Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2197621
Lisa Langdon Koch
Abstract Few military regimes have seriously pursued a nuclear weapons capability, and only Pakistan has succeeded. I argue that military regimes governing nonnuclear weapons states are likely to prefer to invest in conventional rather than nuclear forces, even in the presence of external security threats. I identify two domestic sources of nuclear proliferation behavior in military regimes: the resource distribution preferences of the military organization and the need to manage the domestic conflicts that threaten the regime’s political survival. I test this theory using case evidence from Egypt, Brazil, and Pakistan. This study suggests that while external conditions are certainly important, domestic factors also have a significant impact on state security behavior.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2197619
J. Schwartz
Abstract According to the “Madman Theory” outlined by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas C. Schelling, and embraced by Presidents Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, being perceived as mad can help make seemingly incredible threats—such as starting a nuclear war—more credible. However, recent research has largely concluded that the Madman Theory does not work. In this study, I theorize that the international benefits of the Madman Theory have been underestimated, but also that there are significant domestic barriers associated with adopting such a strategy that undermine its effectiveness. Through a series of five novel survey experiments, I find evidence that perceived madness provides limited advantages in coercive bargaining vis-à-vis foreign adversaries, but it also entails significant domestic costs that potentially erode its efficacy. Overall, this study provides clearer support for the Madman Theory than most previous literature has found, but also breaks new theoretical ground by analyzing the domestic politics of perceived madness.
{"title":"Madman or Mad Genius? The International Benefits and Domestic Costs of the Madman Strategy","authors":"J. Schwartz","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2197619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2197619","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the “Madman Theory” outlined by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas C. Schelling, and embraced by Presidents Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, being perceived as mad can help make seemingly incredible threats—such as starting a nuclear war—more credible. However, recent research has largely concluded that the Madman Theory does not work. In this study, I theorize that the international benefits of the Madman Theory have been underestimated, but also that there are significant domestic barriers associated with adopting such a strategy that undermine its effectiveness. Through a series of five novel survey experiments, I find evidence that perceived madness provides limited advantages in coercive bargaining vis-à-vis foreign adversaries, but it also entails significant domestic costs that potentially erode its efficacy. Overall, this study provides clearer support for the Madman Theory than most previous literature has found, but also breaks new theoretical ground by analyzing the domestic politics of perceived madness.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"271 - 305"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47221318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200971
Emma Ashford
Van Jackson’s “Left of Liberal Internationalism” is a wonderfully clear effort to construct an intellectual scaffolding around the various forms of progressive thinking on foreign policy. This kind of exercise is valuable, as policy-relevant battles about US foreign policy typically take place in disparate venues and media: speeches, panels, magazines, and even across social media; this makes it difficult to build a comprehensive picture of how America’s major political parties are evolving on foreign policy over time. And while similar studies have been done in the past, particularly on the varieties of conservative foreign policy found in the Republican Party,1 Jackson’s article is the first to really explore the increasingly influential progressive wing of the Democratic Party in the context of foreign policy. Likewise, the article does a service in translating often-quixotic political debates over foreign policy into more scholarly language and concepts, allowing researchers to better situate these emerging debates in the canon of existing grand strategic debates.2 Even as an active participant in the policy debates over US foreign policy,3 I found Jackson’s article to be extremely helpful in clearly delineating the different arguments within the progressive movement, outlining how far debate has come, and showing where it still needs progress. With that in mind, however, I think the
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Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200974
Van Jackson
Bringing left-progressive views of the world into dialogue with security studies makes us better analysts by exposing both perspectives’ limitations and blind spots. It helps us discover areas of common ground. And it permits greater specificity about the nature and severity of policy disagreements between those who retain progressive or social democratic political commitments and those whose scope of work concentrates primarily on optimizing the national security state. Nevertheless, any attempt to bridge such distant worlds was bound to generate at least as much controversy as insight. Accordingly, the responses to my research illuminate a mix of fruitful agreements, irreducible differences, and promising avenues for future research. I am grateful for all of it. Rather than respond to every point made across five very different interjections, I will clarify some key elements in my original analysis, as well as some aspects of left-progressive politics that lend themselves to misunderstanding. First, progressive grand strategies are internally coherent logics—not people—describing different ways of using policy to realize peace, democracy, and equality. Second, all grand strategy is worldmaking, and all security analysis has political consequences. Third, progressivism in US foreign policy must be a contrast with—not merely a complement to—US liberal internationalism.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200202
Chad E. Nelson
Abstract What explains the remarkable degree of great-power cooperation during the Concert of Europe? I focus on a period when there were regular congresses and argue that the transformation of the great powers’ respective domestic politics to where they had active revolutionary movements and feared upheavals at home played a key role in undergirding the transformation of European international politics into a more cooperative order. Fears of a common domestic ideological threat can cause states to bind together rather than exploit one another. The cooperation among the great powers was not just because they were constrained by the balance of power or satisfied with the territorial order or because the powers were meeting together. Their considerable cooperation was largely due to their preferences rather than those interactions.
{"title":"Fears of Revolution and International Cooperation:The Concert of Europe and the Transformation of European Politics","authors":"Chad E. Nelson","doi":"10.1080/09636412.2023.2200202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2023.2200202","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What explains the remarkable degree of great-power cooperation during the Concert of Europe? I focus on a period when there were regular congresses and argue that the transformation of the great powers’ respective domestic politics to where they had active revolutionary movements and feared upheavals at home played a key role in undergirding the transformation of European international politics into a more cooperative order. Fears of a common domestic ideological threat can cause states to bind together rather than exploit one another. The cooperation among the great powers was not just because they were constrained by the balance of power or satisfied with the territorial order or because the powers were meeting together. Their considerable cooperation was largely due to their preferences rather than those interactions.","PeriodicalId":47478,"journal":{"name":"Security Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"338 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43188985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200973
C. W. Walldorf
Van Jackson’s “Left of Liberal Internationalism: Grand Strategies within Progressive Foreign Policy Thought” offers an exceptionally clear and fascinating picture of three different threads of grand strategic thinking— progressive pragmatism, antihegemonism, and peacemaking—that exist in current progressive policy circles. All three approaches share a commitment to reduced militarism in US foreign policy (for example, ending the force-based approach to counterterrorism), but each is distinct. Pragmatists advocate strengthening democratic alliances, US leadership in regional order-building, sanctioning autocrats, and achieving greater equity in Global North-South economic relations. Antihegemonists advocate restraint: a full drawdown of US military forces worldwide, an end to all alliances (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), and brokered spheres of influence with China and Russia. Finally, peacemakers advocate multilateral security arrangements, unilateral US demilitarization to stem security dilemmas, and bureaucratic changes to advance peace. This essay does not critique Jackson’s impressive analysis of progressivism. Instead, it focuses on the issue of feasibility. Alexander L. George argues that in the United States, domestic legitimacy (or, “a climate of acceptance”) is invaluable to sustain “a coherent and consistent” grand strategy amid the vicissitudes common to policymaking in democratic states. 1 Which or what parts of the progressive grand strategies Jackson identifies are more (or less) likely to gain domestic legitimacy, and with that shape US foreign policy going forward?
范·杰克逊的《自由国际主义的左派:进步外交政策思想中的大战略》为当前进步政策圈中存在的三种不同的大战略思想——进步实用主义、反霸权主义和缔造和平——提供了一幅异常清晰而引人入胜的画面。这三种方法都致力于减少美国外交政策中的军国主义(例如，结束以武力为基础的反恐方法)，但各有不同。实用主义者主张加强民主联盟，美国在建立地区秩序方面发挥领导作用，制裁独裁者，在全球南北经济关系中实现更大的平等。反霸权主义者主张克制:美国在世界范围内的军事力量全面缩减，结束所有联盟(包括北大西洋公约组织(NATO))，并与中国和俄罗斯进行势力范围的斡旋。最后，和平缔造者主张多边安全安排，美国单方面非军事化以遏制安全困境，并通过官僚机构改革来推进和平。本文并不批评杰克逊对进步主义令人印象深刻的分析。相反，它关注的是可行性问题。亚历山大·l·乔治(Alexander L. George)认为，在美国，国内合法性(或“接受的氛围”)对于在民主国家决策过程中维持“连贯一致”的大战略是非常宝贵的。杰克逊认定的进步大战略的哪些部分或哪些部分更有可能(或更少)获得国内合法性，并以此塑造美国未来的外交政策?
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Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200970
Daniel Bessner
of the world. This is hardly a political program likely to win votes or repair the shattered domestic consensus necessary to sustain an effective foreign policy. Progressives may not like the conservative, militarist, ecologically destructive, and racist attitudes of much of the American public, but disapproval is not a transformative politics. In this respect, progressive grand strategy needs to begin at home and perhaps is best thought of as the declaratory foreign policy of a social movement. If so, its lack of political appeal beyond committed progressives is yet another dimension of its autism, while the real work of progressive strategic thought remains undone.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2200969
Tarak Barkawi
Van Jackson’s thoughtful article “Left of Liberal Internationalism” identifies three “grand strategies,” each of which reflects a strand of progressive foreign policy thinking among the contemporary US Left. For each, he connects an analysis of the global sources of insecurity with a set of guiding policy prescriptions for the United States derived from progressive ideals. Then, with an astute eye, he offers an analysis of the risks involved for each paradigm. However, on offer here is less strategy and more progressive political imagination, preferred images of the world and of America—in short, ideology. This does not differentiate progressive grand strategy from the mainstream strategic thought with which Jackson is trying to dialogue. The Anglo-American tradition of grand strategy, as we find it in international relations (IR), valorizes the United States and its role in world history. Cold War realism, like liberal internationalism, reproduced idealized images of the United States as a democratic bulwark against totalitarianism and an enlightened hegemon. Though powerful states can often afford to maintain some degree of illusion, this is not a particularly strategic way of going about things, at least from a classical, Clausewitzian perspective.1 Strategy demands above all the gimlet eye: for oneself, for one’s opponents and allies, and for the situation at hand. Part of the problem with thinking about strategy in mainstream IR is that the social and political context—the international system of states—is largely taken for granted. So too, for the most part, are Eurocentric historiographies.2 For liberals and realists, these entail rosy conceptions of liberal democracy and of capitalism, as well as triumphalist accounts of the US role in the twentieth century. Jackson wants to move beyond this. His progressive approaches purport to take seriously a domestic history
范·杰克逊(Van Jackson)深思熟虑的文章《自由国际主义的左派》(Left of Liberal Internationalism)确定了三个“大战略”，每一个都反映了当代美国左派的一种进步外交政策思想。对于每一个问题，他都将对全球不安全根源的分析与一套源自进步理想的美国指导性政策处方联系起来。然后，他以敏锐的眼光分析了每种模式所涉及的风险。然而，这里提供的是较少的战略和更多的进步的政治想象，更喜欢的世界和美国的形象-简而言之，意识形态。这并没有将进步的大战略与杰克逊试图与之对话的主流战略思想区分开来。正如我们在国际关系(IR)中所发现的那样，英美大战略传统对美国及其在世界历史上的作用进行了评估。冷战现实主义和自由国际主义一样，复制了美国作为反对极权主义的民主堡垒和开明霸权的理想化形象。虽然强大的国家通常可以维持某种程度的幻觉，但这并不是一种特别有战略意义的处理事情的方式，至少从经典的克劳塞维茨的角度来看是这样战略首先需要敏锐的眼光:为自己，为对手和盟友，为眼前的形势。在主流国际关系中思考战略的部分问题在于，社会和政治背景——国际国家体系——在很大程度上被认为是理所当然的。在很大程度上，以欧洲为中心的史学也是如此对于自由主义者和现实主义者来说，这包括对自由民主和资本主义的乐观看法，以及对美国在20世纪所扮演角色的必胜主义描述。杰克逊想要超越这一点。他的进步方针意在认真对待国内历史
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178963
Darren J. Lim, G. Ikenberry
Abstract We develop a theoretical logic and character of a Chinese model of international order. We begin by considering general problems of power transition and hegemonic order-building, with reference to the American experience with liberal hegemony. China will, like all powerful states, seek an order that protects its interests. But unlike its predecessors, China faces an existing order containing elements that threaten its domestic political and economic model. We describe this domestic model and consider how it might be defended at the international level—embedded in the logic and organizational principles of hegemonic order. Our contribution is to theorize the consequences of China’s hegemonic interests, including domestic preservation, and its order-building practices, for the operation and underlying character of a China-led hegemonic order. Though not inherently illiberal in form, we outline how the emergent order could generate illiberal outcomes. This article therefore theorizes the concept of illiberal hegemony.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2023.2178968
Yogesh Joshi
Abstract Janina Dill, Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino have demonstrated how calculations over the morality of contending norms may influence public's readiness to use nuclear weapons. I argue that such atomic dispositions are highly contingent on the nature of the adversary. Public may react differently to various nuclear targets because adversaries evoke different levels of retributiveness. When deciding between the lives of fellow citizens and those of foreign noncombatants, a bargain is easier to reach against targets which evoke feelings of hatred and anger due to historical, cultural or domestic political reasons. Using the Indian case, I demonstrate why the variance in the character of the threat is a substantive issue. Specifically, I show why the India-China dyad exhibits a greater degree of normative prohibition compared to the India-Pakistan dyad.
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