Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178962
Joshua Tschantret
Abstract Why did modern terrorism arise as a form of political violence? Scholars have located its origins in the mid-nineteenth century, a development that culminated in a global wave of terrorism and contributed to the outbreak of World War I. Despite consensus on its period of origin, we lack any explanation for why this development occurred. This article forwards a social theory for the origins of modern terrorism. Civic associations, which proliferated globally in the nineteenth century, provided the opportunity and motivation for the development of terrorism. Associations not only fostered the social and human capital necessary for terrorism; they also frequently generated grievances through an inability to enact political change and via ideological propaganda. I test this theory using an original global dataset of terrorist groups formed between 1860 and 1945. Statistical analysis reveals that cities with a YMCA, an exogenous indicator of associationism, were much more likely than those without to see the formation of terrorist groups. Additionally, terrorist groups are formed during civil wars, indicating that armed conflict can spur dramatic innovations in violent contention.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178965
Paul D. Williams
Abstract Contrary to popular perceptions, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers engage in combat fairly frequently. A central challenge facing the UN is thus calibration between force and politics: ensuring the organization’s combat power is harnessed to viable political strategies for peace. However, the epistemic community on peacekeeping remains deeply divided between skeptics and proponents of “robust” operations, where peacekeepers are expected to use force to implement mission mandates. This article suggests that militarily effective, robust peacekeeping is most important for improving civilian protection and ensuring mission credibility in theaters where there is no peace to keep; proposes a novel framework and typology to assess combat effectiveness in UN peace operations; and compiles descriptive statistics for the 1948–2020 period. Finally, case studies of four battles involving UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo illuminate the conditions that are conducive to the UN’s combat effectiveness.
{"title":"How Peacekeepers Fight: Assessing Combat Effectiveness in United Nations Peace Operations","authors":"Paul D. Williams","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2178965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2178965","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contrary to popular perceptions, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers engage in combat fairly frequently. A central challenge facing the UN is thus calibration between force and politics: ensuring the organization’s combat power is harnessed to viable political strategies for peace. However, the epistemic community on peacekeeping remains deeply divided between skeptics and proponents of “robust” operations, where peacekeepers are expected to use force to implement mission mandates. This article suggests that militarily effective, robust peacekeeping is most important for improving civilian protection and ensuring mission credibility in theaters where there is no peace to keep; proposes a novel framework and typology to assess combat effectiveness in UN peace operations; and compiles descriptive statistics for the 1948–2020 period. Finally, case studies of four battles involving UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo illuminate the conditions that are conducive to the UN’s combat effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"32 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45050857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178971
Janina Dill, Scott D. Sagan, B. Valentino
Thinking deeply about how a nuclear war might break out is neither easy nor enjoyable. Scholars do so, however, because we hope that contemplating the pathways by which such a cataclysm might happen today could lower the risk one will happen in the future. For that reason, we owe a special thanks to Mark S. Bell, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Yogesh Joshi, Benôıt Pelopidas, and Kjølv Egeland, who have joined us in this discomforting mission. Our article found that different states have similar “kettles of hawks” who favored nuclear use across different scenarios. We are pleased that the contributors to this exchange have formed “a parliament of owls” that has raised important questions, forwarded valuable insights, helped us clarify key points in our own thinking, and pointed the way toward critical new research on nuclear war. One important factor that could affect the likelihood of nuclear war is whether the public would be a constraint on or a goad to political leaders contemplating the use of nuclear weapons. Aided by new survey methods in the past decade, scholars, including those contributing to this symposium, have made significant progress in understanding how the publics of nuclear-armed countries think about nuclear war. Nevertheless, important questions remain and, as is often the case in scholarly progress, answering some questions generates others we could not see clearly before. It would be both tedious and churlish for us to identify each point of agreement and disagreement we have with these four thoughtful commentaries. Instead, this essay has three parts. First, we comment on what we consider the most important points of contention raised by Bell, Pelopidas and Egeland, Joshi, and Braut-Hegghammer. Second, we discuss our views about why it is important for scholars to research and write about disturbing, and even dangerous, public beliefs about the use of force. We argue
{"title":"Public Opinion and the Nuclear Taboo Across Nations: An Exchange – The Authors Reply","authors":"Janina Dill, Scott D. Sagan, B. Valentino","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2178971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2178971","url":null,"abstract":"Thinking deeply about how a nuclear war might break out is neither easy nor enjoyable. Scholars do so, however, because we hope that contemplating the pathways by which such a cataclysm might happen today could lower the risk one will happen in the future. For that reason, we owe a special thanks to Mark S. Bell, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Yogesh Joshi, Benôıt Pelopidas, and Kjølv Egeland, who have joined us in this discomforting mission. Our article found that different states have similar “kettles of hawks” who favored nuclear use across different scenarios. We are pleased that the contributors to this exchange have formed “a parliament of owls” that has raised important questions, forwarded valuable insights, helped us clarify key points in our own thinking, and pointed the way toward critical new research on nuclear war. One important factor that could affect the likelihood of nuclear war is whether the public would be a constraint on or a goad to political leaders contemplating the use of nuclear weapons. Aided by new survey methods in the past decade, scholars, including those contributing to this symposium, have made significant progress in understanding how the publics of nuclear-armed countries think about nuclear war. Nevertheless, important questions remain and, as is often the case in scholarly progress, answering some questions generates others we could not see clearly before. It would be both tedious and churlish for us to identify each point of agreement and disagreement we have with these four thoughtful commentaries. Instead, this essay has three parts. First, we comment on what we consider the most important points of contention raised by Bell, Pelopidas and Egeland, Joshi, and Braut-Hegghammer. Second, we discuss our views about why it is important for scholars to research and write about disturbing, and even dangerous, public beliefs about the use of force. We argue","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"195 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47352776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178969
Benoît Pelopidas, Kjølv Egeland
Abstract What do people really think about nuclear weapons? Responding to Dill, Sagan, and Valentino's “Kettles of Hawks” in Security Studies 31, we examine the inconsistency between different surveys of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons use. We maintain that different survey techniques tap into disparate layers of opinion—each of which is “real” in their own way and of analytical value depending on the research question being asked. We conclude by reflecting on scholarly responsibility and the dilemmas associated with researching and communicating about potentially sensitive knowledge.
{"title":"Thinking about What People Think about Nuclear Weapons","authors":"Benoît Pelopidas, Kjølv Egeland","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2178969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2178969","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What do people really think about nuclear weapons? Responding to Dill, Sagan, and Valentino's “Kettles of Hawks” in Security Studies 31, we examine the inconsistency between different surveys of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons use. We maintain that different survey techniques tap into disparate layers of opinion—each of which is “real” in their own way and of analytical value depending on the research question being asked. We conclude by reflecting on scholarly responsibility and the dilemmas associated with researching and communicating about potentially sensitive knowledge.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"188 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42845435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178966
Mark S. Bell
The nuclear taboo—a strong normative inhibition on the use of nuclear weapons—is one of the most important concepts in the study of nuclear weapons. In the last few years, however, the idea of the taboo has come under attack. Notably, a series of studies have shown that mass publics appear quite comfortable with using nuclear weapons. When given hypothetical scenarios in which nuclear use might be considered, publics appear willing to use nuclear weapons, and concerns about (im)morality appear to weigh less heavily than narrow assessments of military utility. In the latest contribution to this research agenda, Janina Dill, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino (hereafter DSV) demonstrate that not only Americans appear comfortable with nuclear use. Surveying publics in France, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States, they show similar patterns in each country: respondents are surprisingly willing to use nuclear weapons and appear responsive to assessments of military utility. Scholars previously raised the possibility that US publics might be unusual as a caveat qualifying prior findings. DSV’s argument and evidence thus represent an important contribution, showing that prior findings can in fact be replicated across a range of democracies. As someone who has contended that states use nuclear weapons in opportunistic ways relatively unencumbered by normative constraints, and elsewhere has found elements of consistency in public opinion across
核禁忌是对核武器使用的强烈规范抑制，是核武器研究中最重要的概念之一。然而，在过去的几年里，禁忌的想法受到了攻击。值得注意的是，一系列研究表明，公众似乎对使用核武器感到相当自在。当给出可能考虑使用核武器的假设情景时，公众似乎愿意使用核武器，对(非)道德的担忧似乎没有对军事用途的狭隘评估那么重要。在这项研究议程的最新贡献中，Janina Dill, Scott D. Sagan和Benjamin A. Valentino(以下简称DSV)表明，不仅美国人似乎对使用核武器感到满意。对法国、以色列、英国和美国公众的调查显示，每个国家都有类似的模式:令人惊讶的是，受访者愿意使用核武器，而且似乎对军事用途的评估做出了反应。此前，学者们提出了美国公众可能不寻常的可能性，作为对先前研究结果的警告。因此，DSV的论点和证据是一个重要的贡献，表明先前的发现实际上可以在一系列民主国家中复制。有人主张国家以机会主义的方式使用核武器，相对不受规范约束，在其他地方发现了公众舆论的一致性
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178967
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer
Abstract What are the causes of cross-national variation in nuclear hawkishness? In the third nuclear age such variation is likely to be more consequential than in the past. While such variation has been observed, it has not been explained. This article probes possible causes of such variation drawing on a new wave of research on nuclear inhibitions. Specifically, I explore how the threat environment, domestic-level factors, and elite maneuvering, can affect nuclear hawkishness. I argue that hawkishness is less likely to be an outlier phenomenon among the more recent nuclear weapons states and in the broader universe of cases.
{"title":"Birds of a Feather? Probing Cross-National Variation in Nuclear Inhibitions","authors":"Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2178967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2178967","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What are the causes of cross-national variation in nuclear hawkishness? In the third nuclear age such variation is likely to be more consequential than in the past. While such variation has been observed, it has not been explained. This article probes possible causes of such variation drawing on a new wave of research on nuclear inhibitions. Specifically, I explore how the threat environment, domestic-level factors, and elite maneuvering, can affect nuclear hawkishness. I argue that hawkishness is less likely to be an outlier phenomenon among the more recent nuclear weapons states and in the broader universe of cases.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"172 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43501390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178964
Johan Brosché, Desirée Nilsson, Ralph Sundberg
Abstract Civil wars that appear to observers to be the most complex—even using a colloquial understanding of the concept—are also those that seem to register the most intense fighting, the most prolonged spells of war, and the most resistance to durable conflict resolution. But what does it really mean for a civil war to be complex? We currently lack a concept of “civil war complexity” that can help us better understand the most important variations in civil wars across time and space. To address this gap we develop a conceptualization of “civil war complexity” consisting of three dimensions—“actor complexity,” “behavior complexity,” and “issue complexity”—and demonstrate how they manifest empirically. We also highlight this conceptualization’s utility—and the danger of overlooking it—through the case of Darfur. This conceptualization paves the way for a new research agenda that explores how civil wars differ in terms of their complexity, the causes and consequences of civil war complexity, and how to refine conflict resolution techniques and strategies.
{"title":"Conceptualizing Civil War Complexity","authors":"Johan Brosché, Desirée Nilsson, Ralph Sundberg","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2178964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2178964","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Civil wars that appear to observers to be the most complex—even using a colloquial understanding of the concept—are also those that seem to register the most intense fighting, the most prolonged spells of war, and the most resistance to durable conflict resolution. But what does it really mean for a civil war to be complex? We currently lack a concept of “civil war complexity” that can help us better understand the most important variations in civil wars across time and space. To address this gap we develop a conceptualization of “civil war complexity” consisting of three dimensions—“actor complexity,” “behavior complexity,” and “issue complexity”—and demonstrate how they manifest empirically. We also highlight this conceptualization’s utility—and the danger of overlooking it—through the case of Darfur. This conceptualization paves the way for a new research agenda that explores how civil wars differ in terms of their complexity, the causes and consequences of civil war complexity, and how to refine conflict resolution techniques and strategies.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"137 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46475898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-22DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2153731
E. Souleimanov, David S. Siroky, Roberto Colombo
Abstract As an embedded sociocultural code, blood revenge is present in many societies where civil wars occur. Whereas evidence from other social sciences attests to its enduring global significance, security studies scholarship has largely neglected the custom of blood revenge. This article is the first to investigate its relevance for understanding the inception, dynamics, and aftermath of armed conflicts, and to present a comprehensive account of how blood revenge may shape civil wars. Drawing upon multidisciplinary scholarship, cross-case qualitative evidence, and a newly compiled dataset, this proof-of-concept article illustrates how blood revenge influences key dynamics in civil wars—specifically, the processes of violent mobilization, target selection, recruitment, defection, and disengagement. Setting the stage for further inquiries into the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of blood revenge in civil war, this conceptual article suggests why and how this sociocultural code continues to influence civil wars across the world.
{"title":"Blood Revenge in Civil War: Proof of Concept","authors":"E. Souleimanov, David S. Siroky, Roberto Colombo","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2153731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2153731","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As an embedded sociocultural code, blood revenge is present in many societies where civil wars occur. Whereas evidence from other social sciences attests to its enduring global significance, security studies scholarship has largely neglected the custom of blood revenge. This article is the first to investigate its relevance for understanding the inception, dynamics, and aftermath of armed conflicts, and to present a comprehensive account of how blood revenge may shape civil wars. Drawing upon multidisciplinary scholarship, cross-case qualitative evidence, and a newly compiled dataset, this proof-of-concept article illustrates how blood revenge influences key dynamics in civil wars—specifically, the processes of violent mobilization, target selection, recruitment, defection, and disengagement. Setting the stage for further inquiries into the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of blood revenge in civil war, this conceptual article suggests why and how this sociocultural code continues to influence civil wars across the world.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"101 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43021977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-21DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2153730
Shahin Berenji
Abstract Why do decision makers undertake bold conciliatory gestures? It is puzzling why leaders accommodate their rivals in such a way when smaller, less risky avenues exist to initiate conciliation. To shed light on this question, I examine Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to present an unprecedented package of arms control proposals at the Reykjavik summit. In one stroke, he made concessions to the United States on missile defense and strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believed he needed to reassure the Americans, particularly President Ronald Reagan, of the Soviet Union’s benign intentions and therefore made concessions that addressed US fears and security concerns. I argue that these concessions constitute empathic signals designed to communicate Gorbachev’s sincerity in reducing nuclear weapons. In the event his offer was rebuffed, Gorbachev would reveal his proposals to mobilize public opinion against Reagan. These strategies may seem contradictory but fit Gorbachev’s overall plan to challenge the Soviet Union’s threatening image and, in doing so, either persuade or pressure Reagan into reciprocating Soviet concessions.
{"title":"Empathy, Risk-Taking, and Concession-Making: Gorbachev’s Bold Proposals at Reykjavik to End the US-Soviet Arms Race","authors":"Shahin Berenji","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2153730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2153730","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why do decision makers undertake bold conciliatory gestures? It is puzzling why leaders accommodate their rivals in such a way when smaller, less risky avenues exist to initiate conciliation. To shed light on this question, I examine Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to present an unprecedented package of arms control proposals at the Reykjavik summit. In one stroke, he made concessions to the United States on missile defense and strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believed he needed to reassure the Americans, particularly President Ronald Reagan, of the Soviet Union’s benign intentions and therefore made concessions that addressed US fears and security concerns. I argue that these concessions constitute empathic signals designed to communicate Gorbachev’s sincerity in reducing nuclear weapons. In the event his offer was rebuffed, Gorbachev would reveal his proposals to mobilize public opinion against Reagan. These strategies may seem contradictory but fit Gorbachev’s overall plan to challenge the Soviet Union’s threatening image and, in doing so, either persuade or pressure Reagan into reciprocating Soviet concessions.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"306 - 337"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46100249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2022.2153733
Lisel Hintz, David E Banks
Abstract Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of Russian S-400 missile batteries is puzzling. Despite repeated threats of sanctions by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Turkey purchased a multi-billion-dollar Russian air defense system that remains nonoperational, fails to cover Turkey’s air defense gap, and led to Turkey’s costly expulsion from the F-35 program. We argue unexpected domestic constraints created by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s symbolic diplomacy raised the political costs of backing away from the deal. Collecting data from media reports and interviews, we analyze how Turkey’s AKP wielded the S-400 as a weapons system legitimating an identity narrative of Turkey as regional counterhegemon, facilitating the cultivation of coalitions with multiple, often competing, constituencies. We demonstrate via process tracing how the inherent ambiguity of symbols allowed nationalist constituencies key to the AKP’s hold on power to amplify the S-400 as symbolic of Turkey’s sovereignty, trapping Turkish officials in a costly policy corner. In unpacking Turkey’s S-400 purchase, the article contributes to the literature on symbolic diplomacy, audience costs, weapons procurement, and deterrence failure.
{"title":"Symbolic Amplification and Suboptimal Weapons Procurement: Explaining Turkey’s S-400 Program","authors":"Lisel Hintz, David E Banks","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2022.2153733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2153733","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Turkey’s 2019 acquisition of Russian S-400 missile batteries is puzzling. Despite repeated threats of sanctions by the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Turkey purchased a multi-billion-dollar Russian air defense system that remains nonoperational, fails to cover Turkey’s air defense gap, and led to Turkey’s costly expulsion from the F-35 program. We argue unexpected domestic constraints created by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s symbolic diplomacy raised the political costs of backing away from the deal. Collecting data from media reports and interviews, we analyze how Turkey’s AKP wielded the S-400 as a weapons system legitimating an identity narrative of Turkey as regional counterhegemon, facilitating the cultivation of coalitions with multiple, often competing, constituencies. We demonstrate via process tracing how the inherent ambiguity of symbols allowed nationalist constituencies key to the AKP’s hold on power to amplify the S-400 as symbolic of Turkey’s sovereignty, trapping Turkish officials in a costly policy corner. In unpacking Turkey’s S-400 purchase, the article contributes to the literature on symbolic diplomacy, audience costs, weapons procurement, and deterrence failure.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"826 - 856"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48514982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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