent of their history of deviant behaviour. In addition, endogenously chosen sanctioning is argued to induce cooperation due to a higher legitimacy. This study compares the effect of graduated and strict mutual sanctioning on cooperation in common-pool resources at the micro and macro level. In addition, we distinguish whether the type of mutual sanction is exogenously determined or endogenously chosen. A Common-Pool Resource game is used in a laboratory experiment, integrating crucial elements of social structure and rule-making mechanisms within a common. Results support the effectiveness of graduated sanctioning compared to strict sanctioning in the long term and partial support using endogenously chosen sanctioning mechanisms versus imposed sanctioning mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138609781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-08DOI: 10.1177/10434631231213721
Martin Abraham, Natascha Nisic, Miriam Trübner, Hanna Walch, Anja Wunder
This study analyses the role of generalized trust and control in households’ employment of domestic help. Applying a basic trust game with uncertainty, we argue that households differ in their estimate of the proportion of opportunistic domestic workers, variation which we ascribe to generalized trust. Households with low trust should estimate a lower proportion of non-opportunistic individuals, making them less willing to accept a domestic worker. Control, through direct supervision of the domestic worker, is assumed to serve as a substitute for trust and is expected to increase acceptance. We also consider the role of income, which we expect to alter the relation between the potential losses and gains associated with outsourcing. To test our hypotheses, we use a factorial survey conducted in 2020 in Germany and the UK ( N = 1877) which enables us to explore the robustness of the effects across countries. Experimental results show that individuals are more accepting of domestic outsourcing if they have higher trust, higher income, and if control of the worker is easily possible. Interaction effects reveal that the positive effect of higher trust and higher income is only relevant in lowcontrol situations. This suggest that households with higher trust and income have an advantage when it comes to fully utilizing the benefits of domestic help since costly control is not required. Consequently, the results substantially contribute to existing literature on explaining causes of social inequality in service use beyond financial restrictions and shed light on the complex interplay of trust and control.
{"title":"The role of generalized trust and control in the employment of domestic help – An experimental case study for Germany and the UK","authors":"Martin Abraham, Natascha Nisic, Miriam Trübner, Hanna Walch, Anja Wunder","doi":"10.1177/10434631231213721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231213721","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyses the role of generalized trust and control in households’ employment of domestic help. Applying a basic trust game with uncertainty, we argue that households differ in their estimate of the proportion of opportunistic domestic workers, variation which we ascribe to generalized trust. Households with low trust should estimate a lower proportion of non-opportunistic individuals, making them less willing to accept a domestic worker. Control, through direct supervision of the domestic worker, is assumed to serve as a substitute for trust and is expected to increase acceptance. We also consider the role of income, which we expect to alter the relation between the potential losses and gains associated with outsourcing. To test our hypotheses, we use a factorial survey conducted in 2020 in Germany and the UK ( N = 1877) which enables us to explore the robustness of the effects across countries. Experimental results show that individuals are more accepting of domestic outsourcing if they have higher trust, higher income, and if control of the worker is easily possible. Interaction effects reveal that the positive effect of higher trust and higher income is only relevant in lowcontrol situations. This suggest that households with higher trust and income have an advantage when it comes to fully utilizing the benefits of domestic help since costly control is not required. Consequently, the results substantially contribute to existing literature on explaining causes of social inequality in service use beyond financial restrictions and shed light on the complex interplay of trust and control.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135341125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1177/10434631231209832
Zeynep Melis Kirgil, Rafael Wittek
Cooperation sustainability presents a complex social phenomenon. Two common approaches have been used to study the sustainability of cooperation in small groups: endogenous processes (dynamic) and exogenous factors (static approaches). The present study integrates existing research by investigating how the interplay between exogenous and endogenous conditions affects cooperation in small groups. To uncover endogenous group dynamics in an online Public Goods experiment ( n = 353), we performed multilevel latent Markov models on Bayesian estimation that allowed us to estimate latent classes on the level of rounds, individuals, and groups. We studied exogenous factors by investigating the effects of situational tightness versus looseness, and monetary versus symbolic frames on cooperation sustainability. Our key findings show that both endogenous and exogenous factors are critical to explain the variation of cooperation sustainability between groups. Second, groups exposed to tight situations reveal higher levels of cooperation sustainability than groups exposed to loose situations. Money primes did not have an impact. Among the control variables, collective intentionality showed the strongest association with cooperation. Future research may develop a more sophisticated measure of tight versus loose situations and examine the causal relationship between collective intentionality and cooperation.
{"title":"Cooperation sustainability in small groups: Exogenous and endogenous dynamics of the sustainability of cooperation","authors":"Zeynep Melis Kirgil, Rafael Wittek","doi":"10.1177/10434631231209832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231209832","url":null,"abstract":"Cooperation sustainability presents a complex social phenomenon. Two common approaches have been used to study the sustainability of cooperation in small groups: endogenous processes (dynamic) and exogenous factors (static approaches). The present study integrates existing research by investigating how the interplay between exogenous and endogenous conditions affects cooperation in small groups. To uncover endogenous group dynamics in an online Public Goods experiment ( n = 353), we performed multilevel latent Markov models on Bayesian estimation that allowed us to estimate latent classes on the level of rounds, individuals, and groups. We studied exogenous factors by investigating the effects of situational tightness versus looseness, and monetary versus symbolic frames on cooperation sustainability. Our key findings show that both endogenous and exogenous factors are critical to explain the variation of cooperation sustainability between groups. Second, groups exposed to tight situations reveal higher levels of cooperation sustainability than groups exposed to loose situations. Money primes did not have an impact. Among the control variables, collective intentionality showed the strongest association with cooperation. Future research may develop a more sophisticated measure of tight versus loose situations and examine the causal relationship between collective intentionality and cooperation.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135972920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1177/10434631231208989
Miriam Schmaus, Melanie Olczyk, Sebastian Neumeyer, Gisela Will
Educational aspirations are of interest to scholars in several disciplines. They can affect multiple aspects of educational success and have been shown to differ between major social groups. Explanations for educational aspirations typically link to two main models of aspiration formation: the Wisconsin model (WM) and rational choice theory (RCT). Whereas the WM highlights significant others’ educational norms, RCT cites cost-benefit calculations to explain how aspirations are formed. As it is still unclear how the two approaches interrelate, we apply a third model, namely the model of frame selection (MFS), which allows the integration of both WM and RCT arguments. In short, it suggests that the importance of others’ educational norms moderates the relevance of own cost-benefit calculations. We assume that considering this interrelation is fruitful when explaining aspirations in general, and specifically when explaining immigrant students’ aspirations, who often perceive high educational obligations by their parents. Using data from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), we test prognoses derived from the three theoretical models for their relevance when explaining the aspirations of Turkish and German students. Results indicate that the processes suggested by both WM and RCT shape aspirations. Consistent with the MFS, these processes also interrelate in that parents’ educational norms reduce the relevance of students’ own cost-benefit calculations. This interrelation does not only apply to Turkish students but holds for all students in the sample.
{"title":"High realistic aspirations – Do normative pressures overthrow rational calculations? Applying the model of frame selection to the educational aspirations of immigrant and majority students in Germany","authors":"Miriam Schmaus, Melanie Olczyk, Sebastian Neumeyer, Gisela Will","doi":"10.1177/10434631231208989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231208989","url":null,"abstract":"Educational aspirations are of interest to scholars in several disciplines. They can affect multiple aspects of educational success and have been shown to differ between major social groups. Explanations for educational aspirations typically link to two main models of aspiration formation: the Wisconsin model (WM) and rational choice theory (RCT). Whereas the WM highlights significant others’ educational norms, RCT cites cost-benefit calculations to explain how aspirations are formed. As it is still unclear how the two approaches interrelate, we apply a third model, namely the model of frame selection (MFS), which allows the integration of both WM and RCT arguments. In short, it suggests that the importance of others’ educational norms moderates the relevance of own cost-benefit calculations. We assume that considering this interrelation is fruitful when explaining aspirations in general, and specifically when explaining immigrant students’ aspirations, who often perceive high educational obligations by their parents. Using data from the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS), we test prognoses derived from the three theoretical models for their relevance when explaining the aspirations of Turkish and German students. Results indicate that the processes suggested by both WM and RCT shape aspirations. Consistent with the MFS, these processes also interrelate in that parents’ educational norms reduce the relevance of students’ own cost-benefit calculations. This interrelation does not only apply to Turkish students but holds for all students in the sample.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135373074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1177/10434631231203890
Peter T Leeson, Vincent Geloso, Nicholas A Snow
Judaic law famously bans pigs. For millennia, scholars have wondered why. This paper uses the economics of property rights to resolve the puzzle. We argue that the Judaic pig ban was an instrument for internalizing swine externalities. Free ranging pigs in search of sustenance trespass on agricultural landowners’ property, wreaking destruction. Activities that foster such pigs thus create negative externalities that can cripple agricultural economies. When the expected cost of swine externalities becomes large, internalization becomes worthwhile: lawmakers with a vested interest in the agricultural economy ban activities that foster free ranging pigs. That is what transpired in ancient Judah, where lawmakers were priests whose livelihoods depended on agriculture, where all swine ranged freely, and where the expected cost of swine externalities surged during the late Iron Age. Lawmakers invoked God to enjoin involvement with pigs because a supernatural injunction was cheaper to enforce than a natural one: in a land of faithful Hebrews, Yahweh’s swine prohibition enforced itself. The Judaic pig ban’s features are consistent with pig bans recently adopted by US states such as Montana, which everyone agrees are instruments for internalizing swine externalities.
{"title":"Externality and taboo: Resolving the Judaic pig puzzle","authors":"Peter T Leeson, Vincent Geloso, Nicholas A Snow","doi":"10.1177/10434631231203890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231203890","url":null,"abstract":"Judaic law famously bans pigs. For millennia, scholars have wondered why. This paper uses the economics of property rights to resolve the puzzle. We argue that the Judaic pig ban was an instrument for internalizing swine externalities. Free ranging pigs in search of sustenance trespass on agricultural landowners’ property, wreaking destruction. Activities that foster such pigs thus create negative externalities that can cripple agricultural economies. When the expected cost of swine externalities becomes large, internalization becomes worthwhile: lawmakers with a vested interest in the agricultural economy ban activities that foster free ranging pigs. That is what transpired in ancient Judah, where lawmakers were priests whose livelihoods depended on agriculture, where all swine ranged freely, and where the expected cost of swine externalities surged during the late Iron Age. Lawmakers invoked God to enjoin involvement with pigs because a supernatural injunction was cheaper to enforce than a natural one: in a land of faithful Hebrews, Yahweh’s swine prohibition enforced itself. The Judaic pig ban’s features are consistent with pig bans recently adopted by US states such as Montana, which everyone agrees are instruments for internalizing swine externalities.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-20DOI: 10.1177/10434631231194142
B. Crettez, Régis Deloche, Ronan Tallec
On November, 11th, 1630, Queen Marie de’ Medici demanded, in vain, that her son, King Louis XIII, dismiss Richelieu as Principal Minister. Historians agree that this crisis known as the Journée des Dupes (the Day of the Dupes) was the true foundation stone of French “absolutism”, but they disagree about whether the decision made by the Queen was rational. We analyze the historical setting of the crisis from a game theory viewpoint where the King and the Queen are two players. We consider two assumptions regarding the King and the Queen’s cognitive skills. On the one hand, we assume that both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational. On the other hand, we assume that they both have limited cognitive skills (that is, they are level-k players). In this last case we propose a definition of naivety and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the Queen to be naive. We then study the Nash equilibrium when both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational as well as the behavioral theoretical solution of the game when they have limited cognitive skills. We rely on this study to propose an analytical narrative of the Journées des Dupes. We conclude that what we know of the historical facts does not allow us to reject the assumption that the Queen was perfectly rational, or, if she was not, that she had not been naive.
{"title":"An analytical narrative of the Day of Dupes","authors":"B. Crettez, Régis Deloche, Ronan Tallec","doi":"10.1177/10434631231194142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231194142","url":null,"abstract":"On November, 11th, 1630, Queen Marie de’ Medici demanded, in vain, that her son, King Louis XIII, dismiss Richelieu as Principal Minister. Historians agree that this crisis known as the Journée des Dupes (the Day of the Dupes) was the true foundation stone of French “absolutism”, but they disagree about whether the decision made by the Queen was rational. We analyze the historical setting of the crisis from a game theory viewpoint where the King and the Queen are two players. We consider two assumptions regarding the King and the Queen’s cognitive skills. On the one hand, we assume that both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational. On the other hand, we assume that they both have limited cognitive skills (that is, they are level-k players). In this last case we propose a definition of naivety and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the Queen to be naive. We then study the Nash equilibrium when both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational as well as the behavioral theoretical solution of the game when they have limited cognitive skills. We rely on this study to propose an analytical narrative of the Journées des Dupes. We conclude that what we know of the historical facts does not allow us to reject the assumption that the Queen was perfectly rational, or, if she was not, that she had not been naive.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49666508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-09DOI: 10.1177/10434631231194521
R. Mason, Marianne Mason
This paper develops a method to identify manipulation of custodial suspects who attempt to invoke the Miranda right to legal counsel during a custodial interrogation. The method, developed from a combination of framing theory and hypergame theory, first documents the point where custodial suspects’ preferences shift and second identifies the proximate cause of that shift using excerpts from legal cases. The method applies linguistic analysis within a hypergame framework to reveal rational behavior of custodial suspects who, despite owning an initial preference to invoke, waive their right to counsel without explicit pressure from police. The paper terms this shift in preferences “manipulation” adding the concept to hypergames and to the literature on noncooperative discursive exchanges.
{"title":"Reconsidering Miranda rights: Modeling strategic action during the invocation stage of a police interrogation","authors":"R. Mason, Marianne Mason","doi":"10.1177/10434631231194521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231194521","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a method to identify manipulation of custodial suspects who attempt to invoke the Miranda right to legal counsel during a custodial interrogation. The method, developed from a combination of framing theory and hypergame theory, first documents the point where custodial suspects’ preferences shift and second identifies the proximate cause of that shift using excerpts from legal cases. The method applies linguistic analysis within a hypergame framework to reveal rational behavior of custodial suspects who, despite owning an initial preference to invoke, waive their right to counsel without explicit pressure from police. The paper terms this shift in preferences “manipulation” adding the concept to hypergames and to the literature on noncooperative discursive exchanges.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43631189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1177/10434631231193599
David A. Comerford, Angela Tufte-Hewett, Emma K. Bridger
Policymakers must ration healthcare. This necessity became salient during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some policymakers took that opportunity to reduce inequality of health outcomes at the expense of overall health gains. There is a literature that seeks to quantify the optimal trade-off between efficiency and equality in health outcomes: economists employ surveys to quantify the public’s preferred level of equity/efficiency trade-off. An odd result from these studies is that a non-trivial subsample of respondents choose to “level down” i.e., they choose as though an additional year of life delivers negative utility to society if it accrues to the most privileged. In an experiment of US and UK respondents ( n = 495), we compare equity/efficiency trade-offs across an abstract scenario along the lines of that presented in previous surveys versus a COVID-19 scenario, where it is made explicit that healthcare rationing is a real and current necessity occasioned by the pandemic. We find that preference for “levelling down” is reduced in the COVID-19 scenario relative to the abstract scenario. This result implies that, at least in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, previous results have overestimated the public’s willingness to sacrifice overall gains in population health in order to reduce inequality of health outcomes.
{"title":"Public preferences to trade-off gains in total health for health equality: Discrepancies between an abstract scenario versus the real-world scenario presented by COVID-19","authors":"David A. Comerford, Angela Tufte-Hewett, Emma K. Bridger","doi":"10.1177/10434631231193599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231193599","url":null,"abstract":"Policymakers must ration healthcare. This necessity became salient during the COVID-19 pandemic. Some policymakers took that opportunity to reduce inequality of health outcomes at the expense of overall health gains. There is a literature that seeks to quantify the optimal trade-off between efficiency and equality in health outcomes: economists employ surveys to quantify the public’s preferred level of equity/efficiency trade-off. An odd result from these studies is that a non-trivial subsample of respondents choose to “level down” i.e., they choose as though an additional year of life delivers negative utility to society if it accrues to the most privileged. In an experiment of US and UK respondents ( n = 495), we compare equity/efficiency trade-offs across an abstract scenario along the lines of that presented in previous surveys versus a COVID-19 scenario, where it is made explicit that healthcare rationing is a real and current necessity occasioned by the pandemic. We find that preference for “levelling down” is reduced in the COVID-19 scenario relative to the abstract scenario. This result implies that, at least in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, previous results have overestimated the public’s willingness to sacrifice overall gains in population health in order to reduce inequality of health outcomes.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48745751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-10DOI: 10.1177/10434631231186067
Bengt-Arne Wickström
Language policies for the purpose of (re)vitalizing a minority language are analyzed as a dynamic cost-effectiveness problem. We focus on policy measures with two types of cost structures: costs largely proportional to the number of beneficiaries (a rival measure) and costs independent of the number of beneficiaries (a non-rival measure). An example of the former is home nursing in the minority language and an example of the latter is street signs in the minority language. Both types of measures are assumed to contribute positively to the vitality of the minority language. We stylize the analysis, letting the rival measure have an immediate direct effect on the vitality and the non-rival one a protracted indirect effect on the language’s status. Two problems are addressed. Firstly, we study how the optimal combination of the two types of measure changes as the policy is implemented and the vitality of the minority language increases and show that a policy with fixed budget shares as a rule is sub-optimal. Secondly, we compare the opportune policy of a policy maker planning with a fixed time horizon with the optimal policy as the time horizon approaches infinity. The policy maker has incentives to plan for a sub-optimal policy with a reduction in the protracted measure for the whole planning period and making it equal to zero at the time horizon. All effects are illustrated in numeric examples.
{"title":"Optimal and politically opportune language policies for the vitality of minority languages","authors":"Bengt-Arne Wickström","doi":"10.1177/10434631231186067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231186067","url":null,"abstract":"Language policies for the purpose of (re)vitalizing a minority language are analyzed as a dynamic cost-effectiveness problem. We focus on policy measures with two types of cost structures: costs largely proportional to the number of beneficiaries (a rival measure) and costs independent of the number of beneficiaries (a non-rival measure). An example of the former is home nursing in the minority language and an example of the latter is street signs in the minority language. Both types of measures are assumed to contribute positively to the vitality of the minority language. We stylize the analysis, letting the rival measure have an immediate direct effect on the vitality and the non-rival one a protracted indirect effect on the language’s status. Two problems are addressed. Firstly, we study how the optimal combination of the two types of measure changes as the policy is implemented and the vitality of the minority language increases and show that a policy with fixed budget shares as a rule is sub-optimal. Secondly, we compare the opportune policy of a policy maker planning with a fixed time horizon with the optimal policy as the time horizon approaches infinity. The policy maker has incentives to plan for a sub-optimal policy with a reduction in the protracted measure for the whole planning period and making it equal to zero at the time horizon. All effects are illustrated in numeric examples.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45423136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：