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Fear is Anticipatory: A Buddhist Analysis 恐惧是预期的:一个佛教的分析
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.112
B. Finnigan
This article derives from the Buddhist Nikāya Suttas the idea that fear has an intentional object that is best analysed in anticipatory terms. Something is feared, I argue, if construed as dangerous, where to construe something as dangerous is to anticipate it will cause certain unwanted effects. To help explain what this means, I appeal to the concept of formal objects in the philosophy of emotions and to predictive processing accounts of perception. I demonstrate how this analysis of fear can do exegetical work in the context of the Nikāya Suttas, and respond to philosophical issues concerning the relation between the intentional and anticipatory dimensions of fear; the relevant anticipated effects of feared objects; and whether fearing subjects necessarily know they anticipate unwanted effects. I also draw an analogy to allostatic sensations to engage issues concering how the anticipatory dimension of fear relates to the motivational.
这篇文章源于佛教Nikāya佛经的观点,即恐惧有一个有意的对象,最好用预期的方式来分析。我认为,如果把某件事解释为危险,就会让人害怕,而把某件事解释为危险,就是预期它会造成某些不想要的后果。为了帮助解释这意味着什么,我求助于情感哲学中的形式对象概念和感知的预测处理描述。我展示了这种对恐惧的分析如何在Nikāya佛经的背景下进行训诂工作,并回应了关于恐惧的有意维度和预期维度之间关系的哲学问题;恐惧物体的相关预期影响;以及恐惧的受试者是否一定知道他们会预料到不必要的影响。我还用适应感觉来类比恐惧的预期维度与动机之间的关系。
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引用次数: 0
The Phenomenology of Emotional Expression 情感表达现象学
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.013
Joel Smith
Emotions are personal-level states that occupy causal roles and, as such, have a range of behavioural outputs distinctive of them. Intuitively, some but not all of these outputs qualify as expressions of the emotion. But which ones? I begin by offering a descriptive phenomenology of emotional expression, both from the perspective of the expresser and that of the observer. I then consider answers to the question that focus on each of these perspectives. I argue that the best available versions of observer-perspective views are subject to significant objections. I go on to defend an expresser-perspective view that accords a central role to the expresser's consciousness of the relation of motivation that holds between their emotion and its expression.
情绪是个人层面的状态,占据着因果关系的角色,因此具有一系列独特的行为输出。直觉上,这些输出中的一些(但不是全部)符合情感表达的条件。但是哪些呢?我首先从表达者和观察者的角度提供了一种情绪表达的描述性现象学。然后,我会考虑这个问题的答案,重点放在这些观点上。我认为,观察者视角的最佳可用版本会遭到强烈反对。我继续为表达者的观点辩护,这种观点认为表达者对他们的情绪和表达之间的动机关系的意识起着核心作用。
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引用次数: 0
Personal Intentionalism and the Understanding of Emotion Experience 个人意向性与情绪体验的理解
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.061
S. Arnaud, Kathryn Pendoley
How should we seek to account for the qualitative aspect of emotion? Strong intentionalism presents one promising avenue for such an account. According to strong intentionalism, the phenomenology of a mental state is entirely determined by that state's intentional content. Given that many views of the emotions have it that the intentionality and phenomenology of the emotions are very closely related, this makes strong intentionalism an especially promising route. However, strong intentionalism has rarely been defended for emotions and, we argue, where it has, it has failed to be explanatory. This paper proposes a new explanatory form of strong intentionalism about emotion. We call it personal intentionalism. According to this view, the qualitative features of emotion are fully determined by the emotion's intentional content. This content varies inter- and intraindividually, according to one's cares and concerns, as well as one's other mental states. We assess its compatibility with theories of consciousness.
我们应该如何解释情感的定性方面呢?强意向性为这种解释提供了一个有希望的途径。根据强意向性理论,精神状态的现象学完全由该状态的意向性内容决定。鉴于许多关于情感的观点都认为情感的意向性和现象学是密切相关的,这使得强意向性成为一条特别有前途的道路。然而,强烈的意向性很少为情感辩护,我们认为,在它存在的地方,它无法解释。本文提出了一种新的关于情感的强意向性解释形式。我们称之为个人意向性。根据这一观点,情绪的质的特征完全由情绪的意向性内容决定。根据一个人的关心和关注,以及一个人的其他精神状态,这些内容在个体之间和个体内部都是不同的。我们评估它与意识理论的兼容性。
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引用次数: 0
Exploring Affective Evaluative Horizons 探索情感评价的视野
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.036
Jonathan Mitchell
A key claim of classical phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other classical phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is labelled the 'inner horizon'. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for thinking that affective-evaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant experiences, in which particular objects' values are presented as either an ideal 'ought to be' or an ideal 'ought not to be'.
经典现象学的一个关键主张是,意向性经验涉及一种独特的内隐意向性,它伴随着相关的外显意向性。这种内隐意向性据称是那些意向性经验的客体呈现现象学的共同组成部分。这种隐性意向性通常被胡塞尔和其他古典现象学家定义为水平意向性或意向视界。它最有趣的形式被称为“内视界”。我在这篇论文中的目的是考虑是否有理由认为,情感评价经验,主要是有意识的情感,在内在视界中表现出一种隐性意向性。我建议,一种合理的方式来激发这个想法是通过参考相关经验的规范现象学,其中特定对象的价值被呈现为一个理想的“应该是”或一个理想的“不应该是”。
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引用次数: 0
Intentional Feelings, Practical Agency, and Normative Commitments 意向感、实践代理和规范承诺
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.088
Mary Carman
A dominant approach to conceptualizing a role for emotions in practical agency has been to focus on a relation between emotions and reasons, whereby emotions are claimed to track reason-giving considerations via their intentional content. Yet, if we reflect on the phenomenology of emotional consciousness and take seriously a growing consensus that emotions involve intentional feelings then, I argue, such a reason-tracking approach at best only provides part of the story and at worst is fundamentally misguided. This does not mean that emotion has no role in practical agency, however. I tentatively propose that the normative category of commitments offers a promising alternative for thinking about the role of emotions in practical agency, an alternative that has the potential to do justice to intentional feelings while avoiding the problems of a reason-tracking approach.
概念化情绪在实践能动性中的作用的一种主要方法是关注情绪和原因之间的关系,通过这种关系,情绪被声称通过其有意的内容来跟踪理性给予的考虑。然而,如果我们反思情绪意识的现象学,并认真对待情绪涉及有意感受这一日益增长的共识,那么,我认为,这种原因追踪方法充其量只是提供了故事的一部分,最坏的情况是从根本上被误导了。然而,这并不意味着情感在实际代理中没有作用。我暂时建议,规范性承诺类别为思考情感在实际代理中的作用提供了一个很有前途的替代方案,这种替代方案有可能公正对待有意的感受,同时避免原因跟踪方法的问题。
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引用次数: 0
Consciousness, Attention, and the Motivation-Affect System 意识、注意和动机-影响系统
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.139
T. Cochrane
It is an important feature of creatures like us that our various motivations compete for control over our behaviour, including mental behaviour such as imagining and attending. In large part, this competition is adjudicated by the stimulation of affect — the intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant aspects of experience. In this paper I argue that the motivation-affect system controls a sub-type of attention called 'alerting attention' to bring various goals and stimuli to consciousness and thereby prioritize those contents for action. This view allows me to flesh out the global workspace theory of consciousness, as well as some of the phenomenal characteristics of conscious experience.
这是像我们这样的生物的一个重要特征,我们的各种动机竞争控制我们的行为,包括想象和参与等心理行为。在很大程度上,这种竞争是由情感的刺激来决定的——体验中内在的愉快或不愉快的方面。在本文中,我认为动机-影响系统控制着一种称为“提醒注意”的注意子类型,将各种目标和刺激带到意识中,从而优先考虑这些内容的行动。这一观点使我能够充实意识的全局工作空间理论,以及意识体验的一些现象特征。
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引用次数: 0
Towards an Affective Quality Space 走向情感品质空间
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.164
Laura Silva
In this paper I lay the foundations for the construction of an affective quality space. I begin by outlining what quality spaces are, and how they have been constructed for sensory qualities across different perceptual modalities. I then turn to tackle four obstacles that an affective quality space might face that would make an affective quality space unfeasible. After showing these obstacles to be surmountable, I propose a number of conditions and methodological constraints that should be satisfied in attempts to construct an affective quality space. Before concluding, I detail the high explanatory pay-off such a project promises.
本文为构建情感品质空间奠定了基础。我首先概述了什么是质量空间,以及它们是如何在不同的感知模式中为感知质量而构建的。然后,我转向解决情感质量空间可能面临的四个障碍,这四个障碍将使情感质量空间变得不可行。在展示了这些障碍是可以克服的之后,我提出了在试图构建情感品质空间时应该满足的一些条件和方法约束。在结束之前,我详细介绍了这样一个项目的高解释性回报承诺。
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引用次数: 1
Against Emotions as Feelings: Towards an Attitudinal Profile of Emotion 反对情绪作为感觉:对情绪的态度概况
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.7.223
Rodrigo Díaz
Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant to one's motivations.
感觉是情感的一个重要部分或方面吗?无意识情绪的案例表明情况并非如此。然而,有人声称无意识情绪可以更好地理解为:(a)具有现象意识但不具有反思意识的情绪,或(b)具有情绪而不是适当情绪的倾向。在这里,我认为这些解释无意识情绪的方法是不充分的,并提出了一种将情绪视为非现象态度的观点,认为它们的内容与一个人的动机相关。
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引用次数: 0
The Mapuche People: Cultural Beliefs Related to Consciousness, Mind, and Body 马普切人:与意识、心灵和身体相关的文化信仰
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.137
C. Pérez, Giuseppina Marsico
The Mapuche people are a native group from the extreme south of Latin America. Their culture is based on the interconnectedness between the cohabitants of the environment, including human and non-human categories of life. The closest concept to consciousness for them would be Mapuche rakizuamor Mapuche thinking, which is defined as a particular kind of reflexivity or state of awareness of the interdependence of people with natural and spiritual entities. This understanding of the human condition represents a relational ontology, which cannot be translated to the predominating individualistic approach. Although the mind–body distinction is not a central point within Mapuche culture, these dimensions can be explored through crucial processes of the life cycle such as socialization, illness, and death. Contributions from cultural psychology and Indigenous psychology are taken into account regarding the challenge to address the interplay between culture and the human psyche more appropriately.
马普切人是拉丁美洲最南部的土著民族。他们的文化是基于环境的共同居住者之间的相互联系,包括人类和非人类的生活类别。对他们来说,最接近意识的概念是马普切人的思维,它被定义为一种特殊的反身性或意识状态人们与自然和精神实体之间的相互依存关系。这种对人类状况的理解代表了一种关系本体论,它不能被转化为占主导地位的个人主义方法。虽然身心的区别并不是马普切文化的核心,但这些维度可以通过生命周期的关键过程来探索,比如社会化、疾病和死亡。文化心理学和土著心理学的贡献被考虑在内,以更适当地解决文化与人类心理之间的相互作用的挑战。
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引用次数: 0
Editorial Introduction: Indigenous Philosophies of Consciousness 编辑导言:本土意识哲学
IF 0.7 4区 心理学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.5.099
Radek Trnka, Radmila Lorencová
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引用次数: 0
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Journal of Consciousness Studies
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