Pub Date : 2022-05-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500003570
J. Roozenbeek, R. Maertens, Stefan M. Herzog, Michael Geers, R. Kurvers, Mubashir Sultan, S. van der Linden
Misinformation presents a significant societal problem. To measure individuals’ susceptibility to misinformation and study its predictors, researchers have used a broad variety of ad-hoc item sets, scales, question framings, and response modes. Because of this variety, it remains unknown whether results from different studies can be compared (e.g., in meta-analyses). In this preregistered study (US sample; N = 2,622), we compare five commonly used question framings (eliciting perceived headline accuracy, manipulativeness, reliability, trustworthiness, and whether a headline is real or fake) and three response modes (binary, 6-point and 7-point scales), using the psychometrically validated Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). We test 1) whether different question framings and response modes yield similar responses for the same item set, 2) whether people’s confidence in their primary judgments is affected by question framings and response modes, and 3) which key psychological factors (myside bias, political partisanship, cognitive reflection, and numeracy skills) best predict misinformation susceptibility across assessment methods. Different response modes and question framings yield similar (but not identical) responses for both primary ratings and confidence judgments. We also find a similar nomological net across conditions, suggesting cross-study comparability. Finally, myside bias and political conservatism were strongly positively correlated with misinformation susceptibility, whereas numeracy skills and especially cognitive reflection were less important (although we note potential ceiling effects for numeracy). We thus find more support for an “integrative” account than a “classical reasoning” account of misinformation belief.
{"title":"Susceptibility to misinformation is consistent across question framings and response modes and better explained by myside bias and partisanship than analytical thinking","authors":"J. Roozenbeek, R. Maertens, Stefan M. Herzog, Michael Geers, R. Kurvers, Mubashir Sultan, S. van der Linden","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500003570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500003570","url":null,"abstract":"Misinformation presents a significant societal problem. To measure individuals’ susceptibility to misinformation and study its predictors, researchers have used a broad variety of ad-hoc item sets, scales, question framings, and response modes. Because of this variety, it remains unknown whether results from different studies can be compared (e.g., in meta-analyses). In this preregistered study (US sample; N = 2,622), we compare five commonly used question framings (eliciting perceived headline accuracy, manipulativeness, reliability, trustworthiness, and whether a headline is real or fake) and three response modes (binary, 6-point and 7-point scales), using the psychometrically validated Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). We test 1) whether different question framings and response modes yield similar responses for the same item set, 2) whether people’s confidence in their primary judgments is affected by question framings and response modes, and 3) which key psychological factors (myside bias, political partisanship, cognitive reflection, and numeracy skills) best predict misinformation susceptibility across assessment methods. Different response modes and question framings yield similar (but not identical) responses for both primary ratings and confidence judgments. We also find a similar nomological net across conditions, suggesting cross-study comparability. Finally, myside bias and political conservatism were strongly positively correlated with misinformation susceptibility, whereas numeracy skills and especially cognitive reflection were less important (although we note potential ceiling effects for numeracy). We thus find more support for an “integrative” account than a “classical reasoning” account of misinformation belief.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45322188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500003582
Minfan Zhu, J. Wang, Xiaofei Xie
The maximizing decision-making style describes the style of one who pursues maximum utility in decision-making, in contrast to the satisficing style, which describes the style of one who is satisfied with good enough options. The current research concentrates on the within-person variation in the maximizing decision-making style and provides an explanation through three studies. Study 1 (N = 530) developed a domain-specific maximizing scale and found that individuals had different maximizing tendencies across different domains. Studies 2 (N = 162) and 3 (N = 106) further explored this mechanism from the perspective of subjective task value through questionnaires and experiments. It was found that the within-person variation of maximization in different domains is driven by the difference in the individuals’ subjective task value in the corresponding domains. People tend to maximize more in the domains they value more. Our research contributes to a comprehensive understanding of maximization and provides a new perspective for the study of the maximizing decision-making style.
{"title":"Maximize when valuable: The domain specificity of maximizing decision-making style","authors":"Minfan Zhu, J. Wang, Xiaofei Xie","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500003582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500003582","url":null,"abstract":"The maximizing decision-making style describes the style of one who pursues maximum utility in decision-making, in contrast to the satisficing style, which describes the style of one who is satisfied with good enough options. The current research concentrates on the within-person variation in the maximizing decision-making style and provides an explanation through three studies. Study 1 (N = 530) developed a domain-specific maximizing scale and found that individuals had different maximizing tendencies across different domains. Studies 2 (N = 162) and 3 (N = 106) further explored this mechanism from the perspective of subjective task value through questionnaires and experiments. It was found that the within-person variation of maximization in different domains is driven by the difference in the individuals’ subjective task value in the corresponding domains. People tend to maximize more in the domains they value more. Our research contributes to a comprehensive understanding of maximization and provides a new perspective for the study of the maximizing decision-making style.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43840214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500003594
Gregory Gadzinski, Alessio Castello
Granting a short-term loan is a critical decision. A great deal of research has concerned the prediction of credit default, notably through Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. However, given that their black-box nature has sometimes led to unwanted outcomes, comprehensibility in ML guided decision-making strategies has become more important. In many domains, transparency and accountability are no longer optional. In this article, instead of opposing white-box against black-box models, we use a multi-step procedure that combines the Fast and Frugal Tree (FFT) methodology of Martignon et al. (2005) and Phillips et al. (2017) with the extraction of post-hoc explainable information from ensemble ML models. New interpretable models are then built thanks to the inclusion of explainable ML outputs chosen by human intervention. Our methodology improves significantly the accuracy of the FFT predictions while preserving their explainable nature. We apply our approach to a dataset of short-term loans granted to borrowers in the UK, and show how complex machine learning can challenge simpler machines and help decision makers.
{"title":"Combining white box models, black box machines and human interventions for interpretable decision strategies","authors":"Gregory Gadzinski, Alessio Castello","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500003594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500003594","url":null,"abstract":"Granting a short-term loan is a critical decision. A great deal of research has concerned the prediction of credit default, notably through Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. However, given that their black-box nature has sometimes led to unwanted outcomes, comprehensibility in ML guided decision-making strategies has become more important. In many domains, transparency and accountability are no longer optional. In this article, instead of opposing white-box against black-box models, we use a multi-step procedure that combines the Fast and Frugal Tree (FFT) methodology of Martignon et al. (2005) and Phillips et al. (2017) with the extraction of post-hoc explainable information from ensemble ML models. New interpretable models are then built thanks to the inclusion of explainable ML outputs chosen by human intervention. Our methodology improves significantly the accuracy of the FFT predictions while preserving their explainable nature. We apply our approach to a dataset of short-term loans granted to borrowers in the UK, and show how complex machine learning can challenge simpler machines and help decision makers.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47119658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009104
Erin L. Krupka, Roberto A. Weber, Rachel T. A. Crosno, H. Hoover
Previous research in economics, social psychology, and sociology has produced compelling evidence that social norms influence behavior. In this paper we apply the Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation procedure and present U.S. and non-U.S. born subjects with two scenarios for which tipping and punctuality norms are known to vary across countries. We elicit shared beliefs by having subjects match appropriateness ratings of different actions (such as arriving late or on time) to another randomly selected participant from the same university or to a participant who is born in the same country. We also elicit personal beliefs without the matching task. We test whether the responses from the coordination task can be interpreted as social norms by comparing responses from the coordination game with actual social norms (as identified using independent materials such as tipping guides for travelers). We compare responses elicited with the matching tasks to those elicited without the matching task to test whether the coordination device itself is essential for identifying social norms. We find that appropriateness ratings for different actions vary with the reference group in the matching task. Further, the ratings obtained from the matching task vary in a manner consistent with the actual social norms of that reference group. Thus, we find that shared beliefs correspond more closely to externally validated social norms compared to personal beliefs. Second, we highlight the importance that reference groups (for the coordination task) can play.
{"title":"“When in Rome”: Identifying social norms using coordination games","authors":"Erin L. Krupka, Roberto A. Weber, Rachel T. A. Crosno, H. Hoover","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009104","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Previous research in economics, social psychology, and sociology has\u0000 produced compelling evidence that social norms influence behavior. In this\u0000 paper we apply the Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation procedure and\u0000 present U.S. and non-U.S. born subjects with two scenarios for which tipping\u0000 and punctuality norms are known to vary across countries. We elicit shared\u0000 beliefs by having subjects match appropriateness ratings of different\u0000 actions (such as arriving late or on time) to another randomly selected\u0000 participant from the same university or to a participant who is born in the\u0000 same country. We also elicit personal beliefs without the matching task. We\u0000 test whether the responses from the coordination task can be interpreted as\u0000 social norms by comparing responses from the coordination game with actual\u0000 social norms (as identified using independent materials such as tipping\u0000 guides for travelers). We compare responses elicited with the matching tasks\u0000 to those elicited without the matching task to test whether the coordination\u0000 device itself is essential for identifying social norms. We find that\u0000 appropriateness ratings for different actions vary with the reference group\u0000 in the matching task. Further, the ratings obtained from the matching task\u0000 vary in a manner consistent with the actual social norms of that reference\u0000 group. Thus, we find that shared beliefs correspond more closely to\u0000 externally validated social norms compared to personal beliefs. Second, we\u0000 highlight the importance that reference groups (for the coordination task)\u0000 can play.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42559752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009165
Tobias Vogel, Moritz Ingendahl, Linda McCaughey
Humans are evidently able to learn contingencies from the co-occurrence of cues and outcomes. But how do humans judge contingencies when observations of cue and outcome are learned on different occasions? The pseudocontingency framework proposes that humans rely on base-rate correlations across contexts, that is, whether outcome base rates increase or decrease with cue base rates. Here, we elaborate on an alternative mechanism for pseudocontingencies that exploits base rate information within contexts. In two experiments, cue and outcome base rates varied across four contexts, but the correlation by base rates was kept constant at zero. In some contexts, cue and outcome base rates were aligned (e.g., cue and outcome base rates were both high). In other contexts, cue and outcome base rates were misaligned (e.g., cue base rate was high, but outcome base rate was low). Judged contingencies were more positive for contexts in which cue and outcome base rates were aligned than in contexts in which cue and outcome base rates were misaligned. Our findings indicate that people use the alignment of base rates to infer contingencies conditional on the context. As such, they lend support to the pseudocontingency framework, which predicts that decision makers rely on base rates to approximate contingencies. However, they challenge previous conceptions of pseudocontingencies as a uniform inference from correlated base rates. Instead, they suggest that people possess a repertoire of multiple contingency inferences that differ with regard to informational requirements and areas of applicability.
{"title":"Pseudocontingencies: Flexible contingency inferences from base\u0000 rates","authors":"Tobias Vogel, Moritz Ingendahl, Linda McCaughey","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009165","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Humans are evidently able to learn contingencies from the co-occurrence\u0000 of cues and outcomes. But how do humans judge contingencies when\u0000 observations of cue and outcome are learned on different occasions? The\u0000 pseudocontingency framework proposes that humans rely on base-rate\u0000 correlations across contexts, that is, whether outcome base rates increase\u0000 or decrease with cue base rates. Here, we elaborate on an alternative\u0000 mechanism for pseudocontingencies that exploits base rate information within\u0000 contexts. In two experiments, cue and outcome base rates varied across four\u0000 contexts, but the correlation by base rates was kept constant at zero. In\u0000 some contexts, cue and outcome base rates were aligned (e.g., cue and\u0000 outcome base rates were both high). In other contexts, cue and outcome base\u0000 rates were misaligned (e.g., cue base rate was high, but outcome base rate\u0000 was low). Judged contingencies were more positive for contexts in which cue\u0000 and outcome base rates were aligned than in contexts in which cue and\u0000 outcome base rates were misaligned. Our findings indicate that people use\u0000 the alignment of base rates to infer contingencies conditional on the\u0000 context. As such, they lend support to the pseudocontingency framework,\u0000 which predicts that decision makers rely on base rates to approximate\u0000 contingencies. However, they challenge previous conceptions of\u0000 pseudocontingencies as a uniform inference from correlated base rates.\u0000 Instead, they suggest that people possess a repertoire of multiple\u0000 contingency inferences that differ with regard to informational requirements\u0000 and areas of applicability.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47212608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009128
Glen William Spiteri
When evaluating a charity by itself, people tend to overweight overhead costs in relation to cost-effectiveness. However, when evaluating charities side by side, they base their donations on cost-effectiveness. I conducted a replication and extension of Caviola et al. (2014; Study 1) using a 3 (High Overhead/Effectiveness, Low Overhead/Effectiveness, Both) x 2 (Humans, Animals) between-subjects design. I found that the overhead ratio is an easier attribute to evaluate than cost-effectiveness in separate evaluation, and, in joint evaluation, people allocate donations based on cost-effectiveness. This effect was observed for human charities, and to a lesser extent, for animal charities.
{"title":"Does the evaluability bias hold when giving to animal charities?","authors":"Glen William Spiteri","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009128","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When evaluating a charity by itself, people tend to overweight overhead\u0000 costs in relation to cost-effectiveness. However, when evaluating charities\u0000 side by side, they base their donations on cost-effectiveness. I conducted a\u0000 replication and extension of Caviola et al. (2014; Study 1) using a 3 (High\u0000 Overhead/Effectiveness, Low Overhead/Effectiveness, Both) x 2 (Humans,\u0000 Animals) between-subjects design. I found that the overhead ratio is an\u0000 easier attribute to evaluate than cost-effectiveness in separate evaluation,\u0000 and, in joint evaluation, people allocate donations based on\u0000 cost-effectiveness. This effect was observed for human charities, and to a\u0000 lesser extent, for animal charities.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49140032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s193029750000913x
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Kiikeri
Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to explain the processing of everyday arguments.
{"title":"Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and\u0000 analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies","authors":"Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Kiikeri","doi":"10.1017/s193029750000913x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s193029750000913x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are\u0000 psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies\u0000 are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are\u0000 irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies\u0000 is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational\u0000 thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In\u0000 an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and\u0000 reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either\u0000 intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational\u0000 deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories\u0000 (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to\u0000 think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make\u0000 them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were\u0000 drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more\u0000 straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts\u0000 of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective\u0000 default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to\u0000 whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to\u0000 explain the processing of everyday arguments.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44440474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009153
P. C. Price, Grace A. Carlock, Sarah Crouse, Mariana Vargas Arciga
In two experiments, participants decided on each of several trials whether or not to take a risk. If they chose to take the risk, they had a relatively high probability (from 75% to 95%) of winning a small number of points and a relatively low probability (5% to 25%) of losing a large number of points. The loss amounts varied so that the expected value of taking the risk was positive on some trials, zero on others, and negative on the rest. The main independent variable was whether the probability of losing was communicated using numerical percentages or icon arrays. Both experiments included random icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were randomly distributed throughout the array. Experiment 2 also included grouped icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were grouped at the bottom of the array. Neither type of icon array led to better performance in the task. However, the random icon arrays led to less risk taking than the numerical percentages or the grouped icon arrays, especially at the higher loss probabilities. In a third experiment, participants made direct judgments of the percentages and probabilities represented by the icon arrays from Experiment 2. The results supported the idea that random arrays lead to less risk taking because they are perceived to represent greater loss probabilities. These results have several implications for the study of icon arrays and their use in risk communication.
{"title":"Effects of icon arrays to communicate risk in a repeated risky\u0000 decision-making task","authors":"P. C. Price, Grace A. Carlock, Sarah Crouse, Mariana Vargas Arciga","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009153","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In two experiments, participants decided on each of several trials\u0000 whether or not to take a risk. If they chose to take the risk, they had a\u0000 relatively high probability (from 75% to 95%) of winning a small number of\u0000 points and a relatively low probability (5% to 25%) of losing a large number\u0000 of points. The loss amounts varied so that the expected value of taking the\u0000 risk was positive on some trials, zero on others, and negative on the rest.\u0000 The main independent variable was whether the probability of losing was\u0000 communicated using numerical percentages or icon arrays. Both experiments\u0000 included random icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were\u0000 randomly distributed throughout the array. Experiment 2 also included\u0000 grouped icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were grouped at\u0000 the bottom of the array. Neither type of icon array led to better\u0000 performance in the task. However, the random icon arrays led to less risk\u0000 taking than the numerical percentages or the grouped icon arrays, especially\u0000 at the higher loss probabilities. In a third experiment, participants made\u0000 direct judgments of the percentages and probabilities represented by the\u0000 icon arrays from Experiment 2. The results supported the idea that random\u0000 arrays lead to less risk taking because they are perceived to represent\u0000 greater loss probabilities. These results have several implications for the\u0000 study of icon arrays and their use in risk communication.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49216221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009098
Kwanho Suk, Jieun Koo
This research explores the preference for playing order in games in which each of several players draws a random event (e.g., a ball from an urn), with and without replacement after each draw. Three studies show that people tend to prefer to draw early regardless of whether the game is with or without replacement, although the expected probability of winning is the same irrespective of the draw order. The reasons for preferring earlier draws differ depending on the game type. For games without replacement, the biased preference for earlier draws is related to multiple motivational factors such as aversion to uncertainty, ambiguity, and uncontrollability. Game valence also affects draw order preference through the misestimation of winning probabilities: people tend to prefer earlier draws in a gain-dominant game (i.e., a higher probability of winning) but prefer later draws in a loss-dominant game (i.e., a higher probability of losing). For games with replacement, preference for earlier draws is mainly explained by uncertainty aversion, with little bias in probability estimations.
{"title":"Preference for playing order in games with and without replacement:\u0000 Motivational biases and probability misestimations","authors":"Kwanho Suk, Jieun Koo","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009098","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This research explores the preference for playing order in games in\u0000 which each of several players draws a random event (e.g., a ball from an\u0000 urn), with and without replacement after each draw. Three studies show that\u0000 people tend to prefer to draw early regardless of whether the game is with\u0000 or without replacement, although the expected probability of winning is the\u0000 same irrespective of the draw order. The reasons for preferring earlier\u0000 draws differ depending on the game type. For games without replacement, the\u0000 biased preference for earlier draws is related to multiple motivational\u0000 factors such as aversion to uncertainty, ambiguity, and uncontrollability.\u0000 Game valence also affects draw order preference through the misestimation of\u0000 winning probabilities: people tend to prefer earlier draws in a\u0000 gain-dominant game (i.e., a higher probability of winning) but prefer later\u0000 draws in a loss-dominant game (i.e., a higher probability of losing). For\u0000 games with replacement, preference for earlier draws is mainly explained by\u0000 uncertainty aversion, with little bias in probability estimations.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48788615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500009116
James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold
Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity, measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies, those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to predict their strategy.
{"title":"Testing team reasoning: Group identification is related to coordination\u0000 in pure coordination games","authors":"James Matthew Thom, U. Afzal, Natalie Gold","doi":"10.1017/s1930297500009116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500009116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Games of pure mutual interest require players to coordinate their\u0000 choices without being able to communicate. One way to achieve this is\u0000 through team-reasoning, asking ‘what should we choose’, rather than just\u0000 assessing one’s own options from an individual perspective. It has been\u0000 suggested that team-reasoning is more likely when individuals are encouraged\u0000 to think of those they are attempting to coordinate with as members of an\u0000 in-group. In two studies, we examined the effects of group identity,\u0000 measured by the ‘Inclusion of Other in Self’ (IOS) scale, on performance in\u0000 nondescript coordination games, where there are several equilibria but no\u0000 descriptions that a player can use to distinguish any one strategy from the\u0000 others apart from the payoff from coordinating on it. In an online\u0000 experiment, our manipulation of group identity did not have the expected\u0000 effect, but we found a correlation of .18 between IOS and\u0000 team-reasoning-consistent choosing. Similarly, in self-reported strategies,\u0000 those who reported trying to pick an option that stood out (making it easier\u0000 to coordinate on) also reported higher IOS scores than did those who said\u0000 they tended to choose the option with the largest potential payoff. In a\u0000 follow-up study in the lab, participants played either with friends or with\u0000 strangers. Experiment 2 replicated the relationship between IOS and\u0000 team-reasoning in strangers but not in friends. Instead, friends’ behavior\u0000 was related to their expectations of what their partners would do. A\u0000 hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 46.4% of strangers played a team\u0000 reasoning strategy, compared to 20.6% of friends. We suggest that the\u0000 strangers who group identify may have been team reasoning but friends may\u0000 have tried to use their superior knowledge of their partners to try to\u0000 predict their strategy.","PeriodicalId":48045,"journal":{"name":"Judgment and Decision Making","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46164602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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