Topics in Cognitive Science最新文献

Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three-tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes.

Collaborative recall synchronizes downstream individual retrieval processes, giving rise to collective organization. However, little is known about whether particular stimulus features (e.g., semantic relatedness) are necessary for constructing collective organization and how group dynamics (e.g., reconfiguration) moderates it. We leveraged novel quantitative measures and a rich dataset reported in recent articles to address, (a) whether collective organization emerges even for semantically unrelated material and (b) how group reconfiguration-changing partners from one recall to the next-influences collective organization. Participants studied unrelated words and completed three consecutive recalls in one of three conditions: Always recalling individually (III), collaborating with the same partners twice before recalling alone (CCI), or collaborating with different group members during two initial recalls, before recalling alone (CRI). Collective organization increased significantly following any collaboration (CCI or CRI), relative to "groups" who never collaborated (III). Interestingly, collaborating repeatedly with the same partners (CCI) did not increase collective organization compared to reconfigured groups, irrespective of the reference group structure (from Recall 1 or 2). Individuals, however, did tend to base their final individual retrieval on the most recent group recall. We discuss how the fundamental processes that underlie dynamic social interactions align the cognitive processes of many, laying the foundation for other collective phenomena, including shared biases, attitudes, and beliefs.

Web 2.0 has elevated the possibilities of collaboration to unprecedented levels. Therein lies great potential, as the aptly coined phenomenon "Wisdom of the Crowd" implies. When it comes to controversial topics, however, there is no safety in numbers alone. On the contrary, collaboration among only like-minded people may even exacerbate biases (e.g., Echo Chambers). Yet, it is human nature to seek out like-minded others. Consequently, the process of self-selection is crucial if the heterogeneity of opinions serves as a safeguard against undesirable effects of group processes (e.g., attitude polarization). Accordingly, online environments that invite more heterogeneous (vs. homogeneous) users should produce less biased content. We tested this hypothesis in a field study, comparing articles on the same 20 controversial topics from the online encyclopedias Conservapedia and RationalWiki with Wikipedia (and Britannica serving as a gold standard) and exploring the opinions of discussants in the three online encyclopedias. As expected, articles from Conservapedia and RationalWiki were significantly less balanced than articles from Wikipedia and Britannica. We replicated this finding in a lab study with 257 participants who self-selected to one of three online wikis (Vegan Love, Nutrition, Meat & Fish) and individually as well as collaboratively wrote an encyclopedia-like article about "Diets." As expected, Wikis with a specific focus (Vegan Love, Meat & Fish) predominantly attracted authors with a positive attitude toward this focus and, as a consequence, resulted in more biased content than in the Nutrition Wiki. Overall, our results suggest that crowds alone do not guarantee wisdom-self-selection is a crucial process that needs to be taken into account.

How did humans become clever enough to live in nearly every major ecosystem on earth, create vaccines against deadly plagues, explore the oceans depths, and routinely traverse the globe at 30,000 feet in aluminum tubes while nibbling on roasted almonds? Drawing on recent developments in our understanding of human evolution, we consider what makes us distinctively smarter than other animals. Contrary to conventional wisdom, human brilliance emerges not from our innate brainpower or raw computational capacities, but from the sharing of information in communities and networks over generations. We review how larger, more diverse, and more optimally interconnected networks of minds give rise to faster innovation and how the cognitive products of this cumulative cultural evolutionary process feedback to make us individually "smarter"-in the sense of being better at meeting the challenges and problems posed by our societies and socioecologies. Here, we consider not only how cultural evolution supplies us with "thinking tools" (like counting systems and fractions) but also how it has shaped our ontologies (e.g., do germs and witches exist?) and epistemologies, including our notions of what constitutes a "good reason" or "good evidence" (e.g., are dreams a source of evidence?). Building on this, we consider how cultural evolution has organized and distributed cultural knowledge and cognitive tasks among subpopulations, effectively shifting both thinking and production to the level of the community, population, or network, resulting in collective information processing and group decisions. Cultural evolution can turn mindless mobs into wise crowds by facilitating and constraining cognition through a wide variety of epistemic institutions-political, legal, and scientific. These institutions process information and aid better decision-making by suppressing or encouraging the use of different cultural epistemologies and ontologies.

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions-most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because-for humans-the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.

Elections, jury deliberations, lawmaking, high-stakes negotiations and related activities are human attempts to answer the question "How should we live?" Collectively, we know these activities as politics. Politics are how societies attempt to reconcile diverse individual needs with potential benefits of social coordination. People's beliefs about what others will do ainfluence many political strategies and outcomes. This article reviews how properties of cognition affect these political phenomena. Contrary to the common belief that many citizens are too ignorant to make competent political decisions, we focus on a central finding of social science-how societies can design contexts and environments to overcome individual cognitive limitations. These adaptations expand societal capacities to provide essential goods, services, and protections. In addition to explaining these adaptations, we also show how greater collaborations between cognitive science and the social sciences can help societies do even better.

Children's testimonial learning often occurs in epistemic collaborations with others. In this paper, we will discuss ways in which cultural learning emerges in social and interpersonal contexts, and is intrinsically supported and guided by children's collaborative capacities. Much work in cultural learning has focused on children's examination of speaker and model characteristics, but more recent research has investigated the interactive aspects of testimonial exchanges. We will review evidence that children (1) participate in the interpersonal commitments that are shared in testimonial transactions by way of direct address and epistemic buck passing, (2) participate in social groups that affect their selective learning in nuanced ways, and (3) may detect epistemic harms by listeners who refuse to believe sincere and accurate speakers. Implications for conceptualizing children's testimonial learning as an interactive mechanism of collaboration will be discussed.