Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1663763
Ching-Lin Wu, Meng-Ning Tsai, Hsueh-Chih Chen
Abstract Only problems that cannot be solved without representational changes can be regarded as pure insight problems; others are classified as pseudo-insight problems. Existing studies using neuroimaging have not yet distinguished between pure insight and pseudo-insight problems. This study is the first to investigate the brain mechanism of representational change via the remote associates test. Based on the homonymy of Chinese characters, we developed two sets of Chinese remote associates tests (CRATs). By comparing the brain activity of 30 adults during pure and pseudo-insight problem solving, we analysed the commonality and uniqueness of brain activation while solving these two insight problems. The results show that these two types of insight problem solving share the same brain activation area (i.e., the ventral precuneus and thalamus) and different operating areas. This study enhances our understanding of how representational change generates insight.
{"title":"The neural mechanism of pure and pseudo-insight problem solving","authors":"Ching-Lin Wu, Meng-Ning Tsai, Hsueh-Chih Chen","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1663763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1663763","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Only problems that cannot be solved without representational changes can be regarded as pure insight problems; others are classified as pseudo-insight problems. Existing studies using neuroimaging have not yet distinguished between pure insight and pseudo-insight problems. This study is the first to investigate the brain mechanism of representational change via the remote associates test. Based on the homonymy of Chinese characters, we developed two sets of Chinese remote associates tests (CRATs). By comparing the brain activity of 30 adults during pure and pseudo-insight problem solving, we analysed the commonality and uniqueness of brain activation while solving these two insight problems. The results show that these two types of insight problem solving share the same brain activation area (i.e., the ventral precuneus and thalamus) and different operating areas. This study enhances our understanding of how representational change generates insight.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"27 1","pages":"479 - 501"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82691459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1685001
Christine Blech, R. Gaschler, M. Bilalic
Abstract Einstellung (mental set) effects designate the phenomenon where established routines can prevent people from finding other, possibly more efficient solutions. Here we investigate the mechanism behind this phenomenon by using Luchins’ classical water jug paradigm with concurrent verbalization. We find no difference in the extent of the Einstellung effect between the group which was instructed to think aloud during the problem solving and the group which was thinking silently. The think-aloud protocols indicate that the participants who exhibited the Einstellung effect repeatedly attempted to solve the water jug problem by using variations of the previously successful method which had been rendered inappropriate in the final problem. Our study underlines the usefulness of the think-aloud technique in tracking the cognitive processes. More importantly, it demonstrates how, once thought has been activated, it may bias subsequent dealings with new situations, even in the face of repeated failure that people experience in the Einstellung situations.
{"title":"Why do people fail to see simple solutions? Using think-aloud protocols to uncover the mechanism behind the Einstellung (mental set) effect","authors":"Christine Blech, R. Gaschler, M. Bilalic","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1685001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1685001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Einstellung (mental set) effects designate the phenomenon where established routines can prevent people from finding other, possibly more efficient solutions. Here we investigate the mechanism behind this phenomenon by using Luchins’ classical water jug paradigm with concurrent verbalization. We find no difference in the extent of the Einstellung effect between the group which was instructed to think aloud during the problem solving and the group which was thinking silently. The think-aloud protocols indicate that the participants who exhibited the Einstellung effect repeatedly attempted to solve the water jug problem by using variations of the previously successful method which had been rendered inappropriate in the final problem. Our study underlines the usefulness of the think-aloud technique in tracking the cognitive processes. More importantly, it demonstrates how, once thought has been activated, it may bias subsequent dealings with new situations, even in the face of repeated failure that people experience in the Einstellung situations.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"550 1","pages":"552 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88880392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1668479
J. Petervari, Amory H. Danek
Abstract This study investigated how problem solvers get into and out of a state of impasse while solving difficult problems. 47 participants had to decipher the secret method behind 33 magic tricks while repeatedly giving feeling of warmth ratings. After the first viewing of each trick, participants were led into an impasse by presenting two implausible solutions, together with the information that those were incorrect. After another viewing, cues were given to guide out of the impasse. Warmth ratings were flat and non-increasing after the implausible solution manipulation, suggesting a state of impasse. Cues helped to overcome the impasse, with higher solution rates for pictorial (49%) than for verbal cues (39%) and both higher than a no cue condition (29%). Warmth ratings also reflected cue efficacy, with higher ratings after helpful cues. This study represents a first attempt at influencing the onset and offset of the state of impasse.
{"title":"Problem solving of magic tricks: guiding to and through an impasse with solution cues","authors":"J. Petervari, Amory H. Danek","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1668479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1668479","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study investigated how problem solvers get into and out of a state of impasse while solving difficult problems. 47 participants had to decipher the secret method behind 33 magic tricks while repeatedly giving feeling of warmth ratings. After the first viewing of each trick, participants were led into an impasse by presenting two implausible solutions, together with the information that those were incorrect. After another viewing, cues were given to guide out of the impasse. Warmth ratings were flat and non-increasing after the implausible solution manipulation, suggesting a state of impasse. Cues helped to overcome the impasse, with higher solution rates for pictorial (49%) than for verbal cues (39%) and both higher than a no cue condition (29%). Warmth ratings also reflected cue efficacy, with higher ratings after helpful cues. This study represents a first attempt at influencing the onset and offset of the state of impasse.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"50 1","pages":"502 - 533"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73512523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-01DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1679665
A. Rosas, David Aguilar-Pardo
Abstract The mainstream version of the dual-process model of moral cognition claims that utilitarian responses (URs) to sacrificial moral dilemmas are the outputs of controlled cognitive processes. This version predicts that interfering with cognitive resources should elicit more intuitive-deontological responses. Attempts in the literature to experimentally confirm this prediction have been inconclusive. Some experiments partially confirm the prediction, but others suggest that URs are slightly favoured in the time-pressure condition. We present a sequence of four studies with the same background design (total N = 2261) implementing extreme time-pressure. Our data consistently suggest that time-pressure increases URs. The effect is small, but the trend is stable. When confronted with sacrificial dilemmas, our samples slightly favour URs under time pressure. Models of moral cognition should be prepared to include both deontological and utilitarian intuitions as part of the basic structure of moral processing.
{"title":"Extreme time-pressure reveals utilitarian intuitions in sacrificial dilemmas","authors":"A. Rosas, David Aguilar-Pardo","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1679665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1679665","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The mainstream version of the dual-process model of moral cognition claims that utilitarian responses (URs) to sacrificial moral dilemmas are the outputs of controlled cognitive processes. This version predicts that interfering with cognitive resources should elicit more intuitive-deontological responses. Attempts in the literature to experimentally confirm this prediction have been inconclusive. Some experiments partially confirm the prediction, but others suggest that URs are slightly favoured in the time-pressure condition. We present a sequence of four studies with the same background design (total N = 2261) implementing extreme time-pressure. Our data consistently suggest that time-pressure increases URs. The effect is small, but the trend is stable. When confronted with sacrificial dilemmas, our samples slightly favour URs under time pressure. Models of moral cognition should be prepared to include both deontological and utilitarian intuitions as part of the basic structure of moral processing.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"114 1","pages":"534 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79616497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1819415
Li He, Yoed N. Kenett, Kaixiang Zhuang, Cheng Liu, Rongcan Zeng, Tingrui Yan, Tengbin Huo, J. Qiu
Abstract Research has independently highlighted the roles of semantic memory and associative abilities in creative thinking. However, it remains unclear how these two capacities relate to each other, nor how they facilitate different creative thinking modalities, such as verbal and figural creativity. This study employed multiple cognitive tests and network science methodologies to shed light on the relationship between them. We constructed individual-based semantic networks and assessed associative abilities, verbal and figural creative thinking. In line with previous studies, we found a relation between verbal creativity and more flexible semantic memory structure (higher connectivity, shorter distances between concepts, and lower modularity). However, we did not find any such relation between figural creativity and semantic memory structure. Associative abilities mediated the relationship between semantic memory structure and verbal creativity, implying the efficient spread of information in semantic memory may facilitate verbal creative thinking via associative abilities. These findings support and extend the associative theory of creativity and shed novel light on the relationship between semantic memory structure, associative abilities, and creativity.
{"title":"The relation between semantic memory structure, associative abilities, and verbal and figural creativity","authors":"Li He, Yoed N. Kenett, Kaixiang Zhuang, Cheng Liu, Rongcan Zeng, Tingrui Yan, Tengbin Huo, J. Qiu","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1819415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1819415","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research has independently highlighted the roles of semantic memory and associative abilities in creative thinking. However, it remains unclear how these two capacities relate to each other, nor how they facilitate different creative thinking modalities, such as verbal and figural creativity. This study employed multiple cognitive tests and network science methodologies to shed light on the relationship between them. We constructed individual-based semantic networks and assessed associative abilities, verbal and figural creative thinking. In line with previous studies, we found a relation between verbal creativity and more flexible semantic memory structure (higher connectivity, shorter distances between concepts, and lower modularity). However, we did not find any such relation between figural creativity and semantic memory structure. Associative abilities mediated the relationship between semantic memory structure and verbal creativity, implying the efficient spread of information in semantic memory may facilitate verbal creative thinking via associative abilities. These findings support and extend the associative theory of creativity and shed novel light on the relationship between semantic memory structure, associative abilities, and creativity.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"16 1","pages":"268 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72823029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-10DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1819416
Amy M. Smith, Grace Elliott, Gregory I. Hughes, R. Feinn, Tad T. Brunyé
Abstract Analogical reasoning relies on subprocesses of long-term memory and problem-solving. Stress, with its accompanying hormones dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) and cortisol, has been shown to impair memory retrieval but potentially enhance problem solving. The present study combined Gick and Holyoak’s Duncker’s Radiation Problem with stress induction to determine the influence of stress on these two components of analogical reasoning. Participants (N = 131) learned an analog story and returned a day later for a stressful or non-stressful task. They then completed three consecutive tests: a spontaneous attempt at Duncker’s Problem, a recall test for the analog, and another attempt at Duncker’s Problem using analogical reasoning. Stress did not influence spontaneous problem-solving or story recall but did improve performance on the second attempt at Duncker’s Problem. Further, performance trended toward a positive association with DHEA. Thus, stress and increases in DHEA may enhance identification and use of an analog to solve a problem.
{"title":"Acute stress improves analogical reasoning: examining the roles of stress hormones and long-term memory","authors":"Amy M. Smith, Grace Elliott, Gregory I. Hughes, R. Feinn, Tad T. Brunyé","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1819416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1819416","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Analogical reasoning relies on subprocesses of long-term memory and problem-solving. Stress, with its accompanying hormones dehydroepiandrosterone (DHEA) and cortisol, has been shown to impair memory retrieval but potentially enhance problem solving. The present study combined Gick and Holyoak’s Duncker’s Radiation Problem with stress induction to determine the influence of stress on these two components of analogical reasoning. Participants (N = 131) learned an analog story and returned a day later for a stressful or non-stressful task. They then completed three consecutive tests: a spontaneous attempt at Duncker’s Problem, a recall test for the analog, and another attempt at Duncker’s Problem using analogical reasoning. Stress did not influence spontaneous problem-solving or story recall but did improve performance on the second attempt at Duncker’s Problem. Further, performance trended toward a positive association with DHEA. Thus, stress and increases in DHEA may enhance identification and use of an analog to solve a problem.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"42 1","pages":"294 - 318"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85189809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-21DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1794958
R. Ricco, H. Koshino, Anthony Sierra, Jasmine Bonsel, Jay Von Monteza, Da’Nae Owens
Abstract An outstanding question for Hybrid dual process models of reasoning is whether both basic (e.g., modus ponens - MP) and more complex (e.g., modus tollens - MT) forms of conditional inference result from intuitive, type 1 processes. The present study considers whether a proclivity, ability, or capacity to engage in analytical (type 2) thinking might be more closely related to performance on MT than to performance on MP. Such a finding would suggest that the extent to which MT is intuitive for an individual is a function of analytical thinking level and that, in general, MT is not as intuitive an inference form as MP. The present study tested this prediction by way of a conditional reasoning task on which instructional set (belief or logic), congruency, and complexity of inference were manipulated. While results varied somewhat across experiments, it was generally the case that differences in performance between low and high levels of analytical thinking proclivity (AOT), ability (CRT), and capacity (Working Memory Span) were greater for MT problems than for MP problems suggesting that these inference forms may not be equally intuitive.
{"title":"Individual differences in analytical thinking and complexity of inference in conditional reasoning","authors":"R. Ricco, H. Koshino, Anthony Sierra, Jasmine Bonsel, Jay Von Monteza, Da’Nae Owens","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1794958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1794958","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An outstanding question for Hybrid dual process models of reasoning is whether both basic (e.g., modus ponens - MP) and more complex (e.g., modus tollens - MT) forms of conditional inference result from intuitive, type 1 processes. The present study considers whether a proclivity, ability, or capacity to engage in analytical (type 2) thinking might be more closely related to performance on MT than to performance on MP. Such a finding would suggest that the extent to which MT is intuitive for an individual is a function of analytical thinking level and that, in general, MT is not as intuitive an inference form as MP. The present study tested this prediction by way of a conditional reasoning task on which instructional set (belief or logic), congruency, and complexity of inference were manipulated. While results varied somewhat across experiments, it was generally the case that differences in performance between low and high levels of analytical thinking proclivity (AOT), ability (CRT), and capacity (Working Memory Span) were greater for MT problems than for MP problems suggesting that these inference forms may not be equally intuitive.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"165 1","pages":"319 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73708208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-13DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2020.1793813
Zoë A. Purcell, C. Wastell, Naomi Sweller
Abstract Prominent dual process models assert that reasoning processes can transition from effortful (Type 2) to intuitive (Type 1) with increases in domain-specific experience. In two studies we directly examine this automation hypothesis. We examine the nature of the relationship between mathematical experience and performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). We test performance and response time at different levels of experience and cognitive constraint. Participants are required to complete a secondary task of varying complexity while solving the CRT. In Study 1, we demonstrate changes in thinking Type across real-world differences in mathematical experience. In Study 2, convergent with Study 1, we demonstrate changes in thinking Type across a mathematical training paradigm. Our findings suggest that for some individuals low experience is associated with Type 1 processing, intermediate experience is associated with Type 2 processing, and high experience is associated with Type 1 processing. Whereas, for other individuals low experience is associated with ineffective Type 2 processing, intermediate experience is associated with effective Type 2 processing, and high experience is associated with Type 1 processing.
{"title":"Domain-specific experience and dual-process thinking","authors":"Zoë A. Purcell, C. Wastell, Naomi Sweller","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2020.1793813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2020.1793813","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Prominent dual process models assert that reasoning processes can transition from effortful (Type 2) to intuitive (Type 1) with increases in domain-specific experience. In two studies we directly examine this automation hypothesis. We examine the nature of the relationship between mathematical experience and performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). We test performance and response time at different levels of experience and cognitive constraint. Participants are required to complete a secondary task of varying complexity while solving the CRT. In Study 1, we demonstrate changes in thinking Type across real-world differences in mathematical experience. In Study 2, convergent with Study 1, we demonstrate changes in thinking Type across a mathematical training paradigm. Our findings suggest that for some individuals low experience is associated with Type 1 processing, intermediate experience is associated with Type 2 processing, and high experience is associated with Type 1 processing. Whereas, for other individuals low experience is associated with ineffective Type 2 processing, intermediate experience is associated with effective Type 2 processing, and high experience is associated with Type 1 processing.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"13 1","pages":"239 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86928545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1633404
S. Littrell, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Evan F. Risko
Abstract There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here, we examine whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and need for cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective thinking.
{"title":"Overconfidently underthinking: narcissism negatively predicts cognitive reflection","authors":"S. Littrell, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Evan F. Risko","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1633404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1633404","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here, we examine whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and need for cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective thinking.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"75 1","pages":"352 - 380"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86079381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2019.1649191
Dominika Drążyk, Martyna Kumka, Katarzyna Zarzycka, Paulina Zguda, A. Chuderski
Abstract Recently, DeCaro and Van Stockum have suggested that ego depletion following intensive self-control can improve insight problem-solving; this finding was interpreted in terms of insight relying on decreased control over attention and memory. However, DeCaro and Van Stockum used three variants of the single matchstick arithmetic problem. Experiment 1 involved low sample and non-standard problem application, while the more powered Experiment 2 yielded a surprisingly low solution rate. These facts made both studies problematic and called for their replication. In the two present studies, the DeCaro and Van Stockum ego-depletion manipulation and their matchstick problems were administered to a total of 316 people. Furthermore, various other insight problems, subjective ratings of insight experience, analytical problems and executive control tests were applied. The key result was that no reliable effect of ego depletion could be found for any of these measures.
{"title":"No indication that the ego depletion manipulation can affect insight: a comment on DeCaro and Van Stockum (2018)","authors":"Dominika Drążyk, Martyna Kumka, Katarzyna Zarzycka, Paulina Zguda, A. Chuderski","doi":"10.1080/13546783.2019.1649191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1649191","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, DeCaro and Van Stockum have suggested that ego depletion following intensive self-control can improve insight problem-solving; this finding was interpreted in terms of insight relying on decreased control over attention and memory. However, DeCaro and Van Stockum used three variants of the single matchstick arithmetic problem. Experiment 1 involved low sample and non-standard problem application, while the more powered Experiment 2 yielded a surprisingly low solution rate. These facts made both studies problematic and called for their replication. In the two present studies, the DeCaro and Van Stockum ego-depletion manipulation and their matchstick problems were administered to a total of 316 people. Furthermore, various other insight problems, subjective ratings of insight experience, analytical problems and executive control tests were applied. The key result was that no reliable effect of ego depletion could be found for any of these measures.","PeriodicalId":47270,"journal":{"name":"Thinking & Reasoning","volume":"1 1","pages":"414 - 446"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81192675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：