Pub Date : 2023-02-21DOI: 10.1177/10434631231159567
Joan Costa‐Font, Nattavudh Powdthavee
We study the effect of lottery wins on the strength of social ties and its different types, including support networks, in the United Kingdom. On average, we find that winning more in the lottery increases the probability of meeting friends on most days, which is consistent with the complementary effect of income on the strength of social ties. The opposite is true with regards to social ties held for more instrumental reasons such as talking to neighbours. Winning more in the lottery also lessens an individual support network consistently with a substitution of income and support network. However, further robustness checks reveal that such average lottery effects are driven by individuals exhibiting very large wins only, thus suggesting that small to medium-sized wins (below £10k) may not be enough to change people’s social ties and support network in a substantial way.
{"title":"Does money strengthen our social ties? Longitudinal evidence of lottery winners","authors":"Joan Costa‐Font, Nattavudh Powdthavee","doi":"10.1177/10434631231159567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231159567","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of lottery wins on the strength of social ties and its different types, including support networks, in the United Kingdom. On average, we find that winning more in the lottery increases the probability of meeting friends on most days, which is consistent with the complementary effect of income on the strength of social ties. The opposite is true with regards to social ties held for more instrumental reasons such as talking to neighbours. Winning more in the lottery also lessens an individual support network consistently with a substitution of income and support network. However, further robustness checks reveal that such average lottery effects are driven by individuals exhibiting very large wins only, thus suggesting that small to medium-sized wins (below £10k) may not be enough to change people’s social ties and support network in a substantial way.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"139 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42536915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-15DOI: 10.1177/10434631231157588
B. Frey
Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state’s political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage.
{"title":"Camouflage: A dominant reaction to worsening conditions","authors":"B. Frey","doi":"10.1177/10434631231157588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231157588","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state’s political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"366 - 384"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49579763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.1177/10434631231155005
Paul Kuyer, B. Gordijn
In this article, we systematically review the literature on the ethics of nudging. Since the publication of the book Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 2008, a rich literature has been developed on the question whether it is ethical to nudge people. This is an important area for research as nudges are commonly used by governments and private corporations to alter the behaviour of citizens and consumers. In order to gain a complete overview of this literature, we conduct a systematic search of academic sources. We investigate which ethical issues with nudging are discussed. We find four major ethical issues, namely worries regarding 1) autonomy, 2) welfare, 3) long-term adverse effects, and 4) democracy and deliberation. We discuss each ethical issue by highlighting how it is defined, what the critique constitutes, what its sub-issues are, and which defences of nudging have been argued for. In this way, the systematic literature review provides a comprehensive overview of the literature on the ethics of nudging to date. The results of our systematic review contribute to a better understanding of the ethical issues with nudging, as well as of the current state of the literature on these topics.
{"title":"Nudge in perspective: A systematic literature review on the ethical issues with nudging","authors":"Paul Kuyer, B. Gordijn","doi":"10.1177/10434631231155005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231155005","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we systematically review the literature on the ethics of nudging. Since the publication of the book Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 2008, a rich literature has been developed on the question whether it is ethical to nudge people. This is an important area for research as nudges are commonly used by governments and private corporations to alter the behaviour of citizens and consumers. In order to gain a complete overview of this literature, we conduct a systematic search of academic sources. We investigate which ethical issues with nudging are discussed. We find four major ethical issues, namely worries regarding 1) autonomy, 2) welfare, 3) long-term adverse effects, and 4) democracy and deliberation. We discuss each ethical issue by highlighting how it is defined, what the critique constitutes, what its sub-issues are, and which defences of nudging have been argued for. In this way, the systematic literature review provides a comprehensive overview of the literature on the ethics of nudging to date. The results of our systematic review contribute to a better understanding of the ethical issues with nudging, as well as of the current state of the literature on these topics.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"191 - 230"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42021477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-30DOI: 10.1177/10434631221143614
Pál Susánszky, R. Somogyi, Gergely Tóth
Measuring inequalities in political participation across social groups is a challenging task as participation is typically coded in dummy variables. For instance, social scientists record whether their respondents have voted in the previous elections (1) or not (0). In this paper, we identify a list of desirable criteria that an inequality index used for empirical comparative studies should meet. Existing inequality indices fail to satisfy one or more of these criteria. Building on our list, we define a new Gini-type index, the Political Inequality in Participation Index (PIPI), suitable for cross-country comparisons. We show that inequalities measured by the PIPI are correlated to, but are qualitatively different from the best-known measurements. In particular, using data simulation techniques, we demonstrate that this correlation is decreasing in the complexity of societies’ structure. Moreover, by replicating an existing study, we further demonstrate that when working with real-world data, the PIPI provides new empirical results.
{"title":"Political inequality in participation index - a Gini-based measure of inequalities in political participation","authors":"Pál Susánszky, R. Somogyi, Gergely Tóth","doi":"10.1177/10434631221143614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221143614","url":null,"abstract":"Measuring inequalities in political participation across social groups is a challenging task as participation is typically coded in dummy variables. For instance, social scientists record whether their respondents have voted in the previous elections (1) or not (0). In this paper, we identify a list of desirable criteria that an inequality index used for empirical comparative studies should meet. Existing inequality indices fail to satisfy one or more of these criteria. Building on our list, we define a new Gini-type index, the Political Inequality in Participation Index (PIPI), suitable for cross-country comparisons. We show that inequalities measured by the PIPI are correlated to, but are qualitatively different from the best-known measurements. In particular, using data simulation techniques, we demonstrate that this correlation is decreasing in the complexity of societies’ structure. Moreover, by replicating an existing study, we further demonstrate that when working with real-world data, the PIPI provides new empirical results.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"231 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43640687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-28DOI: 10.1177/10434631221142266
Manuel T. Valdés
Different studies have observed that performance is a worse predictor of educational expectations among high-SES students. This result has been referred to as stickiness in high-SES students’ expectations and explained as the outcome of the capacity and motivation of high-SES families to manage low performance so that it does not affect educational ambition and endanger social maintenance. However, little is known about how that stickiness is achieved. I use Spanish data from PISA 2018 to assess the role played by private schools in the stickiness of the expectation of enrolment in the academic track of upper secondary education. First, I report high stickiness in high-SES Spanish students’ expectations. Then, I find that low performance is less detrimental to educational ambition in private schools, particularly for high-SES students. Finally, I simulate a counterfactual scenario where high-SES students enrol in private schools as often as low-SES students and observe that one-fifth of the stickiness in the expectation of academic-USE disappears.
{"title":"Understanding the stickiness in high-SES students’ educational expectations: The role of private schools","authors":"Manuel T. Valdés","doi":"10.1177/10434631221142266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221142266","url":null,"abstract":"Different studies have observed that performance is a worse predictor of educational expectations among high-SES students. This result has been referred to as stickiness in high-SES students’ expectations and explained as the outcome of the capacity and motivation of high-SES families to manage low performance so that it does not affect educational ambition and endanger social maintenance. However, little is known about how that stickiness is achieved. I use Spanish data from PISA 2018 to assess the role played by private schools in the stickiness of the expectation of enrolment in the academic track of upper secondary education. First, I report high stickiness in high-SES Spanish students’ expectations. Then, I find that low performance is less detrimental to educational ambition in private schools, particularly for high-SES students. Finally, I simulate a counterfactual scenario where high-SES students enrol in private schools as often as low-SES students and observe that one-fifth of the stickiness in the expectation of academic-USE disappears.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"110 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46431494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-26DOI: 10.1177/10434631221142733
R. Becker
The aim of the study is to contribute, theoretically and empirically, to an improved understanding of the social processes and mechanisms generating a citizen’s decisions regarding electoral participation. It seeks to contribute to a solution for the legendary paradox of electoral participation based on formalized social-psychological dual process theories by integrating the Weberian typology of rationalities and related social action into a comprehensive explanation of voter turnout. The empirical analysis, based on two German surveys carried out in 1998 and 2017, reveals that the instrumentally rational voting (purposively rational action) emphasized in the classic rational choice theories used in economic electoral research is rather a special case among modal types of action such as habitual voting (traditional action), norm-related voting (norm-guided action), and voting due to value rationality (value-rational action). Most voters vote out of habit and based on norms and values, while purely purposive-rational voting is more of a special case.
{"title":"Voting behavior as social action: Habits, norms, values, and rationality in electoral participation","authors":"R. Becker","doi":"10.1177/10434631221142733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221142733","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the study is to contribute, theoretically and empirically, to an improved understanding of the social processes and mechanisms generating a citizen’s decisions regarding electoral participation. It seeks to contribute to a solution for the legendary paradox of electoral participation based on formalized social-psychological dual process theories by integrating the Weberian typology of rationalities and related social action into a comprehensive explanation of voter turnout. The empirical analysis, based on two German surveys carried out in 1998 and 2017, reveals that the instrumentally rational voting (purposively rational action) emphasized in the classic rational choice theories used in economic electoral research is rather a special case among modal types of action such as habitual voting (traditional action), norm-related voting (norm-guided action), and voting due to value rationality (value-rational action). Most voters vote out of habit and based on norms and values, while purely purposive-rational voting is more of a special case.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"81 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43839431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01Epub Date: 2022-09-30DOI: 10.1177/10434631221130850
Arjun Chowdhury
While one might expect states with low capacity to regulate less than states with high capacity, this is not supported by evidence, leaving open the possibility of rent-seeking. I use the example of the regulation of witchcraft in parts of Africa to informally model the conditions under which states with low capacity still come to promulgate a range of regulations even in the absence of rent-seeking interests. The model suggests that regulation can be a substitute for basic state functions like policing. I identify one normatively troubling aspect of this; the conditions under which such regulation might still improve state capacity over time, which qualifies claims made about rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism; the model's implications for contemporary state formation; and the parallels between the regulation of witchcraft and the regulation of offensive speech.
{"title":"Regulation and state capacity.","authors":"Arjun Chowdhury","doi":"10.1177/10434631221130850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221130850","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>While one might expect states with low capacity to regulate less than states with high capacity, this is not supported by evidence, leaving open the possibility of rent-seeking. I use the example of the regulation of witchcraft in parts of Africa to informally model the conditions under which states with low capacity still come to promulgate a range of regulations even in the absence of rent-seeking interests. The model suggests that regulation can be a substitute for basic state functions like policing. I identify one normatively troubling aspect of this; the conditions under which such regulation might still improve state capacity over time, which qualifies claims made about rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism; the model's implications for contemporary state formation; and the parallels between the regulation of witchcraft and the regulation of offensive speech.</p>","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"34 4","pages":"446-468"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9648979/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40475766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-27DOI: 10.1177/10434631221131771
Marijn A. Keijzer, R. Corten
Online peer-to-peer markets decentralize the distribution of resources, creating a trust problem in economic exchange on the internet. Individual characteristics of trustees — as determinants for being trusted — are therefore increasingly important. In light of this societal development, this study investigates the role of socioeconomic status and reputation as drivers of interpersonal trust. Some have argued that lower status trustees are trusted more easily because over the life course, they repeatedly rely on others' resources. Others state that higher status trustees are perceived as being more trustworthy, because they are more vulnerable to social control and loss of reputation. We propose a novel, experimental method for examining interpersonal trust situations that resembles the reality of peer-to-peer market platforms. 626 subjects in an online experiment were asked to place trust in their preferable trustee based on the asking price, and seller characteristics. The results from conditional logistic regression models showed that status increases perceived trustworthiness and positively affects the trust premium for past trustworthy behavior. Strong reputation effects were found, sending out a warning for inequitable emergent inequality of trust through reputation cascading.
{"title":"Socioeconomic status, reputation, and interpersonal trust in peer-to-peer markets: Evidence from an online experiment","authors":"Marijn A. Keijzer, R. Corten","doi":"10.1177/10434631221131771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221131771","url":null,"abstract":"Online peer-to-peer markets decentralize the distribution of resources, creating a trust problem in economic exchange on the internet. Individual characteristics of trustees — as determinants for being trusted — are therefore increasingly important. In light of this societal development, this study investigates the role of socioeconomic status and reputation as drivers of interpersonal trust. Some have argued that lower status trustees are trusted more easily because over the life course, they repeatedly rely on others' resources. Others state that higher status trustees are perceived as being more trustworthy, because they are more vulnerable to social control and loss of reputation. We propose a novel, experimental method for examining interpersonal trust situations that resembles the reality of peer-to-peer market platforms. 626 subjects in an online experiment were asked to place trust in their preferable trustee based on the asking price, and seller characteristics. The results from conditional logistic regression models showed that status increases perceived trustworthiness and positively affects the trust premium for past trustworthy behavior. Strong reputation effects were found, sending out a warning for inequitable emergent inequality of trust through reputation cascading.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"34 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48369694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-21DOI: 10.1177/10434631221134176
Ondřej Krčál, Š. Mikula, Rostislav Staněk
Theoretical models of local social capital predict that communities may find themselves in one of two equilibria: one with a high level of local social capital and low migration or one with a low level of local social capital and high migration. There is empirical literature suggesting that immigrants who join communities high in social capital are more likely to invest in local social capital and that the whole community will then end up in the equilibrium with high local social capital and low migration. However, this literature suffers from the selection of immigrants, which makes the identification challenging. In order to test the causal influence of the initial level of local social capital, we take the setup used in the theoretical models into the laboratory. We treat some communities by increasing the initial level of social capital without affecting the equilibrium outcomes. We find that while most communities end up in one of the two equilibria predicted by the theoretical models, the treated communities are more likely to converge to the equilibrium with a high level of local social capital and low migration.
{"title":"Social capital and mobility: An experimental study","authors":"Ondřej Krčál, Š. Mikula, Rostislav Staněk","doi":"10.1177/10434631221134176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221134176","url":null,"abstract":"Theoretical models of local social capital predict that communities may find themselves in one of two equilibria: one with a high level of local social capital and low migration or one with a low level of local social capital and high migration. There is empirical literature suggesting that immigrants who join communities high in social capital are more likely to invest in local social capital and that the whole community will then end up in the equilibrium with high local social capital and low migration. However, this literature suffers from the selection of immigrants, which makes the identification challenging. In order to test the causal influence of the initial level of local social capital, we take the setup used in the theoretical models into the laboratory. We treat some communities by increasing the initial level of social capital without affecting the equilibrium outcomes. We find that while most communities end up in one of the two equilibria predicted by the theoretical models, the treated communities are more likely to converge to the equilibrium with a high level of local social capital and low migration.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"61 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42652797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-09DOI: 10.1177/10434631221132263
Antonio D. Sirianni
Decentralized sanctioning arises from a demand for governance that is not adequately provided by the state or another strong and centralized institution. While the dynamics of collective action and sanctioning have been well-examined theoretically, experimentally, and empirically, this work typically assumes community membership is a given. In selective or elite communities, pro-social behavior of one kind or another may be a prerequisite of community membership, which may create perverse incentives for the implementation of peer-sanctions. This article quantitatively examines this phenomenon in the case of professional ice hockey, a highly selective community where fist-fighting between players has long existed as a form of self-help for players to address rule infractions or violent play otherwise unaddressed by officials. An empirical examination of over 70 years of player statistics and play-by-play data from the National Hockey League shows not only the evolution of this system from one of peer-sanctioning to one of specialized-sanctioning, as might be predicted from experimental results showing the favorability and efficacy of more centralized punishment regimes, but also reveals how specialization has led to self-serving sanctions. Less-skilled players who are presumably hired to fight are disproportionately likely to participate in fights that appear to occur for non-retaliatory reasons, and more likely to fight one another in a bid to maintain their status and reputation as sanctioners, and consequently their membership in an elite community.
分散的制裁产生于对治理的需求，而国家或其他强大的中央机构没有充分提供这种需求。虽然集体行动和制裁的动态已经在理论上、实验上和经验上得到了很好的检验，但这项工作通常假设社区成员是给定的。在选择性或精英社区中，这种或那种亲社会行为可能是成为社区成员的先决条件，这可能会为实施同伴制裁创造反常的激励。这篇文章以专业冰球为例定量分析了这一现象，这是一个高度选择性的社区，球员之间的拳头斗争长期以来一直存在，作为球员解决规则违规或暴力比赛的一种自助形式，否则官员无法解决。对美国国家冰球联盟(National Hockey League) 70多年球员统计数据和每场比赛数据的实证研究表明，这一体系不仅从同行制裁向专业制裁演变，正如实验结果所预测的那样，更集中的惩罚制度更受欢迎和更有效，而且还揭示了专业化是如何导致自私的制裁的。那些被雇佣去战斗的技能较差的玩家更有可能因为非报复性的原因而参与战斗，并且更有可能为了维持自己作为制裁者的地位和声誉而相互战斗，从而维持他们在精英社区中的成员身份。
{"title":"The specialization of informal social control in a selective community: Fighting in the National Hockey League from 1947 to 2019","authors":"Antonio D. Sirianni","doi":"10.1177/10434631221132263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631221132263","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralized sanctioning arises from a demand for governance that is not adequately provided by the state or another strong and centralized institution. While the dynamics of collective action and sanctioning have been well-examined theoretically, experimentally, and empirically, this work typically assumes community membership is a given. In selective or elite communities, pro-social behavior of one kind or another may be a prerequisite of community membership, which may create perverse incentives for the implementation of peer-sanctions. This article quantitatively examines this phenomenon in the case of professional ice hockey, a highly selective community where fist-fighting between players has long existed as a form of self-help for players to address rule infractions or violent play otherwise unaddressed by officials. An empirical examination of over 70 years of player statistics and play-by-play data from the National Hockey League shows not only the evolution of this system from one of peer-sanctioning to one of specialized-sanctioning, as might be predicted from experimental results showing the favorability and efficacy of more centralized punishment regimes, but also reveals how specialization has led to self-serving sanctions. Less-skilled players who are presumably hired to fight are disproportionately likely to participate in fights that appear to occur for non-retaliatory reasons, and more likely to fight one another in a bid to maintain their status and reputation as sanctioners, and consequently their membership in an elite community.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"3 - 33"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41364375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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