Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140599
Brian Blankenship, Erik Lin-Greenberg
cent) of US military events in Asia fall into Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg’s worst category—transient demonstrations. These operations—like FONOPS, routine operations through the Taiwan Strait, and flyovers around the North Korean Peninsula—supposedly demonstrate low resolve and low capability. It is an intriguing, and researchable, policy question about why the United States would choose to focus so much of its efforts on precisely the types of activities that Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg argue do little to reassure allies, and thus do little to deter adversaries. After all, most of the activities that fall within the authors’ reassurance typology are not primarily meant to reassure at all, but to deter. This inconsistency raises the additional question of whether the purpose of the military activity determines whether it signals high resolve and/or capability.
{"title":"Tripwires and Alliance Reassurance: An Exchange – The Authors Reply","authors":"Brian Blankenship, Erik Lin-Greenberg","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140599","url":null,"abstract":"cent) of US military events in Asia fall into Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg’s worst category—transient demonstrations. These operations—like FONOPS, routine operations through the Taiwan Strait, and flyovers around the North Korean Peninsula—supposedly demonstrate low resolve and low capability. It is an intriguing, and researchable, policy question about why the United States would choose to focus so much of its efforts on precisely the types of activities that Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg argue do little to reassure allies, and thus do little to deter adversaries. After all, most of the activities that fall within the authors’ reassurance typology are not primarily meant to reassure at all, but to deter. This inconsistency raises the additional question of whether the purpose of the military activity determines whether it signals high resolve and/or capability.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"750 - 756"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46187572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140601
Fiona S. Cunningham
Do cyber operations fuel escalation in international crises, or do they provide states with a pathway to step back from the brink of conflict toward normal peacetime relations? This question has been hotly debated, including in the pages of Security Studies. Many cyber conflict scholars have pushed back against popular warnings that cyber operations could cause a crisis to ignite, citing a lack of empirical evidence that cyberattacks make escalation more likely. Engaging with this debate, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan posit that certain features of cyber operations make them better suited to “accommodative” signaling—signals of a desire to negotiate an end to the crisis—rather than signals of resolve to stand firm or escalate. They argue that “accommodative signaling is linked to crisis de-escalation because the former can enable the latter.” According to Lonergan and Lonergan, cyber operations intended to send accommodative signals have a distinctive logic. Their theory of accommodative signaling in cyberspace does not rely on the same theoretical logic that they and scholars have used to explain why cyber operations are
{"title":"Accommodative Signaling in Cyberspace and the Role of Risk","authors":"Fiona S. Cunningham","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140601","url":null,"abstract":"Do cyber operations fuel escalation in international crises, or do they provide states with a pathway to step back from the brink of conflict toward normal peacetime relations? This question has been hotly debated, including in the pages of Security Studies. Many cyber conflict scholars have pushed back against popular warnings that cyber operations could cause a crisis to ignite, citing a lack of empirical evidence that cyberattacks make escalation more likely. Engaging with this debate, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan posit that certain features of cyber operations make them better suited to “accommodative” signaling—signals of a desire to negotiate an end to the crisis—rather than signals of resolve to stand firm or escalate. They argue that “accommodative signaling is linked to crisis de-escalation because the former can enable the latter.” According to Lonergan and Lonergan, cyber operations intended to send accommodative signals have a distinctive logic. Their theory of accommodative signaling in cyberspace does not rely on the same theoretical logic that they and scholars have used to explain why cyber operations are","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"764 - 771"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45866768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140600
Brandon K. Yoder
How can states de-escalate a crisis and avoid spiraling toward war? Doing so requires the actors to reassure each other of their willingness to issue and commit to concessions. Yet reassurance is fundamentally difficult: states have incentives to misrepresent their aims as moderate in order to dupe the other into offering concessions and drawing down its military readiness, only to renege and issue further demands in the future. Thus, credible signaling mechanisms are essential for peaceful crisis resolution. Adding to a growing literature on credible reassurance, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan offer an intriguing new theory of crisis de-escalation built around the distinct properties of cyber technology. They argue that states caught in an escalatory spiral can use cyberattacks to signal their willingness to compromise and give the opponent an opportunity to reciprocate. Thus, a seemingly provocative action can instead convey restraint and alleviate tensions. Two features of cyberattacks underpin this counterintuitive claim: they are relatively harmless compared to other military operations, and their origins are ambiguous, which facilitates plausible deniability. The “low harm” aspect signals restraint because the attacker foregoes more destructive coercive tools at its disposal. Because an attacker with maximalist goals would
{"title":"Can Cyberattacks Reassure? Half Measures as a De-Escalation Strategy","authors":"Brandon K. Yoder","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140600","url":null,"abstract":"How can states de-escalate a crisis and avoid spiraling toward war? Doing so requires the actors to reassure each other of their willingness to issue and commit to concessions. Yet reassurance is fundamentally difficult: states have incentives to misrepresent their aims as moderate in order to dupe the other into offering concessions and drawing down its military readiness, only to renege and issue further demands in the future. Thus, credible signaling mechanisms are essential for peaceful crisis resolution. Adding to a growing literature on credible reassurance, Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan offer an intriguing new theory of crisis de-escalation built around the distinct properties of cyber technology. They argue that states caught in an escalatory spiral can use cyberattacks to signal their willingness to compromise and give the opponent an opportunity to reciprocate. Thus, a seemingly provocative action can instead convey restraint and alleviate tensions. Two features of cyberattacks underpin this counterintuitive claim: they are relatively harmless compared to other military operations, and their origins are ambiguous, which facilitates plausible deniability. The “low harm” aspect signals restraint because the attacker foregoes more destructive coercive tools at its disposal. Because an attacker with maximalist goals would","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"757 - 763"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46614485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140603
E. Lonergan, Shawn W. Lonergan
with no perceived time to discern otherwise before retaliating. This alternative deductive argument warrants scrutiny, although the empirical cupboard of crises involving cyber operations is bare, despite what Lonergan and Lonergan suggest in their article. Unless, or until, cyberspace matures as a domain of interaction between states in crisis, the deductive logic above suggests caution for policymakers considering the use of cyber operations as crisis management tools.
{"title":"Cyber Operations and Signaling: An Exchange – The Authors Reply","authors":"E. Lonergan, Shawn W. Lonergan","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140603","url":null,"abstract":"with no perceived time to discern otherwise before retaliating. This alternative deductive argument warrants scrutiny, although the empirical cupboard of crises involving cyber operations is bare, despite what Lonergan and Lonergan suggest in their article. Unless, or until, cyberspace matures as a domain of interaction between states in crisis, the deductive logic above suggests caution for policymakers considering the use of cyber operations as crisis management tools.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"782 - 789"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44256562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2129439
Joslyn Barnhart, Robert F. Trager
Abstract Studies have shown that across time and place, women, on average, are less supportive of the use of force than men. This implies that extensions of the franchise to women provide an opportunity to evaluate theories of democratic constraint on foreign policy decision making. In this article, we theorize democratic constraint on war and peace, arguing that it is a common latent constraint on elite actions and an active constraint when one party is pre-committed to a foreign policy position. We use the extraordinary—yet unexplored—case of the 1916 US presidential election to identify the democratic constraint on foreign policy and of women’s votes in particular. This case represents an early step of women into the electoral realm at the national level and provides unique evidence of leader selection due to changes in public opinion because of the uneven extension of women’s suffrage to US states. Reelected on a platform of: “He kept the United States out of war,” Woodrow Wilson would fail to avoid war in Europe, but he did pursue cooperative policies with Mexico that very likely prevented a second Mexican-American war.
{"title":"How Women Shape the Course of War: Women’s Suffrage and the Election of 1916","authors":"Joslyn Barnhart, Robert F. Trager","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2129439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2129439","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Studies have shown that across time and place, women, on average, are less supportive of the use of force than men. This implies that extensions of the franchise to women provide an opportunity to evaluate theories of democratic constraint on foreign policy decision making. In this article, we theorize democratic constraint on war and peace, arguing that it is a common latent constraint on elite actions and an active constraint when one party is pre-committed to a foreign policy position. We use the extraordinary—yet unexplored—case of the 1916 US presidential election to identify the democratic constraint on foreign policy and of women’s votes in particular. This case represents an early step of women into the electoral realm at the national level and provides unique evidence of leader selection due to changes in public opinion because of the uneven extension of women’s suffrage to US states. Reelected on a platform of: “He kept the United States out of war,” Woodrow Wilson would fail to avoid war in Europe, but he did pursue cooperative policies with Mexico that very likely prevented a second Mexican-American war.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"703 - 735"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45292040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2133628
Austin Carson, Matthew J. Conklin
Abstract This article analyzes how democratic leaders cultivate an elite consensus in favor of participating in international institutions. We theorize two tactics to prevent elite dissent. Delegating early policy development to technocratic and nonpartisan experts can set a depoliticized tone. Later integration of opposition elites into the process can create powerful advocates that expand support to a consensus. We assess contrasting fates of the United Nations (UN) and International Trade Organization (ITO). Haunted by Woodrow Wilson’s failure to win approval for the League of Nations, leaders outsourced early planning for a UN to the Council on Foreign Relations. Later, Franklin D. Roosevelt and top aides tapped moderate Republicans for the US delegation to San Francisco, creating powerful Republican advocates. In contrast, leaders developed the ITO in-house and excluded legislative elites in final negotiations, provoking elite dissent. These tactics shed new light on leaders, elites, and the domestic politics of international order and hegemony.
{"title":"Co-Optation at the Creation: Leaders, Elite Consensus, and Postwar International Order","authors":"Austin Carson, Matthew J. Conklin","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2133628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2133628","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyzes how democratic leaders cultivate an elite consensus in favor of participating in international institutions. We theorize two tactics to prevent elite dissent. Delegating early policy development to technocratic and nonpartisan experts can set a depoliticized tone. Later integration of opposition elites into the process can create powerful advocates that expand support to a consensus. We assess contrasting fates of the United Nations (UN) and International Trade Organization (ITO). Haunted by Woodrow Wilson’s failure to win approval for the League of Nations, leaders outsourced early planning for a UN to the Council on Foreign Relations. Later, Franklin D. Roosevelt and top aides tapped moderate Republicans for the US delegation to San Francisco, creating powerful Republican advocates. In contrast, leaders developed the ITO in-house and excluded legislative elites in final negotiations, provoking elite dissent. These tactics shed new light on leaders, elites, and the domestic politics of international order and hegemony.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"634 - 666"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46631336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2101324
Alex Cooley, Daniel H. Nexon
In their ambitious article, Joshua Alley and Matthew Fuhrmann ask how “alliance commitments affect US military spending.” Their answer: each alliance, on average, adds $11–$22 billion to the annual defense budget. Given the number of US defense pacts, that would mean formal alliances accounted for over $735 billion of the 2019 defense budget. This finding, if true, suggests that Donald Trump was right to claim that alliances are “much too costly for the US.” In this reply, we show that supporters of contemporary US grand strategy can rest easy. Given the actual size of US defense budgets, Alley and Fuhrmann’s estimates cannot be correct. Even if their statistical models produced plausible numbers, the article remains deeply flawed. First, the article conflates its spending estimates with fixed costs. How much the United States spends, either directly or indirectly, on its formal alliances is almost entirely a matter of policy decisions and political processes; the United States can reduce the “average cost” of its formal alliances any time it wants to—by cutting the defense budget. Nothing about defense pacts forces Congress to appropriate funds for, say, another aircraft carrier or new generation of strike aircraft. For the same reason, we see no particular reason to think that if the United States shed an alliance (or ten) tomorrow then Congress would reduce military spending. Second, the key grand-strategy debate between “restrainers” and “engagers” concerns whether the United States should dramatically reduce its security commitments or military presence in some combination of Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Knowing the average “price tag” per defense pact does not help us decide which, if any, of those regions the
{"title":"Estimating Alliance Costs: An Exchange","authors":"Alex Cooley, Daniel H. Nexon","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2101324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2101324","url":null,"abstract":"In their ambitious article, Joshua Alley and Matthew Fuhrmann ask how “alliance commitments affect US military spending.” Their answer: each alliance, on average, adds $11–$22 billion to the annual defense budget. Given the number of US defense pacts, that would mean formal alliances accounted for over $735 billion of the 2019 defense budget. This finding, if true, suggests that Donald Trump was right to claim that alliances are “much too costly for the US.” In this reply, we show that supporters of contemporary US grand strategy can rest easy. Given the actual size of US defense budgets, Alley and Fuhrmann’s estimates cannot be correct. Even if their statistical models produced plausible numbers, the article remains deeply flawed. First, the article conflates its spending estimates with fixed costs. How much the United States spends, either directly or indirectly, on its formal alliances is almost entirely a matter of policy decisions and political processes; the United States can reduce the “average cost” of its formal alliances any time it wants to—by cutting the defense budget. Nothing about defense pacts forces Congress to appropriate funds for, say, another aircraft carrier or new generation of strike aircraft. For the same reason, we see no particular reason to think that if the United States shed an alliance (or ten) tomorrow then Congress would reduce military spending. Second, the key grand-strategy debate between “restrainers” and “engagers” concerns whether the United States should dramatically reduce its security commitments or military presence in some combination of Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Knowing the average “price tag” per defense pact does not help us decide which, if any, of those regions the","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"510 - 532"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44988888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2103333
Rachel Tecott, Heidi A. Urben, Sharan Grewal
In “ Norm Diffusion through US Military Training in Tunisia, ” Sharan Grewal argues that foreign soldiers who study in the United States come to absorb the entire pattern of American civil-military relations, and not just the good parts. The article describes the “ politicization of the [US] military, ” focusing on its increasing support for military personnel voting and retired officers serving in key political roles. 1 Noting that the US military deliberately aims to transmit liberal civil-military relations norms to its foreign trainees, the article investigates whether it also inadvertently transmits the “ unhealthy ” elements of American civil-military relations. 2 To answer the question, Grewal conducts interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel (some who trained in France, and some who trained in the United States), and finds a positive relationship between training in the United States and Tunisian officers ’ support for a more political military. This essay proceeds in four parts. The first situates Grewal ’ s article within the wider literature on security assistance and recipient civil-military relations. The second part discusses the article ’ s contributions. The third section argues that the study, though well-designed and well-executed, should not lead readers to significantly update their priors on the major questions moti-vating most scholars and practitioners of security assistance and civil-military relations. The fourth section briefly highlights areas for future research.
{"title":"Norm Diffusion through US Military Training: An Exchange","authors":"Rachel Tecott, Heidi A. Urben, Sharan Grewal","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2103333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2103333","url":null,"abstract":"In “ Norm Diffusion through US Military Training in Tunisia, ” Sharan Grewal argues that foreign soldiers who study in the United States come to absorb the entire pattern of American civil-military relations, and not just the good parts. The article describes the “ politicization of the [US] military, ” focusing on its increasing support for military personnel voting and retired officers serving in key political roles. 1 Noting that the US military deliberately aims to transmit liberal civil-military relations norms to its foreign trainees, the article investigates whether it also inadvertently transmits the “ unhealthy ” elements of American civil-military relations. 2 To answer the question, Grewal conducts interviews and two surveys of Tunisian military personnel (some who trained in France, and some who trained in the United States), and finds a positive relationship between training in the United States and Tunisian officers ’ support for a more political military. This essay proceeds in four parts. The first situates Grewal ’ s article within the wider literature on security assistance and recipient civil-military relations. The second part discusses the article ’ s contributions. The third section argues that the study, though well-designed and well-executed, should not lead readers to significantly update their priors on the major questions moti-vating most scholars and practitioners of security assistance and civil-military relations. The fourth section briefly highlights areas for future research.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"533 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59614067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2097891
Chengzhi Yin
Abstract In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to induce North Korea to drift away from China. This challenged China’s security, given escalated tension between China and the Soviet Union in this period. To counter the Soviet policies, China used binding strategies, which are a state’s attempt to maintain or enhance its alignment with its security partners. I argue that China chose coercive binding as its primary strategy because it had strong leverage over North Korea. Meanwhile, China deployed accommodative binding to complement its primary strategy. In this article, I first develop a theoretical framework to explain how a state chooses its binding strategies. I then apply this theory to the Chinese-North Korean-Soviet triangle in the late 1960s. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical and policy implications, such as the importance of examining how states mix different types of binding strategies.
{"title":"Logic of Choice: China’s Binding Strategies toward North Korea, 1965–1970","authors":"Chengzhi Yin","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2097891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097891","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union tried to induce North Korea to drift away from China. This challenged China’s security, given escalated tension between China and the Soviet Union in this period. To counter the Soviet policies, China used binding strategies, which are a state’s attempt to maintain or enhance its alignment with its security partners. I argue that China chose coercive binding as its primary strategy because it had strong leverage over North Korea. Meanwhile, China deployed accommodative binding to complement its primary strategy. In this article, I first develop a theoretical framework to explain how a state chooses its binding strategies. I then apply this theory to the Chinese-North Korean-Soviet triangle in the late 1960s. I conclude by discussing broader theoretical and policy implications, such as the importance of examining how states mix different types of binding strategies.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"483 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42288489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890
Corinne Bara, Joakim Kreutz
Abstract Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence.
{"title":"To Buy a War but Sell the Peace? Mercenaries and Post-Civil War Stability","authors":"Corinne Bara, Joakim Kreutz","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"417 - 445"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49107390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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