European Law Journal最新文献

The concept of ‘Regulation by Information’ is changing. Past such approaches consisted mainly of signalling regulatory intent and indirectly guiding how and when regulatory discretion should be exercised. We suggest that this conceptual understanding must be reviewed in view of developing regulatory technologies (RegTech) allowing for a far more proactive integration of data flows into regulatory processes. RegTech is thereby changing conditions of Regulation by Information.

This article uses financial regulation as an information-intensive and highly regulated policy field to illustrate and analyse RegTech-induced changes to conditions of Regulation by Information. It finds that the rise of near real-time information flows between market participants and regulatory bodies and, consequently, the need for near real-time regulatory responses on the European Union level have led to an ever higher degree of integration of regulatory software into market data flows.

Regulatory software now increasingly shapes the definitions of reporting standards and formats, which in turn shape regulatory choices by influencing information flows. The article shows how this development will likely be used in other data- and information-dense policy areas outside of financial markets.

Critics of Regulation by Information argue that it can lead to a lack of accountability and transparency, increasing the democratic deficit within the European Union. This article scrutinises both continuities and changes in the role and significance of legal principles and procedures used in regulatory oversight, following the evolution of this new form of Regulation by Information within the EU.

The ethical-political model of the EU needs normative rethinking after the pandemic. Using Dworkin's ‘thesis of continuity’ between ethics and politics, I argue that a strong model of the citizen, called on to exercise duties and civic virtues, is badly needed by the EU. The legitimacy of EU political institutions is not enough, if we want to promote the participation of citizens to their functioning. The basic point is that of arguing in favour of the model of ‘the reasonable citizen’, aimed to overcome the dominant liberal model of ‘citizenship as rights’. This is shown by the ‘European Social Model’, but its weaknesses need to be supplemented by a republican conception. In order for the reasonable citizen not to be just an abstract ideal, some measure of operationalisation is proposed through ‘progressively increasing constellations of common identities’; these rely on and respect the multiple demoi of the EU.

In some Member States, doctrine and case law of national courts have highlighted that, under currently applicable European electoral law, elections to the EP are of a second-order, whereby European issues give way to purely domestic ones. In any event, this does not hinder the position of the EP as a genuine legislative chamber, which, above all, demands effects from electoral law that it cannot provide, since the intensity with which an election is experienced depends on circumstances external to the system itself. What electoral law can guarantee instead is the periodic holding of free elections. And that requires ensuring that the EP is appointed by the free expression of the opinion of all (and only) European citizens; that the weight of the vote is determined by rational criteria; that the electoral formula allows access to significant political currents; and that the “rule of law” is respected in the electoral process.

This article discusses the role of soft law in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in the European Union (EU). In doing so, it revisits the emergence of the standalone, yet cross-cutting, field of ‘EU disability law’ through the lens of the ‘hybridity theory’ advanced inter alia by Trubek and Trubek. Being speculative in nature, this article construes EU disability law as a fruitful area for an enquiry into the dynamic relationship between hard and soft law. Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, soft law was crucial to attract disability within the sphere of action of the EU and to embed the social model of disability, displaying a value-setting role. In the post-Amsterdam period, soft law and hard law coexisted, being complementary to one another. Both contributed to a common objective, namely that of advancing equality of opportunities for persons with disabilities. After the conclusion of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the dynamic relationship between hard and soft law has become more complex and akin to what Trubek and Trubek define as ‘transformation’.

This contribution argues in favour of the use of Article 83(2) TFEU to adopt a Directive criminalising failure of rescue at sea. We explain how and why the EU's legal duty to comply with its obligations under Article 98 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ought to translate into the adoption of a Directive requiring Member States to criminalise all action contrary to Article 98 UNCLOS on the basis of Article 83(2) TFEU. The criminalisation of failure to rescue at sea would not only allow for the EU to abide by the fundamental legal rules that shape its order but also be consistent with the two rationales that have guided European integration so far: a functional rationale, whereby the Union has competence to adopt criminal offences and impose criminal sanctions where approximation proves essential to ensuring the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, and a constitutional rationale, according to which criminal law is key to ensuring respect for EU common values and fundamental rights.

This article explores the role and justifications for EU action in the EU Area of Criminal Justice, also relying on a comparison with the justifications for EU action in the internal market. It distinguishes between a role for the EU as a subsidiary policy actor and as a primary policy actor. By substantiating both models, the article illustrates how the model of the EU as a subsidiary policy actor has been challenged by legislative and judicial developments in the internal market and how these trends were particularly accentuated in the EU Area of Criminal Justice. The EU increasingly regulates areas of non-cross-border crime, as can be appreciated by the shape and the implementation of the competence to harmonise definitions of crimes. And the Court of Justice has unequivocally extended the application of EU criminal law, both substantive and procedural, to internal cases. The article argues that such developments, which build on pre-existing trends in the internal market field, are inevitable in the EU Area of Criminal Justice due to the inherent fundamental rights' sensitive nature of criminal law. A subsidiary, piecemeal approach in criminal justice might safeguard national regulatory autonomy but is hardly affordable as it would challenge general principles of criminal law. Relying only on “legal cross-borderness” as a criterion to justify EU definition of crimes would neglect the harm principle and the legal interest principle. Legal creativity that would stem from limiting EU intervention and safeguarding regulatory competition can be fostered by enlarging EU regulatory tools in this area codifying also decriminalisation competences. Moreover, limiting the application of EU criminal law to only cross-border cases is at odds with the principle of legality in criminal matters and of equal treatment.

EU policy-making in criminal law is a matter of significant public concern for EU citizens and the Member States. The exercise of EU public powers in the fields of criminal law and law enforcement have tangible and adverse consequences for the liberties and well-being of individuals. Furthermore, EU cooperation in the area of criminal law touches upon core functions of statehood including ‘core state powers’ such as the safeguarding of internal security and law enforcement. This raises several questions regarding the rationale underpinning EU criminal policy and its legitimacy within the context of a multi-level polity. This article sketches out a normative argument for legitimate justifications for some particular areas of EU criminal law on the basis of the transnational criterion enshrined in the subsidiarity principle. The article claims that there is a compelling justification for EU action in criminal law to protect European public goods and other key transnational interests.