With the maritime industry’s integration into the carbon emissions trading system, decarbonizing international maritime transport is imminent. This study examines potential ship bypass phenomena under unilateral carbon policies by establishing a stochastic evolutionary game model involving a cross-border maritime enterprise, a carbon policy country, and a bypassing country. We then perform a parameter sensitivity analysis based on the game’s stability conditions. Key findings are outlined below: (1) In the current situation, the unilateral carbon policy will inevitably result in the phenomenon of bypassing of ships. (2) The implementation of synergistic strategies by bypassing countries elevates the variability in cross-border maritime enterprises’ strategic decisions. Specifically, these strategies mitigate the occurrence of bypassing to a certain degree, indicating a potential reduction in its frequency. (3) Bypass countries exhibit a heightened sensitivity toward the degree of synergy in carbon policies and the potential collaborative gains resulting from the improved international standing arising from such synergy. This suggests a greater interest in the long-term advantages conferred by harmonized carbon policies. (4) As stochastic perturbations intensify, bypassing countries exhibit the highest level of volatility, potentially deviating from their original synergistic strategy and adopting a non-synergistic carbon policy. This suggests that their strategic decisions are particularly unstable in response to external disturbances. (5) With an increase in random perturbation intensity, compared with the carbon tax policy, the carbon trading policy exhibits stronger stability, indicating that the implementation of the latter policy is more conducive to cross-regional carbon policy synergy.
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