{"title":"Why You Should Vote to Change the Outcome","authors":"Zach Barnett","doi":"10.1111/PAPA.12177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PAPA.12177","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":"48 1","pages":"422-446"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PAPA.12177","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48559930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Policy Experiments and the Ethics of Randomization","authors":"D. Mackay","doi":"10.1111/papa.12174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12174","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":"48 1","pages":"319-352"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12174","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48045475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At the age of eighteen, Darin Strauss hit and killed a classmate whose bicycle had swerved, across two lanes of traffic, in front of his car. The police determined that he was not at fault for the accident: after all, he had been driving at a safe speed, and likely couldn’t have stopped in time to avoid hitting her. But the accident wracked him with guilt for decades. It wasn’t that Strauss blamed himself for his classmate’s death. Rather, his guilt was directed toward a “plain, plump truth”: “because I’d driven a certain road, someone who had been alive was dead. I had killed someone.”1 Strauss’s case isn’t exceptional. We often feel guilt about outcomes without taking ourselves to have been at fault for them. We can feel guilt about harm that befalls a friend as the result of bad advice we gave her, even if we had every reason beforehand to think that the advice was good; about an illness that we passed to a family member, even if we took the necessary precautions against passing it; or about the sacrifices that our parents made on our behalf when we were young children, even if we did not ask those sacrifices of them. In all of these cases, we feel guilt about the causal role that we had in a harm to others or in their suffering, even if we were in no way at fault for those things.
{"title":"Guilt Without Perceived Wrongdoing","authors":"Michael Zhao","doi":"10.1111/papa.12171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12171","url":null,"abstract":"At the age of eighteen, Darin Strauss hit and killed a classmate whose bicycle had swerved, across two lanes of traffic, in front of his car. The police determined that he was not at fault for the accident: after all, he had been driving at a safe speed, and likely couldn’t have stopped in time to avoid hitting her. But the accident wracked him with guilt for decades. It wasn’t that Strauss blamed himself for his classmate’s death. Rather, his guilt was directed toward a “plain, plump truth”: “because I’d driven a certain road, someone who had been alive was dead. I had killed someone.”1 Strauss’s case isn’t exceptional. We often feel guilt about outcomes without taking ourselves to have been at fault for them. We can feel guilt about harm that befalls a friend as the result of bad advice we gave her, even if we had every reason beforehand to think that the advice was good; about an illness that we passed to a family member, even if we took the necessary precautions against passing it; or about the sacrifices that our parents made on our behalf when we were young children, even if we did not ask those sacrifices of them. In all of these cases, we feel guilt about the causal role that we had in a harm to others or in their suffering, even if we were in no way at fault for those things.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12171","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47134458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Repugnance and Perfection","authors":"N. Venkatesh","doi":"10.1111/papa.12165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12165","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":"48 1","pages":"262-284"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12165","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47727688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on. Little attention has been paid to the central issue of this article: the allocation and distribution of responsibility itself. How can responsibility be allocated or distributed? The social structures of a society, and the choices that individuals make within them, make a difference to who will be responsible for what and how responsible they will be. A person’s responsibility for wrongful actions, imprudent actions, prudent actions, good actions, supererogatory actions, and so on, is itself influenced by social structures and choices. Given their impact on what people will be responsible for, how should these social structures be developed, and choices be made? The allocation and distribution of responsibility can be fair or unfair: responsibility for conduct itself, I argue, makes decisions just or unjust, and that affects the just distribution of other things, such as welfaregenerating resources. Furthermore, the potential injustice of inequalities in responsibility can be counterbalanced by reverse inequalities in welfaregenerating resources. This second idea has radical implications for the
{"title":"Distributing Responsibility","authors":"Victor Tadros","doi":"10.1111/papa.12163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12163","url":null,"abstract":"A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on. Little attention has been paid to the central issue of this article: the allocation and distribution of responsibility itself. How can responsibility be allocated or distributed? The social structures of a society, and the choices that individuals make within them, make a difference to who will be responsible for what and how responsible they will be. A person’s responsibility for wrongful actions, imprudent actions, prudent actions, good actions, supererogatory actions, and so on, is itself influenced by social structures and choices. Given their impact on what people will be responsible for, how should these social structures be developed, and choices be made? The allocation and distribution of responsibility can be fair or unfair: responsibility for conduct itself, I argue, makes decisions just or unjust, and that affects the just distribution of other things, such as welfaregenerating resources. Furthermore, the potential injustice of inequalities in responsibility can be counterbalanced by reverse inequalities in welfaregenerating resources. This second idea has radical implications for the","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papa.12163","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46776523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International tax law determines which states may tax what. Despite its significance, its normative foundations are poorly understood—cursorily treated by tax experts, and almost entirely neglected by philosophers. In this essay, I criticize a common way of thinking about justice in international taxation, and I propose an alternative. My critical target is a claim I call the Capture Principle. Common ground among many government officials, leading tax scholars, and several of the few philosophers who have thought about international taxation, the Capture Principle asserts that each state should have rights to tax income generated from economic activities within its territory. The Capture Principle appears to embody an ideal of reciprocity. I argue that this appearance is illusory. I examine three arguments that connect those two ideas, and I argue that each fails on its own terms. Even if we ought not to free-ride off others, ought to pay compensation for the burdens we place on others’ public sectors, ought to reward people for the surplus value that they create—the Capture Principle does not follow. This critical work reveals an interesting new research agenda for thinking about justice in international taxation.
{"title":"Illusions of Justice in International Taxation","authors":"Adam Kern","doi":"10.1111/papa.12161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12161","url":null,"abstract":"International tax law determines which states may tax what. Despite its significance, its normative foundations are poorly understood—cursorily treated by tax experts, and almost entirely neglected by philosophers. In this essay, I criticize a common way of thinking about justice in international taxation, and I propose an alternative. My critical target is a claim I call the Capture Principle. Common ground among many government officials, leading tax scholars, and several of the few philosophers who have thought about international taxation, the Capture Principle asserts that each state should have rights to tax income generated from economic activities within its territory. The Capture Principle appears to embody an ideal of reciprocity. I argue that this appearance is illusory. I examine three arguments that connect those two ideas, and I argue that each fails on its own terms. Even if we ought not to free-ride off others, ought to pay compensation for the burdens we place on others’ public sectors, ought to reward people for the surplus value that they create—the Capture Principle does not follow. This critical work reveals an interesting new research agenda for thinking about justice in international taxation.","PeriodicalId":47999,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Public Affairs","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138528863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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