Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

Axel Honneth's theory of recognition outlines the personal and social contexts of family, law and community solidarities in which recognition – and misrecognitions – are experienced. His work has implications for Mezirow's theory of transformative learning. Transformative learning is critiqued for an over dependence on the Dewey/Habermas foundations that demand high levels of rationality and for an over reliance on individual learning to the exclusion of social learning. Honneth's ideas are explored in order to further develop the understanding of how experience is central to transformative learning. Disorienting dilemmas and the perplexities that lead to transformative learning are reinterpreted as experiences that have personal and social dimensions. Experience – often seen as individual and unique - cannot be disconnected from social contexts. Honneth helps us resolve these issues and allows us to re-interpret transformative learning as the transformation of experience. Finally, two further concepts are introduced: a) the dialectic nature of experience (Negt); and b) the importance of completeness (Negt). These further enhance the experiential grounding for emancipation and the emancipatory project of transformative learning.

At the core of what makes humans, and their behaviour, social, is the interplay between self and other. Our identities, for example, are essential to our functioning as social beings as they allow us to make sense of ourselves, and others, across different contexts. We care about how others see us and achieving congruence between how we see ourselves, how we think relevant others see us, and indeed how relevant others actually see us in turn, becomes integral for achieving a positive sense of self. Therefore, humans require recognition from relevant others. This recognition can take many different forms, from legal recognition of one's rights in society, to social recognition of one's belonging to different groups. Moreover, the absence of recognition can lead to serious repercussions and consequences, resulting, on an individual level, in a reduced mode of being and feelings of exclusion, and on a social and political level, in tensions and conflict. The current special issue takes a multidisciplinary approach to contribute to the growing debates and discussions around the importance of understanding recognition and its role in social behaviour. As the introduction to this special issue, this paper argues that the concept of recognition enables a better understanding of how identification and belonging become entangled with power struggles and expressions of agency. Doing so leads us to conclude that a social psychology of identity and intra/intergroup relations which does not consider power relations, as bound up in processes of recognition and its denial, fails to consider the key processes and broader impact that exclusion, subtle or explicit, has on individuals' well-being, belonging and ability to act in the world.

Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we “live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin.” Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief-stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self-conception in the latter half of the 20^th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework.

For almost a century, scholars have held the conviction that Max Weber's methodology was based upon neo-Kantian philosophy. This belief was founded on the idea that Weber's methodology was dependent on the neo-Kantianism of Weber's Freiburg colleague and friend Heinrich Rickert. This idea began with Rickert himself and then was promoted by his student Alexander von Schelting. This belief was then passed down through numerous American scholars to the point that today, sociologists have the conviction that Weber's writings on method are tied directly to those of Rickert. In light of this, one may suggest that this conviction has been transformed into dogma. However, as will be demonstrated in this essay, Weber's methodological ideas are fundamentally different from those of Rickert and that is based upon the fact that Weber's methodological goals were fundamentally different from those of Rickert.

In this article, we draw attention to public-private dilemmas among psychologists that make sense of the debates around the replication crisis, citation practices and networking practices. We argue that the values of justice and caring map onto the public sphere and private sphere respectively and create the horns of a dilemma for academics. While bureaucratic justice is a publicly revered value of modernity in psychological research that underpins ethics, validity, reliability and equality of opportunity, ‘caring’ is a more subtle value of traditionalism that runs in parallel and is detected only by our psychological practices. In particular, we argue that it is detected by practices such as disputes between the replicated and their replicators in replication studies (understood as a dramatic counter reality) as to who is more ‘careless’ with procedure; citation (including the self-care of self-citation) as thanksgiving and incantation of powerful others in enchantment rituals, and the system of professional indebtedness that accrues in ‘kinship’ networks – where kinship is understood broadly as adoption into a research group and its network. The clashes between these values can lead to a sense of hypocrisy and irony in academic life, as incommensurate values split between private and public expression. From this position, we delve into Isaiah Berlin's work on incommensurate values to suggest that ethical pluralism, involving more public recognition of the equal but different ethical demands of these values can help overcome these everyday dilemmas in the public sphere.

The vast majority of empirical hypotheses in psychology, or in the social sciences more generally, are directional whereas in other sciences, such as the physical sciences, there are more point or narrow-interval empirical hypotheses. Characteristics of theories and auxiliary assumptions play a role in the difference. Given that psychology research strongly features directional predictions, it is important to question the extent to which these provide convincing tests of theories that they are designed to test. The present work aims to provide a nuanced view that considers the complex interaction between the obviousness of directional predictions, the obviousness of the theory from which they derive, and the quality of the auxiliary assumptions that push towards directional predictions. Then, too, there is the related issue of vulnerability of directional predictions to alternative explanations and how to address them.

Charles S. Peirce's realism has been neglected by pragmatists and critical realists alike in the current debate over metatheoretical realism in sociology. This paper introduces Peirce's view of what is at stake in the question of realism, specifically regarding causation. Leveraging current interest in Peirce's conception of abduction, I show how realism about causation is implicit therein. I present a genealogy of the concept of real causation Peirce embraces. I explicate Peirce's view of the scientific significance of realism about causation, and why he finds it compelling. Finally, I argue that Peirce would intervene in the current debate by saying that those committed to abductive theorizing and causal explanation are implicitly realist.

Cognitive sociology has been split into cultural and interdisciplinary traditions that position themselves differently in relation to the cognitive sciences and make incompatible assumptions about cognition. This article provides an analysis and assessment of the cognitive and methodological assumptions of these two traditions from the perspective of the mechanistic theory of explanation. We argue that while the cultural tradition of cognitive sociology has provided important descriptions about how human cognition varies across cultural groups and historical periods, it has not opened up the black box of cognitive mechanisms that produce and sustain this variation. This means that its explanations for the described phenomena have remained weak. By contrast, the interdisciplinary tradition of cognitive sociology has sought to integrate cognitive scientific concepts and methods into explanatory research on how culture influences action and how culture is stored in memory. Although we grant that interdisciplinary cognitive sociologists have brought many fresh ideas, concepts and methods to cultural sociology from the cognitive sciences, they have not always clarified their assumptions about cognition and their models have sketched only a few specific cognitive mechanisms through which culture influences action, meaning that they have not yet provided a comprehensive explanatory understanding of the interactions between culture, cognition and action.

The notion of tolerance is widely embraced across many settings and is generally considered critical for the peaceful functioning of plural societies, and within organizations, institutions, and many professions. However, the concept of tolerance has various meanings and can be discursively used in different ways and for different purposes. The various understandings and their usage can have different implications for normative views and real-world decision making. This paper focuses on two main understandings of tolerance and how these are flexibly used in a debate about the case in which a social work student was excluded from further study by an university committee. This case serves as a particular illumination of the broader societal context of ‘cultural wars’ and ‘identity politics’ in which the notion of tolerance features prominently. It is examined how those who did and did not support the university decision deployed in different ways the notion of tolerance. It is concluded that tolerance has different cultural meanings which can be used for various ends in debates about contentious issues and for justifying or criticizing impactful decisions.