{"title":"Resisting Rawlsian Political Liberalism","authors":"Japa Pallikkathayil","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12103","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12103","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49005210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many think that it would be wrong to defend an individual from attack if he competently and explicitly refuses defensive intervention. In this paper, I consider the extent to which the preferences of victims affect the permissibility of defending groups or aggregates. These cases are interesting and difficult because there is no straightforward sense in which a group can univocally consent to or refuse defensive intervention in the same way that an individual can. Among those who have considered this question, the dominant view is that that consent imposes only an extremely weak constraint on defending groups. I argue that this is mistaken and defend a much more robust requirement. Indeed, on the account that I develop there are cases in which the refusal of a single member of a victim is enough to make it impermissible to defend a much larger group. At the heart of my account is the idea that consent functions as an internal component of the broader requirement that defensive harms be proportionate: if a victim validly refuses defensive intervention, the fact that defence will benefit him cannot be used to justify harming innocents as the lesser-evil. An important implication of this view is that what constitutes sufficient consent from the members of a victim group will vary on a case-by-case basis.
{"title":"Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention","authors":"J. Parry","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12099","url":null,"abstract":"Many think that it would be wrong to defend an individual from attack if he competently and explicitly refuses defensive intervention. In this paper, I consider the extent to which the preferences of victims affect the permissibility of defending groups or aggregates. These cases are interesting and difficult because there is no straightforward sense in which a group can univocally consent to or refuse defensive intervention in the same way that an individual can. Among those who have considered this question, the dominant view is that that consent imposes only an extremely weak constraint on defending groups. I argue that this is mistaken and defend a much more robust requirement. Indeed, on the account that I develop there are cases in which the refusal of a single member of a victim is enough to make it impermissible to defend a much larger group. At the heart of my account is the idea that consent functions as an internal component of the broader requirement that defensive harms be proportionate: if a victim validly refuses defensive intervention, the fact that defence will benefit him cannot be used to justify harming innocents as the lesser-evil. An important implication of this view is that what constitutes sufficient consent from the members of a victim group will vary on a case-by-case basis.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12099","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46318758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Suppose Green threatens Brown: “Stay out of Malibu, or you’ll be sorry.” And Brown has every reason to believe he will indeed be sorry if he shows up in Malibu again. And so Brown stays out of Malibu. Most of us will think that, prima facie, Green has done something wrong. There is perhaps some background we could fill in that would make it permissible for Green to issue the threat. But in the absence of some special justification, this type of coercion is objectionable. But what exactly has Green done to Brown, so far, that one might object to? Of course, it would be wrong for Green to carry out her threat and, say, beat up Brown. But Green hasn’t done that yet and, in fact, won’t do that, because Brown, we can suppose, will stay out of Malibu. In the literature on the topic, we find an interesting divergence of emphasis. Different accounts focus attention on different aspects of
{"title":"On the Moral Objection to Coercion","authors":"S. J. White","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12098","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose Green threatens Brown: “Stay out of Malibu, or you’ll be sorry.” And Brown has every reason to believe he will indeed be sorry if he shows up in Malibu again. And so Brown stays out of Malibu. Most of us will think that, prima facie, Green has done something wrong. There is perhaps some background we could fill in that would make it permissible for Green to issue the threat. But in the absence of some special justification, this type of coercion is objectionable. But what exactly has Green done to Brown, so far, that one might object to? Of course, it would be wrong for Green to carry out her threat and, say, beat up Brown. But Green hasn’t done that yet and, in fact, won’t do that, because Brown, we can suppose, will stay out of Malibu. In the literature on the topic, we find an interesting divergence of emphasis. Different accounts focus attention on different aspects of","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12098","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47873558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consider the following pair of cases: Case 1. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 1, from paralysis. Case 2.You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 2, from a mild headache. On one view, let’s call it Pure Aggregation, in both cases we have to see how large N is before deciding what to do. If N 1 gets large enough, we should save the people from paralysis. And if N 2 gets large enough, we should prevent the mild headaches. According to another view, Anti-Aggregation, in both cases we should save the one person from death: we should simply satisfy the strongest claim, no matter how large the number of people possessing competing weaker claims gets.
{"title":"On Limited Aggregation","authors":"Patrick Tomlin","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12097","url":null,"abstract":"Consider the following pair of cases: \u0000 \u0000Case 1. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 1, from paralysis. \u0000 \u0000Case 2.You can save one person from death, or some larger number of people, N 2, from a mild headache. \u0000 \u0000On one view, let’s call it Pure Aggregation, in both cases we have to see how large N is before deciding what to do. If N 1 gets large enough, we should save the people from paralysis. And if N 2 gets large enough, we should prevent the mild headaches. According to another view, Anti-Aggregation, in both cases we should save the one person from death: we should simply satisfy the strongest claim, no matter how large the number of people possessing competing weaker claims gets.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12097","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41457805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many theorists treat free speech as a special right. Other theorists argue that, in order for free speech to be important, it must be a special right, but they conclude that it is not. What the term “special right” means in these contexts, however, remains elusive. The term usually suggests that the right in question is distinguishable from the usual governmental decision making processes and from other rights. But just how distinctive the right must be, and in what ways, is rarely defined clearly. Indeed, many discussions of free speech assume quite demanding criteria for a special right of freedom of speech, even as these criteria remain incompletely articulated. This paper seeks to define the criteria for a special right. It argues that the idea of a special right actually conceals two separate requirements. First, a special right must be distinct, in that the activities covered by the right must be analytically distinguishable from the activities outside of it. Second, a special right must be robust in the protection it affords. Most theories demand that a free speech right be highly distinctive, if not singular, and that it receive highly robust protection. By contrast, this paper posits that distinctiveness is a requirement of a special right only to a minimal extent and robustness, as commonly understood, not at all. On the revised criteria offered here, it seems possible that speech may after all be special, though the free speech right we want may be different from the one we can have.
{"title":"Free Speech as a Special Right","authors":"Leslie Kendrick","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12087","url":null,"abstract":"Many theorists treat free speech as a special right. Other theorists argue that, in order for free speech to be important, it must be a special right, but they conclude that it is not. What the term “special right” means in these contexts, however, remains elusive. The term usually suggests that the right in question is distinguishable from the usual governmental decision making processes and from other rights. But just how distinctive the right must be, and in what ways, is rarely defined clearly. Indeed, many discussions of free speech assume quite demanding criteria for a special right of freedom of speech, even as these criteria remain incompletely articulated. \u0000This paper seeks to define the criteria for a special right. It argues that the idea of a special right actually conceals two separate requirements. First, a special right must be distinct, in that the activities covered by the right must be analytically distinguishable from the activities outside of it. Second, a special right must be robust in the protection it affords. Most theories demand that a free speech right be highly distinctive, if not singular, and that it receive highly robust protection. By contrast, this paper posits that distinctiveness is a requirement of a special right only to a minimal extent and robustness, as commonly understood, not at all. On the revised criteria offered here, it seems possible that speech may after all be special, though the free speech right we want may be different from the one we can have.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12087","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44893995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Acting in Combination","authors":"R. Goodin","doi":"10.1111/papa.12090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12090","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12090","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46359847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. After we all die, human history ends, since there would be no future people. Would that be bad? Would we have acted wrongly? Some pessimists would answer No. These people are saddened by the suffering in most people’s lives, and they believe it would be wrong to inflict such suffering on others by having children. In earlier centuries, this bleak view was fairly plausible. But our successors would be able to prevent most human suffering. Some optimists would also answer No. These people believe that most people’s lives are worth living. But they accept two Strong Narrow Person-Affecting Principles. On the Narrow Telic Principle:
{"title":"Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles","authors":"D. Parfit","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12088","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. After we all die, human history ends, since there would be no future people. Would that be bad? Would we have acted wrongly? Some pessimists would answer No. These people are saddened by the suffering in most people’s lives, and they believe it would be wrong to inflict such suffering on others by having children. In earlier centuries, this bleak view was fairly plausible. But our successors would be able to prevent most human suffering. Some optimists would also answer No. These people believe that most people’s lives are worth living. But they accept two Strong Narrow Person-Affecting Principles. On the Narrow Telic Principle:","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12088","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44707311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ethics of giving has traditionally focused on whether, and how much, to give to charities helping people in extreme poverty. In more recent years, the discussion has increasingly focused on where to give, spurred by an appreciation of the substantial differences in costeffectiveness between charities. According to a commonly cited example, $40,000 can be used either to help one blind person by training a seeing-eye dog in the United States or to help two thousand blind
{"title":"Whether and Where to Give","authors":"Theron Pummer","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12065","url":null,"abstract":"The ethics of giving has traditionally focused on whether, and how much, to give to charities helping people in extreme poverty. In more recent years, the discussion has increasingly focused on where to give, spurred by an appreciation of the substantial differences in costeffectiveness between charities. According to a commonly cited example, $40,000 can be used either to help one blind person by training a seeing-eye dog in the United States or to help two thousand blind","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12065","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63562897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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