Horrific scenes of needy migrants attempting to enter wealthy countries, often after expensive, arduous, and dangerous journeys, move many to believe that more such migrants should be permitted to enter and reside. But there are also horrific scenes of desperately needy people at a distance from wealthy countries—the distant needy—who are persecuted by their states, internally displaced due to armed conflict, or who suffer from preventable disease, insecurity, malnutrition, homelessness, and poor education. Wealthy countries could use resources under their control to assist these people. Just migration policies are part of a more general scheme of international justice owed to needy migrants and the distant needy.
One question concerns the overall stringency and source of duties of the duties wealthy countries owe to the needy. Many will agree that they do too little. These obligations arise because wealthy countries exploit poorer countries by misusing economic and military power; or they have benefited from the historic unjust exercise of colonial power and economic exploitation; or the norms of distributive justice that apply due to (or independently of) global economic or institutional integration; or simply because of the general duty to assist those in need.
I explore the distinct issue of the comparison between duties owed to needy migrants and the distant needy. International law prioritizes at least some needy migrants over the distant needy. Some needy migrants have refugee status, resulting in legal obligations to protect them. But states owe no general legal obligations to assist the distant needy, even those facing identical threats to needy migrants. Needy migrants also figure more vividly in the popular imagination than the distant needy, leading people to fight more vociferously for improving immigration rights than for increased international aid.
I focus on cases where it is costly to assist needy people. I assume that wealthy countries have duties to impose costs on their citizens to assist needy people, and that particular wealthy countries are not required to assist all the needy people they can assist. Given this, who should be prioritized?
Section I briefly explores three factors that might seem relevant: distance, identity, and risk. Without exploring these issues in depth, I argue that they are unlikely to justify systematic prioritization of needy migrants over the distant needy. Section II explores whether needy migrants should be prioritized either because they are easier to assist or because the threats of wrongdoing that they face are especially grave. Neither factor typically supports assisting needy migrants over the distant needy. Sections III and IV consider whether duties to needy migrants are more stringent than duties to the distant needy because, unlike the distant needy, needy migrants will be harmed (or its moral equivalent) if they are prevented from making themselves safe by bei
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：