{"title":"Perfectionism: Political not Metaphysical","authors":"Collis Tahzib","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12143","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12143","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45521256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Power of Excuses","authors":"P. Sliwa","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12139","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":"47 1","pages":"37-71"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12139","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48136790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against the Political Use of Religious Exemptions","authors":"Brian Hutler","doi":"10.1111/papa.12150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12150","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12150","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46081561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dangerous Speech","authors":"J. Howard","doi":"10.1111/papa.12145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12145","url":null,"abstract":"Jeffrey W. Howard","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12145","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46310219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be taken as consentcommunicating.
{"title":"Moral Risk and Communicating Consent","authors":"Renée Jorgensen Bolinger","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12144","url":null,"abstract":"In addition to protecting agents’ autonomy, consent plays a crucial social role: it enables agents to secure partners in valuable interactions that would be prohibitively morally risk otherwise. To do this, consent must be observable: agents must be able to track the facts about whether they have received a consent-based permission. I argue that this morally justifies a consent-practice on which communicating that one consents is sufficient for consent, but also generates robust constraints on what sorts of behaviors can be taken as consentcommunicating.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12144","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46210788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For conversations or written comments concerning this paper, thanks to Paul Billingham, Mark Budolfson, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Luara Ferracioli, Sarah Hannan, Ben Miller, Blain Neufeld, Lachlan Umbers, Han van Wietmarschen, Chad Van Schoelandt, two anonymous editors at Philosophy and Public Affairs, and the students in Neufeld’s "Justice as Fairness: Justification and Application" seminar at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 1. This principle is broadly Rawlsian, characterized by its demand that citizens premise their political decisions on considerations that are deliberative common ground among their reasonable co-citizens (even if the conclusions reached by reasoning from these premises are sometimes controversial). I use “political liberals” to refer to theorists who understand the principle in this general way. Classic statements of political liberalism include Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, (1997): 765–807. For more recent systematic interpretation and defense, see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Other theorists of public reason have endorsed competing understandings of mutual justifiability, often ones demanding that political conclusions be ones we could expect reasonable citizens to converge in accepting, regardless of whether these conclusions are supported by considerations drawn from reasonable citizens’ deliberative common ground. See, for instance, Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014). My focus here is on offering a defense of political liberalism, so I don’t discuss these alternative views here. Subsequent talk of “public reason” should be interpreted as referring only to politically liberal understandings of the principle.
关于本文的对话或书面评论，感谢Paul Billingham, Mark Budolfson, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Luara Ferracioli, Sarah Hannan, Ben Miller, Blain Neufeld, Lachlan Umbers, Han van Wietmarschen, Chad van Schoelandt，哲学和公共事务的两位匿名编辑，以及Neufeld在威斯康星大学密尔沃基分校举办的“正义作为公平:辩护和应用”研讨会的学生。1. 这一原则大体上是罗尔斯式的，其特点是它要求公民将他们的政治决策建立在他们理性的共同公民之间协商一致的考虑基础之上(即使从这些前提推理得出的结论有时是有争议的)。我用“政治自由主义者”来指代以这种一般方式理解这一原则的理论家。关于政治自由主义的经典论述包括查尔斯·拉莫尔，《现代性的道德》(剑桥大学出版社，1996年);约翰·罗尔斯，《政治自由主义》(纽约:哥伦比亚大学出版社，1996);约翰·罗尔斯:《重新审视公共理性的概念》，《芝加哥大学法律评论》，1997年第64期，第765-807页。有关最近的系统解释和辩护，请参阅Jonathan Quong的《没有完美的自由主义》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2011)和Paul Weithman的《为什么是政治自由主义?》(牛津:牛津大学出版社，2011)。其他公共理性的理论家支持对相互正当性的相互矛盾的理解，通常要求政治结论是我们可以期望理性公民一致接受的结论，不管这些结论是否得到理性公民审议共同基础的考虑的支持。例如，参见杰拉尔德·高斯的《公共理性的秩序:一个多样化和有限世界中的自由和道德理论》(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社，2011);哈贝马斯:《在事实与规范之间:对法律与民主话语理论的贡献》，英译。W. Rehg(剑桥:麻省理工学院出版社，1996);《自由政治与公共信仰:超越分离》(纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2014)。我在这里的重点是为政治自由主义辩护，所以我不在这里讨论这些不同的观点。随后关于“公共理性”的讨论应被解释为仅指政治上自由主义对该原则的理解。
{"title":"Civic Friendship, Public Reason","authors":"R. Leland","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12141","url":null,"abstract":"For conversations or written comments concerning this paper, thanks to Paul Billingham, Mark Budolfson, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Luara Ferracioli, Sarah Hannan, Ben Miller, Blain Neufeld, Lachlan Umbers, Han van Wietmarschen, Chad Van Schoelandt, two anonymous editors at Philosophy and Public Affairs, and the students in Neufeld’s \"Justice as Fairness: Justification and Application\" seminar at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 1. This principle is broadly Rawlsian, characterized by its demand that citizens premise their political decisions on considerations that are deliberative common ground among their reasonable co-citizens (even if the conclusions reached by reasoning from these premises are sometimes controversial). I use “political liberals” to refer to theorists who understand the principle in this general way. Classic statements of political liberalism include Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, (1997): 765–807. For more recent systematic interpretation and defense, see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Other theorists of public reason have endorsed competing understandings of mutual justifiability, often ones demanding that political conclusions be ones we could expect reasonable citizens to converge in accepting, regardless of whether these conclusions are supported by considerations drawn from reasonable citizens’ deliberative common ground. See, for instance, Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014). My focus here is on offering a defense of political liberalism, so I don’t discuss these alternative views here. Subsequent talk of “public reason” should be interpreted as referring only to politically liberal understandings of the principle.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12141","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63563129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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