Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Kemmerer's paper convincingly claims that the grounded cognition model (GCM) entails linguistic relativity. Here, we underline that tackling linguistic relativity and cultural differences is vital for GCM. First, it allows GCM to focus more on flexible rather than stable aspects of cognition. Second, it highlights the centrality of linguistic experience for human cognition. While GCM-inspired research underscored the similarity between linguistic and nonlinguistic concepts, it is now paramount to understand when and how language(s) influence knowledge. To this aim, we argue that linguistic variation might be particularly relevant for more abstract concepts-which are more debatable and open to revisions.

According to the popular Grounded Cognition Model (GCM), the sensory and motor features of concepts, including word meanings, are stored directly within neural systems for perception and action. More precisely, the core claim is that these concrete conceptual features reuse some of the same modality-specific representations that serve to categorize experiences involving the relevant kinds of objects and events. Research in semantic typology, however, has shown that word meanings vary significantly across the roughly 6500 languages in the world. I argue that this crosslinguistic semantic diversity has significant yet previously unrecognized theoretical consequences for the GCM. In particular, to accommodate the typological data, the GCM must assume that the concrete features of word meanings are not merely stored within sensory/motor brain systems, but are represented there in ways that are, to a nontrivial degree, language-specific. Moreover, it must assume that these conceptual representations are also activated during the nonlinguistic processing of the relevant kinds of objects and events (e.g., during visual perception and action planning); otherwise, they would not really be grounded, which is to say, embedded inside sensory/motor systems. Crucially, however, such activations would constitute what is traditionally called linguistic relativity-that is, the influence of language-specific semantic structures on other forms of cognition. The overarching aim of this paper is to elaborate this argument more fully and explore its repercussions. To that end, I discuss in greater detail the key aspects of the GCM, the evidence for crosslinguistic semantic diversity, pertinent work on linguistic relativity, the central claim that the GCM entails linguistic relativity, some initial supporting results, and some important limitations and future directions.

In this paper, I respond to eight commentaries on my target article called "Grounded cognition entails linguistic relativity: A neglected implication of a major semantic theory." The commentaries span a broad range of disciplines and perspectives. I have organized my response around the following topics: (1) an introductory synopsis of my main argument; (2) grounded versus amodal theories of concepts; (3) language-specific versus language-independent concepts; (4) language, culture, and cognition; (5) language itself as a source of conceptual grounding; (6) abstract concepts, linguistic relativity, and contextual and individual variability; (7) word meanings as language-specific predictions; and (8) some final remarks about the importance of cross-linguistic diversity.

Kemmerer describes grounded accounts of cognition and, using crosslinguistic diversity across conceptual domains, argues that these accounts entail linguistic relativity. In this comment, I extend Kemmerer's position to the domain of emotion. Emotion concepts exemplify characteristics highlighted by grounded accounts of cognition and differ by culture and language. Recent research further demonstrates considerable situation- and person-specific differences. Based on this evidence, I argue that emotion concepts carry unique implications for variation in meaning and experience, entailing a relativity that is contextual and individual in addition to linguistic. I conclude by considering what such pervasive relativity means for interpersonal understanding.

Kemmerer's discussion of links between semantic typology and embodied cognition is welcome, especially his survey of available evidence. Focusing on mechanisms of embodied enculturation, however, we must understand that language is just one part of developmental assemblies that shape cognition, alongside other cultural elements such as sensory learning, behavior patterns, social interactions, and emotional experience. We believe that a source of this problem is an obsolete definition of "culture" as shared mental information that is inconsistent with models of embodied cognition and yet pervasive in human and cognitive sciences. We point to microethnographies of cognitive ecologies as a tractable remedy.

This paper reviews the recent history of a subset of research in dynamical cognitive science, in particular that subset that allies itself with the sciences of complexity and casts cognitive systems as interaction dominant, noncomputational, and nonmodular. I look at this history in the light of C.S. Peirce's understanding of scientific reasoning as progressing from abduction to deduction to induction. In particular, I examine the development of a controversy concerning the use of the interaction dominance of human cognitive systems as an explanation of the ubiquitous 1/f noise, multifractality, and complexity matching in human behavior.

Fractal fluctuations are a core concept for inquiries into human behavior and cognition from a dynamic systems perspective. Here, we present a generalized variance method for multivariate detrended fluctuation analysis (mvDFA). The advantage of this extension is that it can be applied to multivariate time series and considers intercorrelation between these time series when estimating fractal properties. First, we briefly describe how fractal fluctuations have advanced a dynamic system understanding of cognition. Then, we describe mvDFA in detail and highlight some of the advantages of the approach for simulated data. Furthermore, we show how mvDFA can be used to investigate empirical multivariate data using electroencephalographic recordings during a time-estimation task. We discuss this methodological development within the framework of interaction-dominant dynamics. Moreover, we outline how the availability of multivariate analyses can inform theoretical developments in the area of dynamic systems in human behavior.

Representational drift is a phenomenon of increasing interest in the cognitive and neural sciences. While investigations are ongoing for other sensory cortices, recent research has demonstrated the pervasiveness in which it occurs in the piriform cortex for olfaction. This gradual weakening and shifting of stimulus-responsive cells has critical implications for sensory stimulus-response models and perceptual decision-making. While representational drift may complicate traditional sensory processing models, it could be seen as an advantage in olfaction, as animals live in environments with constantly changing and unpredictable chemical information. Non-topographical encoding in the olfactory system may aid in contextualizing reactions to promiscuous odor stimuli, facilitating adaptive animal behavior and survival. This article suggests that traditional models of stimulus-(neural) response mapping in olfaction may need to be reevaluated and instead motivates the use of dynamical systems theory as a methodology and conceptual framework.

The dynamical hypothesis claims that cognitive systems, such as teams, are dynamical systems (i.e., an interdependent collection of individuals and their technology that change together over time). Following this hypothesis, team researchers have adopted dynamical approaches to better understand the team cognitive processes and states that form team cognition, as well as how they emerge over time. One approach focuses on team coordination dynamics, which examines the coupling of signals between interacting individuals in various modalities, and has been shown to reflect aspects of team functioning including team cognition. However, how changes in team coordination relate to high-level team cognitive processes and states, as well as important events, are not yet fully understood. To this end, we advance a methodological framework for researching team cognition under the dynamical hypothesis. Subsequently, we provided an empirical case-study application of this framework. Thereby, this work contributes methodologically and empirically to a deeper understanding of team cognition, the dynamical hypothesis, and the synergy between them.