European Law Journal最新文献

This article highlights how the EU fundamental rights framework should inform the liability regime of platforms foreseen in secondary EU law, in particular with regard to the reform of the E-commerce directive by the Digital Services Act. In order to identify all possible tensions between the liability regime of platforms on the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other hand, and in order to contribute to a well-balanced and proportionate European legal instrument, this article addresses these potential conflicts from the standpoint of users (those who share content and those who access it), platforms, regulators and other stakeholders involved. Section 2 delves into the intricate landscape of online intermediary liability, interrogating how the E-Commerce Directive and the emerging Digital Services Act grapple with the delicate equilibrium between shielding intermediaries and upholding the competing rights of other stakeholders. The article then navigates in Section 3 the fraught terrain of fundamental rights as articulated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the aegis of the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter. This section poses an urgent inquiry: can the DSA's foundational principles reconcile these legal frameworks in a manner that fuels democracy rather than stifles it through inadvertent censorship? Section 4 then delves into the intricate relationship between fundamental rights and the DSA reform. This section conducts a comprehensive analysis of the key provisions of the DSA, emphasising how they underscore the importance of fundamental rights. In addition to mapping out the strengths of the framework the section also identifies existing limitations within the DSA and suggests potential pathways for further refinement and improvement. This article concludes by outlining key avenues for achieving a balanced and fundamental rights-compliant regulatory framework for platform liability within the EU.

Data plays a crucial role for society. Accordingly, building a ‘single market for data’ by increasing the availability of public and private data ranks high on the EU policy agenda. But when advancing legal data sharing regimes, there is an inevitable need to balance public and private interests. While the European Commission continues to push for more binding rules on data sharing between private businesses, public undertakings are already covered by mandatory rules. Exploring how the law addresses their data offers valuable lessons on the reconciliation of market reasoning with the public interest. In particular, this article inquires into the recast Open Data and Public Sector Information Directive, the Data Governance Act, and different national rules which regulate access to and re-use of public undertakings' data. It identifies five striking characteristics and discusses their potential and limitations for regulating data sharing by private undertakings. The implications serve as a guidepost for advancing the wider debate on building a single market for data in the EU. Some of them are already reflected in the upcoming EU Data Act.

Building upon A Manifesto In Defense of Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Age of ‘Artificial Intelligence’, we, the Transatlantic Reflection Group on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Age of ‘Artificial Intelligence’, have reconvened to draft a second consensus manifesto that calls for the effective and legitimate enforcement of laws concerning AI systems. In doing so, we recognise the important and complementary role of standards and compliance practices. Whereas the first manifesto focused on the relationship between democratic law-making and technology, this second manifesto shifts focus from the design of law in the age of AI to the enforcement of law. Concretely, we offer 10 recommendations for addressing the key enforcement challenges shared across transatlantic stakeholders. We call on those who support these recommendations to sign this manifesto. The Fifth Edition of The Athens Roundtable on AI and the Rule of Law will take place on November 30th and December 1st, 2023. It will delve into pressing governance challenges posed by foundation models and generative AI across jurisdictions.

The paper explores the evolution of private powers in the digital landscape, developing a quadrangular systematisation of such a phenomenon based on four main aspects: space, values, (private) actors, and (digital) constitutional remedies. Taking a trans-Atlantic approach, the paper shows how these categories, typical of constitutionalism, apply to the context of the Internet and of new digital technologies both in the United States and in Europe. On the one hand, the United States has up to now maintained the supremacy of the notorious Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. On the other hand, European legislation has undergone a significant change, moving from a phase of digital liberalism, of which the 2000 E-Commerce Directive is the emblem, towards a new era of digital constitutionalism, passing through the age of judicial activism of European courts. In this sense, Europe has increasingly attempted to introduce limits to private (digital) powers, with a view to better protect and enforce (also horizontally) users' fundamental rights. Additionally, the evolution of digital constitutionalism, from a vertical-sectoral approach to a horizontal and procedure-based one, significantly showcased by the recent Digital Services Package, is underscored, signalling the recent movement of the EU into its second phase of digital constitutionalism. In this respect, the paper argues that the great benefit of stressing the procedural dimension, which may be defined as a European application of “due (data) process” to the relationship between individuals and private powers, is that it is potentially able to help consolidate a (necessary) trans-Atlantic bridge.

Mutual trust in the Dublin III Regulation is justified by the assumption that all Member States respect the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and that it is therefore immaterial which Member State processes any given claim. This justification has been questioned in light of the treatment of asylum seekers in some Member States. Nonetheless, in order to circumvent a Dublin transfer on fundamental rights grounds, the Court of Justice of the EU has held that the risked violation must meet the threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment in Article 4 of the Charter. Recently, the Court rejected the proposition that another Charter right—the principle of the best interests of the child—could block Dublin transfers of families with children. Through a child-rights analysis of the jurisprudence, this article explores the idea of exceptionality for children, concluding that there is potential for the best interests principle to trump mutual trust.

Does the emergence of the European Union (EU) disrupt the frames of reference of the contemporary history of Europe to such an extent that historians distrust it? It would seem that methodological Euroscepticism exists. European integration arouses scepticism among some in the community of historians of contemporary Europe, since the conceptual underpinnings of that history cannot in themselves account for European integration. This billet expresses, more than a word of caution, a call for enhanced dialogue on the EU as an object of study among the different strands of historical studies and different disciplines. On the one hand, some of the analyses provided by historical studies on contemporary Europe constitute a fertile source for the study and understanding of European integration, notably in the field of history. Using them can stimulate the development in the European studies field of new concepts, new representations and new hypotheses for grasping the EU as a reality and a comparatively new object of academic interest. On the other hand, the critical study of the EU conducted in the specific field of the history of the EU questions and sheds a new light on the analytical categories of contemporary European history. In this regard, the fruitful interaction between history, political geography, law and political science can enrich contemporary European history. Interdisciplinary studies on European integration notably enable us to decentre notions of sovereignty, territory and democracy, which have classically taken the nation state as their reference in broad explanatory narratives of contemporary European history. Research mutualisation would offer all the potential interpretative and analytical benefits of the conceptual and methodological rethink of our various disciplines and of European integration as an object of study.

This comment on Ermioni Xanthopoulou's insightful article starts by revisiting the nature and role of trust in the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) procedure, considering the recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (from Aranyosi/Căldăraru to Bivolaru/Moldovan). It is argued that trust is distinct from the presumption of respect for fundamental rights that underlies mutual recognition. The exercise of trust is now monitored by those Courts, as a means of protecting individual rights. This rehabilitates the proper meaning of trust, which can be reinforced by assurances. Prison conditions and legal changes affecting the rule of law are analysed in this light, as ‘drivers of distrust’. In sum, distrust can legitimately provide immediate protection for the individual, and the spectre of distrust causes the appreciation of trust, which in turn is beneficial for fundamental rights.

During a time of distrust towards some Member States, the position of fundamental rights when executing a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) has been strengthened. The article considers whether the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is now ‘taking rights seriously’ as regards the EAW. To this end, it employs a theoretical and contextual approach that supports a comprehensive analysis of case-law. First, the article borrows from a theory of rights as trumps and observes that rights are no longer treated as norms with no special force that are in the way of cooperation interests. Second, the article offers a contextual exegesis of this trajectory, by mapping drivers of distrust and evaluating their impact on the position of rights. Through contextualisation, it is argued that distrust, although limited by its circumstances, has offered a compelling opportunity for the ECJ to take rights seriously, paving the way forward for future case-law.

China's approach to ISDS reform is widely perceived as undecided and ambiguous. This paper provides the first detailed analysis of China's submission to the UNITRAL Working Group III and situates China's approach in the context of global dialogue of ISDS reform and competing reform proposals. The paper shows that China's open, flexible, and evolving approach to ISDS reform could be better understood by a contextual evaluation of the pertinent factors which have contributed to its formation. Moreover, this paper explains why China did not sign up to the EU's investment court system (ICS) proposal in the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Lastly, the paper argues that China should reconsider its attitude towards the ICS in the CAI context and that the EU's recent suggestion that the envisaged multilateral investment court may adopt an ‘open architecture’ is likely to enhance its appeal to China.