Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-118-135
D. Stremoukhov
Why do some regional entrepreneurs engage in conflicts with the heads of the subnational units of the Russian Federation within a system that puts economic elites in a deliberately unequal position in relation to the authorities? Based on the analysis of conflicts between governors and businessmen in Karelia, the author hypothesizes that contradictions around redistribution, combined with the availability of the independent resources e.g., branchy patronal networks, drive such confrontation. According to the author’s conclusion, the federal center also plays a significant role. When deciding whether to start confrontation with governors, regional actors could count on the support from Moscow and resignation of an undesirable regional leader. However, due to the peculiarity of the external environment, primarily institutional and informational, the rationality of such behavior often turns out to be low. The opaque informal rules, which electoral authoritarianism relies upon, affect the ability of actors to create adequate cognitive schemata. The informational environment, in which the regional elites operate, sends them unclear and contradictory signals about the limits of acceptable actions and their possible consequences. In turn, the formal preservation of an institution of elections and parties leads to the formation of identities that narrow the set of available behavioral strategies. The mechanism of mutual learning does not work either: under conditions when the resources available to counter-actors cannot be verified, and the rules of the game change with a governor’s turnover, reliance on the previous experience is fraught with strategic miscalculations.
{"title":"Political Conflicts between Governors and Regional Economic Elites (Case of the Republic of Karelia)","authors":"D. Stremoukhov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-118-135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-118-135","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some regional entrepreneurs engage in conflicts with the heads of the subnational units of the Russian Federation within a system that puts economic elites in a deliberately unequal position in relation to the authorities? Based on the analysis of conflicts between governors and businessmen in Karelia, the author hypothesizes that contradictions around redistribution, combined with the availability of the independent resources e.g., branchy patronal networks, drive such confrontation. According to the author’s conclusion, the federal center also plays a significant role. When deciding whether to start confrontation with governors, regional actors could count on the support from Moscow and resignation of an undesirable regional leader. However, due to the peculiarity of the external environment, primarily institutional and informational, the rationality of such behavior often turns out to be low. The opaque informal rules, which electoral authoritarianism relies upon, affect the ability of actors to create adequate cognitive schemata. The informational environment, in which the regional elites operate, sends them unclear and contradictory signals about the limits of acceptable actions and their possible consequences. In turn, the formal preservation of an institution of elections and parties leads to the formation of identities that narrow the set of available behavioral strategies. The mechanism of mutual learning does not work either: under conditions when the resources available to counter-actors cannot be verified, and the rules of the game change with a governor’s turnover, reliance on the previous experience is fraught with strategic miscalculations.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83944162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-24-48
I. Philippov
The article presents the results of the empirical study about the impact of the police suppression of street rallies on the political communication in social networks. Based on the messages published in the social network VKontakte during the discussion of a series of protests that took place in Moscow in the summer of 2019 on the eve of the City Duma elections, the author analyzes how police violence affects publishing activity on the Internet and the demand for the published content. The author reveals a positive relationship between the use of force by the police and the intensity of the discussion of the relevant event. According to his conclusion, the effect can be explained not only by a surge of interest in the protest events of a lesser scale, but also by the ability of motivated users to search and find an additional audience via the commenting mechanism. By communicating about what happened in the comments on neutral messages within the initially non-politicized communities, such users draw new people into the protest communication. In the event of a police crackdown, the number of comments that make up the most “democratic” part of the political communication in the new media, which is available even to users with low media capital, increases dramatically. The effectiveness of these comments is also increasing, in a sense that they are attracting new users into the discussion, which results in spreading the content to the pages, where protest actions are normally not discussed.
{"title":"Symmetrical Answer: Police Suppression of Protests as a Driver of Political Communication in Social Media","authors":"I. Philippov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-24-48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-24-48","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the results of the empirical study about the impact of the police suppression of street rallies on the political communication in social networks. Based on the messages published in the social network VKontakte during the discussion of a series of protests that took place in Moscow in the summer of 2019 on the eve of the City Duma elections, the author analyzes how police violence affects publishing activity on the Internet and the demand for the published content. The author reveals a positive relationship between the use of force by the police and the intensity of the discussion of the relevant event. According to his conclusion, the effect can be explained not only by a surge of interest in the protest events of a lesser scale, but also by the ability of motivated users to search and find an additional audience via the commenting mechanism. By communicating about what happened in the comments on neutral messages within the initially non-politicized communities, such users draw new people into the protest communication. In the event of a police crackdown, the number of comments that make up the most “democratic” part of the political communication in the new media, which is available even to users with low media capital, increases dramatically. The effectiveness of these comments is also increasing, in a sense that they are attracting new users into the discussion, which results in spreading the content to the pages, where protest actions are normally not discussed.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77006014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-136-162
A. Medushevsky
The European integration project, after 70 years of the successful implementation, is now facing a significant number of difficulties caused by the process of globalization. The list of these difficulties includes: (1) the incompleteness of the process of formation of the European identity; (2) the deepening contradiction between two fundamental legal principles — transnational and national constitutionalism; (3) the growing asymmetry between the European regions; (4) dramatic disputes over migration issues; (5) the ideological confrontation between liberal and illiberal democracies. This situation, exacerbated by the challenges of globalization and officially defined today as the “existential crisis” of the EU, revealed certain significant flaws in the current integration model hung between confederalism and federalism. The shortcomings, such as weakened democratic legitimacy, ineffective decision-making and the absence of clear and stable European leadership, have resulted in the growing spread of Euroscepticism and rightwing populism, as well as the erosion of Europe’s mission in the world. The increasingly obvious threat of a loss of political balance in Europe makes it important to comprehend the potential directions and scope of changes in the EU integration project, to assess the hypothetically possible legal and institutional forms of the new integration model and their political implications. The author describes the current situation as a Machiavellian moment in Europe: under the conditions when the preservation of the status quo only reinforces the contradictions within the integration project, the European elites are faced with the necessity to make a clear choice between a confederal and a federal system in order to find a new legitimizing formula for this fading project, and it should be done as soon as possible.
{"title":"Machiavellian Moment of Europe: Prospects of EU Integration Project under Global Political Equilibrium Destruction","authors":"A. Medushevsky","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-136-162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-136-162","url":null,"abstract":"The European integration project, after 70 years of the successful implementation, is now facing a significant number of difficulties caused by the process of globalization. The list of these difficulties includes: (1) the incompleteness of the process of formation of the European identity; (2) the deepening contradiction between two fundamental legal principles — transnational and national constitutionalism; (3) the growing asymmetry between the European regions; (4) dramatic disputes over migration issues; (5) the ideological confrontation between liberal and illiberal democracies. This situation, exacerbated by the challenges of globalization and officially defined today as the “existential crisis” of the EU, revealed certain significant flaws in the current integration model hung between confederalism and federalism. The shortcomings, such as weakened democratic legitimacy, ineffective decision-making and the absence of clear and stable European leadership, have resulted in the growing spread of Euroscepticism and rightwing populism, as well as the erosion of Europe’s mission in the world. The increasingly obvious threat of a loss of political balance in Europe makes it important to comprehend the potential directions and scope of changes in the EU integration project, to assess the hypothetically possible legal and institutional forms of the new integration model and their political implications. The author describes the current situation as a Machiavellian moment in Europe: under the conditions when the preservation of the status quo only reinforces the contradictions within the integration project, the European elites are faced with the necessity to make a clear choice between a confederal and a federal system in order to find a new legitimizing formula for this fading project, and it should be done as soon as possible.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80306700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-163-175
Rodion Belkovich, D. A. Konkova
The rise of new players — neoconservatives — to the leading positions in the Republican Party and American politics on the whole during the years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency spurred a reaction from far-right intellectuals, who united in a movement called “paleoconservatism”. Although this movement was not able to secure any important victories in the political field, its representatives made a significant contribution to the revival of the republican ideological tradition, having produced a rich intellectual legacy, which still remains relatively understudied. The article attempts to partially fill this gap by reconstructing the paleoconservative identity on the basis of the methodology of social constructivism. Searching for an answer to the question of who paleoconservatives are, the authors analyze the ideals and guidelines put forward by paleoconservatives as well as the set of principles they oppose. The conducted research shows that the identity of paleoconservatives includes two components. Its “positive” component is based on the partial identification with the agenda that the American right defended in the 1930s— 1950s, and its “negative” component is based on opposing themselves to neoconservatives and right-wing mainstream. According to the authors’ conclusion, paleoconservatism, being aimed at undermining the tacit consensus that developed in the United States between the center-right and center-left elites, de facto represents a struggle to define the essence of the American conservatism. Positioning true conservatism as anti-liberal, anti-(social)- democratic, anti-egalitarian, and anti-statist, paleoconservatives reject more moderate right-wing movements as blurring the boundaries of the conservative identity.
{"title":"Paleoconservative Movement in the USA through the Prism of Social Constructivism","authors":"Rodion Belkovich, D. A. Konkova","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-163-175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-163-175","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of new players — neoconservatives — to the leading positions in the Republican Party and American politics on the whole during the years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency spurred a reaction from far-right intellectuals, who united in a movement called “paleoconservatism”. Although this movement was not able to secure any important victories in the political field, its representatives made a significant contribution to the revival of the republican ideological tradition, having produced a rich intellectual legacy, which still remains relatively understudied. The article attempts to partially fill this gap by reconstructing the paleoconservative identity on the basis of the methodology of social constructivism. Searching for an answer to the question of who paleoconservatives are, the authors analyze the ideals and guidelines put forward by paleoconservatives as well as the set of principles they oppose. The conducted research shows that the identity of paleoconservatives includes two components. Its “positive” component is based on the partial identification with the agenda that the American right defended in the 1930s— 1950s, and its “negative” component is based on opposing themselves to neoconservatives and right-wing mainstream. According to the authors’ conclusion, paleoconservatism, being aimed at undermining the tacit consensus that developed in the United States between the center-right and center-left elites, de facto represents a struggle to define the essence of the American conservatism. Positioning true conservatism as anti-liberal, anti-(social)- democratic, anti-egalitarian, and anti-statist, paleoconservatives reject more moderate right-wing movements as blurring the boundaries of the conservative identity.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86964407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-6-23
A. Yarkeev, D. V. Popov
The establishment of the biopolitical paradigm of state governance, which views its main task in the implementation of ambitious socioeconomic and military-political projects in close connection with the control over individuals and even care for their living, has produced a fundamentally new type of social contract that puts the authorities and the population who they patronize into mutual dependence. The balance of interests manifests itself in the form of a welfare state that embodies the positive side of biopolitical governance and provides the public with numerous benefits associated with the admission to participation in the economic and political life. Based on the analysis of the processes unfolding in the recent years, the authors come to the conclusion that the consensus reached during the “great biopolitical game” is not unshakable. The long journey to include the population into the economy and politics in the interests of the authorities resulted in an unintended long-term consequence for the latter — a progressive decline in the productivity of the investment into the population within the established status quo. The effectiveness of such investments is almost exhausted. The growing demands of the population, who expects greater care from the authorities, reflect the trend towards a consumer revolution from below. However, these demands may turn out to be overwhelming for the biopower that could in the blink of an eye reverse the costly policy that stopped being beneficial, which creates a tendency towards the counter-revolution from above. Against this background, the authorities could regress to the forms of government that deny the people the living standards that they became used to.
{"title":"Biopolitical Revolution: Pro et Contra","authors":"A. Yarkeev, D. V. Popov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-6-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-6-23","url":null,"abstract":"The establishment of the biopolitical paradigm of state governance, which views its main task in the implementation of ambitious socioeconomic and military-political projects in close connection with the control over individuals and even care for their living, has produced a fundamentally new type of social contract that puts the authorities and the population who they patronize into mutual dependence. The balance of interests manifests itself in the form of a welfare state that embodies the positive side of biopolitical governance and provides the public with numerous benefits associated with the admission to participation in the economic and political life. Based on the analysis of the processes unfolding in the recent years, the authors come to the conclusion that the consensus reached during the “great biopolitical game” is not unshakable. The long journey to include the population into the economy and politics in the interests of the authorities resulted in an unintended long-term consequence for the latter — a progressive decline in the productivity of the investment into the population within the established status quo. The effectiveness of such investments is almost exhausted. The growing demands of the population, who expects greater care from the authorities, reflect the trend towards a consumer revolution from below. However, these demands may turn out to be overwhelming for the biopower that could in the blink of an eye reverse the costly policy that stopped being beneficial, which creates a tendency towards the counter-revolution from above. Against this background, the authorities could regress to the forms of government that deny the people the living standards that they became used to.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77758533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-49-70
F. Haiting
Transforming a political system is never an easy task. The reforms that launched this process can easily fall into the “balancing trap”, when a lion's share of political capital is directed to ensure a balance of interests of various social groups, which inevitably leads to the curtailment of reforms and, as a result, stagnation. The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the approaches of China and Russia to solving this problem. The essence of the Chinese approach, which is usually referred to as the “policy experimentation”, is that reforms are first carried out in a separate region, and then, if successful, gradually spread to the whole country. However, the key to China's success lies not only in experimentation, but also in a variety of reform strategies, the choice of which is determined by the specific conditions prevailing in a given region. Russia also uses this model, which is known as an “unbalanced reform” and aimed at spotting areas of least resistance to reforms in order to prevent the unification of the efforts of the opponents to reforms and direct confrontation between the state and the society. However, its Russian version differs remarkably from the Chinese one. According to the author, the differences between the Chinese and the Russian models of reforms are rooted in the political sphere and are associated with the specifics of the electoral and party systems of these countries, and most importantly, with the nature of the relations in the “center-regions” system. In China, when carrying out reforms, the emphasis is placed upon the initiative from below, while Russia prefers political instruments that are under the direct control of the federal structures.
{"title":"Unbalanced Reform (Comparative Analysis of China’s and Russia’s Experience)","authors":"F. Haiting","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-49-70","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-105-2-49-70","url":null,"abstract":"Transforming a political system is never an easy task. The reforms that launched this process can easily fall into the “balancing trap”, when a lion's share of political capital is directed to ensure a balance of interests of various social groups, which inevitably leads to the curtailment of reforms and, as a result, stagnation. The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the approaches of China and Russia to solving this problem. The essence of the Chinese approach, which is usually referred to as the “policy experimentation”, is that reforms are first carried out in a separate region, and then, if successful, gradually spread to the whole country. However, the key to China's success lies not only in experimentation, but also in a variety of reform strategies, the choice of which is determined by the specific conditions prevailing in a given region. Russia also uses this model, which is known as an “unbalanced reform” and aimed at spotting areas of least resistance to reforms in order to prevent the unification of the efforts of the opponents to reforms and direct confrontation between the state and the society. However, its Russian version differs remarkably from the Chinese one. According to the author, the differences between the Chinese and the Russian models of reforms are rooted in the political sphere and are associated with the specifics of the electoral and party systems of these countries, and most importantly, with the nature of the relations in the “center-regions” system. In China, when carrying out reforms, the emphasis is placed upon the initiative from below, while Russia prefers political instruments that are under the direct control of the federal structures.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"27 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75230095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-24-49
V. Martianov, V. Rudenko
The value and institutional core, which legitimized the historical rise and global domination of the West, is increasingly becoming the object of criticism. The initial coordinates of the liberal consensus, which promised humanity a constant rise in the living standards and opportunities thanks to the universality of the models of self-regulating markets and liberal democracies, find themselves under a revision. The background global trends, including those that unfolded in the Western societies, demonstrate the opposite — stagnation or shrinking of the resource base of the majority of the population against the background of the radicalization of economic inequali ty, corporate game that includes “shorting” the cost of labor (global uberization), the formation of elite democracies with limited access that ignore the principles of equality and interests of the majority. As a result, values, practices and institutions that were previously viewed as pathological deviations, institutional traps and something archaic (backwardness), consistently transform into a new global normality. Thus, theories that describe the contours of the global future mainly in non-market, and sometimes in illiberal categories, are gai ning momentum. These theories document new formats for the distribution of public resources, which are not based on markets and democracy, but rather on rent mechanisms, redistributive political regulation and differentiated value for the state of different social groups. The authors argue that, from the economic standpoint, the emerging new normality is associated with the unfolding consensus that citizens are entitled to the basic political rent or other forms of differentiated access to resources that can provide them with decent existence in the face of the gro wing inefficiency of market communications. From the political standpoint, the new normality manifests itself in the potential communitarian turn, based on a set of left-wing, nationalist and populist discourses, united by the resentment idea of returning to the state (which distributes resources) a key role in regula ting radical inequalities in the interests of the majority.
{"title":"The Magic of the White Progressor: From Global Cargo Cult to a New Political Normality","authors":"V. Martianov, V. Rudenko","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-24-49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-24-49","url":null,"abstract":"The value and institutional core, which legitimized the historical rise and global domination of the West, is increasingly becoming the object of criticism. The initial coordinates of the liberal consensus, which promised humanity a constant rise in the living standards and opportunities thanks to the universality of the models of self-regulating markets and liberal democracies, find themselves under a revision. The background global trends, including those that unfolded in the Western societies, demonstrate the opposite — stagnation or shrinking of the resource base of the majority of the population against the background of the radicalization of economic inequali ty, corporate game that includes “shorting” the cost of labor (global uberization), the formation of elite democracies with limited access that ignore the principles of equality and interests of the majority. As a result, values, practices and institutions that were previously viewed as pathological deviations, institutional traps and something archaic (backwardness), consistently transform into a new global normality. Thus, theories that describe the contours of the global future mainly in non-market, and sometimes in illiberal categories, are gai ning momentum. These theories document new formats for the distribution of public resources, which are not based on markets and democracy, but rather on rent mechanisms, redistributive political regulation and differentiated value for the state of different social groups. The authors argue that, from the economic standpoint, the emerging new normality is associated with the unfolding consensus that citizens are entitled to the basic political rent or other forms of differentiated access to resources that can provide them with decent existence in the face of the gro wing inefficiency of market communications. From the political standpoint, the new normality manifests itself in the potential communitarian turn, based on a set of left-wing, nationalist and populist discourses, united by the resentment idea of returning to the state (which distributes resources) a key role in regula ting radical inequalities in the interests of the majority.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82549996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-7-23
I. Inshakov
The article is devoted to the question of the relationship between Modernity and utopia. Modernity is viewed as a special time regime (i.e., a set of socially significant forms of perception of time by people and social groups), which constitutes a number of conditions that open up opportunities and create obstacles for the utopian thinking and the policies it directs, struggle practices, etc. The author identifies three important from the perspective for the existence of utopia conditions. The first condition is the tension between the openness of Modernity to qualitative changes and its desire for self-closure and reduction towards one of its features (rationalization, global capitalism, etc.). The possibilities of utopian thinking in a particular historical situation depend on the predominance of one of these impulses. The second condition is the problematization of any specific utopia against the background of the general process of reflexive self-renewal of modern societies, the appropriation of criticism to oneself and its recoding into the elements of routine management. The third condition is the colonization of time due to the subjectively perceived acceleration of time and loss of control over time, which complicates any thinking outside the everyday facts, including utopian thinking. According to the author’s conclusion, these three conditions are interrelated: it is the openness of Modernity to change that causes both the problematization of a specific utopia and the colonization of accelerating time, every moment of which should be spent on changes for the better. In its turn, the colonization of time undermines the possibility of “stopping” it, transferring it into the so-called “messianic time”, a time of eventfulness and concreteness.
{"title":"Modernity as a Time for Utopia","authors":"I. Inshakov","doi":"10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-7-23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-7-23","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the question of the relationship between Modernity and utopia. Modernity is viewed as a special time regime (i.e., a set of socially significant forms of perception of time by people and social groups), which constitutes a number of conditions that open up opportunities and create obstacles for the utopian thinking and the policies it directs, struggle practices, etc. The author identifies three important from the perspective for the existence of utopia conditions. The first condition is the tension between the openness of Modernity to qualitative changes and its desire for self-closure and reduction towards one of its features (rationalization, global capitalism, etc.). The possibilities of utopian thinking in a particular historical situation depend on the predominance of one of these impulses. The second condition is the problematization of any specific utopia against the background of the general process of reflexive self-renewal of modern societies, the appropriation of criticism to oneself and its recoding into the elements of routine management. The third condition is the colonization of time due to the subjectively perceived acceleration of time and loss of control over time, which complicates any thinking outside the everyday facts, including utopian thinking. According to the author’s conclusion, these three conditions are interrelated: it is the openness of Modernity to change that causes both the problematization of a specific utopia and the colonization of accelerating time, every moment of which should be spent on changes for the better. In its turn, the colonization of time undermines the possibility of “stopping” it, transferring it into the so-called “messianic time”, a time of eventfulness and concreteness.","PeriodicalId":47624,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77158389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-50-71
V. Ustyuzhanin, L. Grinin, I. Medvedev, Andrey Korotayev
Despite the existence of numerous hypotheses about what factors influence protesters’ choice of armed vs. unarmed struggle tactics, today there is a dearth of global, quantitative cross-national studies aimed at identifying the reasons why revolutions take a violent vs. a non-violent form. The article attempts to fill one of the gaps existing here by conducting a crossnational analysis of the relationship between education and the type of revolutionary action. Based on the existing literature, the authors document several mechanisms that nudge educated people to choose unarmed forms of protest. In particular, education makes people more receptive to liberal-democratic valu es (including recognition and respect for the rights of others), promotes the development of tolerance and a culture of peaceful discussion, as well as increases human capital, which, on the one hand, makes it possible to successfully use non-violent instruments to defend one’s interests, and, on the other hand, increases the relative costs of participating in armed uprisings. Hence, the authors put forward a hypothesis, according to which in countries with a higher percentage of the population with formal education, the likelihood of armed revolutionary uprisings will decrease. The analysis of 387 revolutionary events that took place in the world from 1950 to 2019 conducted via cross-tabulation, correlation and regression methods, fully confirms the hypothesis: high level of education is indeed a strong and significant predictor of the unarmed nature of revolutionary upheavals. The correlation is especially high between the proportion of revolutionary events and the average number of years of schooling (in the logged form), which approaches the level of functional depen dence. Therefore, the factor of education has the maximum influence on the nature of revolutionary uprisings precisely in the early stages of modernization.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-28DOI: 10.30570/2078-5089-2022-104-1-162-182
I. Glebova
The end of the 19th — beginning of the 20th century is a watershed moment for Russia. It was the era of “theomachy”, or getting rid of the former gods (authorities, restrictions, coercion and control), in politics, economy, science and culture. In this sense, the motto “Down with the autocracy!” is the political equivalent of the poets’ slogan “Throw Pushkin off the ship of Modernity”. Poets, like politicians, wanted to break out of the past by removing its linchpin — the tsar, the old power. Some intended to reestablish it, others — to rethink it. Politicians sought their ideal in “geography” (the political structure of advanced, democratic Europe), poets — in culture. And they found it in Peter the Great — the revolutionary on the throne, the demiurge of St Petersburg’s Russia. That cult, which was seemingly organic for that culture, concealed the expectations that can be politically deciphered as “the dictatorship of development”. It was Peter’s model of transformation (radical upheaval, a step from the past into the future, with the leader heading the process) that was adopted by the Russian culture as a normative. The revolution and the new (“October”) world, with its eulogy of the future, dictatorship, and cult of the leader, have become the answer to the questions of the beginning of the century and their test. The article views revolution precisely as an experience (which, for all its intensity and tragic nature, has received insufficient reflection) that failed to have any impact on the subsequent political practice. At the same time, although the main goal of the study is political in nature, the author draws on literary, mostly poetic sources, showing how revolutionary practice (not only at the start, but also at the end of the century) highlights the extent to which the “irresponsible chatter” of poets was truly reflective in political and moral respects.
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