<p>It is not fair to ask of others what you are not willing to do yourself.(Eleanor Roosevelt).</p><p>Something seems troubling about Miguel's behavior. Yet it is hard to say what he is doing wrong. He did not ask anyone to act for his benefit. He never agreed to any park-walking plan. Given the number of people involved in the watch (imagine it is a town with thousands of volunteers at the ready), he is not meaningfully adding to anyone's burden.</p><p>Put more precisely:</p><p>Much about this claim is controversial: does the mere receipt of benefits really trigger obligations? Does this hold if beneficiaries do not acquiesce? Must the relevant benefits track objective or subjective good? But my interest lies in a further puzzle, one that arises once we accept that something in this vein explains the wrongness of Miguel's actions.</p><p>Many scholars treat <i>Park</i> and <i>Snow</i> as different in kind. While the former is said to involve wrongful free-riding, the latter is viewed as a <i>predatory demand</i>. Consequently, while Miguel is said to have a duty to join in, Neda is thought to do nothing wrong if she refuses to pay the bill.</p><p>The problem is that the two scenarios look remarkably similar. In both situations, a group of people provide an unrequested benefit and take their doing so to trigger an obligation for beneficiaries to repay in a manner specified by their benefactors. My goal in this essay is to make sense of these competing intuitions by developing an account of what differentiates predatory demands from practices that properly generate duties of fair play. In fact, I will argue, cases like <i>Snow</i> and <i>Park</i> are even more similar than theories of fair play have acknowledged. Nonetheless, we can distinguish the two by properly situating fair play in the broader moral landscape. Doing so better grounds the duty and, more precisely, illuminates its scope—but it requires profoundly reimagining what fair play asks of us in a way that calls into question long-standing assumptions about civic ethics.</p><p>My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I detail an account of the moral motivation that underlies the duty of fair play. Building on recent work by Garrett Cullity and others, I argue that such obligations arise from a concern for fairness best understood as a demand for appropriate impartiality. Those who free-ride make unjustified exceptions by granting themselves a privilege that they would deny to others. In Section II, I raise a challenge to recent attempts by Isabella Trifan to flesh out the relevant notion of impartiality. We can, she suggests, distinguish cases of free-riding and predatory demands by looking to participants' attitudes. On her account, people are similarly situated such that non-contributions constitute violations of impartiality so long as they share a preference for receiving the same good without contributing to its production. But this approach, I show, fails to capture widesprea
{"title":"Impartiality and fair play revisited","authors":"Brookes Brown","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12300","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is not fair to ask of others what you are not willing to do yourself.(Eleanor Roosevelt).</p><p>Something seems troubling about Miguel's behavior. Yet it is hard to say what he is doing wrong. He did not ask anyone to act for his benefit. He never agreed to any park-walking plan. Given the number of people involved in the watch (imagine it is a town with thousands of volunteers at the ready), he is not meaningfully adding to anyone's burden.</p><p>Put more precisely:</p><p>Much about this claim is controversial: does the mere receipt of benefits really trigger obligations? Does this hold if beneficiaries do not acquiesce? Must the relevant benefits track objective or subjective good? But my interest lies in a further puzzle, one that arises once we accept that something in this vein explains the wrongness of Miguel's actions.</p><p>Many scholars treat <i>Park</i> and <i>Snow</i> as different in kind. While the former is said to involve wrongful free-riding, the latter is viewed as a <i>predatory demand</i>. Consequently, while Miguel is said to have a duty to join in, Neda is thought to do nothing wrong if she refuses to pay the bill.</p><p>The problem is that the two scenarios look remarkably similar. In both situations, a group of people provide an unrequested benefit and take their doing so to trigger an obligation for beneficiaries to repay in a manner specified by their benefactors. My goal in this essay is to make sense of these competing intuitions by developing an account of what differentiates predatory demands from practices that properly generate duties of fair play. In fact, I will argue, cases like <i>Snow</i> and <i>Park</i> are even more similar than theories of fair play have acknowledged. Nonetheless, we can distinguish the two by properly situating fair play in the broader moral landscape. Doing so better grounds the duty and, more precisely, illuminates its scope—but it requires profoundly reimagining what fair play asks of us in a way that calls into question long-standing assumptions about civic ethics.</p><p>My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I detail an account of the moral motivation that underlies the duty of fair play. Building on recent work by Garrett Cullity and others, I argue that such obligations arise from a concern for fairness best understood as a demand for appropriate impartiality. Those who free-ride make unjustified exceptions by granting themselves a privilege that they would deny to others. In Section II, I raise a challenge to recent attempts by Isabella Trifan to flesh out the relevant notion of impartiality. We can, she suggests, distinguish cases of free-riding and predatory demands by looking to participants' attitudes. On her account, people are similarly situated such that non-contributions constitute violations of impartiality so long as they share a preference for receiving the same good without contributing to its production. But this approach, I show, fails to capture widesprea","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 3","pages":"315-336"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12300","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50132631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an “egalitarian plateau”.1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception to Kymlicka's claim. They too start from the idea of moral equality. As one of us previously put it, “as a matter of fact, we are one another's moral equals and in relating as equals we honour that fact, and this is what grounds the ideal of relational egalitarianism”.2</p><p>In this article, we will assume that not all human beings are moral equals. This is an assumption, not an assertion, on our part. It is motivated partly by the challenges mentioned in the previous paragraph, and partly by the nature of the present inquiry: to wit, examining what, if anything, relational egalitarianism implies when it comes to relationships between moral unequals. Must moral unequals relate as moral equals?4 Or as unequals? Or in some third way? We will show that relational egalitarianism has much to say about such relationships. And we will show that what it has to say is plausible.</p><p>Before proceeding, we need to defend our line of inquiry in view of the following skeptical challenge. For its supporters, what grounds relational egalitarianism is the fact—so they claim—that people <i>are</i> moral equals. For instance, this seems to be what the following passage from Kolodny implies: “Insofar as we are to have ongoing social relations with other moral equals, we have reason to relate to them as social equals”.5 Hence, to ask what relational egalitarians are committed to saying about social relations in a—in their view—hypothetical situation, where people are not moral equals, is to ask a moot question. It is like asking what a utilitarian is committed to, as regards the right thing to do, if welfare is not valuable. The question makes no sense, because the notion that welfare <i>has</i> value is built into, and therefore presupposed by, utilitarianism. Similarly, the notion that people are moral equals is presupposed by relational egalitarianism.6</p><p>While this challenge makes sense, we think that, ultimately, we are asking a perfectly justifiable question, and one we have the resources to answer. First, Kolodny's remark is most naturally taken to mean that moral equals must relate as social and political equals given that, more generally, the way people relate, socially and politically, should fit the way they relate in terms of moral status. If this is correct, Kolodny's view is underpinned by a general commitment to some kind of <i>fittingness</i>; and this general commitment, surely, has implications for the question of how moral unequals should relate, even if Kolodny thinks that people are not moral u
{"title":"Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals","authors":"Andreas Bengtson, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen","doi":"10.1111/jopp.12299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12299","url":null,"abstract":"<p>When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an “egalitarian plateau”.1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception to Kymlicka's claim. They too start from the idea of moral equality. As one of us previously put it, “as a matter of fact, we are one another's moral equals and in relating as equals we honour that fact, and this is what grounds the ideal of relational egalitarianism”.2</p><p>In this article, we will assume that not all human beings are moral equals. This is an assumption, not an assertion, on our part. It is motivated partly by the challenges mentioned in the previous paragraph, and partly by the nature of the present inquiry: to wit, examining what, if anything, relational egalitarianism implies when it comes to relationships between moral unequals. Must moral unequals relate as moral equals?4 Or as unequals? Or in some third way? We will show that relational egalitarianism has much to say about such relationships. And we will show that what it has to say is plausible.</p><p>Before proceeding, we need to defend our line of inquiry in view of the following skeptical challenge. For its supporters, what grounds relational egalitarianism is the fact—so they claim—that people <i>are</i> moral equals. For instance, this seems to be what the following passage from Kolodny implies: “Insofar as we are to have ongoing social relations with other moral equals, we have reason to relate to them as social equals”.5 Hence, to ask what relational egalitarians are committed to saying about social relations in a—in their view—hypothetical situation, where people are not moral equals, is to ask a moot question. It is like asking what a utilitarian is committed to, as regards the right thing to do, if welfare is not valuable. The question makes no sense, because the notion that welfare <i>has</i> value is built into, and therefore presupposed by, utilitarianism. Similarly, the notion that people are moral equals is presupposed by relational egalitarianism.6</p><p>While this challenge makes sense, we think that, ultimately, we are asking a perfectly justifiable question, and one we have the resources to answer. First, Kolodny's remark is most naturally taken to mean that moral equals must relate as social and political equals given that, more generally, the way people relate, socially and politically, should fit the way they relate in terms of moral status. If this is correct, Kolodny's view is underpinned by a general commitment to some kind of <i>fittingness</i>; and this general commitment, surely, has implications for the question of how moral unequals should relate, even if Kolodny thinks that people are not moral u","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"31 4","pages":"387-410"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jopp.12299","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68181361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-64-87
V. Ustyuzhanin, V. A. Mikheeva, I. A. Sumernikov, Andrey Korotayev
The recent years have witnessed numerous studies that analyze the influence of different factors on the probability of revolutionary events. At the same time, an important set of modernization variables (GDP, urbanization, education, democratization) still remains understudied. Moreover, the results of the contemporary quantitative studies show significant discrepancies in how wealth (operationalized through GDP per capita) affects the risks of revolutionary events. Herewith scholars usually consider such events in the aggregate, without dividing them into armed and non-armed rebellions. This paper attempts to shed light on the impact of wealth on revolutionary instability, taking into account the distinguishing features of its armed and non-armed versions. On the basis of the analysis of 425 revolutionary episodes of various types over the period of 1900—2019, the authors document a strong linear negative relationship between armed revolutions and the level of GDP per capita, while the relationship between unarmed revolutions and wealth has a curvilinear nature. At first, as GDP per capita increases, the risks of unarmed revolutions increase, but after reaching a certain threshold they begin to fall. The inflection point, when the risk of unarmed revolutionary instability is the greatest, corresponds to the level of GDP per capita in the middle-income countries, which currently face the middle-income trap. In other words, their wealth stagnates at the level that is most risky for the emergence of unarmed revolutions. According to the authors’ conclusion, in addition to the obvious economic problems associated with the middle-income trap, the latter also leads to the increased probability of unarmed revolutionary instability.
{"title":"Economic Origins of Revolutions: the Link between GDP and the Risk of Revolutionary Events","authors":"V. Ustyuzhanin, V. A. Mikheeva, I. A. Sumernikov, Andrey Korotayev","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-64-87","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-64-87","url":null,"abstract":"The recent years have witnessed numerous studies that analyze the influence of different factors on the probability of revolutionary events. At the same time, an important set of modernization variables (GDP, urbanization, education, democratization) still remains understudied. Moreover, the results of the contemporary quantitative studies show significant discrepancies in how wealth (operationalized through GDP per capita) affects the risks of revolutionary events. Herewith scholars usually consider such events in the aggregate, without dividing them into armed and non-armed rebellions. This paper attempts to shed light on the impact of wealth on revolutionary instability, taking into account the distinguishing features of its armed and non-armed versions. On the basis of the analysis of 425 revolutionary episodes of various types over the period of 1900—2019, the authors document a strong linear negative relationship between armed revolutions and the level of GDP per capita, while the relationship between unarmed revolutions and wealth has a curvilinear nature. At first, as GDP per capita increases, the risks of unarmed revolutions increase, but after reaching a certain threshold they begin to fall. The inflection point, when the risk of unarmed revolutionary instability is the greatest, corresponds to the level of GDP per capita in the middle-income countries, which currently face the middle-income trap. In other words, their wealth stagnates at the level that is most risky for the emergence of unarmed revolutions. According to the authors’ conclusion, in addition to the obvious economic problems associated with the middle-income trap, the latter also leads to the increased probability of unarmed revolutionary instability.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83248467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-6-24
N. A. Shaveko
The article is devoted to the analysis of the main tenets of the theory of competitive democracy and its underlying principle of agonistic pluralism, which have become quite widespread among the Western political philosophers in the recent years. The author identifies two main approaches to the normative substantiation of the value of democratic competition. The first approach is based on the postulate about the importance of maintaining the diversity of public discourses and, therefore, inadmissibility of giving one of them the status of dominant or preferred. The second approach emphasizes the importance of constantly challenging the established power relations. Having demonstrated serious flaws in these approaches, one of which, in fact, promotes diversity for the sake of diversity, and the other — variability for the sake of variability, the author turns to the strategy of justifying competitive democracy that focuses on providing all stakeholders with an equal opportunity to change the existing power relations. In his estimation, this strategy, which largely overcomes the shortcomings of the above mentioned approaches, also has its weaknesses related to (1) the difficulty of disentangling between unequal opportunities for transforming power mechanisms and other social inequalities, (2) the unattainability of the complete equality of opportunities, and (3) the ambiguous relationship between the value of the opportunity to define and abolish social restrictions (political equality) and other values (in particular, the so-called intrinsic equality). A special attention in the article is paid to the identification of the deep value foundations of agonistic pluralism. The author notices that advocates of agonism want to evade clarification of these foundations and states that agonistic pluralism as the highest moral basis of politics is highly doubtful, while the part of the concept that is acceptable does not represent anything fundamentally new. According to his conclusion, all this speaks of the purely instrumental nature of this principle, and thus of its relative importance in comparison with those ideals that it intends to achieve.
{"title":"Agonistic Pluralism and Competitive Model of Democracy: Problems of Normative Justification","authors":"N. A. Shaveko","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-6-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-6-24","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis of the main tenets of the theory of competitive democracy and its underlying principle of agonistic pluralism, which have become quite widespread among the Western political philosophers in the recent years. The author identifies two main approaches to the normative substantiation of the value of democratic competition. The first approach is based on the postulate about the importance of maintaining the diversity of public discourses and, therefore, inadmissibility of giving one of them the status of dominant or preferred. The second approach emphasizes the importance of constantly challenging the established power relations. Having demonstrated serious flaws in these approaches, one of which, in fact, promotes diversity for the sake of diversity, and the other — variability for the sake of variability, the author turns to the strategy of justifying competitive democracy that focuses on providing all stakeholders with an equal opportunity to change the existing power relations. In his estimation, this strategy, which largely overcomes the shortcomings of the above mentioned approaches, also has its weaknesses related to (1) the difficulty of disentangling between unequal opportunities for transforming power mechanisms and other social inequalities, (2) the unattainability of the complete equality of opportunities, and (3) the ambiguous relationship between the value of the opportunity to define and abolish social restrictions (political equality) and other values (in particular, the so-called intrinsic equality). A special attention in the article is paid to the identification of the deep value foundations of agonistic pluralism. The author notices that advocates of agonism want to evade clarification of these foundations and states that agonistic pluralism as the highest moral basis of politics is highly doubtful, while the part of the concept that is acceptable does not represent anything fundamentally new. According to his conclusion, all this speaks of the purely instrumental nature of this principle, and thus of its relative importance in comparison with those ideals that it intends to achieve.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76183365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-182-203
T. Rovinskaya
The article analyzes the political path of the environmental party the Union 90/The Greens from the moment of the birth of the green movement in Germany to the present day. The author focuses on the transformation of the ideological platform of The Greens. Having thoroughly analyzed the stages of the party’s development and its policy documents, the author records the transition of the German Greens from conservative to liberal values, and then from the idealism and nonconformism of the 1970s—1980s to the realism and pragmatism of the 1990s—2000s, from an out-of-system radical position to the in-system centre-left position. The author also discusses the cost of their political success. Does the party manage to hew to the principles it stated? How does it deal with the political dilemmas it inevitably faces when it has to function in a real political environment in coalition with other parties? How far are The Greens willing to go in making political and ideological compromises? And does all this, in fact, correspond to the green ideology? Based on the conducted research, the author comes to the conclusion that the dominance of the realist wing in the party, who rely on assuming power at any cost and sideline the idealists-(eco)fundamentalists who stood at the origins of the movement, leads to the erosion of the very essence of the alternative green ideology and, ultimately, to the loss of the party’s originality and attractiveness for voters. According to the author, the 2022 international crisis is a turning point in the history of the Union 90/The Greens, which will have a decisive impact on the political fate of the party in the near future.
{"title":"“The Greens” in Germany: Political Dilemmas and Compromises","authors":"T. Rovinskaya","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-182-203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-182-203","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the political path of the environmental party the Union 90/The Greens from the moment of the birth of the green movement in Germany to the present day. The author focuses on the transformation of the ideological platform of The Greens. Having thoroughly analyzed the stages of the party’s development and its policy documents, the author records the transition of the German Greens from conservative to liberal values, and then from the idealism and nonconformism of the 1970s—1980s to the realism and pragmatism of the 1990s—2000s, from an out-of-system radical position to the in-system centre-left position. The author also discusses the cost of their political success. Does the party manage to hew to the principles it stated? How does it deal with the political dilemmas it inevitably faces when it has to function in a real political environment in coalition with other parties? How far are The Greens willing to go in making political and ideological compromises? And does all this, in fact, correspond to the green ideology? Based on the conducted research, the author comes to the conclusion that the dominance of the realist wing in the party, who rely on assuming power at any cost and sideline the idealists-(eco)fundamentalists who stood at the origins of the movement, leads to the erosion of the very essence of the alternative green ideology and, ultimately, to the loss of the party’s originality and attractiveness for voters. According to the author, the 2022 international crisis is a turning point in the history of the Union 90/The Greens, which will have a decisive impact on the political fate of the party in the near future.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"130 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76760982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-141-160
Yuliya Karpich
The article is devoted to the study of the influence of religiosity on the individual political choice of Orthodox Russians. Based on the analysis of in-depth interviews with believers who actively attend religious services, the author identifies a relationship between certain aspects of religiosity (beliefs, religious practices) and conservative attitudes of parishioners. The author reveals the logic of a conservative choice and shows how conservative attitudes associated with shifts in values are combined with conservative attitudes based on religion. The results of the study allow the author to document three types of political positioning arising from a conservative worldview. In the case of loyalty to the current government the conservative logic manifests itself in the desire to maintain stability and avoid political changes. Opposition voting takes the form of a moral protest when voters want to punish the authorities for the actions that are inconsistent with their moral ideals. Non-participation in elections is conservative in the sense that believers avoid politics, which seems to them immoral and corrupt. Employing the qualitative methodology and analyzing individual-level data, the author comes to the conclusion that believers make their decisions about voting largely on the basis of their political attitudes. Religious voters evaluate politicians’ actions and assess the potential ability to influence the political situation. The impact of practices is limited to political participation. The conservative logic of voting is closely related to secular attitudes; religious beliefs and practices of church cooperation can only adjust the choice that was already made.
{"title":"Orthodoxy and Conservatism: Political Attitudes of Religious Russians","authors":"Yuliya Karpich","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-141-160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-141-160","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the study of the influence of religiosity on the individual political choice of Orthodox Russians. Based on the analysis of in-depth interviews with believers who actively attend religious services, the author identifies a relationship between certain aspects of religiosity (beliefs, religious practices) and conservative attitudes of parishioners. The author reveals the logic of a conservative choice and shows how conservative attitudes associated with shifts in values are combined with conservative attitudes based on religion. The results of the study allow the author to document three types of political positioning arising from a conservative worldview. In the case of loyalty to the current government the conservative logic manifests itself in the desire to maintain stability and avoid political changes. Opposition voting takes the form of a moral protest when voters want to punish the authorities for the actions that are inconsistent with their moral ideals. Non-participation in elections is conservative in the sense that believers avoid politics, which seems to them immoral and corrupt. Employing the qualitative methodology and analyzing individual-level data, the author comes to the conclusion that believers make their decisions about voting largely on the basis of their political attitudes. Religious voters evaluate politicians’ actions and assess the potential ability to influence the political situation. The impact of practices is limited to political participation. The conservative logic of voting is closely related to secular attitudes; religious beliefs and practices of church cooperation can only adjust the choice that was already made.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86157234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-25-39
V. Levytskyy
The article is devoted to clarifying the understanding of the nature of politics. Having documented the lack of consensus in the scientific discourse even regarding the very concept of politics, the author proposes an approach that, from his point of view, allows to obtain the most consistent conceptualization of the political. In his study of the nature of politics, the author relies primarily on the analysis of the phenomenon of polis, because, despite serious disagreements in the scientific circles about what politics is, its origin is generally associated with polis. Based on the works of Plato and Aristotle and drawing on the works of modern historians and political philosophers, he demonstrates the inadequacy of the interpretation of polis as a city, state or society, and proposes to consider polis as a sphere of “supra-physical” and “supra-economic” activity of citizens in external and internal harmonization of public space. In the development of the transcendentalist tradition, the article shows that polis is primarily an ontological reality, a place where (in the eyes of the Greeks) the existence of being was manifested. Taking into account the connection between polis and politics in the ancient world, the author comes to the conclusion that politics as a practice of organizing life in polis is an activity for the formation and maintenance of ontological reality. Such an understanding of politics, in his opinion, is valid not only in relation to antiquity. Therefore, he defines politics as an ontological action, in which a struggle for the fate of being unfolds every time. In this respect, the nature of ancient politics differs little from the nature of medieval and modern politics. Despite all the differences between modern and pre-modern political discourse, this definition quite adequately characterizes the nature of the political per se.
{"title":"The Ontological Nature of Politics","authors":"V. Levytskyy","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-25-39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-25-39","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to clarifying the understanding of the nature of politics. Having documented the lack of consensus in the scientific discourse even regarding the very concept of politics, the author proposes an approach that, from his point of view, allows to obtain the most consistent conceptualization of the political. In his study of the nature of politics, the author relies primarily on the analysis of the phenomenon of polis, because, despite serious disagreements in the scientific circles about what politics is, its origin is generally associated with polis. Based on the works of Plato and Aristotle and drawing on the works of modern historians and political philosophers, he demonstrates the inadequacy of the interpretation of polis as a city, state or society, and proposes to consider polis as a sphere of “supra-physical” and “supra-economic” activity of citizens in external and internal harmonization of public space. In the development of the transcendentalist tradition, the article shows that polis is primarily an ontological reality, a place where (in the eyes of the Greeks) the existence of being was manifested. Taking into account the connection between polis and politics in the ancient world, the author comes to the conclusion that politics as a practice of organizing life in polis is an activity for the formation and maintenance of ontological reality. Such an understanding of politics, in his opinion, is valid not only in relation to antiquity. Therefore, he defines politics as an ontological action, in which a struggle for the fate of being unfolds every time. In this respect, the nature of ancient politics differs little from the nature of medieval and modern politics. Despite all the differences between modern and pre-modern political discourse, this definition quite adequately characterizes the nature of the political per se.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74463498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-88-125
Y. Korgunyuk
The article is devoted to the analysis of the place of the Soviet past in the inter-party discussion and the influence of this theme on the choice of the Russian electorate in the electoral campaigns of 1993—2021. According to the author’s conclusion, despite the moderate number of issues related to this topic, and their rather modest share in the general agenda of the campaigns, they formed confrontations that strongly correlated with the divisions within the major political dimensions and issue domain divisions and resonated in the mass political consciousness. The 1993—2011 campaigns were about one confrontation — “communists vs. anti-communists (liberals)”. In 2016—2021 this confrontation was supplemented by a cleavage along the “conservatives — liberals” line, which manifested in the special position of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, that adjoined the liberals on some aspects of the Soviet past theme, and communists — on other aspects. In 1993 and 1995 the confrontation between communists and anti-communists (liberals) on the issues of the Soviet past successfully competed with political dimensions and issue domain divisions for the role of the “political face” of the first, or the main, electoral cleavage. In 1999, this confrontation moved from the first electoral cleavage to the second, within which it continued to successfully contend with the cleavage between Soviet traditionalists and modernists in the systemic issue domain. In 2003, it also withstood competition with the divisions between adherents of market and supporters of planned economy in the socio-economic issue domain and Soviet traditionalists and modernists in the systemic one, but in 2007— 2016 it lost such ability, although it retained a background presence in the political space. In 2021, the theme of the Soviet past experienced some sort of renaissance, with not only communists and liberals, but also other political forces, including the “party of power”, starting to actively appeal to this topic. The influence of the confrontations around the theme of the Soviet past on electoral divisions also increased, however, only when regions with a voter turnout of more than 60% were excluded from the analysis. In this case, the confrontation between communists and liberals on the subject of the Soviet past determined “the face” of the second electoral cleavage, and the special position of the Liberal Democratic Party — of the third one.
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Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-161-181
A. Zhdanov, K. V. Kosolapov
The article is devoted to the study of political polarization in the United States through the prism of the influence of various groups of American elites on this process. Empirically analyzing the campaign messages of Joseph Biden, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, which were spread by their electoral staff during the 2020 presidential campaign, and using the methods of network and LDA analysis, the authors attempt to determine to what extent the Democratic and Republican leaders tend to use tools that polarize society and whether the nature of the influence of these parties on the American society differs. Having documented the presence of all types of political polarization in the United States, the authors show that both Republicans and Democrats significantly add to polarization because, on the one hand, they fuel emotional tension in the society, and on the other hand, they deny legitimacy to the principles of their opponents. The analysis carried out in the article clearly demonstrates that all groups of the American political elites, regardless of party affiliation, are nearly equally susceptible to affective and positional polarization, including those whose political activity is usually assessed as depolarizing. All this refutes the widespread notion that the Republican Party, which exploits the Us vs. Them dichotomy for narrow political purposes, is primarily responsible for the polarization in the country, indicating that something bigger, rather than the rise of right-wing populism or the increased popularity of nativist movements, explains the crisis processes that have been unfolding in the recent years in the United States, as well as in other old democracies.
{"title":"Polarization of American Elites (Evidence from the Analysis of the Candidates' Policy Statements during the 2020 Presidential Election)","authors":"A. Zhdanov, K. V. Kosolapov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-161-181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-161-181","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the study of political polarization in the United States through the prism of the influence of various groups of American elites on this process. Empirically analyzing the campaign messages of Joseph Biden, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, which were spread by their electoral staff during the 2020 presidential campaign, and using the methods of network and LDA analysis, the authors attempt to determine to what extent the Democratic and Republican leaders tend to use tools that polarize society and whether the nature of the influence of these parties on the American society differs. Having documented the presence of all types of political polarization in the United States, the authors show that both Republicans and Democrats significantly add to polarization because, on the one hand, they fuel emotional tension in the society, and on the other hand, they deny legitimacy to the principles of their opponents. The analysis carried out in the article clearly demonstrates that all groups of the American political elites, regardless of party affiliation, are nearly equally susceptible to affective and positional polarization, including those whose political activity is usually assessed as depolarizing. All this refutes the widespread notion that the Republican Party, which exploits the Us vs. Them dichotomy for narrow political purposes, is primarily responsible for the polarization in the country, indicating that something bigger, rather than the rise of right-wing populism or the increased popularity of nativist movements, explains the crisis processes that have been unfolding in the recent years in the United States, as well as in other old democracies.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85744631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-20DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-126-140
N. S. Zubarev
How do leaders of non-democratic states retain support of the population? One of the most popular explanations in the modern Political Science suggests that people in non-democratic countries vote for incumbents and generally have a positive attitude towards them, because the latter possess maximum access to resources that can potentially be directed to improve the lives of the people. However, such an explanatory model leaves out the expressive component of political behavior. Meanwhile, citizens of authoritarian countries can sincerely express solidarity with the current rulers. The theory of social identity reveals this side of the problem, offering alternative explanations for the mechanisms of political support. National identity as one of the forms of social identity shapes expectations, norms and patterns of behavior that are associated with the idea of a perfect representative of the nation. The specific characteristics of authoritarian states nudge citizens towards behavior and attitudes that contribute to maintaining the status quo. Moreover, since it is often difficult for an average person to rationally assess the actual performance of government and correctly attribute responsibility for social, political, and economic outcomes when deciding which politician to support, voters tend to use cognitive “shortcuts” based on their own satisfaction with life. The article proposes a hypothesis that national pride plays the role of a mediator between subjective well-being and the level of political support (operationalized via trust in president). The author tested this hypothesis using survey data and reveled that the mediation effect of pride for the nation is indeed present, however, it is partial. The results of the analysis indicate that subjective well-being has a positive effect on the support of the incumbent, both directly and through an increased national pride.
{"title":"National Pride as Mediator of Trust in President (Case of Russia)","authors":"N. S. Zubarev","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-126-140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2023-108-1-126-140","url":null,"abstract":"How do leaders of non-democratic states retain support of the population? One of the most popular explanations in the modern Political Science suggests that people in non-democratic countries vote for incumbents and generally have a positive attitude towards them, because the latter possess maximum access to resources that can potentially be directed to improve the lives of the people. However, such an explanatory model leaves out the expressive component of political behavior. Meanwhile, citizens of authoritarian countries can sincerely express solidarity with the current rulers. The theory of social identity reveals this side of the problem, offering alternative explanations for the mechanisms of political support. National identity as one of the forms of social identity shapes expectations, norms and patterns of behavior that are associated with the idea of a perfect representative of the nation. The specific characteristics of authoritarian states nudge citizens towards behavior and attitudes that contribute to maintaining the status quo. Moreover, since it is often difficult for an average person to rationally assess the actual performance of government and correctly attribute responsibility for social, political, and economic outcomes when deciding which politician to support, voters tend to use cognitive “shortcuts” based on their own satisfaction with life. The article proposes a hypothesis that national pride plays the role of a mediator between subjective well-being and the level of political support (operationalized via trust in president). The author tested this hypothesis using survey data and reveled that the mediation effect of pride for the nation is indeed present, however, it is partial. The results of the analysis indicate that subjective well-being has a positive effect on the support of the incumbent, both directly and through an increased national pride.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86941537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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