Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2153734
A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Ivan Zaccagnini
Abstract Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage? This is a question of central theoretical and substantive relevance. For the most part, however, the literature on this topic has not investigated empirically whether such technologies make attacking easier than defending, but it has largely assumed that they do. At the same time, work on the offense–defense balance has primarily focused on land conflicts, thus offering little understanding of the effect of technological change in other domains, such as the air and sea. In this article we address these gaps by investigating whether current- and next-generation drones shift the offense–defense balance toward the offense or toward offense dominance, as many assume—that is, whether drone technology can or will defeat current- and next-generation air defense systems. To answer these questions, we have explored the literature in radar engineering, electromagnetism, signal processing, and air defense operation. Our analysis challenges the existing consensus about the present and raises questions about the future. Our findings also demonstrate how important it is for the field of security studies to embrace greater interdisciplinarity in order to explore pressing policy and theoretical questions.
{"title":"Will the Drone Always Get Through? Offensive Myths and Defensive Realities","authors":"A. Calcara, A. Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Ivan Zaccagnini","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2153734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2153734","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage? This is a question of central theoretical and substantive relevance. For the most part, however, the literature on this topic has not investigated empirically whether such technologies make attacking easier than defending, but it has largely assumed that they do. At the same time, work on the offense–defense balance has primarily focused on land conflicts, thus offering little understanding of the effect of technological change in other domains, such as the air and sea. In this article we address these gaps by investigating whether current- and next-generation drones shift the offense–defense balance toward the offense or toward offense dominance, as many assume—that is, whether drone technology can or will defeat current- and next-generation air defense systems. To answer these questions, we have explored the literature in radar engineering, electromagnetism, signal processing, and air defense operation. Our analysis challenges the existing consensus about the present and raises questions about the future. Our findings also demonstrate how important it is for the field of security studies to embrace greater interdisciplinarity in order to explore pressing policy and theoretical questions.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"791 - 825"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45711142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2137429
Isaac B. Kardon
Abstract China lacks the network of foreign military bases that typically attends great-power expansion, yet its armed forces operate at an increasingly global scale. How has the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) managed this feat without a significant footprint on foreign soil? Why has Chinese leadership not (yet) established a network of bases to address security threats to China’s overseas interests? This article analyzes the structural constraints facing China’s military basing abroad and then examines the methods by which the PLA has nonetheless achieved significant global power-projection capability. It highlights the capacity provided by international maritime transport infrastructure owned and operated by Chinese firms as a viable—yet limited—means of securing national interests overseas with military power. The study demonstrates that the structural setting and historical sequence of China’s rise render foreign military bases relatively costly, incentivizing alternative modes of access and power projection in the maritime domain.
{"title":"China’s Global Maritime Access: Alternatives to Overseas Military Bases in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"Isaac B. Kardon","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2137429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2137429","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China lacks the network of foreign military bases that typically attends great-power expansion, yet its armed forces operate at an increasingly global scale. How has the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) managed this feat without a significant footprint on foreign soil? Why has Chinese leadership not (yet) established a network of bases to address security threats to China’s overseas interests? This article analyzes the structural constraints facing China’s military basing abroad and then examines the methods by which the PLA has nonetheless achieved significant global power-projection capability. It highlights the capacity provided by international maritime transport infrastructure owned and operated by Chinese firms as a viable—yet limited—means of securing national interests overseas with military power. The study demonstrates that the structural setting and historical sequence of China’s rise render foreign military bases relatively costly, incentivizing alternative modes of access and power projection in the maritime domain.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"885 - 916"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45979837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2153732
Nizan Feldman, M. Shipton
Abstract Although commonly assumed to secure trade, the influence of both naval power and merchant fleets on combatants’ ability to secure trade has been rarely explored. Using the gravity model on a dataset spanning 1980–2011, this study shows that the damage conflict inflicts on states’ third-party trade declines as both their naval power and commercial fleet size increase. Beyond validating core assumptions of modern maritime strategy, our results make a valuable contribution to the extensive literature on trade and conflict. The notion that trade integration fosters peace rests on the assumption that conflict depresses third-party trade, thereby reducing trade-integrated states’ propensity to initiate conflict. As this study shows, however, naval power and merchant fleets mitigate these trade-related costs of conflict. Thus, the ability of trade to deter conflict declines when states possess substantial maritime capabilities.
{"title":"Naval Power, Merchant Fleets, and the Impact of Conflict on Trade","authors":"Nizan Feldman, M. Shipton","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2153732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2153732","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although commonly assumed to secure trade, the influence of both naval power and merchant fleets on combatants’ ability to secure trade has been rarely explored. Using the gravity model on a dataset spanning 1980–2011, this study shows that the damage conflict inflicts on states’ third-party trade declines as both their naval power and commercial fleet size increase. Beyond validating core assumptions of modern maritime strategy, our results make a valuable contribution to the extensive literature on trade and conflict. The notion that trade integration fosters peace rests on the assumption that conflict depresses third-party trade, thereby reducing trade-integrated states’ propensity to initiate conflict. As this study shows, however, naval power and merchant fleets mitigate these trade-related costs of conflict. Thus, the ability of trade to deter conflict declines when states possess substantial maritime capabilities.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"857 - 884"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42729043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-13DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2133627
S. Schmidt
Abstract The prevailing assumption in discussions of foreign military basing is that such presences are hierarchical in nature. Though this was unavoidably the case prior to the Second World War, changes in the normative framework of international politics mean that such presences’ relationship to hierarchy has become an empirical question. Specifically, changes in sovereignty norms and the emergence of territorial and jurisdictional integrity render the linkage between foreign military basing and hierarchy contingent. As a result, some basing arrangements’ dynamics now closely resemble those of other interstate agreements. This analysis regrounds hierarchy in the specific normative context of action and in doing so highlights the implicit reification of the state in contemporary security studies. In practical terms, it shows how assuming hierarchy both overestimates the fragility of the US basing network and, by exaggerating authority relations, obscures the potential for greater fluidity in the basing space.
{"title":"Imperial Relations? Hierarchy and Contemporary Base Politics","authors":"S. Schmidt","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2133627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2133627","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The prevailing assumption in discussions of foreign military basing is that such presences are hierarchical in nature. Though this was unavoidably the case prior to the Second World War, changes in the normative framework of international politics mean that such presences’ relationship to hierarchy has become an empirical question. Specifically, changes in sovereignty norms and the emergence of territorial and jurisdictional integrity render the linkage between foreign military basing and hierarchy contingent. As a result, some basing arrangements’ dynamics now closely resemble those of other interstate agreements. This analysis regrounds hierarchy in the specific normative context of action and in doing so highlights the implicit reification of the state in contemporary security studies. In practical terms, it shows how assuming hierarchy both overestimates the fragility of the US basing network and, by exaggerating authority relations, obscures the potential for greater fluidity in the basing space.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"917 - 944"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48490429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2133629
David M. McCourt
Abstract The United States’ long-standing approach to the People’s Republic of China—“engagement”—is at an end, replaced by a tougher approach, labeled “strategic competition.” Foregrounding the role of knowledge communities in the making of US foreign policy, I show that engagement’s demise followed less a rational process responding to shifts in Chinese behavior and the balance of power, and more a paradigmatic turnover in key individuals’ views of China within the government and the China expert community. Adopting a sociological perspective attuned to the social and professional underpinnings of US foreign policy, I trace the paradigmatic turnover in US views of China to three processes: politicization, professional status competition, and personalization. Drawing on a range of sources, including over one hundred original interviews with members of the US China expert community, this article traces the entanglement of engagement at once political, professional, and deeply personal.
{"title":"Knowledge Communities in US Foreign Policy Making: The American China Field and the End of Engagement with the PRC","authors":"David M. McCourt","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2133629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2133629","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States’ long-standing approach to the People’s Republic of China—“engagement”—is at an end, replaced by a tougher approach, labeled “strategic competition.” Foregrounding the role of knowledge communities in the making of US foreign policy, I show that engagement’s demise followed less a rational process responding to shifts in Chinese behavior and the balance of power, and more a paradigmatic turnover in key individuals’ views of China within the government and the China expert community. Adopting a sociological perspective attuned to the social and professional underpinnings of US foreign policy, I trace the paradigmatic turnover in US views of China to three processes: politicization, professional status competition, and personalization. Drawing on a range of sources, including over one hundred original interviews with members of the US China expert community, this article traces the entanglement of engagement at once political, professional, and deeply personal.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"593 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49272194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2132874
Van Jackson
Abstract This article brings leftist-oriented foreign policy ideas into dialogue with mainstream grand strategy literature. It argues that American progressives seek a durable security comprised of peace, democracy, and equality, meaning the grand strategies discoverable within progressive thinking are ultimately projects of worldmaking. Since leftist thought is eclectic, it gives rise to not one but three ideal-type progressive grand strategies. Progressive pragmatism treats oligarchy and kleptocracy as threats, sustains military commitments to democratic allies only, and prioritizes equality at the level of the global political economy. Antihegemonism is a project of robust restraint, positing that US power per se makes the United States and others less secure. Peacemaking aims to change the valence of world politics. It combines a cooperative security regime and gradual disarmament with nonviolent peacebuilding and support for democracy movements. These modes of progressive reasoning entail their own assumptions, wagers, and risks.
{"title":"Left of Liberal Internationalism: Grand Strategies within Progressive Foreign Policy Thought","authors":"Van Jackson","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2132874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2132874","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article brings leftist-oriented foreign policy ideas into dialogue with mainstream grand strategy literature. It argues that American progressives seek a durable security comprised of peace, democracy, and equality, meaning the grand strategies discoverable within progressive thinking are ultimately projects of worldmaking. Since leftist thought is eclectic, it gives rise to not one but three ideal-type progressive grand strategies. Progressive pragmatism treats oligarchy and kleptocracy as threats, sustains military commitments to democratic allies only, and prioritizes equality at the level of the global political economy. Antihegemonism is a project of robust restraint, positing that US power per se makes the United States and others less secure. Peacemaking aims to change the valence of world politics. It combines a cooperative security regime and gradual disarmament with nonviolent peacebuilding and support for democracy movements. These modes of progressive reasoning entail their own assumptions, wagers, and risks.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"553 - 592"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44299239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140602
Michael P. Fischerkeller
In “ Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
在“网络作战、适应信号和国际危机的缓和”中
{"title":"Cyber Signaling: Deeper Case Research Tells a Different Story","authors":"Michael P. Fischerkeller","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140602","url":null,"abstract":"In “ Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"772 - 782"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43827983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2133626
Robert Ralston
Abstract Narratives of national decline occur frequently, often independent of “objective” measures of decline. What causes declinism? First, I argue that declinism most often comes from opposition brokers. Brokers bring otherwise unconnected groups and individuals together in a coalition. This coalition is well positioned to blame the nation’s decline on the establishment. Second, I argue that negative events or conditions help narratives of decline resonate with audiences. Using text analyses of UK parliamentary speech, I show that declinism was rampant in late-1970s Britain. I show how two brokers—Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph—brought together previously unconnected groups to create a coalition that centered on British decline. Negative events, particularly the “Winter of Discontent,” helped declinism resonate, something the coalition recognized and exploited. Finally, I trace the foreign policy consequences of Thatcher’s declinism, particularly with respect to the Falklands War.
{"title":"Make Us Great Again: The Causes of Declinism in Major Powers","authors":"Robert Ralston","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2133626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2133626","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Narratives of national decline occur frequently, often independent of “objective” measures of decline. What causes declinism? First, I argue that declinism most often comes from opposition brokers. Brokers bring otherwise unconnected groups and individuals together in a coalition. This coalition is well positioned to blame the nation’s decline on the establishment. Second, I argue that negative events or conditions help narratives of decline resonate with audiences. Using text analyses of UK parliamentary speech, I show that declinism was rampant in late-1970s Britain. I show how two brokers—Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph—brought together previously unconnected groups to create a coalition that centered on British decline. Negative events, particularly the “Winter of Discontent,” helped declinism resonate, something the coalition recognized and exploited. Finally, I trace the foreign policy consequences of Thatcher’s declinism, particularly with respect to the Falklands War.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"667 - 702"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42126584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140597
J. Goldgeier, Lily Wojtowicz
In response to Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and expanded war against Ukraine in 2022, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states rushed support to help the latter defend itself, while the United States also reassured NATO’s eastern members that they would be defended in the event that Russia expanded the war into alliance territory. Since the start of the Cold War, extended deterrence has been a critical issue for scholarly and practitioner communities. How could the United States signal to Moscow during the Cold War and again today that it was ready to come to the defense of its treaty allies? Would the Kremlin believe the United States would risk damage, including a Russian nuclear strike, to its homeland to deter an attack on allies located far from US soil? Though alliance reassurance has received more attention in recent years, the subject remains far less studied than topics such as credibility among adversaries and extended deterrence’s impact on nonproliferation. What does it take to reassure allies that the United States will protect them in the event of an attack? Focusing on the interplay between resolve and capabilities, Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg argue that a feature of US policy since the Cold War, namely the use of relatively small numbers of
{"title":"Reassurance and Deterrence after Russia’s War against Ukraine","authors":"J. Goldgeier, Lily Wojtowicz","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140597","url":null,"abstract":"In response to Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and expanded war against Ukraine in 2022, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states rushed support to help the latter defend itself, while the United States also reassured NATO’s eastern members that they would be defended in the event that Russia expanded the war into alliance territory. Since the start of the Cold War, extended deterrence has been a critical issue for scholarly and practitioner communities. How could the United States signal to Moscow during the Cold War and again today that it was ready to come to the defense of its treaty allies? Would the Kremlin believe the United States would risk damage, including a Russian nuclear strike, to its homeland to deter an attack on allies located far from US soil? Though alliance reassurance has received more attention in recent years, the subject remains far less studied than topics such as credibility among adversaries and extended deterrence’s impact on nonproliferation. What does it take to reassure allies that the United States will protect them in the event of an attack? Focusing on the interplay between resolve and capabilities, Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg argue that a feature of US policy since the Cold War, namely the use of relatively small numbers of","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"736 - 743"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45583428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2140598
O. Mastro
the former Warsaw Pact members of NATO, which view the United States as the ultimate defender against Russia, and long-standing NATO members such as France, which, at least prior to the expanded Russian war against Ukraine in 2022, had grown less enamored of European dependence on American security commitments, it is critical to gain insight into how Europeans view their role within NATO. The reassurance issues Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg raise will only grow more complex if Europe manages to develop more significant strategic capabilities of its own, and the United States rebalances more of its foreign and national security policy over time away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific.
{"title":"Reassurance and Deterrence in Asia","authors":"O. Mastro","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2140598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140598","url":null,"abstract":"the former Warsaw Pact members of NATO, which view the United States as the ultimate defender against Russia, and long-standing NATO members such as France, which, at least prior to the expanded Russian war against Ukraine in 2022, had grown less enamored of European dependence on American security commitments, it is critical to gain insight into how Europeans view their role within NATO. The reassurance issues Blankenship and Lin-Greenberg raise will only grow more complex if Europe manages to develop more significant strategic capabilities of its own, and the United States rebalances more of its foreign and national security policy over time away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"743 - 750"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46076031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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