Pub Date : 2020-02-15DOI: 10.1007/s11050-020-09161-z
Pauline Jacobson
There have been a variety of arguments over the decades both for and against syntactic Neg Raising (NR). Two recent papers (Jacobson in Linguist Inq 49(3):559–576, 2018; Crowley in Nat Lang Semant 27(1), 1–17, 2019) focus on the interaction of NR effects with ellipsis. These papers examine similar types of data, but come to opposite conclusion: Jacobson shows that the ellipsis facts provide evidence against syntactic NR, whereas Crowley argues in favor of syntactic NR. The present paper revisits the evidence, showing that the key case in Crowley (2019) that he uses to argue for syntactic NR contains a confound, while the broader set of evidence in Jacobson (2018) continues to support the non-syntactic account. In addition, I reply here to an argument for syntactic NR due originally to Prince (Language 52:404–426, 1976) and Smaby (pers. comm. to Prince) and elaborated on by Crowley. The key generalization can be shown to disappear once contexts are carefully controlled for. Moreover, Crowley extends the Prince/Smaby argument to show that no inference-based account of NR can survive, but this conclusion rests on the claim that there are cases where ever is vacuous; I show that this is not the case. I also consider the question—discussed in much previous literature—of why under the syntactic approach to NR the class of predicates allowing NR is limited to just those which easily support an Excluded Middle inference. Crowley (2019) attempts to provide a principled explanation, speculating that NR is allowed just in case it is ‘semantically vacuous’. I argue that this proposal is problematic and so the challenge to syntactic approaches remains. Finally, I provide a new argument against syntactic NR which centers on the behavior of guess.
在过去的几十年里，有各种各样的争论，支持和反对句法负提升(NR)。最近的两篇论文(Jacobson in Linguist Inq 49(3): 559-576, 2018;Crowley在Nat Lang Semant 27(1)， 1 - 17,2019)中重点研究了NR效应与省略的相互作用。这些论文研究了类似类型的数据，但得出了相反的结论:Jacobson表明，省略事实提供了反对句法NR的证据，而Crowley则支持句法NR。本文重新审视了这些证据，表明Crowley(2019)中用来支持句法NR的关键案例包含一个混淆，而Jacobson(2018)中更广泛的证据集继续支持非句法的说法。此外，我在此回复最初由Prince (Language 52:404-426, 1976)和Smaby (pers。(与普林斯共享)，并由克劳利详细阐述。一旦仔细控制了上下文，关键的泛化就会消失。此外，Crowley扩展了Prince/Smaby的论点，表明没有任何基于推理的NR解释能够成立，但这个结论是基于这样的主张，即在某些情况下，任何情况都是空洞的;我证明了事实并非如此。我还考虑了之前许多文献中讨论过的问题——为什么在NR的句法方法下，允许NR的谓词类仅限于那些容易支持排除中间推理的谓词类。Crowley(2019)试图提供一个原则性的解释，推测NR是允许的，以防它是“语义上空洞的”。我认为这个建议是有问题的，因此对句法方法的挑战仍然存在。最后，以猜测行为为中心，提出了反对句法NR的新论点。
{"title":"Neg Raising and ellipsis (and related issues) revisited","authors":"Pauline Jacobson","doi":"10.1007/s11050-020-09161-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-020-09161-z","url":null,"abstract":"There have been a variety of arguments over the decades both for and against syntactic Neg Raising (NR). Two recent papers (Jacobson in Linguist Inq 49(3):559–576, 2018; Crowley in Nat Lang Semant 27(1), 1–17, 2019) focus on the interaction of NR effects with ellipsis. These papers examine similar types of data, but come to opposite conclusion: Jacobson shows that the ellipsis facts provide evidence against syntactic NR, whereas Crowley argues in favor of syntactic NR. The present paper revisits the evidence, showing that the key case in Crowley (2019) that he uses to argue for syntactic NR contains a confound, while the broader set of evidence in Jacobson (2018) continues to support the non-syntactic account. In addition, I reply here to an argument for syntactic NR due originally to Prince (Language 52:404–426, 1976) and Smaby (pers. comm. to Prince) and elaborated on by Crowley. The key generalization can be shown to disappear once contexts are carefully controlled for. Moreover, Crowley extends the Prince/Smaby argument to show that no inference-based account of NR can survive, but this conclusion rests on the claim that there are cases where <i>ever</i> is vacuous; I show that this is not the case. I also consider the question—discussed in much previous literature—of why under the syntactic approach to NR the class of predicates allowing NR is limited to just those which easily support an Excluded Middle inference. Crowley (2019) attempts to provide a principled explanation, speculating that NR is allowed just in case it is ‘semantically vacuous’. I argue that this proposal is problematic and so the challenge to syntactic approaches remains. Finally, I provide a new argument against syntactic NR which centers on the behavior of <i>guess.</i>","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"217 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2020-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138542837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-14DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09158-3
Gennaro Chierchia
Approaches to anaphora generally seek to explain the potential for a DP to covary with a pronoun in terms of a combination of factors, such as (i) the inherent semantics of the antecedent DP (i.e., whether it is indefinite, quantificational, referential), (ii) its scope properties, and (iii) its structural position. A case in point is Reinhart’s classic condition on bound anaphora, paraphrasable as A DP can antecede a pronoun pro only if the DP c-commands pro at S-structure, supplemented with some extra machinery to allow indefinites to covary with pronouns beyond their c-command domains. In the present paper, I explore a different take. I propose that anaphora is governed not by DPs and their properties; it is governed by predicates (i.e., in the unary case, objects of type <e, t>) and their properties. To use a metaphor from dynamic semantics: discourse referents can only be ‘activated’ by predicates, never by DPs (Dynamic Predication Principle). This conceptually simple assumption is shown to have far-reaching consequences. For one, it yields a new take on weak crossover, arguably worthy of consideration. Moreover, it leads to a further general “restatement of the anaphora question”, in Reinhart’s (Linguist Philos 6: 47–88, 1983) words.
{"title":"Origins of weak crossover: when dynamic semantics meets event semantics","authors":"Gennaro Chierchia","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09158-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09158-3","url":null,"abstract":"Approaches to anaphora generally seek to explain the potential for a DP to covary with a pronoun in terms of a combination of factors, such as (i) the inherent semantics of the antecedent DP (i.e., whether it is indefinite, quantificational, referential), (ii) its scope properties, and (iii) its structural position. A case in point is Reinhart’s classic condition on bound anaphora, paraphrasable as <i>A DP can antecede a pronoun pro only if the DP c</i>-<i>commands pro at S</i>-<i>structure</i>, supplemented with some extra machinery to allow indefinites to covary with pronouns beyond their c-command domains. In the present paper, I explore a different take. I propose that anaphora is governed not by DPs and their properties; it is governed by predicates (i.e., in the unary case, objects of type <e, t>) and their properties. To use a metaphor from dynamic semantics: discourse referents can only be ‘activated’ by predicates, never by DPs (<i>Dynamic Predication Principle</i>). This conceptually simple assumption is shown to have far-reaching consequences. For one, it yields a new take on weak crossover, arguably worthy of consideration. Moreover, it leads to a further general “restatement of the anaphora question”, in Reinhart’s (Linguist Philos 6: 47–88, 1983) words.","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"27 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-20DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09157-4
Radek Šimík
Doubling unconditionals are exemplified by the Spanish example Venga quien venga, estaré contento ‘Whoever comes, I’ll be happy’ (lit. ‘Comes who comes, I’ll be happy’). This curious and little studied construction is attested in various forms in a number of Romance and Slavic languages. In this paper, I provide a basic description of these constructions, focusing especially on Spanish, Czech, and Slovenian, and argue that they can be brought in line with analyses of run-of-the-mill unconditionals (of the English type) if one recognizes (1) that the wh-structure within the unconditional antecedent (quien venga ‘who comes’) is a free relative and (2) that the free relative is focused. The focused free relative introduces alternatives and thus gives rise to the denotation proposed by Rawlins (Nat Lang Semant 40(2):111–178, 2013) for English unconditionals. In the last part of the paper, I hypothesize that at least some non-doubling unconditionals could in fact have a doubling underlying structure, which is disguised by relative sluicing—clausal ellipsis with a relative pronoun remnant.
双重无条件条件的例子是西班牙语的Venga quien Venga, estar contento“谁来，我就高兴”(即“谁来，我就高兴”)。这种奇特而鲜有研究的结构在许多罗曼语和斯拉夫语中以各种形式得到证实。在本文中，我提供了这些结构的基本描述，特别关注西班牙语，捷克语和斯洛文尼亚语，并认为如果人们认识到(1)无条件先行词(quien venga“谁来了”)中的wh结构是一个自由关系，(2)自由关系是集中的，那么它们可以与普通的无条件条件句(英语类型)的分析保持一致。集中的自由关系引入了替代，从而产生了Rawlins (Nat Lang Semant 40(2): 111-178, 2013)对英语无条件条件的外延。在本文的最后一部分，我假设至少一些非双重的无条件条件实际上可能具有双重的潜在结构，这种结构被相对回避的小句省略和相对代词的残余所掩盖。
{"title":"Doubling unconditionals and relative sluicing","authors":"Radek Šimík","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09157-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09157-4","url":null,"abstract":"Doubling unconditionals are exemplified by the Spanish example <i>Venga quien venga, estaré contento</i> ‘Whoever comes, I’ll be happy’ (lit. ‘Comes who comes, I’ll be happy’). This curious and little studied construction is attested in various forms in a number of Romance and Slavic languages. In this paper, I provide a basic description of these constructions, focusing especially on Spanish, Czech, and Slovenian, and argue that they can be brought in line with analyses of run-of-the-mill unconditionals (of the English type) if one recognizes (1) that the wh-structure within the unconditional antecedent (<i>quien venga</i> ‘who comes’) is a free relative and (2) that the free relative is focused. The focused free relative introduces alternatives and thus gives rise to the denotation proposed by Rawlins (Nat Lang Semant 40(2):111–178, 2013) for English unconditionals. In the last part of the paper, I hypothesize that at least some non-doubling unconditionals could in fact have a doubling underlying structure, which is disguised by relative sluicing—clausal ellipsis with a relative pronoun remnant.","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"72 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-30DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09155-6
Vincent Homer, R. Bhatt
{"title":"Licensing of PPI indefinites: Movement or pseudoscope?","authors":"Vincent Homer, R. Bhatt","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09155-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09155-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"27 1","pages":"279 - 321"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11050-019-09155-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49619027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-06DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09153-8
Clemens Mayr
Why do predicates like know embed both declarative and interrogative clauses, whereas closely related ones like believe only embed the former? The standard approach following Grimshaw (Linguist Inq 10:279–326, 1979) to this issue has been to specify lexically for each predicate which type of complement clause it can combine with. This view is challenged by predicates such as be certain, which embed interrogative clauses only in certain contexts. To deal with this issue, this paper proposes (i) a novel, unified semantics for declarative and interrogative embedding and (ii) a theory where embedding is constrained by semantic considerations. The reason for the apparent unembeddability of an interrogative clause under a given predicate is the resulting trivial meaning of the sentence. Such triviality manifests itself in unacceptability. Crucially, it is affected by both the lexical meaning of the predicate and the polarity of the sentence as a whole.
{"title":"Triviality and interrogative embedding: context sensitivity, factivity, and neg-raising","authors":"Clemens Mayr","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09153-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09153-8","url":null,"abstract":"Why do predicates like <i>know</i> embed both declarative and interrogative clauses, whereas closely related ones like <i>believe</i> only embed the former? The standard approach following Grimshaw (Linguist Inq 10:279–326, 1979) to this issue has been to specify lexically for each predicate which type of complement clause it can combine with. This view is challenged by predicates such as <i>be certain</i>, which embed interrogative clauses only in certain contexts. To deal with this issue, this paper proposes (i) a novel, unified semantics for declarative and interrogative embedding and (ii) a theory where embedding is constrained by semantic considerations. The reason for the apparent unembeddability of an interrogative clause under a given predicate is the resulting trivial meaning of the sentence. Such triviality manifests itself in unacceptability. Crucially, it is affected by both the lexical meaning of the predicate and the polarity of the sentence as a whole.","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"240 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-18DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09154-7
Nicole Gotzner
The function of focus is to activate alternatives, and these activated alternatives are used to compute the corresponding inferences of an utterance. The experimental research reported here investigates the role of focus intonation in inference computation and its interplay with the overt focus particles only and also. In particular, I compare the mechanisms underlying the computation of exhaustivity implicatures, assertions, and additive presuppositions. A memory delay experiment revealed that contrastive intonation (L+H*) makes an exhaustive interpretation equally available as overt only. A second experiment showed that in immediate processing, the implicature in bare focus conditions is delayed relative to the inferences associated with only and also. The findings thus indicate that L+H* accents do not conventionally encode an exhaustive meaning, but encourage implicature computation by (i) making relevant alternatives salient and (ii) providing a strong cue that an inference should be derived.
{"title":"The role of focus intonation in implicature computation: a comparison with only and also","authors":"Nicole Gotzner","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09154-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09154-7","url":null,"abstract":"The function of focus is to activate alternatives, and these activated alternatives are used to compute the corresponding inferences of an utterance. The experimental research reported here investigates the role of focus intonation in inference computation and its interplay with the overt focus particles <i>only</i> and <i>also</i>. In particular, I compare the mechanisms underlying the computation of exhaustivity implicatures, assertions, and additive presuppositions. A memory delay experiment revealed that contrastive intonation (L+H*) makes an exhaustive interpretation equally available as overt <i>only</i>. A second experiment showed that in immediate processing, the implicature in bare focus conditions is delayed relative to the inferences associated with <i>only</i> and <i>also</i>. The findings thus indicate that L+H* accents do not conventionally encode an exhaustive meaning, but encourage implicature computation by (i) making relevant alternatives salient and (ii) providing a strong cue that an inference should be derived.","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-27DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09151-w
Guillermo Del Pinal, Brandon Waldon
According to Kratzer’s influential account of epistemic must and might, these operators involve quantification over domains of possibilities determined by a modal base and an ordering source. Recently, this account has been challenged by invoking contexts of ‘epistemic tension’: i.e., cases in which an assertion that must(phi ) is conjoined with the possibility that (lnot phi ), and cases in which speakers try to downplay a previous assertion that must(phi ), after finding out that (lnot phi ). Epistemic tensions have been invoked from two directions. Von Fintel and Gillies (Nat Lang Semant 18(4):351–383, 2010) propose a return to a simpler modal logic-inspired account: must and might still involve universal and existential quantification, but the domains of possibilities are determined solely by realistic modal bases. In contrast, Lassiter (Nat Lang Semant 24(2):117–163, 2016), following Swanson (Interactions with context. Ph.D. thesis, MIT, 2006; and in A. Eagan and B. Weatherstone, eds., Epistemic Modality, Oxford UP, 2011), proposes a more revisionary account which treats must and might as probabilistic operators. In this paper, we present a series of experiments to obtain reliable data on the degree of acceptability of various contexts of epistemic tension. Our experiments include novel variations that, we argue, are required to make progress in this debate. We show that restricted quantificational accounts à la Kratzer fit the overall pattern of results better than either of their recent competitors. In addition, our results help us identify the key components of restricted quantificational accounts, and on that basis propose some refinements and general constraints that should be satisfied by any account of the modal auxiliaries.
{"title":"Modals under epistemic tension","authors":"Guillermo Del Pinal, Brandon Waldon","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09151-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09151-w","url":null,"abstract":"According to Kratzer’s influential account of epistemic <i>must</i> and <i>might</i>, these operators involve quantification over domains of possibilities determined by a modal base and an ordering source. Recently, this account has been challenged by invoking contexts of ‘epistemic tension’: i.e., cases in which an assertion that <i>must</i><span>(phi )</span> is conjoined with the possibility that <span>(lnot phi )</span>, and cases in which speakers try to downplay a previous assertion that <i>must</i><span>(phi )</span>, after finding out that <span>(lnot phi )</span>. Epistemic tensions have been invoked from two directions. Von Fintel and Gillies (Nat Lang Semant 18(4):351–383, 2010) propose a return to a simpler modal logic-inspired account: <i>must</i> and <i>might</i> still involve universal and existential quantification, but the domains of possibilities are determined solely by realistic modal bases. In contrast, Lassiter (Nat Lang Semant 24(2):117–163, 2016), following Swanson (Interactions with context. Ph.D. thesis, MIT, 2006; and in A. Eagan and B. Weatherstone, eds., Epistemic Modality, Oxford UP, 2011), proposes a more revisionary account which treats <i>must</i> and <i>might</i> as probabilistic operators. In this paper, we present a series of experiments to obtain reliable data on the degree of acceptability of various contexts of epistemic tension. Our experiments include novel variations that, we argue, are required to make progress in this debate. We show that restricted quantificational accounts à la Kratzer fit the overall pattern of results better than either of their recent competitors. In addition, our results help us identify the key components of restricted quantificational accounts, and on that basis propose some refinements and general constraints that should be satisfied by any account of the modal auxiliaries.","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"38 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-03-18DOI: 10.1007/s11050-019-09152-9
N. Theiler, F. Roelofsen, M. Aloni
{"title":"Picky predicates: why believe doesn’t like interrogative complements, and other puzzles","authors":"N. Theiler, F. Roelofsen, M. Aloni","doi":"10.1007/s11050-019-09152-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-019-09152-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47108,"journal":{"name":"Natural Language Semantics","volume":"27 1","pages":"95 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2019-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s11050-019-09152-9","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52482999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：