Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2225779
A. Fanlo, L. Sukin
Abstract When crises occur between nuclear-armed states, do relative nuclear capabilities affect the outcome? The literature offers no consensus about nuclear superiority’s effect on crisis victory, but this article demonstrates that this effect depends on the size of the disparity between states’ nuclear arsenals. Although superiority is correlated with victory in crises between states with similarly sized nuclear arsenals, superiority provides no advantage in asymmetric crises. Because a vastly inferior state risks annihilation in a nuclear conflict, it will acquiesce to an opponent’s demands before the crisis occurs, unless backing down implies an existential threat as well. Given an asymmetric crisis has emerged, therefore, the inferior side will be willing to bid up the risk of nuclear war, deterring superior opponents. Using quantitative analyses of crisis data, this article shows that the positive association between nuclear superiority and crisis victory decreases as the disparity between competing states’ arsenals increases.
{"title":"The Disadvantage of Nuclear Superiority","authors":"A. Fanlo, L. Sukin","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2225779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225779","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When crises occur between nuclear-armed states, do relative nuclear capabilities affect the outcome? The literature offers no consensus about nuclear superiority’s effect on crisis victory, but this article demonstrates that this effect depends on the size of the disparity between states’ nuclear arsenals. Although superiority is correlated with victory in crises between states with similarly sized nuclear arsenals, superiority provides no advantage in asymmetric crises. Because a vastly inferior state risks annihilation in a nuclear conflict, it will acquiesce to an opponent’s demands before the crisis occurs, unless backing down implies an existential threat as well. Given an asymmetric crisis has emerged, therefore, the inferior side will be willing to bid up the risk of nuclear war, deterring superior opponents. Using quantitative analyses of crisis data, this article shows that the positive association between nuclear superiority and crisis victory decreases as the disparity between competing states’ arsenals increases.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"446 - 475"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48597557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2226329
Henrique Garbino
Abstract Rebels have become the most prolific users of landmines but still display significant variation in how they employ and restrict the weapon’s use. This article argues that how rebels exercise restraint on landmine use depends on which audiences they rely on most. In a comparative case study of three Philippine rebel groups—the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the New People’s Army—this article highlights three main findings. First, rebels reliant on voluntary compliance from local communities are more likely to limit the effects of landmines on their perceived constituency. Second, when rebels have conciliatory relations with the government, they are more likely to comply with national law, reciprocate government behavior, and limit the effects of landmines on the government’s constituents. Finally, rebels seeking legitimacy from human-rights-conscious foreign sponsors are more likely to comply with international law related to landmine use.
{"title":"Rebels against Mines? Legitimacy and Restraint on Landmine Use in the Philippines","authors":"Henrique Garbino","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2226329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2226329","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Rebels have become the most prolific users of landmines but still display significant variation in how they employ and restrict the weapon’s use. This article argues that how rebels exercise restraint on landmine use depends on which audiences they rely on most. In a comparative case study of three Philippine rebel groups—the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the New People’s Army—this article highlights three main findings. First, rebels reliant on voluntary compliance from local communities are more likely to limit the effects of landmines on their perceived constituency. Second, when rebels have conciliatory relations with the government, they are more likely to comply with national law, reciprocate government behavior, and limit the effects of landmines on the government’s constituents. Finally, rebels seeking legitimacy from human-rights-conscious foreign sponsors are more likely to comply with international law related to landmine use.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"505 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45624253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2225784
A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Ivan Zaccagnini
In “Will the Drone Always Get Through?,” we investigated empirically whether Medium-Altitude and High-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE and HALE, respectively) drones make attacking comparatively easier or even easy in an absolute sense, as some analysts and scholars assume or claim. To conduct our analysis, we first translated existing arguments into testable hypotheses consistent with the literature on the offense–defense balance (ODB)—that is, whether drones shift the ODB toward the offense or to offensive dominance. Then we explored relevant disciplines such as radar engineering, electromagnetism, signal processing, and air defense operations to assess these competing hypotheses. For our analysis, we focused on currentand next-generation drones. Our findings suggest that currentgeneration drones neither lower the probability of interception by air defense systems compared to existing aerospace technologies, nor are they in the position to systematically avoid interception. Regarding next-generation drones, it is not possible to derive definitive conclusions, but our analysis suggests that scholars should pay more attention to how technological change affects the defense, not only the offense, as advances in semiconductors, big data, machine learning, and communications, among other fields, are going to significantly enhance air defense capabilities in the future. In the replies to our article, Jacquelyn Schneider, as well as Paul Lushenko and Sarah Kreps, criticize our investigation on several grounds: our findings are allegedly unsurprising; we should have investigated different dependent variables; we should have focused on different independent variables; and we should have employed a different measurement. These criticisms are either unwarranted or orthogonal to our analysis—that is, they neither question our methodology nor undermine our findings. However, we are grateful to Schneider and Lushenko and Kreps for engaging with our work. According to Schneider, our investigation is empirically correct; for Lushenko and Kreps, it provides the starting point to answer other research questions, including some they raise in their reply.
{"title":"Drones and Offensive Advantage: An Exchange – The Authors Reply","authors":"A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Ivan Zaccagnini","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2225784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225784","url":null,"abstract":"In “Will the Drone Always Get Through?,” we investigated empirically whether Medium-Altitude and High-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE and HALE, respectively) drones make attacking comparatively easier or even easy in an absolute sense, as some analysts and scholars assume or claim. To conduct our analysis, we first translated existing arguments into testable hypotheses consistent with the literature on the offense–defense balance (ODB)—that is, whether drones shift the ODB toward the offense or to offensive dominance. Then we explored relevant disciplines such as radar engineering, electromagnetism, signal processing, and air defense operations to assess these competing hypotheses. For our analysis, we focused on currentand next-generation drones. Our findings suggest that currentgeneration drones neither lower the probability of interception by air defense systems compared to existing aerospace technologies, nor are they in the position to systematically avoid interception. Regarding next-generation drones, it is not possible to derive definitive conclusions, but our analysis suggests that scholars should pay more attention to how technological change affects the defense, not only the offense, as advances in semiconductors, big data, machine learning, and communications, among other fields, are going to significantly enhance air defense capabilities in the future. In the replies to our article, Jacquelyn Schneider, as well as Paul Lushenko and Sarah Kreps, criticize our investigation on several grounds: our findings are allegedly unsurprising; we should have investigated different dependent variables; we should have focused on different independent variables; and we should have employed a different measurement. These criticisms are either unwarranted or orthogonal to our analysis—that is, they neither question our methodology nor undermine our findings. However, we are grateful to Schneider and Lushenko and Kreps for engaging with our work. According to Schneider, our investigation is empirically correct; for Lushenko and Kreps, it provides the starting point to answer other research questions, including some they raise in their reply.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"582 - 588"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47094782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2224924
Don Casler, David T. Ribar, Keren Yarhi-Milo
Abstract The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that an actor’s past record of keeping her word determines her cooperative credibility, and that mutual perceptions of credibility are essential in sustaining cooperation. Yet competing reputation-skeptic and psychological perspectives dispute this conventional wisdom, suggesting that assessments of cooperative credibility result from observers’ judgments about the other’s capabilities and interests or observers’ foreign policy orientations. How do observers assess others’ cooperative credibility? We field a nationally representative survey experiment asking 2,953 Americans to evaluate a hypothetical coercer’s commitment to lift sanctions on a would-be proliferator in exchange for the latter dismantling its nascent nuclear program. We vary the coercer’s previous behavior plus several other contextual factors. We find that respondents’ hawkishness interacts with the coercer’s past actions to shape respondents’ credibility assessments and their support for the proliferator accepting the proposal, with substantial implications for theories of misperception and bargaining.
{"title":"The Many Faces of Credibility: Hawks, Doves, and Nuclear Disarmament","authors":"Don Casler, David T. Ribar, Keren Yarhi-Milo","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2224924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2224924","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that an actor’s past record of keeping her word determines her cooperative credibility, and that mutual perceptions of credibility are essential in sustaining cooperation. Yet competing reputation-skeptic and psychological perspectives dispute this conventional wisdom, suggesting that assessments of cooperative credibility result from observers’ judgments about the other’s capabilities and interests or observers’ foreign policy orientations. How do observers assess others’ cooperative credibility? We field a nationally representative survey experiment asking 2,953 Americans to evaluate a hypothetical coercer’s commitment to lift sanctions on a would-be proliferator in exchange for the latter dismantling its nascent nuclear program. We vary the coercer’s previous behavior plus several other contextual factors. We find that respondents’ hawkishness interacts with the coercer’s past actions to shape respondents’ credibility assessments and their support for the proliferator accepting the proposal, with substantial implications for theories of misperception and bargaining.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"413 - 445"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41615721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780
James A. Piazza
Abstract Is political violence and support for political violence more prevalent in democratic societies with high levels of affective polarization? This study argues that affective partisan political polarization fosters dehumanization of opposing partisans, lends a moralistic and zero-sum nature to political life, and facilitates group mobilization. These all produce an environment in which political violence is both more socially acceptable and more frequent. The study tests this assertion using two sets of empirical tests: an original survey of 1,899 US residents and a cross-national time-series analysis of eighty-three democracies. It finds that in the United States, Democrats who express aversion toward Republicans are 8% more likely to express support for the use of political violence, whereas Republicans who express aversion toward Democrats are 18% more likely to endorse political violence. Furthermore, in the cross-national analysis, democracies characterized by higher levels of affective partisan political polarization are 34% more likely to experience frequent political violence.
{"title":"Political Polarization and Political Violence","authors":"James A. Piazza","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225780","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Is political violence and support for political violence more prevalent in democratic societies with high levels of affective polarization? This study argues that affective partisan political polarization fosters dehumanization of opposing partisans, lends a moralistic and zero-sum nature to political life, and facilitates group mobilization. These all produce an environment in which political violence is both more socially acceptable and more frequent. The study tests this assertion using two sets of empirical tests: an original survey of 1,899 US residents and a cross-national time-series analysis of eighty-three democracies. It finds that in the United States, Democrats who express aversion toward Republicans are 8% more likely to express support for the use of political violence, whereas Republicans who express aversion toward Democrats are 18% more likely to endorse political violence. Furthermore, in the cross-national analysis, democracies characterized by higher levels of affective partisan political polarization are 34% more likely to experience frequent political violence.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"476 - 504"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43756477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2225783
Paul Lushenko, S. Kreps
the United States has built unmanned systems that focus on decreasing political cost and privileging control, precision, and persistence over survivability, mass, and economic cost. But these are all human choices—they are not immutable or even unique characteristics of drones (or even of the narrow segment of drones on which the authors focus). So how would I answer the authors’ opening question: “Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage?” I would say the puzzle is not in a technological assessment of a few weapons’ capabilities in a snapshot of time, but instead in the complicated interaction of technologies, tactics, and human choices that ultimately determine the winners and losers of war. And for this more complicated puzzle, I would argue that the article, while factually correct, is unscorable at 12.
{"title":"Tactical Myths and Perceptions of Reality","authors":"Paul Lushenko, S. Kreps","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2225783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225783","url":null,"abstract":"the United States has built unmanned systems that focus on decreasing political cost and privileging control, precision, and persistence over survivability, mass, and economic cost. But these are all human choices—they are not immutable or even unique characteristics of drones (or even of the narrow segment of drones on which the authors focus). So how would I answer the authors’ opening question: “Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage?” I would say the puzzle is not in a technological assessment of a few weapons’ capabilities in a snapshot of time, but instead in the complicated interaction of technologies, tactics, and human choices that ultimately determine the winners and losers of war. And for this more complicated puzzle, I would argue that the article, while factually correct, is unscorable at 12.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"574 - 581"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47473773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2229238
Meghan Garrity
Abstract Given similar probabilities of mass expulsion, why do some governments expel ethnic groups en masse and others refrain? Extending the genocide studies literature on the dynamics of restraint, this theory-building study introduces a new framework to conceptualize the process of governments’ mass expulsion policy decisions. The novel paired-comparison case study of Asian minorities in postcolonial Uganda and Kenya generates new hypotheses about what enables and constrains a specific type of eliminationist policy. Despite analogous contexts, target populations, and motives to expel, in 1972 Uganda systematically expelled up to 80,000 South Asians en masse, whereas in 1967–69 Kenya did not. The negative case of Kenya, a country that seemed likely to expel but refrained, highlights important factors that constrain government expulsion decisions: alliances, target group “homeland” state(s), and international organizations. Evidence was drawn from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The article concludes by outlining a research agenda to test the new analytical framework to contribute to our understanding of demographic engineering policies and restraints on ethnic violence.
{"title":"What Enables or Constrains Mass Expulsion? A New Decision-Making Framework","authors":"Meghan Garrity","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2229238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2229238","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Given similar probabilities of mass expulsion, why do some governments expel ethnic groups en masse and others refrain? Extending the genocide studies literature on the dynamics of restraint, this theory-building study introduces a new framework to conceptualize the process of governments’ mass expulsion policy decisions. The novel paired-comparison case study of Asian minorities in postcolonial Uganda and Kenya generates new hypotheses about what enables and constrains a specific type of eliminationist policy. Despite analogous contexts, target populations, and motives to expel, in 1972 Uganda systematically expelled up to 80,000 South Asians en masse, whereas in 1967–69 Kenya did not. The negative case of Kenya, a country that seemed likely to expel but refrained, highlights important factors that constrain government expulsion decisions: alliances, target group “homeland” state(s), and international organizations. Evidence was drawn from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The article concludes by outlining a research agenda to test the new analytical framework to contribute to our understanding of demographic engineering policies and restraints on ethnic violence.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"537 - 567"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48705582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2225782
Jacquelyn G. Schneider
In “Will the Drone Always Get Through? Offensive Myths and Defensive Realities,” Antonio Calcara and coauthors open the article with: “Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage?”1 To answer this ambitious question, they look at one highly scoped segment of unmanned or autonomous technology: Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance and High-Altitude Long-Endurance armed remotely piloted aircraft.2 The authors then use the article’s body to detail why these platforms cannot survive against modern integrated air defense systems by either avoiding detection or saturating air defenses, concluding that emerging technologies, therefore, do not necessarily lead to an offensive advantage.3 Although the article’s technical analysis is reasonably correct, in creating a straw man argument about the impetus and purpose of a rather narrow category of autonomous systems, its conclusions ultimately miss the mark. For all the technical detail, the authors miss the potential impact of autonomy on future air campaigns, a phenomenon that American pilots in training would call “unscorable at 12”—a term used when a bomb is dropped within correct parameters and yet fails to land near the impact zone.4
{"title":"Unscorable at 12: Technically Correct, but Misses the Mark","authors":"Jacquelyn G. Schneider","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2225782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225782","url":null,"abstract":"In “Will the Drone Always Get Through? Offensive Myths and Defensive Realities,” Antonio Calcara and coauthors open the article with: “Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage?”1 To answer this ambitious question, they look at one highly scoped segment of unmanned or autonomous technology: Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance and High-Altitude Long-Endurance armed remotely piloted aircraft.2 The authors then use the article’s body to detail why these platforms cannot survive against modern integrated air defense systems by either avoiding detection or saturating air defenses, concluding that emerging technologies, therefore, do not necessarily lead to an offensive advantage.3 Although the article’s technical analysis is reasonably correct, in creating a straw man argument about the impetus and purpose of a rather narrow category of autonomous systems, its conclusions ultimately miss the mark. For all the technical detail, the authors miss the potential impact of autonomy on future air campaigns, a phenomenon that American pilots in training would call “unscorable at 12”—a term used when a bomb is dropped within correct parameters and yet fails to land near the impact zone.4","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"568 - 574"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44775457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200972
Rachel Myrick
What differentiates progressive grand strategies from other variants of US grand strategy? Van Jackson’s “Left of Liberal Internationalism: Grand Strategies within Progressive Foreign Policy Thought” argues that progressives reject the idea that security is limited to questions about the use of military force. Jackson begins instead with a broader concept of security rooted in “peace, democracy, and equality.” 1 Following from these commitments, he proposes three progressive grand strategies. First, progressive pragmatism prioritizes economic equality, seeking to mitigate threats posed by corrupt autocrats. Second, antihegemonism attempts to rein in American military power and imperialism. Third, peacemaking aims to respond to structural causes of violence and advocates for wide-spread disarmament.
{"title":"Searching For Progressive Foreign Policy in Theory and in Practice","authors":"Rachel Myrick","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2200972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2200972","url":null,"abstract":"What differentiates progressive grand strategies from other variants of US grand strategy? Van Jackson’s “Left of Liberal Internationalism: Grand Strategies within Progressive Foreign Policy Thought” argues that progressives reject the idea that security is limited to questions about the use of military force. Jackson begins instead with a broader concept of security rooted in “peace, democracy, and equality.” 1 Following from these commitments, he proposes three progressive grand strategies. First, progressive pragmatism prioritizes economic equality, seeking to mitigate threats posed by corrupt autocrats. Second, antihegemonism attempts to rein in American military power and imperialism. Third, peacemaking aims to respond to structural causes of violence and advocates for wide-spread disarmament.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"389 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41723891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200203
Michael A. Goldfien, Michael F. Joseph
Abstract Are leaders perceived as important actors during conflict, or are they discounted because of domestic institutions and international structure? We exploit recently declassified CIA President’s Daily Briefs to construct a cross-national, weekly measure of how intelligence analysts perceive foreign leader importance in conflict and diplomacy. We estimate perceptions of leader importance at crisis onset, crisis escalation, war, and war termination in over 16,000 statistical models that overcome selection and endogeneity concerns common in existing studies of leadership and conflict. Leaders are not perceived to matter equally at every stage of conflict. They are seen to matter most during crisis negotiations when conflicts can either de-escalate to peace or escalate to war. But they are not perceived to matter for crisis onset. We find that leaders of heavily constrained regimes are seen as no more important at any stage of the conflict process than they are in peacetime. Leaders of moderately constrained regimes are perceived to matter for crisis escalation. Finally, leaders of weakly constrained regimes are seen as important at nearly every stage of conflict relative to peacetime. Our findings suggest that even if leaders are perceived to matter for conflict on average, domestic institutions and international structure plausibly constrain leaders more at some stages of the conflict process than others. We contribute to the quantification of historical documents by illustrating how researchers can combine data selection, historiography, measurement, and statistical modeling to draw stronger inferences.
{"title":"Perceptions of Leadership Importance: Evidence from the CIA’s President’s Daily Brief","authors":"Michael A. Goldfien, Michael F. Joseph","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2200203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2200203","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Are leaders perceived as important actors during conflict, or are they discounted because of domestic institutions and international structure? We exploit recently declassified CIA President’s Daily Briefs to construct a cross-national, weekly measure of how intelligence analysts perceive foreign leader importance in conflict and diplomacy. We estimate perceptions of leader importance at crisis onset, crisis escalation, war, and war termination in over 16,000 statistical models that overcome selection and endogeneity concerns common in existing studies of leadership and conflict. Leaders are not perceived to matter equally at every stage of conflict. They are seen to matter most during crisis negotiations when conflicts can either de-escalate to peace or escalate to war. But they are not perceived to matter for crisis onset. We find that leaders of heavily constrained regimes are seen as no more important at any stage of the conflict process than they are in peacetime. Leaders of moderately constrained regimes are perceived to matter for crisis escalation. Finally, leaders of weakly constrained regimes are seen as important at nearly every stage of conflict relative to peacetime. Our findings suggest that even if leaders are perceived to matter for conflict on average, domestic institutions and international structure plausibly constrain leaders more at some stages of the conflict process than others. We contribute to the quantification of historical documents by illustrating how researchers can combine data selection, historiography, measurement, and statistical modeling to draw stronger inferences.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"205 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48176733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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