Almas Haider Naqvi, Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas Assistant Professor
This paper is an attempt to analyse the Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian policy responses towards the South Asia particularly India and Pakistan contextualising how the systemic pressures stimulated from balance of power and intervened by domestic factors specifically ideology and leaders’ images played important role in policy formulation and execution. Majority explanations of Soviet-Russian South Asian policy do not offer analysis of inside-out interactions. Incorporation of domestic factors in analysis would provide better explanation of Soviet-Russian policy and the key developments in South Asia. Soft-positivist methodology with qualitative and quantitative methods are employed to analyse data from primary and secondary sources. The paper categorises four distinct phases of Russian South Asia policy responses; Estrangement (1947-1953), Engagement (1954-1971), Indo-Centrality (1971-1991), Pragmatism (1991-2022) stimulated by systemic and intervened by domestic factors. Balancing and competition with the United States (US) and China primarily motivates Soviet Union to shape policy but ideology, leaders’ perceptions and images also influenced.
{"title":"Russian South Asia Policy: From Estrangement to Pragmatism","authors":"Almas Haider Naqvi, Dr. Syed Qandil Abbas Assistant Professor","doi":"10.53532/ss.042.01.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53532/ss.042.01.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an attempt to analyse the Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian policy responses towards the South Asia particularly India and Pakistan contextualising how the systemic pressures stimulated from balance of power and intervened by domestic factors specifically ideology and leaders’ images played important role in policy formulation and execution. Majority explanations of Soviet-Russian South Asian policy do not offer analysis of inside-out interactions. Incorporation of domestic factors in analysis would provide better explanation of Soviet-Russian policy and the key developments in South Asia. Soft-positivist methodology with qualitative and quantitative methods are employed to analyse data from primary and secondary sources. The paper categorises four distinct phases of Russian South Asia policy responses; Estrangement (1947-1953), Engagement (1954-1971), Indo-Centrality (1971-1991), Pragmatism (1991-2022) stimulated by systemic and intervened by domestic factors. Balancing and competition with the United States (US) and China primarily motivates Soviet Union to shape policy but ideology, leaders’ perceptions and images also influenced.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81096712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-04DOI: 10.53532/ss.042.01.00138
Victoria Schofield Independentwriter
Since 1947 the expectation that the fate of the disputed former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided by a plebiscite has been part of the narrative of the state’s history. Seventy-five years later, the plebiscite has never been held, the state remaining de facto divided between India and Pakistan, both accusing each other of illegally occupying the territory the other controls, while a significant proportion of the inhabitants of the state maintain that they have never been allowed their ‘right of self-determination.’[1] This paper examines the reasoning behind holding a plebiscite, the challenges of holding a unitary plebiscite in a state where the inhabitants of the major regions of the state have differing allegiances and aspirations and the reasons why the plebiscite was not held. It also explains why successive governments of Pakistan have clung to the notion of holding a plebiscite, whereas successive Indian governments have long since decided that a plebiscite is no longer necessary. Finally this paper will examine whether, in a changed demographic environment, with the state de facto divided for over half the time it was ever a united administrative unit, the holding of a plebiscite would resolve the issue or whether it would create more disaffection among disappointed minorities. [1] Pakistani maps and rhetoric describe the area of the state occupied by India as ‘illegally occupied disputed territory’; Indian maps describe the area of the state occupied by Pakistan as ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’ (POK).
{"title":"Plebiscite Conundrum in Jammu and Kashmir","authors":"Victoria Schofield Independentwriter","doi":"10.53532/ss.042.01.00138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53532/ss.042.01.00138","url":null,"abstract":"Since 1947 the expectation that the fate of the disputed former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided by a plebiscite has been part of the narrative of the state’s history. Seventy-five years later, the plebiscite has never been held, the state remaining de facto divided between India and Pakistan, both accusing each other of illegally occupying the territory the other controls, while a significant proportion of the inhabitants of the state maintain that they have never been allowed their ‘right of self-determination.’[1] This paper examines the reasoning behind holding a plebiscite, the challenges of holding a unitary plebiscite in a state where the inhabitants of the major regions of the state have differing allegiances and aspirations and the reasons why the plebiscite was not held. It also explains why successive governments of Pakistan have clung to the notion of holding a plebiscite, whereas successive Indian governments have long since decided that a plebiscite is no longer necessary. Finally this paper will examine whether, in a changed demographic environment, with the state de facto divided for over half the time it was ever a united administrative unit, the holding of a plebiscite would resolve the issue or whether it would create more disaffection among disappointed minorities. \u0000 \u0000[1] Pakistani maps and rhetoric describe the area of the state occupied by India as ‘illegally occupied disputed territory’; Indian maps describe the area of the state occupied by Pakistan as ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’ (POK).","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82702358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-31DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2104836
Woody Wu
ABSTRACT This article sheds new light on how the war on the Yangtze became integrated into the broader Allied war effort and contributed to the collapse of the Japanese wartime economy. From 1940 to 1945, the Sino-Japanese conflict on the Yangtze, while influenced by developments in other theatres, remained at the core of Kuomintang’s concerns and strategy. The fall of Yichang caused severe economic and strategic difficulties in Free China. Assisted by the US, the Chinese forces repelled the Japanese expansion in West Hubei. Moreover, the Sino-US aerial interdictions on the Yangtze halted iron ore shipment essential to the Japanese economy.
{"title":"The Yangtze and the Sino-US cooperation in World War II, 1940–1945","authors":"Woody Wu","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2104836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2104836","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article sheds new light on how the war on the Yangtze became integrated into the broader Allied war effort and contributed to the collapse of the Japanese wartime economy. From 1940 to 1945, the Sino-Japanese conflict on the Yangtze, while influenced by developments in other theatres, remained at the core of Kuomintang’s concerns and strategy. The fall of Yichang caused severe economic and strategic difficulties in Free China. Assisted by the US, the Chinese forces repelled the Japanese expansion in West Hubei. Moreover, the Sino-US aerial interdictions on the Yangtze halted iron ore shipment essential to the Japanese economy.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91197538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-31DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2104837
Grant Golub
ABSTRACT Many accounts of the formation of American and British grand strategy during World War II between the fall of France and the Pearl Harbor attacks stress the differences between the two sides’ strategic thinking. These accounts argue that while the Americans favored a ‘direct’ Germany-first approach to defeating the Axis powers, the British preferred the ‘indirect’ or ‘peripheral’ method. However, a review of Anglo-American strategic planning in this period shows that before official U.S. wartime entry, both sides largely agreed the British ‘peripheral’ approach was the wisest grand strategy for winning the war.
{"title":"The Eagle and the Lion: Reassessing Anglo-American strategic planning and the foundations of U.S. grand strategy for World War II","authors":"Grant Golub","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2104837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2104837","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many accounts of the formation of American and British grand strategy during World War II between the fall of France and the Pearl Harbor attacks stress the differences between the two sides’ strategic thinking. These accounts argue that while the Americans favored a ‘direct’ Germany-first approach to defeating the Axis powers, the British preferred the ‘indirect’ or ‘peripheral’ method. However, a review of Anglo-American strategic planning in this period shows that before official U.S. wartime entry, both sides largely agreed the British ‘peripheral’ approach was the wisest grand strategy for winning the war.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78264312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-27DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2104255
Augusto C. Dall’Agnol
Technological and scientific progress, especially the rapid development of information technology (IT), plays a crucial role in peace and security issues1. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one example. AI is a sub-discipline of computer science, dealing with computer systems capable of performing tasks which require human intelligence2. According to James Johnson, PhD, Lecturer in Strategic Studies in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Aberdeen and author of the book Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare, the hype around this has made it easy to overstate the opportunities and challenges posed by the development and deployment of AI in the military sphere. The author argues, that “speculations about super intelligent AI or the threat of superman AI to humanity” are entirely disconnected from today’s capabilities of AI. The book aims to address this problem by deciphering “proven capabilities and applications from mere speculation”, with a strong focus on the challenges AI poses to strategic stability, nuclear deterrence and how AI might influence nuclear weapon systems. The author concludes with implications and policy recommendations on how states could manage the escalatory risks posed by AI.
{"title":"Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare: The USA, China, and strategic stability","authors":"Augusto C. Dall’Agnol","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2104255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2104255","url":null,"abstract":"Technological and scientific progress, especially the rapid development of information technology (IT), plays a crucial role in peace and security issues1. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one example. AI is a sub-discipline of computer science, dealing with computer systems capable of performing tasks which require human intelligence2. According to James Johnson, PhD, Lecturer in Strategic Studies in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Aberdeen and author of the book Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare, the hype around this has made it easy to overstate the opportunities and challenges posed by the development and deployment of AI in the military sphere. The author argues, that “speculations about super intelligent AI or the threat of superman AI to humanity” are entirely disconnected from today’s capabilities of AI. The book aims to address this problem by deciphering “proven capabilities and applications from mere speculation”, with a strong focus on the challenges AI poses to strategic stability, nuclear deterrence and how AI might influence nuclear weapon systems. The author concludes with implications and policy recommendations on how states could manage the escalatory risks posed by AI.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73556544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-27DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2104253
Lennart Maschmeyer
ABSTRACT Theorizing on cyber conflict has moved from warfare to conflict short of war, but strategic thought has not kept pace. This article argues cyber conflict is subversive, builds on intelligence scholarship to identify strategies of subversion, and examines their applicability in cyber conflict. It distinguishes three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. The analysis shows cyber operations can only implement one of these strategies (erosion), indicating they offer less strategic value than traditional counterparts. Accordingly, although cyber operations offer superior scale, I argue their scope of influence is more limited. Finally, the article discusses strategic implications and identifies possible counterstrategies.
{"title":"A new and better quiet option? Strategies of subversion and cyber conflict","authors":"Lennart Maschmeyer","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2104253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2104253","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Theorizing on cyber conflict has moved from warfare to conflict short of war, but strategic thought has not kept pace. This article argues cyber conflict is subversive, builds on intelligence scholarship to identify strategies of subversion, and examines their applicability in cyber conflict. It distinguishes three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. The analysis shows cyber operations can only implement one of these strategies (erosion), indicating they offer less strategic value than traditional counterparts. Accordingly, although cyber operations offer superior scale, I argue their scope of influence is more limited. Finally, the article discusses strategic implications and identifies possible counterstrategies.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82884126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-24DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2074651
R. Overy
29 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. “We Russians don’t give a shit about all their sanctions. We are [now] more self-sufficient.” The bravado expressed by the Russian ambassador to Sweden in February 2022 about the threatened use of sanctions to deter an invasion of Ukraine would have been unthinkable in the period covering the world wars of the last century, if The Economic Weapon is any guide. World leaders then lived in fear of blockades or embargoes, after the British-led ones during World War I against Germany and ally Austria-Hungary led to the deaths of 300,000– 400,000 civilians. Mulder notes that the death toll was just as high against fellow belligerent Turkey in the then “Ottoman provinces of the Middle East.” (5)
{"title":"The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War","authors":"R. Overy","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2074651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2074651","url":null,"abstract":"29 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. “We Russians don’t give a shit about all their sanctions. We are [now] more self-sufficient.” The bravado expressed by the Russian ambassador to Sweden in February 2022 about the threatened use of sanctions to deter an invasion of Ukraine would have been unthinkable in the period covering the world wars of the last century, if The Economic Weapon is any guide. World leaders then lived in fear of blockades or embargoes, after the British-led ones during World War I against Germany and ally Austria-Hungary led to the deaths of 300,000– 400,000 civilians. Mulder notes that the death toll was just as high against fellow belligerent Turkey in the then “Ottoman provinces of the Middle East.” (5)","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83106600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-17DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2068263
Brian Holden Reid
ABSTRACT The historiography of the US Civil War during the twenty-first century has pursued four directions or 'turns' - the operational, strategic, cultural and the 'dark'. The latter underlines the human cost of the war, death, disfigurement and suffering. It has adopted the British language of commemoration of the First World War in stressing the 'futility' of war. The essay explores the context of these 'turns' and assesses three significant contributions to the field which exemplify their strengths and weaknesses. The article contends that war is a multifaceted activity and is primarily about human beings. The effects of war on individuals and their combined influence on the culture of societies is key to understanding the nature of war. Consequently, the article argues against discussing the US Civil War through the medium of exclusive categories. Alternative approaches from different perspectives and directions should be encouraged. Necessity does not require 'turning' down one path while ignoring the others.
{"title":"Which way to turn? Recent directions in writing about the American Civil War","authors":"Brian Holden Reid","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2068263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2068263","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The historiography of the US Civil War during the twenty-first century has pursued four directions or 'turns' - the operational, strategic, cultural and the 'dark'. The latter underlines the human cost of the war, death, disfigurement and suffering. It has adopted the British language of commemoration of the First World War in stressing the 'futility' of war. The essay explores the context of these 'turns' and assesses three significant contributions to the field which exemplify their strengths and weaknesses. The article contends that war is a multifaceted activity and is primarily about human beings. The effects of war on individuals and their combined influence on the culture of societies is key to understanding the nature of war. Consequently, the article argues against discussing the US Civil War through the medium of exclusive categories. Alternative approaches from different perspectives and directions should be encouraged. Necessity does not require 'turning' down one path while ignoring the others.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82858257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-11DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2074405
Jeffrey H. Michaels
ABSTRACT Scholars focused on NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War have devoted little attention to the dynamics of how the Alliance would decide to use nuclear weapons. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the internal debates about how a nuclear use decision would be taken, particularly balancing the desire to ensure adequate consultation of the non-nuclear members without undermining the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent by giving them a veto. To avoid undermining Alliance cohesion, the nuclear use decision process was kept deliberately vague, despite the problems that would almost certainly have arisen in a war.
{"title":"“No annihilation without representation”: NATO nuclear use decision-making during the Cold War","authors":"Jeffrey H. Michaels","doi":"10.1080/01402390.2022.2074405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2074405","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Scholars focused on NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War have devoted little attention to the dynamics of how the Alliance would decide to use nuclear weapons. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the internal debates about how a nuclear use decision would be taken, particularly balancing the desire to ensure adequate consultation of the non-nuclear members without undermining the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent by giving them a veto. To avoid undermining Alliance cohesion, the nuclear use decision process was kept deliberately vague, despite the problems that would almost certainly have arisen in a war.","PeriodicalId":47240,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Strategic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81691298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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