Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-6-27
M. M. Rodionova, N.M. Smirnov
The article analyzes the process of transformation of the concept of violence in the political and social theory of the 20th — 21st centuries. The authors document a tremendous growth of interest in this phenomenon despite the absence of a coherent metatheory and attempt to trace possible reasons for the appearance of the latter. For this purpose, they distinguish two analytical categories — “classic” and “new” violence — and consider both concepts in terms of the specifics of the action, the object and subject of violence, as well as the prevailing models of theoretical explanation. Such simplification allows to trace transformations that the category of violence has gone through: the transition from a fundamentally observable action to a concealed one; from the state, group or person as subjects of violence to an impersonal structure; from capturing subject’s experience to its “loss”; from a functional explanation of violence to a dysfunctional one. According to the authors, these changes in the conceptualization of violence mean a significant expansion of the concept and a simultaneous blurring of its boundaries, which ultimately leads to the loss of its discrimination ability. After having diagnosed the reinvention of the concept, they highlight three potential solutions: to think about violence as a stable concept, in which the constitutive elements do not change, but their semantic content does; to interpret new conceptualizations of violence as additions to rather than replacements of the previous statements; and, finally, to recognize the possibility of the coexistence of several understandings of violence.
{"title":"The Ship of Theseus: Transformations of the Concept of Violence in Political and Social Theory","authors":"M. M. Rodionova, N.M. Smirnov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-6-27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-6-27","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the process of transformation of the concept of violence in the political and social theory of the 20th — 21st centuries. The authors document a tremendous growth of interest in this phenomenon despite the absence of a coherent metatheory and attempt to trace possible reasons for the appearance of the latter. For this purpose, they distinguish two analytical categories — “classic” and “new” violence — and consider both concepts in terms of the specifics of the action, the object and subject of violence, as well as the prevailing models of theoretical explanation. Such simplification allows to trace transformations that the category of violence has gone through: the transition from a fundamentally observable action to a concealed one; from the state, group or person as subjects of violence to an impersonal structure; from capturing subject’s experience to its “loss”; from a functional explanation of violence to a dysfunctional one. According to the authors, these changes in the conceptualization of violence mean a significant expansion of the concept and a simultaneous blurring of its boundaries, which ultimately leads to the loss of its discrimination ability. After having diagnosed the reinvention of the concept, they highlight three potential solutions: to think about violence as a stable concept, in which the constitutive elements do not change, but their semantic content does; to interpret new conceptualizations of violence as additions to rather than replacements of the previous statements; and, finally, to recognize the possibility of the coexistence of several understandings of violence.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88682226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-65-79
S. Gorokhov, R. Dmitriev, M. M. Agafoshin
The article presents the attempt of using the marketing paradigm in the analysis of state-confessional relations. Considering such relations through the prism of market structures, the authors identify three main types: religious monopoly, religious oligopoly, and religious monopolistic competition. Religious monopoly implies the dominance of one religion, which enjoys the full support of the state that protects it from competition from other religions. In the modern world, religious monopoly exists in two forms — closed and open, with the differences between the two lying in the degree of monopolization of the market by one of the confessions. According to the authors’ conclusion, the religious monopoly imposed from above (by the state) ultimately has a secular effect, reducing the level of participation of the population in religious activities and thereby weakening the monopoly of religion, which, in turn, can lead to the termination of state support for it. Religious oligopoly implies that several dominant religions or their branches that are equally supported by the state and have the same status compete in the market; the emergence of new ones is difficult (open oligopoly) or even seriously limited (closed oligopoly). Religious monopolistic competition is characterized by the inclusion in the process of competition not only of religions and their branches, but also religious denominations. Each of these “players” produces its own unique religious product and has relatively free access to the market of religions, which is almost not limited by the state. The proposed typology is historical in its nature, which makes it possible to predict the dynamics of state-confessional relations.
{"title":"Religion and the State: Types of Relations in the Religious Market","authors":"S. Gorokhov, R. Dmitriev, M. M. Agafoshin","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-65-79","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-65-79","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the attempt of using the marketing paradigm in the analysis of state-confessional relations. Considering such relations through the prism of market structures, the authors identify three main types: religious monopoly, religious oligopoly, and religious monopolistic competition. Religious monopoly implies the dominance of one religion, which enjoys the full support of the state that protects it from competition from other religions. In the modern world, religious monopoly exists in two forms — closed and open, with the differences between the two lying in the degree of monopolization of the market by one of the confessions. According to the authors’ conclusion, the religious monopoly imposed from above (by the state) ultimately has a secular effect, reducing the level of participation of the population in religious activities and thereby weakening the monopoly of religion, which, in turn, can lead to the termination of state support for it. Religious oligopoly implies that several dominant religions or their branches that are equally supported by the state and have the same status compete in the market; the emergence of new ones is difficult (open oligopoly) or even seriously limited (closed oligopoly). Religious monopolistic competition is characterized by the inclusion in the process of competition not only of religions and their branches, but also religious denominations. Each of these “players” produces its own unique religious product and has relatively free access to the market of religions, which is almost not limited by the state. The proposed typology is historical in its nature, which makes it possible to predict the dynamics of state-confessional relations.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81602571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-158-178
N. Rabotyazhev
The rise of the right-wing populism has become a distinguishing feature of the political life of European countries at the beginning of the 21st century. Over the last 20—25 years, right-wing populist parties have turned from once marginal associations into an important component of the partypolitical system of the EU countries. The key components of the ideology of the parties of this type include ethno-cultural nationalism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-globalism, and euroscepticism. Similarly to other populists, their representatives claim to express the interests of the “true” people, which they understand as an organic unity that is opposed to the self-serving and morally degraded establishment. The German version of right-wing populism manifests itself in the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which stands somewhat apart from the European right-wing populist organizations and differs from most of them in its genesis. The AfD was founded in 2013 by the conservatives and national liberals and in the first few years of its existence it used to be in fact a national conservative eurosceptic party. Although later its right-wing component became stronger, the party still decisively dissociates itself from right-wing radicalism and denies any connection with the German right-wing tradition. The preservation of the national and cultural identity of Germany, the restriction of the influx of immigrants, the rejection of the euro and the transformation of the European Union into an association of sovereign states are among the most important AfD’s principles set out in the party platform. The electoral base of the AfD consists of those Germans who lose out from globalization, do not accept multiculturalism and are concerned about the influx of migrants from other cultures into Germany. The party is most popular in the eastern lands of Germany. In addition to the extreme right movement, which gravitates towards right-wing radicalism, the party also retains a moderate conservative one. Nevertheless, the AfD remains a party that no one wants to “shake hands” with and has almost no chance of entering power.
{"title":"Alternative for Germany: Between Conservatism and Right-Wing Populism","authors":"N. Rabotyazhev","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-158-178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-158-178","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of the right-wing populism has become a distinguishing feature of the political life of European countries at the beginning of the 21st century. Over the last 20—25 years, right-wing populist parties have turned from once marginal associations into an important component of the partypolitical system of the EU countries. The key components of the ideology of the parties of this type include ethno-cultural nationalism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-globalism, and euroscepticism. Similarly to other populists, their representatives claim to express the interests of the “true” people, which they understand as an organic unity that is opposed to the self-serving and morally degraded establishment. The German version of right-wing populism manifests itself in the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which stands somewhat apart from the European right-wing populist organizations and differs from most of them in its genesis. The AfD was founded in 2013 by the conservatives and national liberals and in the first few years of its existence it used to be in fact a national conservative eurosceptic party. Although later its right-wing component became stronger, the party still decisively dissociates itself from right-wing radicalism and denies any connection with the German right-wing tradition. The preservation of the national and cultural identity of Germany, the restriction of the influx of immigrants, the rejection of the euro and the transformation of the European Union into an association of sovereign states are among the most important AfD’s principles set out in the party platform. The electoral base of the AfD consists of those Germans who lose out from globalization, do not accept multiculturalism and are concerned about the influx of migrants from other cultures into Germany. The party is most popular in the eastern lands of Germany. In addition to the extreme right movement, which gravitates towards right-wing radicalism, the party also retains a moderate conservative one. Nevertheless, the AfD remains a party that no one wants to “shake hands” with and has almost no chance of entering power.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77066067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-48-64
A. Matetskaya
The concept of a post-secular society proposed by Jurgen Habermas has become quite popular in Russia, and not only within the framework of scientific discourse. However, in the Russian context, the very concept of “post-secular” is most often interpreted through the prism of desecularization. According to the author’s conclusion, the special aspects of the religious revival in the country after the collapse of the Soviet regime can largely explain this. The article shows that the transition to a post-secular state in Russia included not only a rethinking of the perspectives of religion in a secular society and an awareness of the need for the participation of believers in public discussions, but also a change in the institutional position of religion, the rapprochement of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the authorities, the formation of a new idea of collective identity on the basis of Orthodoxy as the dominant confession, as well as an attempt to construct an official ideology, or a secular religion, an important element of which would be the symbolic heritage of Orthodoxy. Religion turned out to be in demand primarily for solving social and political problems: determining national specifics, reviving lost cultural traditions, and legitimizing political power. Religious revival in that form did not imply proper religious conversion and thus was not accompanied by a noticeable increase in real religiosity. The author explains the predominantly “secular” perception of the functions of religion by the authorities and a significant part of society by the legacy of the Soviet political religion, which pushed traditional religions with their transcendent sacred to the periphery of social life and gave rise to specific forms of the secular sacred.
{"title":"After Political Religion: Special Aspects of Russian Post-Secularism","authors":"A. Matetskaya","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-48-64","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-48-64","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of a post-secular society proposed by Jurgen Habermas has become quite popular in Russia, and not only within the framework of scientific discourse. However, in the Russian context, the very concept of “post-secular” is most often interpreted through the prism of desecularization. According to the author’s conclusion, the special aspects of the religious revival in the country after the collapse of the Soviet regime can largely explain this. The article shows that the transition to a post-secular state in Russia included not only a rethinking of the perspectives of religion in a secular society and an awareness of the need for the participation of believers in public discussions, but also a change in the institutional position of religion, the rapprochement of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the authorities, the formation of a new idea of collective identity on the basis of Orthodoxy as the dominant confession, as well as an attempt to construct an official ideology, or a secular religion, an important element of which would be the symbolic heritage of Orthodoxy. Religion turned out to be in demand primarily for solving social and political problems: determining national specifics, reviving lost cultural traditions, and legitimizing political power. Religious revival in that form did not imply proper religious conversion and thus was not accompanied by a noticeable increase in real religiosity. The author explains the predominantly “secular” perception of the functions of religion by the authorities and a significant part of society by the legacy of the Soviet political religion, which pushed traditional religions with their transcendent sacred to the periphery of social life and gave rise to specific forms of the secular sacred.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79544142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-105-129
Y. Korgunyuk
The article is devoted to the theme of the Soviet past in the 2021 Duma elections. The author shows that, in comparison with 2016, the relevance of this topic has not decreased, but has in fact increased. While in the previous Duma elections the confrontations on the issues of the Soviet past dissolved into broader cleavages, this time they manifested themselves very clearly. The author documents the change in the structure of the confrontations on the issues of the Soviet past. If a year earlier such confrontations ran along the lines of “Communists vs. Anti-Communists” and “Liberals vs. Statists”, in 2021 they rather went along the lines of “Defenders of the Soviet period vs. its Critics” and “Reds vs. Whites”, with communists surpassing liberals and assuming the leading role in such confrontations. The author explains this shift by the growing importance of the topic of the Soviet past in the interparty discussion, because it is the communists who are its main promoters and beneficiaries. The article reveals that the confrontation “Defenders of the Soviet period vs. its Critics” quite convincingly explains the second electoral cleavage. In one of the models, it even displaces the general confrontation between liberals and conservatives in the worldview issues. The use of an alternative methodology based on a double factor analysis allowed the author to detect the opposition “Communists vs. Liberals”, as well as an additional one associated with the special position of the Liberal Democratic Party on the issues of the Soviet past. These confrontations colored a number of electoral cleavages, including some of those that otherwise would be impossible to interpret politically. The author interprets an increase in the importance of the Soviet past in the mass consciousness as the evidence that the process of “Left vs. Right” confrontation shifting from the socio-economic area to the socio-cultural one, which is typical for the European and North American democracies, has partially affected Russia.
{"title":"The Soviet Past Theme in the 2021 Duma Campaign","authors":"Y. Korgunyuk","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-105-129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-106-3-105-129","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the theme of the Soviet past in the 2021 Duma elections. The author shows that, in comparison with 2016, the relevance of this topic has not decreased, but has in fact increased. While in the previous Duma elections the confrontations on the issues of the Soviet past dissolved into broader cleavages, this time they manifested themselves very clearly. The author documents the change in the structure of the confrontations on the issues of the Soviet past. If a year earlier such confrontations ran along the lines of “Communists vs. Anti-Communists” and “Liberals vs. Statists”, in 2021 they rather went along the lines of “Defenders of the Soviet period vs. its Critics” and “Reds vs. Whites”, with communists surpassing liberals and assuming the leading role in such confrontations. The author explains this shift by the growing importance of the topic of the Soviet past in the interparty discussion, because it is the communists who are its main promoters and beneficiaries. The article reveals that the confrontation “Defenders of the Soviet period vs. its Critics” quite convincingly explains the second electoral cleavage. In one of the models, it even displaces the general confrontation between liberals and conservatives in the worldview issues. The use of an alternative methodology based on a double factor analysis allowed the author to detect the opposition “Communists vs. Liberals”, as well as an additional one associated with the special position of the Liberal Democratic Party on the issues of the Soviet past. These confrontations colored a number of electoral cleavages, including some of those that otherwise would be impossible to interpret politically. The author interprets an increase in the importance of the Soviet past in the mass consciousness as the evidence that the process of “Left vs. Right” confrontation shifting from the socio-economic area to the socio-cultural one, which is typical for the European and North American democracies, has partially affected Russia.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79215366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>The public discourse on climate change has long centred around hope-based narratives pushed by both the media and mainstream environmentalist agents from Greenpeace and WWF to Bill Gates and Al Gore.1 The promises of scientific and technological advance in particular, they argue, give us reason to be hopeful that it is in our hands to halt the incipient climate catastrophe. We just need to roll up our sleeves and get on with it.</p><p>In the face of humanity’s apparent inability—on display most recently at COP26 in Glasgow—to adopt the ‘rapid and far-reaching changes in all aspects of society’ required to at least keep average global temperature increases below 1.5°C,2 this narrative has come under pressure. More radical climate activists make the case for an affective shift away from hope in the face of global warming towards darker attitudes such as anger, panic, or fear, or, most surprisingly perhaps, despair. The activist group Extinction Rebellion (XR) has arguably been the most vocal in their call for hope to ‘die’.3 Hope, they worry, obscures the truth about global warming as the single largest existential threat to the planet and hampers the kind of radical action that would be required at least to rein in its consequences. ‘In facing our climate predicament’, they argue, ‘there is no way to escape despair'.4</p><p>Reactions have been mixed, both from within and beyond the climate movement. While some fellow activists express enthusiasm about an explicit invocation of despair,5 others worry about its potentially stifling and depoliticizing effects on the public. According to the American scientist Michael Mann, the rhetoric of despair ‘is in many ways as pernicious as outright climate change denial, for it leads us down the same path of inaction’;6 writer and activist George Monbiot even considers succumbing to despair to be a moral failure.7 In the media, XR are frequently portrayed as the ‘eccentric and dangerous merchants of despair’.8</p><p>This discursive backlash chimes with a philosophical scepticism about despair that is both widespread and long-standing. According to Euripides’ Amphitryon, despair is the ‘mark of a worthless man’;9 Aquinas considers it ‘the greatest of sins’;10 Kant’s greatest worry is that we might ‘succumb to despair’ in the face of moral obligation;11 Charles Peirce equates despair with insanity.12 And contemporary philosophers juxtapose celebratory accounts of hope as a motivation and source of grit with a view of despair as unproductive, impotent, or nihilistic. Despairing agents, they argue, should either give up on the relevant end or cultivate an attitude, such as hope, that strengthens their resolve rather than undermining it.13 Unsurprisingly, political philosophers tend to agree that ‘a hopeful politics, one based upon a vision of generalized global prosperity and sustainability, best addresses the problems of climate change’.14</p><p>The aim of this article is to withstand this wholehearted rejecti
{"title":"Hope from Despair*","authors":"Jakob Huber","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12283","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The public discourse on climate change has long centred around hope-based narratives pushed by both the media and mainstream environmentalist agents from Greenpeace and WWF to Bill Gates and Al Gore.1 The promises of scientific and technological advance in particular, they argue, give us reason to be hopeful that it is in our hands to halt the incipient climate catastrophe. We just need to roll up our sleeves and get on with it.</p><p>In the face of humanity’s apparent inability—on display most recently at COP26 in Glasgow—to adopt the ‘rapid and far-reaching changes in all aspects of society’ required to at least keep average global temperature increases below 1.5°C,2 this narrative has come under pressure. More radical climate activists make the case for an affective shift away from hope in the face of global warming towards darker attitudes such as anger, panic, or fear, or, most surprisingly perhaps, despair. The activist group Extinction Rebellion (XR) has arguably been the most vocal in their call for hope to ‘die’.3 Hope, they worry, obscures the truth about global warming as the single largest existential threat to the planet and hampers the kind of radical action that would be required at least to rein in its consequences. ‘In facing our climate predicament’, they argue, ‘there is no way to escape despair'.4</p><p>Reactions have been mixed, both from within and beyond the climate movement. While some fellow activists express enthusiasm about an explicit invocation of despair,5 others worry about its potentially stifling and depoliticizing effects on the public. According to the American scientist Michael Mann, the rhetoric of despair ‘is in many ways as pernicious as outright climate change denial, for it leads us down the same path of inaction’;6 writer and activist George Monbiot even considers succumbing to despair to be a moral failure.7 In the media, XR are frequently portrayed as the ‘eccentric and dangerous merchants of despair’.8</p><p>This discursive backlash chimes with a philosophical scepticism about despair that is both widespread and long-standing. According to Euripides’ Amphitryon, despair is the ‘mark of a worthless man’;9 Aquinas considers it ‘the greatest of sins’;10 Kant’s greatest worry is that we might ‘succumb to despair’ in the face of moral obligation;11 Charles Peirce equates despair with insanity.12 And contemporary philosophers juxtapose celebratory accounts of hope as a motivation and source of grit with a view of despair as unproductive, impotent, or nihilistic. Despairing agents, they argue, should either give up on the relevant end or cultivate an attitude, such as hope, that strengthens their resolve rather than undermining it.13 Unsurprisingly, political philosophers tend to agree that ‘a hopeful politics, one based upon a vision of generalized global prosperity and sustainability, best addresses the problems of climate change’.14</p><p>The aim of this article is to withstand this wholehearted rejecti","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"80-101"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50136931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-191-201
N.N. Gudalov
The monograph written by Kirill Koktysh is devoted to the issues of constructing languages of Political Science. These languages are diverse, but the author analyzes them through three basic concepts — rationalism, institutions and ideas. Masterfully combining a limited number of concepts, he builds a large-scale construction, showing in detail how one can study languages for describing politics. According to Koktysh, the rational is constructed by specific institutions. He identifies three institutions that go back to the three functions of the Indo-European gods, highlighted by Georges Dumézil. These institutions correspond to the three functions of politics — “leader” (makes decisions), “priest” (forms and maintains norms) and “merchant” (is engaged in economic reproduction). These institutions seek to extend their rationality to the society at large, using for this purpose three “big ideas” — order, justice, and freedom. According to the author’s conclusion, the institutions of the leader and the priest form the basis of stable social conditions — “political architectures”, and it is the relations between them that determine the specifics of such “architectures”. At the same time, the book pays attention not only to statics, but also to dynamics. The cognitive-structural method used by the author allows him to explore the transformations of the societies through the analysis of changes in rationalism, institutions and ideas. Koktysh’s book is valuable not only due to the novelty of its research question and fundamental nature, but also because it outlines important directions for further discussion. One of these directions concerns the popular criticism of the Enlightenment, with which the author agrees, as well as the justification for reducing rationality to mere derivatives of certain social contexts. Another direction for a discussion is about the evaluation of the Anglo-American model of democracy, which is denied the ability to produce generally valid meanings. In many ways, this book per se represents a significant contribution to a rational discussion of politics, convincingly demonstrating how complex and elusive the concepts of Political Science are.
{"title":"Три лика Левиафана: рациональность, институты, идеи Коктыш К.Е. Дискурс рационализма, свободы и демократии. М.: МГИМО-Университет, 2021 _","authors":"N.N. Gudalov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-191-201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-191-201","url":null,"abstract":"The monograph written by Kirill Koktysh is devoted to the issues of constructing languages of Political Science. These languages are diverse, but the author analyzes them through three basic concepts — rationalism, institutions and ideas. Masterfully combining a limited number of concepts, he builds a large-scale construction, showing in detail how one can study languages for describing politics. According to Koktysh, the rational is constructed by specific institutions. He identifies three institutions that go back to the three functions of the Indo-European gods, highlighted by Georges Dumézil. These institutions correspond to the three functions of politics — “leader” (makes decisions), “priest” (forms and maintains norms) and “merchant” (is engaged in economic reproduction). These institutions seek to extend their rationality to the society at large, using for this purpose three “big ideas” — order, justice, and freedom. According to the author’s conclusion, the institutions of the leader and the priest form the basis of stable social conditions — “political architectures”, and it is the relations between them that determine the specifics of such “architectures”. At the same time, the book pays attention not only to statics, but also to dynamics. The cognitive-structural method used by the author allows him to explore the transformations of the societies through the analysis of changes in rationalism, institutions and ideas. Koktysh’s book is valuable not only due to the novelty of its research question and fundamental nature, but also because it outlines important directions for further discussion. One of these directions concerns the popular criticism of the Enlightenment, with which the author agrees, as well as the justification for reducing rationality to mere derivatives of certain social contexts. Another direction for a discussion is about the evaluation of the Anglo-American model of democracy, which is denied the ability to produce generally valid meanings. In many ways, this book per se represents a significant contribution to a rational discussion of politics, convincingly demonstrating how complex and elusive the concepts of Political Science are.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76308723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-71-101
L. Bliakher, K. Grigorichev, I. Peshkov
The article is devoted to the analysis of a special political form that arises in the “empty space” on the “edge of the state”, where actors of power exist remotely, beyond the boundaries of the “emptiness”, but they can be materialized in it. The authors use the term “periphery of power” to describe this political form. The article shows that “empty space” is not a vacuum, but it does not contain what the observer (in this case, the authorities) expects to see, what he can read and comprehend as some kind of entity. It is the absence of the expected objects, actors and practices that makes the space “empty”. The paper verifies the hypothesis that, being “empty” for an observer, such space is populated and has authorities. Empirically, the study is based on the results of two field works to the upper Lena River. The territory has neither settlement structure nor legal economic activity, and the number of registered residents is minimal. The nearest authorities (police, environmental protection, municipal authorities, etc.) are located on the borders of the territory, and the distance to the nearest large city (Irkutsk) is 500—700 km. Nevertheless, the field work there revealed a fairly large community with its own hierarchy, stable forms of communication, legalization and mobilization of remote authorities. For members of this community, staying in the “empty territory” makes no sense from the economic point of view. They are registered in other places (district centers or other regional cities, including capitals) and represent relatively successful citizens. However, the city remains for them nothing else but a source of resources (material, financial, etc.). They live exactly in the “empty space”. Social networks are formed in it, statuses and communication are built, which can be turned into the space of power. The insights that the authors obtained give ground to assume that this process is not an outlier, but rather represented a more general process of separating a place to earn money and a place to live. According to their conclusion, while maintaining the current trends, the “exit space” documented by them will expand, forming more and more new forms of “emptiness”
{"title":"On the Edge of the State: Political Formation of the Periphery of Power","authors":"L. Bliakher, K. Grigorichev, I. Peshkov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-71-101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-71-101","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis of a special political form that arises in the “empty space” on the “edge of the state”, where actors of power exist remotely, beyond the boundaries of the “emptiness”, but they can be materialized in it. The authors use the term “periphery of power” to describe this political form. The article shows that “empty space” is not a vacuum, but it does not contain what the observer (in this case, the authorities) expects to see, what he can read and comprehend as some kind of entity. It is the absence of the expected objects, actors and practices that makes the space “empty”. The paper verifies the hypothesis that, being “empty” for an observer, such space is populated and has authorities. Empirically, the study is based on the results of two field works to the upper Lena River. The territory has neither settlement structure nor legal economic activity, and the number of registered residents is minimal. The nearest authorities (police, environmental protection, municipal authorities, etc.) are located on the borders of the territory, and the distance to the nearest large city (Irkutsk) is 500—700 km. Nevertheless, the field work there revealed a fairly large community with its own hierarchy, stable forms of communication, legalization and mobilization of remote authorities. For members of this community, staying in the “empty territory” makes no sense from the economic point of view. They are registered in other places (district centers or other regional cities, including capitals) and represent relatively successful citizens. However, the city remains for them nothing else but a source of resources (material, financial, etc.). They live exactly in the “empty space”. Social networks are formed in it, statuses and communication are built, which can be turned into the space of power. The insights that the authors obtained give ground to assume that this process is not an outlier, but rather represented a more general process of separating a place to earn money and a place to live. According to their conclusion, while maintaining the current trends, the “exit space” documented by them will expand, forming more and more new forms of “emptiness”","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"129 6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83445939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-102-117
A. Semenov
Ethnicity, being one of the most important forms of selfidentification, plays a significant role in many political processes, including the electoral process. Many research articles document a systematic relationship between ethnic identity and voting. At the same time, there is a dearth of studies about the concrete mechanisms on how ethnicity and voting are connected at the individual level. The question of their efficiency remains debatable. In the article, based on the materials of the focus group discussions in small towns in five ethnic republics of the Russian Federation, the author analyzes such mechanisms and tries to assess their possible effects in the Russian context. The research study shows that the factor of ethnicity is very weak in voting at the local level. Although ethnic identification helps reduce information uncertainty due to the presence of the common cultural markers, these markers are not the only or even the priority basis for electoral choices — the socio-economic agenda and personal qualities of candidates are equally or even more important. Such mechanisms as group pressure and political machines that are driven by ethnicity almost fail to predict electoral behavior. The research findings call into question a number of conclusions based on the crosssectional analysis of aggregated data, indicating that even if ethnicity plays a role in voting, this role is mediated by other factors.
{"title":"Factor of Ethnicity in Voting at Local Level in Russia","authors":"A. Semenov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-102-117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-102-117","url":null,"abstract":"Ethnicity, being one of the most important forms of selfidentification, plays a significant role in many political processes, including the electoral process. Many research articles document a systematic relationship between ethnic identity and voting. At the same time, there is a dearth of studies about the concrete mechanisms on how ethnicity and voting are connected at the individual level. The question of their efficiency remains debatable. In the article, based on the materials of the focus group discussions in small towns in five ethnic republics of the Russian Federation, the author analyzes such mechanisms and tries to assess their possible effects in the Russian context. The research study shows that the factor of ethnicity is very weak in voting at the local level. Although ethnic identification helps reduce information uncertainty due to the presence of the common cultural markers, these markers are not the only or even the priority basis for electoral choices — the socio-economic agenda and personal qualities of candidates are equally or even more important. Such mechanisms as group pressure and political machines that are driven by ethnicity almost fail to predict electoral behavior. The research findings call into question a number of conclusions based on the crosssectional analysis of aggregated data, indicating that even if ethnicity plays a role in voting, this role is mediated by other factors.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86378294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-176-190
S. Sergeev, A. Kuznetsova, S. Kuzmina
The article is devoted to studying the new radical left parties (NRLP) that either emerged or strengthened in Western Europe in the light of social protests against neoliberal policies and austerity measures. The mid2010s witnessed the peak of the electoral successes of the NRLP, when, after revisiting the mistakes of the past, the radical left challenged social democrats, who shifted to the right and thus freed up a niche in the political space. Despite the fact that the mass protests, which swept across Europe, created preconditions for strengthening the NRLP everywhere, not all such parties could claim significant electoral achievements. The purpose of the article is to identify the reasons why in some Western European countries the radical left managed to create effective political organizations, while in others they did not. The authors analyze SYRIZA (Greece), Podemos (Spain) and France Unbowed as examples of successful NRLP, which achieved the best results in the elections. However, only SYRIZA managed to become a senior partner in the government coalition. Podemos had to settle for the role of a junior partner, while the achievements of France Unbowed were even more modest. The conducted research allowed the authors to single out several factors that can explain the successful performance of the NLRP in the electoral field. According to their conclusion, the existence of a pluralist democracy is a necessary condition for the efficiency of the NRLP. In addition, the electoral successes of the radical left were prepared by a change in the social structure, which provided the NRLP with a social base — young educated professionals. However, a country’s party system, primarily the role and the weight of social democratic parties in a country’s political life, is a decisive factor that defines prospects for the NRLP.
{"title":"From “Storming Heaven” to Normalization: the New Radical Left Parties in Western Europe","authors":"S. Sergeev, A. Kuznetsova, S. Kuzmina","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-176-190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-176-190","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to studying the new radical left parties (NRLP) that either emerged or strengthened in Western Europe in the light of social protests against neoliberal policies and austerity measures. The mid2010s witnessed the peak of the electoral successes of the NRLP, when, after revisiting the mistakes of the past, the radical left challenged social democrats, who shifted to the right and thus freed up a niche in the political space. Despite the fact that the mass protests, which swept across Europe, created preconditions for strengthening the NRLP everywhere, not all such parties could claim significant electoral achievements. The purpose of the article is to identify the reasons why in some Western European countries the radical left managed to create effective political organizations, while in others they did not. The authors analyze SYRIZA (Greece), Podemos (Spain) and France Unbowed as examples of successful NRLP, which achieved the best results in the elections. However, only SYRIZA managed to become a senior partner in the government coalition. Podemos had to settle for the role of a junior partner, while the achievements of France Unbowed were even more modest. The conducted research allowed the authors to single out several factors that can explain the successful performance of the NLRP in the electoral field. According to their conclusion, the existence of a pluralist democracy is a necessary condition for the efficiency of the NRLP. In addition, the electoral successes of the radical left were prepared by a change in the social structure, which provided the NRLP with a social base — young educated professionals. However, a country’s party system, primarily the role and the weight of social democratic parties in a country’s political life, is a decisive factor that defines prospects for the NRLP.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79337292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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