It is not fair to ask of others what you are not willing to do yourself.(Eleanor Roosevelt).
Something seems troubling about Miguel's behavior. Yet it is hard to say what he is doing wrong. He did not ask anyone to act for his benefit. He never agreed to any park-walking plan. Given the number of people involved in the watch (imagine it is a town with thousands of volunteers at the ready), he is not meaningfully adding to anyone's burden.
Put more precisely:
Much about this claim is controversial: does the mere receipt of benefits really trigger obligations? Does this hold if beneficiaries do not acquiesce? Must the relevant benefits track objective or subjective good? But my interest lies in a further puzzle, one that arises once we accept that something in this vein explains the wrongness of Miguel's actions.
Many scholars treat Park and Snow as different in kind. While the former is said to involve wrongful free-riding, the latter is viewed as a predatory demand. Consequently, while Miguel is said to have a duty to join in, Neda is thought to do nothing wrong if she refuses to pay the bill.
The problem is that the two scenarios look remarkably similar. In both situations, a group of people provide an unrequested benefit and take their doing so to trigger an obligation for beneficiaries to repay in a manner specified by their benefactors. My goal in this essay is to make sense of these competing intuitions by developing an account of what differentiates predatory demands from practices that properly generate duties of fair play. In fact, I will argue, cases like Snow and Park are even more similar than theories of fair play have acknowledged. Nonetheless, we can distinguish the two by properly situating fair play in the broader moral landscape. Doing so better grounds the duty and, more precisely, illuminates its scope—but it requires profoundly reimagining what fair play asks of us in a way that calls into question long-standing assumptions about civic ethics.
My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I detail an account of the moral motivation that underlies the duty of fair play. Building on recent work by Garrett Cullity and others, I argue that such obligations arise from a concern for fairness best understood as a demand for appropriate impartiality. Those who free-ride make unjustified exceptions by granting themselves a privilege that they would deny to others. In Section II, I raise a challenge to recent attempts by Isabella Trifan to flesh out the relevant notion of impartiality. We can, she suggests, distinguish cases of free-riding and predatory demands by looking to participants' attitudes. On her account, people are similarly situated such that non-contributions constitute violations of impartiality so long as they share a preference for receiving the same good without contributing to its production. But this approach, I show, fails to capture widesprea