Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.1.110
Charles F. Detmar
This article extends the brief description of cognition previously offered in the adaptational theory of consciousness (ATC). Here I suggest how unconscious and conscious minds interact to achieve mutual cognitive development. Interactions occur in an extended moment of subjective time consisting of perceptual, associational, and affective scenes. During the extended moment, the conscious self becomes time-agile, shuttling between the past, present, and future in order to assemble ideas within global awareness that produce pleasure. The products of its cognitive journeys are saved as synaptic modifications by the unconscious mind's mnemonic functions. As this occurs, instincts and the conscious self's implementation of cultural values are brought into better alignment.
{"title":"The Development of Cognition in the Interaction of Conscious and Unconscious Minds","authors":"Charles F. Detmar","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.1.110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.1.110","url":null,"abstract":"This article extends the brief description of cognition previously offered in the adaptational theory of consciousness (ATC). Here I suggest how unconscious and conscious minds interact to achieve mutual cognitive development. Interactions occur in an extended moment of subjective time\u0000 consisting of perceptual, associational, and affective scenes. During the extended moment, the conscious self becomes time-agile, shuttling between the past, present, and future in order to assemble ideas within global awareness that produce pleasure. The products of its cognitive journeys\u0000 are saved as synaptic modifications by the unconscious mind's mnemonic functions. As this occurs, instincts and the conscious self's implementation of cultural values are brought into better alignment.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44387818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.1.087
J. Kihlstrom
Inspired by the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans, this paper considers four problems of mind and body. (1) The traditional mind–body problem, including the 'easy' problem of identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and the 'hard' problem of determining just how neural processes generate conscious states. (2) The distinction between automatic (unconscious) and controlled (conscious) processes, raising the question about the relative roles they play in experience, thought, and action, as well as the question of free will. (3) Psychosomatic effects, including the stress–disease connection, placebo effects, and hypnotic suggestion, in which beliefs appear to have consequences for bodily processes outside the nervous system. (4) Whether mind can exist in the absence of a bodily host, as exemplified by spiritualism and parapsychology. As challenging as the easy and hard problems are, psychology can advance as a science of mental life without ever solving them.
{"title":"Four Problems of Mind and Body: Celebrating the 80th Birthday of Max Velmans","authors":"J. Kihlstrom","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.1.087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.1.087","url":null,"abstract":"Inspired by the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans, this paper considers four problems of mind and body. (1) The traditional mind–body problem, including the 'easy' problem of identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and the 'hard' problem of determining just how neural\u0000 processes generate conscious states. (2) The distinction between automatic (unconscious) and controlled (conscious) processes, raising the question about the relative roles they play in experience, thought, and action, as well as the question of free will. (3) Psychosomatic effects, including\u0000 the stress–disease connection, placebo effects, and hypnotic suggestion, in which beliefs appear to have consequences for bodily processes outside the nervous system. (4) Whether mind can exist in the absence of a bodily host, as exemplified by spiritualism and parapsychology. As challenging\u0000 as the easy and hard problems are, psychology can advance as a science of mental life without ever solving them.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45640422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.1.007
E. Cardeña
{"title":"A Hitchhiker's Guide to Consciousness: Max Velmans at 80 Years of Age","authors":"E. Cardeña","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.1.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.1.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45488829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.1.043
B. Lancaster
In assessing the relevance of Velmans' work for transpersonal psychology, two major features of his reflexive monism are explored. The first is the notion that consciousness is embedded in the external world and in the body, the second is the principle of reflexivity itself. The embeddedness of consciousness in the world underpins transpersonal notions of consciousness as a primary reality of the universe. Consciousness as embodied is a critical component for therapies and psychospiritual practices that focus on somatic awareness, both central to transpersonal psychology's objectives. The reflexivity at the core of Velmans' theory is identified as a principle that recurs at different scales (the brain, cognition, and the universe), thus relating to esoteric ideas of correspondence across microcosmic and macrocosmic levels of being. For transpersonal psychology, this recognition that 'ancient' esoteric ideas can be substantiated and updated through contemporary research into consciousness opens further avenues of enquiry.
{"title":"Velmans and the Transpersonal: Reflexivity at the Core","authors":"B. Lancaster","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.1.043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.1.043","url":null,"abstract":"In assessing the relevance of Velmans' work for transpersonal psychology, two major features of his reflexive monism are explored. The first is the notion that consciousness is embedded in the external world and in the body, the second is the principle of reflexivity itself. The embeddedness\u0000 of consciousness in the world underpins transpersonal notions of consciousness as a primary reality of the universe. Consciousness as embodied is a critical component for therapies and psychospiritual practices that focus on somatic awareness, both central to transpersonal psychology's objectives.\u0000 The reflexivity at the core of Velmans' theory is identified as a principle that recurs at different scales (the brain, cognition, and the universe), thus relating to esoteric ideas of correspondence across microcosmic and macrocosmic levels of being. For transpersonal psychology, this recognition\u0000 that 'ancient' esoteric ideas can be substantiated and updated through contemporary research into consciousness opens further avenues of enquiry.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47963724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.1.065
J. J. Joaquin
Max Velmans, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London, is one of the leading theorists of consciousness studies — an interdisciplinary field of study that deals with questions about the nature of consciousness and how it relates to the physical world. In this interview, we look back at his life and work; in particular, his idea of reflexive monism, which is one of his landmark contributions to the field.
{"title":"Max Velmans Interview: On Understanding Consciousness, Reflexive Monism, and the Future of Consciousness Studies","authors":"J. J. Joaquin","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.1.065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.1.065","url":null,"abstract":"Max Velmans, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London, is one of the leading theorists of consciousness studies — an interdisciplinary field of study that deals with questions about the nature of consciousness and how it relates to the physical world.\u0000 In this interview, we look back at his life and work; in particular, his idea of reflexive monism, which is one of his landmark contributions to the field.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47679023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.1.138
Mette Leonard Høeg
The paper proposes to integrate literary studies in consciousness research to develop a strong ethical and existential dimension in the field. More specifically, it considers the value of fictional narrative for developing concepts of selfhood and personal identity that cohere with the reductionist explanations of human consciousness and self in modern empirical consciousness research. My central claim is that looking to the literary representations of human consciousness and existence that reject or are free from conventional essentialist ideas of self, agency, and anthropocentrism can help 'normalize' the reductionist scientific descriptions of humans and reduce their psychologically and socio-culturally disruptive impact. The paper uses Virginia Woolf's The Waves as an example, showing how the novel's non-anthropocentric and non-essentialist conceptions of self and consciousness overlap with materialist theories in neuroscience and -philosophy but present these in a distinctive narrative framework and poetic terms that bring out the inherent emancipatory potential of the materialist explanation of human existence and offer the reader the possibility of relating to these experientially and emotionally.
{"title":"The Value of Literature for Consciousness Research and Ethics","authors":"Mette Leonard Høeg","doi":"10.53765/20512201.30.1.138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.30.1.138","url":null,"abstract":"The paper proposes to integrate literary studies in consciousness research to develop a strong ethical and existential dimension in the field. More specifically, it considers the value of fictional narrative for developing concepts of selfhood and personal identity that cohere with\u0000 the reductionist explanations of human consciousness and self in modern empirical consciousness research. My central claim is that looking to the literary representations of human consciousness and existence that reject or are free from conventional essentialist ideas of self, agency, and\u0000 anthropocentrism can help 'normalize' the reductionist scientific descriptions of humans and reduce their psychologically and socio-culturally disruptive impact. The paper uses Virginia Woolf's The Waves as an example, showing how the novel's non-anthropocentric and non-essentialist\u0000 conceptions of self and consciousness overlap with materialist theories in neuroscience and -philosophy but present these in a distinctive narrative framework and poetic terms that bring out the inherent emancipatory potential of the materialist explanation of human existence and offer the\u0000 reader the possibility of relating to these experientially and emotionally.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49093718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.11.155
Adriana Renero, Richard Brown
Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.
{"title":"A HOROR Theory for Introspective Consciousness","authors":"Adriana Renero, Richard Brown","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.11.155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.11.155","url":null,"abstract":"Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of\u0000 introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended\u0000 to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective\u0000 Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for\u0000 what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49035309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-21DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.9.084
A. Køster
Abstract: Since Erich Lindemann's seminal work on 'the symptomatology and management of acute grief' from 1944, it has been common to define grief through its particular emotional structure and dynamics. According to this perspective, grief announces itself in socalled 'pangs of grief' in which the bereaved is occasionally flooded by waves of emotions. This picture has become so ingrained in our understanding of grief that it has defined both public discourse on grief and contemporary clinical constructs. In this paper, I propose that underneath grief's fluctuating emotivity, there is a deeper feeling of grief. This deeper feeling reflects an altered mode of being in the world in which the bereaved experiences herself as 'at a distance' from the worldly. I will refer to this state as world-distancing and emphasize it as a protective affective state that shields the bereaved from a limit situation in which the world has become overwhelming in the absence of the deceased. It is experienced as being in a bubble or as if enclosed in a kind of membrane that shields the bereaved from the intrusiveness and penetrating character of the world. Worlddistancing, however, comes with significant perils if the bereaved are unable to reattach to the world. I outline this danger as a state of existential loneliness that follows from what Eugené Minkowski termed a felt lack of vital contact with the world.
{"title":"A Deeper Feeling of Grief","authors":"A. Køster","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.9.084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.9.084","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Since Erich Lindemann's seminal work on 'the symptomatology and management of acute grief' from 1944, it has been common to define grief through its particular emotional structure and dynamics. According to this perspective, grief announces itself in socalled 'pangs\u0000 of grief' in which the bereaved is occasionally flooded by waves of emotions. This picture has become so ingrained in our understanding of grief that it has defined both public discourse on grief and contemporary clinical constructs. In this paper, I propose that underneath grief's fluctuating\u0000 emotivity, there is a deeper feeling of grief. This deeper feeling reflects an altered mode of being in the world in which the bereaved experiences herself as 'at a distance' from the worldly. I will refer to this state as world-distancing and emphasize it as a protective affective state that\u0000 shields the bereaved from a limit situation in which the world has become overwhelming in the absence of the deceased. It is experienced as being in a bubble or as if enclosed in a kind of membrane that shields the bereaved from the intrusiveness and penetrating character of the world. Worlddistancing,\u0000 however, comes with significant perils if the bereaved are unable to reattach to the world. I outline this danger as a state of existential loneliness that follows from what Eugené Minkowski termed a felt lack of vital contact with the world.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48094501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-21DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.9.175
E. A. Byrne
This paper points to a more expansive conception of grief by arguing that the losses of illness can be genuine objects of grief. I argue for this by illuminating underappreciated structural features of typical grief — that is, grief over a bereavement — which are shared but under-recognized. I offer a common chronic illness, chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME), as a striking case study. I then use this analysis to highlight some clinical challenges that arise should this claim receive uptake in clinical practice. Extant literature on CFS/ME tells us that rates of comorbid depression are atypically high. If one accepts that people with CFS/ ME can grieve over losses associated with the condition, and that grief can be easily mistaken for depression in this context, this might suggest that rates of comorbid depression are inflated. I show, however, that the challenge of distinguishing between healthy and pathological grief arises in its place, and is just as tricky to solve.
{"title":"Grief in Chronic Illness: A Case Study of CFS/ME","authors":"E. A. Byrne","doi":"10.53765/20512201.29.9.175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.9.175","url":null,"abstract":"This paper points to a more expansive conception of grief by arguing that the losses of illness can be genuine objects of grief. I argue for this by illuminating underappreciated structural features of typical grief — that is, grief over a bereavement — which are shared\u0000 but under-recognized. I offer a common chronic illness, chronic fatigue syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME), as a striking case study. I then use this analysis to highlight some clinical challenges that arise should this claim receive uptake in clinical practice. Extant literature\u0000 on CFS/ME tells us that rates of comorbid depression are atypically high. If one accepts that people with CFS/ ME can grieve over losses associated with the condition, and that grief can be easily mistaken for depression in this context, this might suggest that rates of comorbid depression\u0000 are inflated. I show, however, that the challenge of distinguishing between healthy and pathological grief arises in its place, and is just as tricky to solve.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46194610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}