{"title":"Democratic Group Cognition","authors":"Maxime Lepoutre","doi":"10.1111/papa.12157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12157","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12157","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42132229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Vanity Is Dangerous","authors":"Grant J. Rozeboom","doi":"10.1111/papa.12156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12156","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12156","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48205072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pitting People Against Each Other","authors":"Waheed Hussain","doi":"10.1111/papa.12158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12158","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12158","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63563140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to commonsense morality, while we have reason to be concerned about the effects of our actions on anyone’s welfare, we also have reason to be partial towards the welfare of people to whom we have certain special relationships. I have, for example, more reason to make sure that my own child gets into a good school than that my neighbor’s child does. In this paper, I want to examine a kind of decision where the identity of people to whom we bear the special relationship depends on our action – in particular, the identity of our future children.
{"title":"Partiality, Identity, and Procreation","authors":"Abelard Podgorski","doi":"10.1111/papa.12182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12182","url":null,"abstract":"According to commonsense morality, while we have reason to be concerned about the effects of our actions on anyone’s welfare, we also have reason to be partial towards the welfare of people to whom we have certain special relationships. I have, for example, more reason to make sure that my own child gets into a good school than that my neighbor’s child does. In this paper, I want to examine a kind of decision where the identity of people to whom we bear the special relationship depends on our action – in particular, the identity of our future children.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12182","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63563220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Freedom and Trust: A Rejoinder to Lovett and Pettit","authors":"T. Simpson","doi":"10.1111/papa.12154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12154","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12154","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47213918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.
{"title":"The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof","authors":"Georgi Gardiner","doi":"10.1111/papa.12149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12149","url":null,"abstract":"According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12149","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41750247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: Disagreement persists about when, if at all, disenfranchisement is a fitting response to criminal wrongdoing of type X. Positive retributivists endorse a permissive view of fittingness: on this view, disenfranchising a remarkably wide range of morally serious criminal wrongdoers is justified. But defining fittingness in the context of criminal disenfranchisement in such broad terms is implausible, since many crimes sanctioned via disenfranchisement have little to do with democratic participation in the first place: the link between the nature of a criminal act X (the ‘desert basis’) and a fitting sanction Y is insufficiently direct in such cases. I define a new, much narrower account of the kind of criminal wrongdoing which is a more plausible desert basis for disenfranchisement: ‘political wrongdoing’, such as electioneering, corruption, or conspiracy with foreign powers . I conclude that widespread blanket and post-incarceration disenfranchisement policies are overinclusive , because they disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but non-political, criminal wrongdoing. While such overinclusiveness is objectionable in any context, it is particularly objectionable in circumstances in which it has additional large-scale collateral consequences, for instance by perpetuating existing structures of racial injustice. At the same time, current policies are underinclusive , thus hindering the aim of holding political wrongdoers accountable. Philosophy & Public Affairs (Early View, 2019). This is the accepted version. Please cite the published version (https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12153).
{"title":"Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Concept of Political Wrongdoing","authors":"A. Zimmermann","doi":"10.1111/papa.12153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12153","url":null,"abstract":": Disagreement persists about when, if at all, disenfranchisement is a fitting response to criminal wrongdoing of type X. Positive retributivists endorse a permissive view of fittingness: on this view, disenfranchising a remarkably wide range of morally serious criminal wrongdoers is justified. But defining fittingness in the context of criminal disenfranchisement in such broad terms is implausible, since many crimes sanctioned via disenfranchisement have little to do with democratic participation in the first place: the link between the nature of a criminal act X (the ‘desert basis’) and a fitting sanction Y is insufficiently direct in such cases. I define a new, much narrower account of the kind of criminal wrongdoing which is a more plausible desert basis for disenfranchisement: ‘political wrongdoing’, such as electioneering, corruption, or conspiracy with foreign powers . I conclude that widespread blanket and post-incarceration disenfranchisement policies are overinclusive , because they disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but non-political, criminal wrongdoing. While such overinclusiveness is objectionable in any context, it is particularly objectionable in circumstances in which it has additional large-scale collateral consequences, for instance by perpetuating existing structures of racial injustice. At the same time, current policies are underinclusive , thus hindering the aim of holding political wrongdoers accountable. Philosophy & Public Affairs (Early View, 2019). This is the accepted version. Please cite the published version (https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12153).","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12153","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48209087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human Rights and Inequality","authors":"Jiewuh Song","doi":"10.1111/papa.12152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12152","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12152","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46912713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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