European Law Journal最新文献

This paper raises the question as to whether a theory of justice exists in EU law. The focus is on justice as a system. The assumption is that the independence of institutional actors involved in the administration of criminal justice (mainly judges and prosecutors) vis-à-vis each other, and other State powers, is key to that system achieving justice as a value. Against the benchmark of judicial and prosecutorial independence developed in European law, the paper assesses the role for independence in investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicating functions as it emerges from the current state of EU criminal law. The conclusions reveal that the EU's idea of justice remains underdeveloped, and that there is a need for systemic coherence to better protect the rule of law and enhance the legitimacy of EU criminal law.

This article looks at how and why the EU has been/can be endowed with powers over criminal matters, within the framework of the theory of jurisdiction. It examines the extent to which the specific responsibility of the EU for the protection of certain legal interests justifies the establishment of a (peripheral) jurisdiction. Member States (MS) can confer such powers upon the EU, but this attribution must be consistent with their domestic obligations and limitations on state action. A crucial distinction is established between exclusive and shared responsibility: the former concerns the protection of ‘institutional legal interests’ exclusive to the EU, whereas the latter relates to ‘functional legal interests’, which also fall within the remit of Member States but are moulded or significantly affected by EU policies. It is argued that this differentiation should translate into the type of acts adopted, which may require some adaptations to traditional guarantees such as the legality principle.

Consultation is a crucial tool for better regulation, as well as being essential for the accountability and legitimacy of decision-makers. The European minimum requirements for consultation are fundamental conditions in order to attain these goals. However, they may not be enough, and consultation should also be designed to neutralise or reveal cognitive limitations, both of decision-makers as well as of stakeholders. This paper claims that enriching the better regulation approach with cognitive insights can in fact increase consultation effectiveness and thus become a critical piece in the puzzle to improve the legitimacy of the European Commission. Moreover, it suggests some techniques to tackle this complexity, which need to be further assessed by ad hoc experiments.

The current repurposing of the principle of effet utile of European Union law can be found in the revolutionary steps taken by the Court of Justice in its application of Article 19 TEU. The implicit goal of this recent body of case-law is to equip national judges with the tools to resist domestic judicial reforms that affect their freedom to adjudicate independently. Considering Simmenthal to Unibet, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses to the latest case-law relating to the organisation of national judiciaries, this article contends that, while the case-law on judicial independence is unprecedented, the Court of Justice has gone to great lengths to ensure that the developments in EU law precipitated by its rulings are grounded in established doctrine. They follow a line of case-law that builds on the principle of primacy of EU law and the obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of EU law in the domestic legal order. Further, the current trajectory is for Article 19 TEU to form the operational basis of review of any judicially minded reforms, whether they be organisational (Article 19 TEU, together with Article 47 CFREU), limit actually or potentially the freedom for dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice (Article 19 TEU together with Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 CFREU) or where they reduce the protection of the value of the rule of law (Article 19 TEU, Article 2 TEU, Article 49 TEU and Article 47 CFREU), with potential implications for the effective application in EU law of the principle of mutual trust.

The rule-of-law-backsliding in some Member States has subverted not only one of the EU fundamental values but also trust among national authorities when implementing European Arrest Warrants (EAW). However, when evaluating the execution of EAWs issued by countries experiencing rule-of-law crises, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) sought to preserve judicial cooperation and imposed a rather “top-down” view on mutual trust among Member States. This approach seemingly disregards the (dis)trust which has emerged in the EU due to rule-of-law-backsliding and fails to acknowledge the psycho-sociological nature of trust. Drawing on the trust literature, the paper offers novel conceptual elements to rethink mutual trust in the EAW framework. Notably, it critically assesses some of the gaps in the CJEU's interpretation of mutual trust and advances suggestions to embed empirical considerations in the conceptualisation of this principle to bridge the gap between trust in practice and in principle.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the apex of the EU legal order, and is the supreme arbiter of EU law. For decades, it has delivered judgments, collectively shaping European integration and ‘integration through law’. It has undoubtedly been an authoritative leader in entrenching a European judicial culture, and has benefited from the cardinal principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU Treaties, which in turn, it has insisted on being upheld as regards national courts. Questions have rarely arisen, however, about judicial independence of the CJEU. The Sharpston Affair of 2020–2021 opened the door to questioning such judicial independence. Is the CJEU at the mercy of the Member States? If so, what are the consequences for the EU legal order? This article reflects on the judicial independence of the CJEU, and offers reflections on how it can be preserved in the future.

The ambition of this article is twofold. First, it argues that, in order to enhance respect for the rule of law by its Member States, the EU has launched a new strategy albeit essentially based on mechanisms which were not specifically designed to protect the rule of law. Second, the article aims to clarify the notion of rule of law resulting from this strategy and to subsequently analyse its consequences. In doing so, this article will thereby demonstrate that the instruments used by the new strategy promote a notion of the EU rule of law which implies a constant arbitrage between the rule of law and the economic objectives pursued by the EU. The risk may be, however, that it would subjugate fundamental values (as defined in Article 2 TEU) to the logic of European economic integration, thus inverting the hierarchy between protection for the rule of law and economic values.