Abstract Research Summary In this paper, we study how variations in debt and equity ownership and the institutions that govern interactions between different types of principals and agents affect the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Using a sample of 55,722 acquisitions, our study finds that risk‐averse debtholders reduce the completion likelihood of acquisitions. When acquisitions cross borders, the acquiring capital providers become exposed to institutional environments that have evolved to prioritize different ideologies or principals because of the structure and customers of local capital markets. As a result, institutional duality in home and target countries reduces the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Our study integrates varieties of capitalism arguments and firm‐level agency conflicts and highlights the theoretical importance of capital markets and their concentration. Managerial Summary An acquisition is a highly consequential negotiation process between managers and capital providers of a firm. Based on their evaluation of a potential deal, managers propose acquisitions to capital providers who either accept it or pressure managers into withdrawing from the announced deal. This study considers firms' capital structure and cross‐national differences in the governing institutions to explain the resistance of capital providers against announced acquisitions. In particular, it points to the fear of capital providers losing control of their firms as a driver of their resistance against cross‐border acquisitions. However, when a favorable capital‐market structure in the target's home country alleviates the fears of capital providers, their resistance weakens.
{"title":"Ownership, institutions, and the agency of M&A completion","authors":"Thomas Lindner, Jakob Müllner, Harald Puhr","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1494","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research Summary In this paper, we study how variations in debt and equity ownership and the institutions that govern interactions between different types of principals and agents affect the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Using a sample of 55,722 acquisitions, our study finds that risk‐averse debtholders reduce the completion likelihood of acquisitions. When acquisitions cross borders, the acquiring capital providers become exposed to institutional environments that have evolved to prioritize different ideologies or principals because of the structure and customers of local capital markets. As a result, institutional duality in home and target countries reduces the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Our study integrates varieties of capitalism arguments and firm‐level agency conflicts and highlights the theoretical importance of capital markets and their concentration. Managerial Summary An acquisition is a highly consequential negotiation process between managers and capital providers of a firm. Based on their evaluation of a potential deal, managers propose acquisitions to capital providers who either accept it or pressure managers into withdrawing from the announced deal. This study considers firms' capital structure and cross‐national differences in the governing institutions to explain the resistance of capital providers against announced acquisitions. In particular, it points to the fear of capital providers losing control of their firms as a driver of their resistance against cross‐border acquisitions. However, when a favorable capital‐market structure in the target's home country alleviates the fears of capital providers, their resistance weakens.","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135783987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marcus M. Larsen, Julian Birkinshaw, Yue Maggie Zhou, Gabriel R. G. Benito
The multinational corporation (MNC) is a typical example of a complex organization. In this essay, we employ an established body of literature on complexity in organizations to explore and discuss the nature and consequences of complexity for global strategy and MNCs. On that basis, we develop a simple organizing framework for complexity in global strategies emphasizing the source (external and internal complexity) and type (process and structural complexity) of complexity. We use this framework to structure and discuss the six research contributions in this Special Issue. We conclude by suggesting additional avenues of research on the interface between global strategy and complexity.Firms internationalize because they recognize business opportunities abroad and devise strategies to successfully exploit them. At the same time, managers face increasing complexity as MNCs expand internationally and engage in more unknown and dispersed operations. Not only do MNCs face considerable complexity by operating in diverse and uncertain environments, but also by managing and coordinating organizational tasks and activities spanning multiple countries. This essay discusses these challenges and corresponding strategies for MNC managers. It also provides an overview of the six research articles included in this Special Issue about complexity and MNCs.
{"title":"Complexity and multinationals","authors":"Marcus M. Larsen, Julian Birkinshaw, Yue Maggie Zhou, Gabriel R. G. Benito","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1493","DOIUrl":"10.1002/gsj.1493","url":null,"abstract":"The multinational corporation (MNC) is a typical example of a complex organization. In this essay, we employ an established body of literature on complexity in organizations to explore and discuss the nature and consequences of complexity for global strategy and MNCs. On that basis, we develop a simple organizing framework for complexity in global strategies emphasizing the source (external and internal complexity) and type (process and structural complexity) of complexity. We use this framework to structure and discuss the six research contributions in this Special Issue. We conclude by suggesting additional avenues of research on the interface between global strategy and complexity.Firms internationalize because they recognize business opportunities abroad and devise strategies to successfully exploit them. At the same time, managers face increasing complexity as MNCs expand internationally and engage in more unknown and dispersed operations. Not only do MNCs face considerable complexity by operating in diverse and uncertain environments, but also by managing and coordinating organizational tasks and activities spanning multiple countries. This essay discusses these challenges and corresponding strategies for MNC managers. It also provides an overview of the six research articles included in this Special Issue about complexity and MNCs.","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":"13 3","pages":"535-551"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/gsj.1493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45665031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}